

children, black or white, get together, from the nurseries to the universities, in sports and cultural associations, then we can make it so that the next generation—if not already our own—begin to truly be South Africans, and stop organizing themselves on the basis of their racial or ethnic groups.

Q: You have said of yourself and your party, that you are realists. Would you agree with me when I say that the South African Communist Party still has an unrealistic and idealistic image of man?

Hani: I am, we are idealists. And I believe that we all have to be idealists. I believe that we must all strive toward a perfect society even if the perfect society, no doubt, can never be realized.

Why should we not be inspired and animated by that which the Christians dream about, arriving in Paradise, in Heaven, where there is no place for suffering? I remember that as a child I used to observe the Catholic priests. They went through the villages to convince the people to go to church and to school. They cared about the poor. In our area there was nothing, no hospital, no doctors, none of the structures which make up a modern society. And we were poor. My father, for example, was a miner, we only saw him once a year. And every day I had to go on foot to school, which was 10 kilometers away. In the winter it was frightful, because in Transkei it can get terribly cold, and we had no shoes. That was a hard life, but we made it anyway. The church was our tie to the city. The parish priests even brought the mail to the villagers. They worked hard and made an effort to lighten the burdens of the people. I told myself that these are people who unselfishly stand up in their own person for others and fight for justice. That made a big impression on me. I believe that influenced my whole life. I even wanted to be a priest myself, but my father did not want me to.

I know that it is hard to act like those priests in this world. But why should we not have for humanity a vision of a society in which there is no exploitation? The progress of technological development and scientific discoveries is such that we have the potential to achieve a society of surplus, in which no one any longer needs to go hungry. I believe that as communists we must not allow this idealism to be taken away from us. So we should make a crusade for it. It should not be any arrogant or presumptuous crusade as a group or party, which thinks it should stand above the others. Rather I think, on the contrary, that the whole society should wrack its brains—and also fight—to find out how we can spread the wealth around in a reasonable way, such that we have a society in which people no longer have to suffer from curable diseases and malnutrition. A society in which there are no more illiterates and every house has electricity, in which no one has to fight hopelessly for his simple survival. I have this idealism anchored in myself, and I believe that we should all hold to it with determination.

Interview: Tienie Groenewald

A new colonialism is being fostered

Major General Tienie Groenewald is the former head of the Department of Military Intelligence of the South African Defense Forces, and is a founder of the "Committee of Generals" currently playing a key role in the negotiations toward a new constitution for South Africa. He was interviewed in Johannesburg on April 28.

EIR: There are currently multi-party negotiations which restarted again on Friday, April 23, toward what the new South Africa will look like. Could you tell us, as opposed to the news reports, what actually is going on inside those negotiations?

Groenewald: In the forum, you have basically three main political groups that participate. The Nationalist Party is the ruling party at the moment, significant because it is in control of the structures of the state. Secondly, the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions—this alliance between the three. These two groupings, the African National Congress alliance and the Nationalist Party, basically control 14 of the 27 votes in the multi-party congress. The third grouping is the COSAG grouping, which stands for Concerned South Africans Group. It consists of two independent states, the governments of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei, and the semi-independent state of KwaZulu, headed by Chief Minister [Mangosuthu] Buthelezi, forms the third important leg of the black groupings within the COSAG movement. And then most of the major conservative right-wing parties, such as the Conservative Party, the Afrikaner Volksunie, the Volkswacht of Prof. Karl Boschoff, and the Afrikaner Unity Committee. This grouping is more representative of the people in South Africa than either the ANC or the Nationalist Party. To give you an idea: The ANC professes to be a multi-racial or non-racial party, but 99% of the members are black, and then there are a few whites, Indians, and colored members. The Nationalist Party professes to be multi-racial, but 95% of the Nationalist Party are white, and the rest basically are coloreds. But within the COSAG grouping, approximately 50% of the blacks are controlled by these governments, of COSAG, and more than 50% of the whites in actual fact support the concept of nation-states. So it's a much more representative group.

In the current phase in the negotiation process of the Multi-Party Congress, the ANC wants, and in this the Nationalist Party supports them, the transitional executive councils, which would be a form of interim government, to be appointed immediately. This should lead to elections, and the introduction of a transitional government, or as they call it, a constitution-writing government, and then somewhere in the next five to nine years to have another election that will then appoint the final government of South Africa. And the ANC alliance has specifically used the Chris Hani [head of the South African Communist Party] assassination as an instrument to now say that the only way in which we can stop the bloodshed and the economic chaos is by introducing a transitional government.

Most people don't realize that the people who *could* stop the bloodshed and chaos are the ANC alliance, because they *cause* it. They are the people who use intimidation and violence for political purposes. So on Friday, the ANC, supported by the government, tried to push the meeting to accept changes in the agenda whereby they would discuss the introduction of the transitional executive councils, and push the important issues which could be deal-breakers aside. The COSAG grouping says, look, before we can talk about a constitution, and before we can talk about transition, and before we can talk about setting a date for the election, we must first decide what form of state are we negotiating for.

Let me illustrate this more clearly. The ANC basically believes that we should have a unitary state with a strong centralized government. The COSAG grouping believes that we should have a federal or even a confederal system of government, where power resides primarily with the different states; and should this be the case, should this form of state be accepted, it means that the whole negotiation process would move to regional multi-party discussions. And these regions, once they've determined their boundaries and the power which they would want for themselves, would then send representatives to the multi-party forum. This would change the whole nature of the negotiation process, and if you do this, there is no necessity for a transitional process. You have your multi-party regional conferences, they decide on the boundaries and on the power which these states should have, they send their representatives to a newly constituted multi-party conference, they approve it, you have elections on a regional basis, and this leads us to federal or a confederal type of government—no interim government is necessary and the process can be completed by the end of the year.

But this, the ANC wants to avoid at all costs. They want to avoid talking about the form of the state, because this is really the critical issue at the moment. The important thing to realize is that the transition executive council which they want is an interim government to the degree that you will then have joint ANC control over our security forces. They will jointly control the budget. They will control the whole constitutional process. They have even agreed to the appoint-

ment of a commission which would decide on the boundaries and of the power of these regions—this commission would only report back to the constitution-writing body after the election. So what it basically means is that the ANC, which cannot control Umkhonto we Sizwe [the ANC's armed wing (MK)], and which cannot control the self-defense units—this they have admitted openly—now wants to share control over the security forces. So what happens? The government gets partial control over the SDUs and MK which cannot be controlled, and the ANC gets dual control over South Africa—at least a defense force which can be controlled. So who wins in this deal? It's quite obvious.

And the parties which do not have private armies, such as Inkatha and the Conservative Party and those governments, lose complete control over the situation. In other words, the playing field becomes very, very uneven. It becomes such that the whole weight shifts toward the ANC. This is not what negotiations are all about.

The second point is that once you appoint or determine the date for an election, the whole atmosphere in the country changes toward fighting an election. You know what happens in the states: When the presidential election starts, everything comes to a stop, people fight at the election. And this basically means that the whole negotiation is around the election; it's not about critical constitutional issues. That's why it's the most wrong thing you can imagine to decide upon a date for elections until you've sorted out the principles which will apply in a future constitution—at least the principles as far as regional dispensations are concerned. It's so important.

So those are the three critical demands which they want to discuss: the appointment of the transitional executive councils, the date for the election, and dual control over the security forces. And COSAG, from the other side, says, no; the first issue is the form of state. That is the critical issue. That is the one issue which we cannot avoid any longer.

EIR: The ANC and also the U.S. ambassador to South Africa have indicated that there was foot-dragging, although these are not their words, by irresponsible people who were trying to slow down the negotiations. You have 27 parties in the multi-party negotiations. Could you shed some light on whether it's just one or two irresponsible people throwing sand in the wheels?

Groenewald: Gentlemen, what they expect these parties to do (for example, Ciskei and Bophuthatswana are independent states) is to subject themselves to a transitional executive council that will have control over their destiny without having decided on the form of state. In the case of Bophuthatswana, *de jure* an independent country, its point of view is, you tell us what kind of a constitutional dispensation South Africa will have *before* we decide whether or not we want to become part of it. That's basically what they say. The Ciskei is saying the same thing. The government of KwaZulu, which is semi-independent at this stage, is now expected to agree to a transi-

tional executive council and give up its independence and its control over its police forces and its financial matters, without having the faintest idea of what the form of state will be in the future. The Conservative Party and the other right-wing parties, who basically are the people who are supported by the Afrikaner nation—which had two independent republics recognized by the world, the Transvaal republic and the Free State republic—in this country, are now expected to become part of a dispensation where they, approximately 18% of the population, will be completely dominated by people of different races and cultures. It's like expecting a country like France or Britain to just disband their parliaments and their independence at this stage and subject themselves to European decisions. It's like expecting U.N. Security Council members to give up their veto and subject themselves to the decisions of the General Assembly. This is what we're talking about.

So, the form of state is a very critical issue. And if we are talking about negotiations, then I think it's very irresponsible to go for a temporary settlement which will not last months, just to get a transitional government. This is the most ridiculous point of view I've ever heard in my life, and I think that the representatives within the COSAG grouping are acting very responsibly indeed in saying, first of all gentlemen, let's decide on the form of state, because then we have the basis upon which we can decide how the negotiation process should progress further. Let's have control over the MK and APLA commandos, and other private armies such as the AWB's armed force, so that we can have peace in this country. How can you have an election when thousands of people are being killed in political intimidation? So let's look at the critical issues, and *solve* these critical issues before we simply hand all the authority of government and all the power which we currently have to an organization like the South African Communist Party, because that is basically what is being asked of us.

Now what bothers us in this process is that the tendency in the past has been, on the side of the ANC, if they run into a difficult matter at the negotiation process, as the one at present or as happened at Codesa 2 [Congress for a Democratic South Africa—the earlier name for the Multi-Party Congress], they withdraw from the negotiations and start conducting mass action, which is nothing else but violence. Mass action which leads to the death of thousands of people and the destruction of property to the value of billions of dollars. In other words, their attitude is, either you do as we say or else we stop negotiating and we turn to violence, which is a classic communist technique, of course.

The second thing that worries us at the moment is the fact that the South African government has apparently made a deal with the ANC, and in the negotiation process they might just as well not have been there. They did not fulfill their obligations as the government of this country. They try and pass the responsibility for law and order, for peace, and even

for the economy, on to people who do not have the authority or the ability to control the situation. This is a very, very worrying factor.

The third worrying factor is that the press tries to create the perception that the people who really want to deal with the critical issues, are being branded as spoilers in the process. But if we go back we find that all the delays in the process have been caused by the ANC. The ANC walked out from Codesa and delayed the process for a whole year. Why not spend two or three weeks at this stage on discussing critical issues which will lead to a constitution which will last us for scores of years, a constitution which will really be a final solution and not a temporary solution. That's what the ANC and the South African government want at the moment.

EIR: There are 27 parties to these negotiations. How does that break down when it comes to voting?

Groenewald: Well, let's look at the result of the voting on Friday in the planning committee. Of the 27 parties, the government and the ANC control 14, so 14 voted that the agenda should be changed and that the transitional executive council election date and so on and so forth should be put to the top of the agenda. The people who opposed it and the people who asked that we talk about the form of state, the COSAG members mainly, are 9 votes out of the 27. And 4 parties abstained at this stage. These parties are moderate parties, which will in the long run possibly also add their vote to the COSAG grouping.

So you can see it is really a substantial number of parties that are now accused of spoiling tactics.

EIR: Potentially then we're talking about 14 to 13.

Groenewald: It's 14 to 9; without abstentions it could be 14 to 13, yes.

EIR: If you do reach a deadlock in this negotiating process, what are your expectations about what might happen?

Groenewald: I think first of all it would lead to intensive bilateral negotiations. In other words, the government and the ANC will get together to decide how to act, the COSAG members will bilaterally talk to each other, so there'll be a lot of bilateral negotiations. But the first decisive action would be that the ANC will immediately step up their campaign of violence. So you'll have mass actions, you'll have strikes, you'll have stay-aways. This is to intimidate the people to basically accept the ANC's way. The increase in violence could lead the government to basically take two steps. The first would be to declare an immediate referendum. Such a referendum could be held within five days. And because the government and the ANC control all the mass media, television and all the major newspapers, they could in the short term influence the people enormously to support their initiatives. In this way, you could have a one-man, one-vote sort of a referendum which gives the government the

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authority to go ahead *without* the other members.

Second, they could introduce a junta—the government and the ANC between them could introduce the transitional executive councils without the approval of the other parties. They could give it a very nice name, like a government of national unity, but in actual fact it would be a typical South American junta. This would immediately lead to violent reactions on the side of the independent states and also of the Afrikaner community. And the result would be that such a junta, introduced even before or after a referendum or an election, could not survive unless they declare a state of emergency and impose security legislation very much equivalent to martial law. And this is when at least 5,000 people would be locked up without trial, not because they're necessarily planning something, but because they have the capability or they are a potential threat. . . .

EIR: Does such a list of 5,000 people exist?

Groenewald: Oh, yes. The list is actually 5,590 the last time I saw it.

EIR: You've actually seen this list yourself?

Groenewald: I have seen a copy of such a list, yes.

EIR: The nation has recently been rocked by the assassination of Chris Hani. News media reports and leads from police sources all seem to point toward the Polish immigrant Janusz Walus, now in police custody. Yet there are many unanswered questions about the assassination. Do you think Walus did it, and if so, is it conceivable that he acted alone?

Groenewald: It's a difficult question. Most assassinations always provide enormous problems. I think you could just look at the assassination and assassination attempts on people like President Kennedy, and even your previous President. In South Africa, for example, there were the two assassination attempts against Dr. Verwoerd, the first by a man by the name of Pratt, and secondly, the successful assassination of Dr. Verwoerd in Parliament, when a messenger stabbed him, right in the House of Parliament. In both cases, it was just attributed to the actions of a madman. And like the assassination of a Member of Parliament—Smits—when you start picking up the tracks you find that there have been coverups in most of these attempts.

The assassination of Chris Hani, where you had a man

who's a Polish immigrant, who fled from Poland because of his hatred for Marxism and now suddenly gets involved in the most stupid assassination attempt imaginable—it sounds just too pat to be true. It's just too obvious. He's an intelligent man. How he could simply walk up, shoot a man, climb into his car, drive away, and be picked up half an hour later in the same car that's been identified, with the pistol in the car, no attempts whatsoever made to get rid of the weapon, to get rid of the powder burns on his hands, even to disguise himself in any way whatsoever. The fact that, although it was a public holiday, just about every important member of the national executive of the ANC was present within a matter minutes; and, of course, most important of all, was the fact that no single incident could have benefitted the ANC more than the assassination of Chris Hani.

I think we should also remember that Hani was one of the leaders who was fighting a very important struggle for leadership within the ANC. He was actually a key figure in the ANC; just before the assassination, the alliance between the ANC and the South African Communist Party was an issue which was very embarrassing to the ANC, and there is no way in which they could explain the control exerted by the South African Communist Party over the ANC. And with an election to be held shortly, the contamination of Hani in the ANC was a very important factor. But they couldn't fire him, because the black youths supported Hani. Somehow or other, Hani had to be removed from the scene.

Now, I don't have any proof that the ANC was involved in it, but what has become obvious from the investigation of the South African police at this stage, is that there appear to be extensive links between certain organizations and Walus, which also seem to link up with foreign intelligence agencies. I don't want to make accusations that I cannot prove, but the hand of MI-6 seems to be quite clear in this whole effort.

But these, gentlemen, are rumors at this stage. I cannot prove it, and I think in the investigation, eventually, probably the finding will be that this Pole, this immigrant, acted on his own, that it wasn't linked to any other organization, and that the police are even using the Hani death to investigate organizations that previously they would not have any access into and to interrogate people that previously they would not have the right to interrogate. For example, the prominent member of the Conservative Party, Clive Derby-Lewis, who has been in detention for 10 days for questioning. Under

current security legislation, he can be held for 10 days without trial, and then he must be charged or released. But the minister of justice can provide an extension of his detention when requested by the South African police. And this is what has happened. They have now asked to extend the period of detention of Derby-Lewis, which indicates that they simply do not have enough information to charge him for complicity in this assassination. And in the meantime, the press is using the arrest of Derby-Lewis to make a serious attack against the Conservative Party, which is a very important member of the COSAG grouping. And once again, this ties up with other actions, about delaying tactics, spoiling tactics, within the multi-party conference.

EIR: General Groenewald, you have signed, as have a number of other prominent South Africans, an open letter to President Bill Clinton to free Lyndon LaRouche. Could you comment on how you see the importance of Mr. LaRouche?
Groenewald: I look at Mr. LaRouche in the African context, not in the American context. Mr. LaRouche has exerted some very important influence, specifically as far as the economic development of Africa is concerned. This influence has been directed against neo-colonialism in Africa. Africa is at present being exploited by the major corporations, and in the meantime the country is in dire straits. We believe that the influence Mr. LaRouche could exert in American politics and in America as a superpower could possibly determine the economic future of Africa, which is very very important to us.

EIR: The U.S. and British governments, as well as others, have been intervening heavily into South Africa's politics for years. How would you characterize their role?

Groenewald: I think the first question we should ask is, why do they intervene in South African politics? I don't believe this is for humanitarian reasons, or because they really care for the people of Africa. If they did they would act entirely differently from the way they are acting at the moment. What they are interested in is how Africa can support the industrial complexes of these nations. South Africa has become a very important regional power within the African context. We are one of the major trading organizations in the world. We are located in a very strategic position. We are, in African terms, a regional power. To give you an idea: We produce about 70% of all the electricity generated in Africa. We have more motor cars in South Africa than in the rest of Africa put together. It gives you an idea to what extent we are, or were, a regional power in Africa. Even with economic sanctions being applied against South Africa, we have the industrial capacity to develop the most advanced mining technology. We did the first heart transplant. We developed a very unique uranium enrichment process. We even developed a nuclear capability—I'm talking about a weapon capability. This puts South Africa, whether we want it or not, in the big league.



Paul Kruger, President of the South African Republic and leader of the Afrikaners in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. Kruger had proposed that pass laws and other British-established apartheid measures be lifted. The British wanted not only to seize South Africa's raw materials, but, playing the imperial game of divide and conquer, to prevent the emergence of a viable multicultural republic in Africa.

But the most important thing of all was, this was the powerhouse of Africa. And we became the dominant trading and economic power in Africa, and in this way we seriously threatened the export markets of the major powers—of the United States, and the European countries. It was therefore in their interest to break the power of South Africa in such a way that it could not threaten the United States or the European powers in the economic field, and certainly as a country that could dominate the economic process and economic development within Africa. The result was that they simply had to break the power of the present government. They had to introduce a new system of colonialism, whereby South Africa would be controlled by major corporations. South Africa could become one of the most important keys to the establishment of the new world order.

EIR: Are you talking about a new world order characterized by civil wars, genocide, that sort of thing?

Groenewald: Oh yes, very much so. Gentlemen, what's happening in Africa at the moment is nothing other than genocide and civil war—if we look at what's happening in Ethiopia and Somalia, if we look at what's happening in Angola, if we look at what's happening in Mozambique. In the last two years, 250 leaders of Inkatha were murdered, assassinated; 35,000 people were killed in so-called political unrest, without the government even establishing a state of emergency as we did in 1986 when we had the situation under control within six months.