

Iraq. It is not clear that the IAEA, with its inherited ethos of trust in those it monitors, can do all the hard work alone.”

In other words, the IAEA's established pattern of functioning renders it incapable of carrying out the dirty work necessary to maintain the non-proliferation policy. Said Bundy, “What is clear is that if there is to be timely international action against suspect states, there must be readiness to act in the U.N. Security Council, and here American support will be crucial.”

The most significant part of the Bundy report is an attack on the concept of strategic defense based on new physical principles, including a not-so-veiled reference to the proposal of Lyndon H. LaRouche that the original version of the Strategic Defense Initiative, announced on March 23, 1983 by President Ronald Reagan, should be adopted. To maintain the non-proliferation policy, Bundy openly and hysterically rejects any effort to find a superior strategic solution by means of a technological leap, such as that proposed by the Russians at the Vancouver summit in April.

Bundy wrote: “The case of strategic defense is one of the best examples of the requirement that we respect the realities of nuclear warheads. There is a recurrent tendency to ask technical experts to do more than nature permits—to make us safe, by science and technology, from what science and technology have made possible. Sometimes technological enthusiasts contribute to the confusion by advertising more than they can deliver. The case that is currently relevant is that of strategic defense. There really is no present prospect that all-out defense can outrun all-out offense in nuclear warfare, because of one simple reality: the overwhelming destructiveness of every single nuclear warhead. . . . The United States can keep a sharp eye out for some real possibility of a technical revolution between strategic offense and defense; prudence require no less, and the United States should not allow its bad experience with the Strategic Defense Initiative, as originally advertised, to make it imprudently inattentive.”

Challenge inspections

While awaiting the revision of the NPT in 1995, IAEA director Hans Blix has been working with the permanent members of the Security Council to grant the council the power to carry out challenge inspections based on nothing more than public charges from any entity considered “internationally credible.” This IAEA policy is revealed in two secret documents, Gov/2554, of January 1992, entitled “Strengthening the Safeguards: the Providing and Use of Design Information,” and Gov/2657, of May 1993, entitled “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Safeguard System: a Reexamination of the Application of Safeguards.”

In both documents, the IAEA board of governors orders all countries to maintain the “complete” safeguard accords, which include challenge inspections, and that all countries participate in a full international effort to gather data; in other words, to sanction a system of mutual espionage exactly as called for by both Bundy and CIA head Woolsey.

Document Gov/2657 even speaks of “a number of measures, including environmental monitoring, which would improve the capability to detect undeclared facilities and activities” and recommends that “these measures be further developed, assessed and implemented by the Secretariat, as matter of urgency.” The document states that environmental monitoring “includes water and air monitoring techniques applicable at different ranges. [The IAEA] noted there is greater certainty at this stage in the use of these techniques for long-range detection of reprocessing compared to front-end fuel

The return of Bernard Baruch

In the April 1992 issue of the British journal *Nuclear Engineering International*, Geoffrey Greenhalgh wrote an article with the suggestive title “The Return of Baruch,” in reference to the infamous Baruch Plan formulated by U.S. ambassador Bernard Baruch at the First International Conference on Nuclear Energy which took place just after the Second World War. Baruch proposed creating a supra-national entity for the forcible world control of all nuclear technology and world reserves of radioactive minerals.

Baruch complained that it was “an injustice of nature” that precisely those countries that developed nuclear technology were the very countries that lacked nuclear mineral reserves. Working from this premise, Baruch proposed that the countries that possessed these reserves must cede control over them to the major powers and accept a policy of forcible nuclear non-proliferation. In fact, since 1991, when the United States and its allies decided to bomb Iraq's nuclear installations because of charged violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which Iraq was a signatory, the world has been subject to the Baruch Plan.

Greenhalgh began his article with a brief review of the various plans for international control of nuclear energy, writing that “one of the more far-sighted and detailed of these was the plan put forward in July 1946 to the United Nations by the U.S. representative Bernard M. Baruch, based on the Acheson-Lilienthal study of the problem. This proposed the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority which would manage, control, or own all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security, and have the power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.”

Later in the article, to justify his proposal to revive the Baruch Plan, Greenhalgh analyzed the weaknesses of the safeguards established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): “Back to Baruch. A key feature of any international control system is that it must be strictly

cycle activities, specifically enrichment. Further development of this long-range capability as regards both is urged.

The foregoing makes clear that the IAEA has gone beyond mere spying from space, to legitimize territorial invasions by special corps of spies utilizing "marvelous new techniques" whose efficacy is very doubtful.

The Four-Party Nuclear Safeguard Accord signed between Brazil, Argentina, and the IAEA, as well as the so-called "modified" Tlatelolco Treaty now in process of ratification, are both tied to the reforms now under discussion to

modify the non-proliferation regulations. The former indirectly approves the new demands of the IAEA for "challenge inspections" of nuclear installations. The latter explicitly replaces the entirety of Article 16 of the original treaty with a new text that sanctions the unrestricted right of the IAEA to carry out challenge inspections in any of the cited countries. This act of capitulation was ratified by the foreign ministries of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico at an Aug. 26, 1992 meeting in Mexico City, where they signed Resolution No. 290, that made official the challenge inspections statute.

enforceable. The weakness of the IAEA safeguards system, as shown in Iraq, is that it only applies to 'declared' facilities which the IAEA is empowered to inspect; the IAEA has neither authority or means to search out suspected violations even in countries which adhere to the non-proliferation treaty let alone those countries which have so far refused to sign. Baruch on the other hand saw prevention and penalization going hand in hand.

"We must provide the mechanism to ensure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in war. To that end, we must provide immediate, swift, and sure punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by nations. Penalization is essential if peace is to be more than a feverish interlude between wars. . . . The United Nations can prescribe individual responsibility and punishment on the principles applied at Nuremberg. . . . When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and corresponding punishment set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes, we propose that: Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop; existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty. . . .

"But before a country is ready to relinquish any winning weapons it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have a guarantee of safety, not only against offenders in the nuclear area but against the illegal users of other weapons—bacteriological, biological, gas—and perhaps—why not—against war itself.

"The breakup of the Soviet Union, and the declared wish of the successor republics to renounce nuclear weapons, now offers the world a rare second chance to establish a strict international control over nuclear weapons. . . . While many of the detailed control proposals for Baruch's International Atomic Development Authority have been overtaken by 40 years of growth of the nuclear power industry, the basic principles of the need to prohibit weapons development and to punish violations remains unchanged. This bold proposal was tantamount to the imposition of world control through the authority of the

United Nations.

"This will represent a large step forward in international control by the United Nations, but the world cannot wait until the occasional miscalculation, as by Iraq, occurs to present the U.N. with the opportunity to act on a case-by-case basis. It will necessarily require interference in the affairs of sovereign states, but as Baruch claimed, the time may have come when people are 'not afraid of an internationalism that protects and are unwilling to be fobbed off by mouthings about narrow sovereignty.' "

Greenhalgh's article ends with a somber statement which, more than being just a warning of the possible use of nuclear weapons in local conflicts, could be analyzed as a threat that the Anglo-American oligarchy might consider the possibility of using a manipulated regional conflict for the purpose of imposing its new system of nuclear safeguards:

"The danger, now . . . is more limited conflicts from local rivalries, probably involving no more than a few bombs. . . . But the shock of such an event would surely galvanize the world community into enforcing some system of regulation and control. Why not do this now, instead of waiting for the worst to happen?"

British anti-science

Greenhalgh has a long career as a British intelligence operative since he worked for the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. in the Abadan refinery during the Second World War. In 1948, Greenhalgh joined the just-formed Atomic Energy Research outfit set up in Harwell, England. Nominally an advanced nuclear research center, Harwell has in reality functioned to disseminate discriminatory policies against non-nuclear powers, and to try to maintain indefinitely the 1945 postwar international status quo in the nuclear area.

Later, in 1956 and 1961, Greenhalgh was the British scientific attaché in Estocolmo, and he later moved over to Brussels as the British Atomic Energy Agency's representative to Euratom. In 1964, he returned to Britain as the first director of the British Nuclear Forum. Today he functions as an "independent consultant" on nuclear affairs.—*Lorenzo Carrasco*