

Anatomy of the British war against President Clinton in Korea

by Kathy Wolfe

The April 21 breakdown of U.S.-North Korean nuclear peace talks was the latest in a long string of crises orchestrated by London since the beginning of the Clinton administration, to create a war in Korea and torpedo American foreign policy in Asia. Virtually since George Bush lost the November 1992 U.S. election, British Defense Ministry circles around former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, as well as U.S. networks around George Bush, have played a spoiler role in attempts to provoke North Korea into confrontation with Washington.

In fact, there is no need for war, but a clear choice for peaceful reunification in Korea. Since South Korean President Noh Tae-woo's Oct. 4, 1988 "Northern Policy" speech, North and South Korean leaders have offered several reasonable peace plans, notably at the September 1990 Seoul summit of North Korean Premier Yong Hyong-mok and South Korean Premier Kang Young-hoon. Both proposed to create a "commonwealth" between North and South using investment in infrastructure, industry, and agriculture to generate economic growth, before addressing the divisive issue of political systems.

Especially since the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, leaders in Seoul and Pyongyang have rejected Margaret Thatcher's disastrous model for the divided Germany. Thatcher, as she wrote in her memoirs, first tried to stop German reunification, and then destroyed Germany's economy with the International Monetary Fund's shock therapy in eastern Germany and Russia. "We reject the German model of sudden reunification, and we must avoid at all costs the East German-Russian type of shock therapy," a South Korean diplomat told *EIR*.

London disagrees, and seeks a Korean crisis to create a foreign policy disaster for Bill Clinton. Just as Thatcher destroyed Germany to stop its growth as an economic power, Britain also seeks to halt Korean reunification, for fear that a Korean powerhouse, allied with the United States and Japan, could develop China. "We don't want a reunified Korea; we don't need a second Japan over there!" an aide to George Bush's South Korean ambassador, Donald Gregg, told *EIR* on March 13. Thatcher "was right to try to keep Germany divided," he said, because of the economic competition with London.

"Not as a military potential do we want unification, and

not even Korea as a strong economy," Gregg's man said. "We need to *keep North Korea just as it is*. We need an enemy to replace the U.S.S.R. . . .


"We don't want to have a really prosperous unified China, either, in ten years. That would be a big geopolitical threat."

The North Korean affair has been simmering since the Bush administration accused Pyongyang of sequestering plutonium in 1989. Britain's provocations began with a vengeance in 1992, when U.S. Ambassador Gregg accused North Korea of having built the bomb. Unless the London-run International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were permitted immediate inspection of Pyongyang's plutonium reactors, the Bush administration threatened, there would be sanctions and embargoes against the isolated regime, a not-so-subtle hint of the "Iraq treatment."

When North Korea acquiesced, the IAEA, during six inspections from late 1992 to January 1993, made ever more provocative demands, never agreed to by Pyongyang, for "special inspections." These are "police inspections, under which U.N. officials go anywhere, anytime, unannounced," a Washington Korean analyst told *EIR*. "They can go anywhere in your military facilities without warning; they can walk into the President's home. Such a thing has never before been demanded of any sovereign country. By treating North Korea like Iraq, as though it had no rights, the IAEA makes negotiations impossible."

In late 1992, Gen. Robert RisCassi, the Bush administration U.S. forces commander in South Korea, announced that U.S.-South Korean "Team Spirit" war games targeting North Korea would resume. This was done although Ambassador Gregg and Bush negotiator Undersecretary of State Arnold Kanter had promised to halt the games, which Pyongyang sees as a threat, in return for IAEA inspections. According to Lim Dong-wong, Seoul's North Korea policy director, RisCassi never consulted Seoul—and certainly did not consult the incoming Clinton team.

The Team Spirit war games began on March 10, 1993; North Korea on March 12 announced that it would suspend its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if the United States continued to treat it as a hostile power. On



Donald Gregg, Bush administration ambassador to South Korea. His aim is to prevent the emergence of "a second Japan" in a unified Korea.

April 21, RisCassi electrified the world by announcing that North Korea "could explode at any moment" in a nuclear attack on the South. Bush's Ambassador to China and Assistant Secretary of Defense James Lilley told the *Far East Economic Review* that "the hardliners in North Korea are fooling with the military option."

It was the "Kissinger old boys, the unelected career bureaucrats in the Defense and State Department," in place before Clinton's election, who triggered the crisis, Paul Beaver, analyst for *Jane's Defense Weekly*, which speaks for the British Defense Ministry, told *EIR* on May 19, 1993. They acted, he said, under urging from the British, who "are very concerned that North Korea not become another Iraq. They're concerned about what's happening in North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Libya."

When the Clinton administration gained some control over U.S. foreign policy, it cooled the crisis by negotiations with North Korea in June and July 1993. Yet all through the fall of 1993 and spring of 1994, London and its Bush allies persisted in pushing for war. On Nov. 2, 1993, former Bush Pentagon official Frank Gaffney called for the United States to preemptively bomb North Korea. On Dec. 11, 1993, British asset Hans Blix, the IAEA director, arbitrarily declared that North Korea must give the IAEA all special inspections demanded by the end of December or face international sanctions. On Dec. 14, columnist Lally Weymouth published an article quoting Kissinger Associates partner and Bush Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who said, "If you're not prepared to use force, then you're nowhere."

On March 22, 1994, the British defense journal *Jane's Intelligence Review* published a special report announcing

that North Korea had begun production of enough new plutonium to create 10 nuclear warheads per year, and was set to invade the South in a "surprise attack."

Sanity and economic development

Clinton's military and new State Department advisers, however, refused to bite the hook. Spokesmen including Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman John Shalikashvili and Air Force Chief Gen. Merrill McPeak said that in the event of war, the 21-million person city of Seoul, near the Demilitarized Zone, could be devastated, and thousands of U.S. soldiers would be killed.

By April 1994, President Clinton had decided to try for a peace settlement on the Korean peninsula, Korean sources told *EIR*, modeled on the Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization accords. Consulting with Japan, South Korea, and China, which all want America involved in Asian economic development, Clinton decided to help rebuild the North Korean economy. "It's time for a new day in Korea, just as in the Middle East," a Korean Christian leader told *EIR*. "As Clinton brought together the PLO and Israel on the White House lawn, the President is edging toward a Camp David conference with North and South Korea."

The Clinton team had decided to accept Pyongyang's July 1993 request for new light water nuclear plants, to replace its antiquated plutonium program, a Clinton appointee told *EIR* on April 21. "My friends in Greenpeace and the anti-nuclear lobby will howl and say 'Let them eat coal,' but North Korea can't run an economy on coal."

Despite the continuing calls by such as Bush's National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) for a preemptive bombing of North Korea during the summer of 1994, the agreement was solidified when former President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang to meet Kim Il-sung on June 17. After Kim's death in July, his son Kim Jong-il continued the economic program, which was put on paper as the U.S.-North Korean "framework agreement," signed in Geneva on Oct. 21, 1994.

Yet the crisis continues, for Britain and the Bush crowd in Washington oppose the basic premise of the Clinton-Kim Jong-il accords. U.S.-North Korea talks today are ostensibly stalled over U.S. insistence that South Korean-style reactors be the ones built in the North, while Pyongyang fears that the South wants to take over its economy. However, if both sides are serious about the program, a compromise should be worked out.

On the Washington side, however, British assets, led by Donald Gregg, are using the impasse to try to sabotage the Clinton accord from within. At "Beyond the Nuclear Crisis," a conference at the American Enterprise Institute on March 13, Gregg and James Lilley announced that they now support the Clinton accord, but they just want to "improve" it. However, as Lilley told *EIR* later, the Bush crowd has one objective: to make sure that North Korea *never* receives nuclear reactors—or any other help—from the United States.