

England against Europe

A rare glimpse into the systematic British policy of sabotaging continental Europe is provided by French psycho-sociologist Jean-Claude Charra.

The author of this two-part commentary has kindly given permission to EIR to reprint it in full translation. Part I appeared in the Paris daily Libération last Nov. 24, while Part II was printed on March 12 in another newspaper, France-Soir. While the author does not plumb the full depth of all the historical issues at stake, Charra's essays constitute a "call to arms" mobilizing the French people against the ignorance and negligence which are allowing the British sabotage to go forward. Some subheads have been added.

For a long time, history professors have taught their students that the constant policies of Great Britain over the course of centuries consisted of maintaining the "Continental Balance." Under this modest appellation, it really was a question of its making sure that no bloc on the continent could have preponderance and thereby offend it. This action could be translated a lot more clearly with the formula: "Divide the continent to rule it."

After the shocks which have disturbed the world in this 20th century—two world wars and the Soviet threat to destroy the planet—certain people might have thought that this policy is now "old hat." They would be wrong. Great Britain continues, through an effort which has never been interrupted, to attempt to impede all unification of Europe.

The same people perhaps will think that this is an unfounded assertion, or even spiteful. To disabuse them, we are going to review the events chronologically, limiting ourselves to the most striking ones.

The Soviet threat

First of all, when, faced with the Soviet troops that threatened to overrun our continent, Chancellor Adenauer, Prime Minister De Gasperi, Jean Monnet, and Robert Schuman, among others, began to work to construct Europe, England deliberately remained aloof. In the face of the danger coming from the East, it was hard for it to be too openly opposed, and especially since the Americans were very favorable to this project. But it attempted, for its part, to erect a competing bloc, EFTA, with the small nations that were not participating in the Germano-Italo-French undertaking.

Only as the years passed did [England] realize that the European edifice was slowly but surely advancing and that

to remain too long outside of it, it would risk losing its grip on events. Then it asked to enter the Common Market. To participate in its construction? No, of course not: to attempt to slow it down and, if possible, to cause the undertaking to fail. Is this another spiteful assertion? Let us continue simply to examine the facts, always as chronologically as possible.

'I want my money'

From the outset of its entry, it dragged its feet—let us recall Mrs. Thatcher: "I want my money"—when the financial contribution was asked. In itself, this may perhaps not mean much more than the lack of serious negotiations on the part of other Europeans and singularly of France.

More significant is the fact that it refused to participate in joint enterprises, such as the Airbus when it started. Only when it realized that success was well under way, did it ask to take part in building this family of aircraft. But after Britain joined the consortium, British Airways always refused to buy Airbuses, continuing to purchase from the United States.

A similar analysis could be made for the Ariane rocket, in which it only had a token participation, a lot weaker than Belgium's.

Then there is the case of Westland, the British helicopter manufacturer, which was no longer able to assure its future on its own. Everyone remembers that the British defense minister proposed an alliance with the Europeans, but the Supreme Power took drastic action in the direction of the Centuries-Old Policy of that country, and Westland was sold to the Americans. Ever since, Great Britain has purchased its military helicopters from them.

This affair is very indicative of England's standing preference: especially not to reinforce Europe's industry and military, but to undercut it at every opportunity by allying with the competition, the Americans in this case, the Japanese when it comes to cars.

Policy and diplomacy

However, up to this point, we have looked at events only from the industrial angle. Now let us look at, the more generally political and diplomatic level.

Here, we can dissect what one could call a masterpiece: the agricultural negotiations in the GATT [General Agree-



France's Charles de Gaulle (right) and Germany's Konrad Adenauer. Britain's postwar relationship toward continental Europe has been to play the most divisive role possible, especially targeting any Franco-German alliance.

ment on Tariffs and Trade] framework. Let us briefly review the development of the matter.

In the second half of 1992, this problem came up, as if by accident, in the GATT talks. By accident? Evidently not. The Americans, who set the pace and the agenda of the negotiations, knew that Great Britain was chairing the [European] Community at the time and that they could count on its cooperation, especially since it was the British who were negotiating in the name of the Brussels Commission. Hence, an intense "forcing" [in English in original] for everything to be locked up during the British chairmanship: so much so that at Blair House [in Washington, where the GATT talks were conducted], since the compromise had not been drafted in time, the English, instead of entrusting this task to the country which would be taking up the Community chairmanship on Jan. 1, 1993, decided to give it into the care of the Americans.

It does not make us any more forgiving when we learn that at that point the negotiations were coming up against this or that word, against a comma or other points which may have appeared less important to someone who was not previously briefed.

Wedge between France and Germany

But how did this behavior affect Europe?

First of all, it weakened France in several areas. Since France was one of the main pillars of constructing Europe, to weaken it is that much more of a plus for England. If we export fewer farm products and import more, that will have a very harmful and lasting influence on our balance of payments, which is amputated every year by several billion francs.

But this is not all: It is a cause of division for the Europeans. Since our country represents 52% of the agriculture of the Twelve, that means that for our neighbors it involves a more or less marginal sector of their economy. But by flashing at them, thanks to GATT, a dazzling future in the other sectors of the economy, one can only incite them to desert the interests of French farmers.

Even more serious than this aspect, Great Britain is attempting to drive a "wedge" into the good French-German understanding upon which the future of Europe rests. If the maneuver has apparently failed so far, the shock has been rude, and the English can hope that other blows will enable them to carry it off. Moreover, the intense pressure to complete the negotiations on Dec. 15 has no other objective than that of embarrassing the Germans, who are going to be holding elections soon, and of trying to force them to line up on the Anglo-American position.

The International Monetary Fund and World Bank's recent coming to the rescue can only make one smile when the preponderant influence of the Anglo-Americans in these two organizations is recognized, but it also indicates to what an extent all forces are engaged in this battle to try to break Europe.

Attack on the culture front

This time, isn't this all? Not yet—England also invests long-term and attacks insidiously on all fronts, including the cultural one.

If the American Ted Turner had a warm welcome in this country for his project to invade Europe with American

cultural products, it is because the more the Europeans are "Americanized," the less they will be motivated to defend their national and European identities. And the more they will be passive before even further British attempts at destabilizing Europe.

But now we just have to examine what could be the crowning of this policy, a little like the cherry on top of the cake: the anti-French policy conducted by the English as a last resort, to drive the French out of the European undertaking. Let us cite a few facts there too.

When the French company Aérospatiale negotiated the buyout of a Canadian aeronautical firm, Mr. Brittan intervened to keep the operation from being finalized because that would overshadow British Aerospace. On another occasion, the same Englishman prevented the buyout of TAT [a British airline] by Air France, leaving practically no other way out except its acquisition by British Airways. In both cases, France is penalized and a British firm picks up the pieces.

Finally, let us cite one last fact: the move of Hoover, an American subsidiary, from France to Scotland. By itself the affair would have been minor if—by means of the huge media echo which, among other things, was given to the statements of the British government which, far from calming the waters, deliberately threw fat on the fire—it had not taken on a symbolic value in the eyes of the French which, added to all the other affairs which we have just brought up, leads them to say to themselves that Europe is decidedly playing against their interests and that we should get out as fast as possible. That was what had to be produced in the 1992 referendum [when French voters turned down the treaty establishing the European Union].

If that had been carried out, what a marvelous victory it would have been for the Centuries-Old Policy of Great Britain! Without it having been apparently reponsible, Europe would fall to pieces, and it would have been France's fault.

Europe must be built! Yes—but to what end?

The first project was that of the "Six of Little Europe" who wanted to constitute a structured outfit having friendly relations with the United States on the level of strict equality in all domains: political, economic, diplomatic, and finally, military.

Then, England's concept was added, which sees Europe as a "loose outfit," structured as little as possible on the political and military level, open to all winds on the economic level and encompassing a larger area within which, to use a simile familiar to the English, the United States would have to play the role of captain and Great Britain would be first mate, while France, Italy, and Spain would be the sailors. As for Germany, it could play the role of quartermaster.

Quite obviously, this way of seeing things is no longer European, but Atlantic, and in this case, Europe would remain definitively an American protectorate. Nonetheless, it

is toward this "Atlantic whole" which we are going at top speed, spurred on actively by England—hiding the whip!—after the entry of that country into the Common Market.

Where is Britain taking us?

Having gotten to this point, some are going to ask: But how does England manage to take Europe in this direction?

That's a good question. Thank you for asking me.

To start with, it can profit from its six-month turn as chairman of the Community, which comes to it once every 12 semesters. We saw the effects with the unspeakable "Blair House Accord" [of GATT] in 1992; but it is too episodic a situation to be sufficient.

In fact, the permanent tool at the disposal of the United Kingdom is simply the Brussels [European] Commission, which it uses in two ways:

- First, in a suicidal step, the Europeans having entrusted an Englishman with defending their interests abroad in general and with the Americans in particular, it profits fully from this capability. Thus, Mr. Brittan, who no longer even hides his complicity with the United States, was able to declare on worldwide television last year: "I am against the cultural exclusion." As Mrs. Thatcher, who has no words too harsh for the Community technocrats, would have said: "But what mandate, elective or otherwise, did Mr. Brittan receive anyway, which allows him to make such a statement beside the American negotiator?"

- Next, everything shows, that in purely European affairs, the British have succeeded in pulling off a "soft takeover" on the Commission. Let us see some examples: In the field of electricity, England seems to be the only one interested in Third-Party Network Access (ATR) [arrangements by which private electricity companies pay for access to the French public energy distribution networks to supply customers]. Despite the lack of enthusiasm from other Europeans for this measure, the Commission continues relentlessly to seek the means to impose it on other countries. The same for natural gas. The present efforts would lead to the disintegration of Gaz de France.

In reality, through these and other measures, *it seeks to deprive the French government of all ability to control what takes place on its territory*. It seems to have already attained this for air traffic, since, if this decision is not overturned, France will have lost all control in this domain in 1997. Now, let us stop for an instant at this example and look at a map of Europe: France is at the center, and it is obvious that everyone has an interest in crossing our country, not just by airplane, without seeking the permission of the French government.

By contrast, Great Britain is at the edge of Europe, and the French can go in any direction and avoid passing over England. France therefore has a considerable trump there, and what does it do with it? Nothing. It gives it free to the United Kingdom, whereas it could negotiate for it in a tough exchange for irreversible advances in other areas.

Perhaps you might say that the European Treaties provide for a liberalization of trade. Sure, but first they did not foresee a simultaneous opening to the outside world, which could be produced with the GATT accords, which are very pernicious for Europe in several domains.

Next, they called for simultaneous political, social, and defense construction. Now, on these last points, Great Britain "slams on the brakes" when it does not purely and simply block any improvement, as in the social aspects of a policy.

Raise the alarm

It is fine to realize this, but what should be done?

The most important thing is to inform the citizens of what is happening because, in a democracy, as long as they do not know, it is vain to hope that the situation will improve. And there, we run up against a block: Among the layer of politicians and the trade unions as well as among the media, *there exists a taboo which forbids publicly talking of the behavior of England in Europe*. If we can overcome this difficulty, the means for "turning the rudder around" will appear completely naturally. We can already expect some solutions:

- First of all, as long as an English Commissioner is defending European interests abroad, no improvement can be obtained.

- Next, the Council of the Community must vigorously take in hand the work of the Commission and France must exercise its veto as often as necessary: on the studies on the ATR and the dismantling of Gaz de France, the opening of the French airspace to English companies, among others, which does not prevent accords with the Germans, the Italians, and the Spaniards. All this, as well as the buildup of Europe's social, political, and defense structures, will not yield very meaningful concrete results, which will require decades.

The military aspect

As for the military aspect of the construction of Europe, we have spoken very little of this up to this point. In this domain, there exists the Western European Union, whose headquarters is in London and which, theoretically, should serve as the framework for the constitution of a purely European defense. In fact, the British use the WEU as a means of preventing it. One example will suffice to illustrate this assertion:

In November 1992, one could read in the press: "France, Italy, and Spain propose to create a European navy air arm." Admiral Lanxade, who provided this information, added that Great Britain would not have any objection to this project *on the condition that this force would not be permanent*.

What is a non-permanent force except a force which does not exist? Moreover, if we recall the hostile reactions at the time of the Franco-German brigade, it is useless to continue—the issue is clear: The only Europe acceptable by the English must be disorganized and entirely subject to the Anglo-American leadership on the military, economic, social, and hence political levels!

Uproar in France over Bosnia policy

by Katharine Kanter

Seen from a higher standpoint, the appearance of a new electoral movement in France, "Alliance Sarajevo," founded by the Jewish writer Bernard Henry-Lévy, may turn out to be a true political turning-point. This is the first time since the death of Charles de Gaulle in 1970 where an issue of foreign policy other than some jingoistic hobby horse—an issue of strategic import to the world as a whole—has taken center stage of the public debate in France. The platform of Alliance Sarajevo rejects partition, upholds the territorial unity of Bosnia, and calls for lifting the arms embargo and executing all U.N. resolutions on Bosnia, i.e., enforcing air strikes.

The French population is being swept up in a wave of concern with the affairs of state, a thing potentially as threatening to the ruling elite as the mass political ferment created by Marshal Blücher's military reforms under the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon. So the question is not at all whether one likes or admires Henry-Lévy, Mr. Herzog, Mr. Julliard, or the gaggle of elegant denizens of Parisian café society they have attracted, nor whether Henry-Lévy's crony Michel Rocard may have his political hand strengthened in the upcoming presidential elections.

What is happening—and this has not escaped the frightened attention of French President François Mitterrand and his friends in London—is that the French population has broken out into revolt against a policy which they believe to be not only unprincipled, but a threat to the survival of the nation. This, at a point in time when the economic policies of Mitterrand, dictated by Anglo-Saxon financial interests, have led to over 6 million unemployed and squalid misery in the cities of a kind not seen in France since the early 19th century. In a country where the man in the street takes a personal interest in history (news kiosks on every corner stock dozens of popular historical periodicals), there has been readily drawn the parallel between Mitterrand's alignment on London, and the Great War of 1914-18 in which over a million Frenchmen were immolated to serve British policy on what the British fondly call "The Continent." This, we have ascertained in hundreds of conversations on the streets during leaflet distributions, where the word on everyone's lips is: "Mitterrand is leading us down the path to world war."