

# SDI missile defense program no hoax

by Charles B. Stevens

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the former Soviet Union, there has been a major effort to play down or even totally discredit the direct role played by the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) announced by President Reagan on March 23, 1983 in those events. The reality is that even though the SDI was not technically implemented along the lines specified by Lyndon H. LaRouche—which would have utilized the most advanced physical principles—nonetheless it did work to a significant degree. Indeed, never has a distinct, new policy initiative been so successful in the entire history of grand strategy covering both political and military science. The patent success of the SDI most clearly demonstrates the power of ideas in shaping history.

And despite the mounting evidence from the statements of former Soviet leaders and secret Soviet government reports now coming to light, there are those, such as Robert McFarlane, who replaced Judge William Clark as President Reagan's national security adviser in 1983, who have always opposed the SDI policy and what it represents. McFarlane asserted on the CBS TV show "60 Minutes" on Sept. 11, 1994, that the SDI was always a "deception program"; technically, it could have never worked. Yet as more and more of the experimental data from what was done as part of the SDI effort becomes public, we find that the technical evidence was and is that the SDI would work.

In the past year, a major focus of the *New York Times* and other publications in painting the SDI as "pure" deception has been the allegation that the 1984 Homing Overlay Experiments were fraudulently carried out and reported. Now, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has reviewed the technical data and reports concerning these 1984 SDI experiments and issued a report on July 21, which finds all of these allegations to be completely false.

The Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) program predated the SDI by more than five years. It was an outgrowth of the original anti-missile ABM efforts of the 1960s. Therefore, HOE did not formally fit the specifications of the LaRouche SDI policy, which called for directed-energy beam weapon methods of interception, such as lasers and particle beams, instead of utilizing missile interceptors—"shooting a bullet with a bullet."

The HOE program did contain, as one of its chief components, a sensor technology applicable to both ABM missile interceptors and directed-energy weapons operating at the

speed of light. This sensor technology consisted of the development of long wavelength infrared telescopes that could detect missile warheads in space over thousands of miles. The fact that one such sensor could find and discriminate such a target over thousands of miles, and maintain that contact over the many minutes it takes for a missile interceptor to intercept the warhead, and with sufficient accuracy to actually collide with the warhead, means that that sensor, working in conjunction with a directed-energy beam weapon, could destroy thousands of such warheads over the same time-lapse.

When viewed from the standpoint of this broader array of interception techniques, the implications of the successful development of the HOE sensor technology did play an important role in the initial adoption of the SDI policy as announced by President Reagan in March 1983.

The chief author of government reports made public in 1980 concerning the implications of the HOE program for missile defense was Ray Pollock, who in 1980 headed missile defense studies at Los Alamos National Laboratory. In 1981, Dr. Pollock moved to Washington, D.C. when he was appointed as the chief of an interagency nuclear weapons intelligence group. By August 1982, Dr. Pollock was working for Judge Clark in the National Security Council and later played a crucial role in getting the March 23, 1983 SDI policy announcement through the White House.

## The GAO Report

During 1993, allegations were published that the SDI Organization had faked the results of the 1984 HOE missile interception test. According to the GAO report, "Senator David Pryor [D-Ark.] asked GAO to investigate allegations he received in 1993 of deception in HOE 4."

The report states in part: "The Army began a technology demonstration program in the mid-1970s to validate emerging technologies to enable nonnuclear, hit-to-kill intercepts of Soviet ballistic missile warheads in space. This program, which became HOE, concluded with four flight tests in 1983 and 1984. Each test involved launching a target from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and a HOE interceptor from the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Pacific. Only the fourth test resulted in DOD announcements of a successful intercept. . . ."

"GAO found no evidence that DOD deceived Congress about HOE 4 intercepting the target. Records indicate that the contingency deception plan had been in place for the first two tests but did not affect their outcomes. The plan was dropped prior to HOE 3. Analyses of HOE 4 test data are consistent with the Army's conclusion that the interceptor and target collided.

"Records also support the conclusion that the interceptor was guided during its final maneuvers by its onboard infrared sensor. GAO also found that the target was appropriate for this demonstration. . . ."