intriguers from within the Jacobin camp itself. The Russian Revolution of 1905, on the other hand, was a mass revolution, a reaction to the Japanese victory and the defeat of the Russian czarist forces. You may recall that time historically, around Port Arthur and the China Sea: The czar's great Baltic fleet sails halfway around the world, and within a mere two days is pulverized. People are aware that they have to put up with huge losses in order to support the empire's eastward expansion. But at the same time, serfdom still had not been abolished, and the masses went into the streets. There are considerably more casualties than in the French Revolution; and then in 1917-20, the numbers climb into the millions.

My prognosis is that the modern revolution from below which has now gotten under way, will claim the greatest number of victims in comparison to all these other revolutions. The power of the great forces at work which I have described, can only be evaluated correctly when we take the Russian mentality into account. The Russian mentality is the product, on the one hand, of this 1,000-year anti-western, religious influence emanating from Constantinople—the old Byzantium—and second, in addition to this purely Byzantine, anti-western Third Rome mind-set, comes the rejection of all other possibilities in the wake of the Mongol invasion. The 240 years of Mongol occupation—from 1240 to 1480—

brought with it the mass experience of Mongol terrorism, and thence derives the hardening of the Russian mentality in its fight against this highly oppressive domination. You have to be aware that whenever a village had not paid its tribute, they would immediately burn down all the houses, hang the women and treat the men accordingly, and also kill all the children.

Thus we have two moments within Russian history which are crucial: Orthodoxy versus the western Rome, deriving from the schism between the Latin and Byzantine churches both of them Christian, but completely differently constituted. The western Roman pope is rejected, and with this, the East is cut off from the West. And from then on, there was no new opening until the short period under Peter the Great, and during the brief reigns of some other czars. But in every case, they were always pushed back by Orthodoxy, i.e., by the Orthodox Church: "Shut the windows, close yourselves off! This is a hostile world, and we can only conquer it by destroying it." This ideological heritage was carried forward. In 1904, Lenin developed these ideas while he was in Switzerland—already by then he had fled into the underground to become a super-agent—and from his station he acted to play on the powerful force of anti-western sentiment, using it to drive his strategy.

General Scherer's record

In numerous visits to the United States during the past several years, General Scherer has briefed senators, congressmen, and the press on the crisis in Russia, warning them, "Keep your powder dry!" Here are some of his forecasts. All were given in press conferences at the National Press Club, except for the last. All were translated from the German by Webster Tarpley, and were published in EIR.

April 29, 1989: The Russians "have not trodden the path of western civilization for the last 400 years. Therefore, we must doubt the ripeness of the Soviet population to adopt democratic ideas as we have them in the West. There will be blood raining out of heaven in the Soviet Union in the coming period."

Oct. 18, 1989: "If Gorbachov and his group are able to survive into the summer of 1990, they will then be ousted in one way or another. . . . I am convinced that Gorbachov will fall, he will trip, he will stumble, in the same way that I predicted that Honecker would be out. I would add to that the prediction that Poland, for economic reasons, even with western aid, simply will not make it."

May 16, 1990: "The year 1990 is decisive, and not any successive or later year. I would say that if Gorbachov proves to be incapable of using these last chances that are still offered [giving up control over the Baltic states—ed.], or if a successor group to the Gorbachov group proves to be incapable of exploiting these opportunities, then my prediction is a civil war in the Soviet Union, under extremely bloody circumstances that will last from three to four years."

June 5, 1992: "I don't think we're going to be able to avoid civil war, either in Russia or in Kazakhstan, and especially not in the Muslim southern belt."

March 26, 1993, briefing to the Schiller Institute in Leesburg, Virginia: "The Yeltsin crew has reached the end of their rope. . . . Tying this into the situation in the Balkans and the experiences there, this means that if tomorrow, or in a month, or perhaps in two months, the question of power is posed, namely, when entirely new forces push themselves to the fore, as in a revolution, and a change of power occurs—a junta replacing the Yeltsin group—what do you have? It is certain that under those circumstances there would exist an inclination in the Great Russian mentality to resume a position of opposition to the West. . . . The illusions of a long period of peace, the illusions of no more nuclear war, the illusions of a pleasantly disposed East which will come over to our ways, all these illusions have now blown up in our faces."

32 Feature EIR October 15, 1993