

Carrington (the former British foreign secretary) have condemned both sides equally. This is de facto support for Serbian aggression. The truces and arms embargoes imposed have selectively favored the much more heavily armed Serbia, which continues to acquire arms from Greece.

5) Throughout this bloodbath, Anglo-American media have claimed that the mass death was the necessary result of the rise of nationalism following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union. The images daily broadcast on television screens in Central Europe, and in the press, are intended to induce a sense of impotent despair, as war again returned to Europe.

6) Then, in an abrupt public policy shift in the spring of 1992, the British and U.S. governments demanded that sanctions and even military action be taken against Serbia. This shift was coupled with the shameless lie that Europe in general, and Germany in particular, were responsible for the do-nothing approach to Serbian aggression. The argument was made that only action by the U.N., NATO, or some other supranational, Anglo-American-dominated entity, could contain nationalist wars throughout Europe. Yet, it is unlikely that force will be used, if at all, until after Bosnia is exterminated. On Aug. 25, U.S. government officials leaked to the press that Britain, the United States, and France had abandoned any coalition effort to deliver even humanitarian aid.

Documentation

A history of lies about Serbian genocide

Anglo-American instigation of the war in Yugoslavia can be traced to June 21, 1991, when U.S. Secretary of State James Baker gave Serbia the "green light" for launching war against Croatia and Slovenia. The following chronology traces the perfidy of Washington and London, with the full acquiescence of the Anglo-Americans' junior partner, French President François Mitterrand. Of the principal NATO powers, only Germany has bucked the State Department line, as the time line shows.

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, June 21, 1991:

"The United States would like to help in whatever way we can in assisting Yugoslavia to democratize, to maintain respect for human rights, and to preserve the unity of the country." So stated Baker in Belgrade, Serbia—the capital of former Yugoslavia. The statement was made in a speech to the Yugoslav parliament which was televised and broadcast live throughout the country. Slovenia and Croatia, then

two republics of Yugoslavia, had announced the previous week that they would each be unilaterally declaring their independence from Yugoslavia on June 25. Baker also stated that the United States would not recognize the independence of either republic.

Baker's statements were interpreted by Serbs, Croats, and all other knowledgeable European observers, as giving Serbia the go-ahead to crush Slovenia and Croatia. Five days after the speech, the day following their declarations of independence, Slovenia, and then Croatia, came under a full-scale assault by the Yugoslav (Serbian) Army and Air Force. Serbian irregular, guerrilla units had been involved in sporadic actions against Croatia since August 1990, but it was only after Baker's address that a full-scale war involving government troops began.

European Community "peace negotiator," former British Foreign Minister Peter Lord Carrington, Oct. 5, 1991:

"Logically there is nothing to fight about now . . . but frankly I wouldn't bet my shirt on it!" Lord Carrington told the BBC, commenting on a just-forged "Yugoslavia peace agreement" he had sponsored earlier that week, following the three months of fighting between Serbia and Croatia that began after Baker's June 21 speech. "What we must hope, is that now that the motive for fighting seems to have very largely disappeared, that good sense will prevail." Lord Carrington claimed that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic "for the first time" has publicly acknowledged Croatia's right to independence, while Croatia guaranteed the protection of ethnic Serbs, so the agreement, he said, was successful.

Even the *Washington Post's* Zagreb (Croatia) correspondent felt embarrassed in reporting the statement, writing the next day that "the failure today to stop or even reduce the level of fighting, struck many Croats here as a signal that the entire political agreement was doomed. Reflecting that pessimism, Croatian media today relegated the peace deal, which is being described by European diplomats as a major breakthrough, to the end of gloomy reports about federal air and artillery attacks."

EC mediator Lord Carrington, Oct. 10, 1991:

On the eve of his visit to New York to meet with U.N. special envoy to Yugoslavia Cyrus Vance, Carrington rejected the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia: "The position of the European Community has been that nobody is going to recognize the independence and sovereignty of any of the republics until there is a solution to the whole problem."

U.N. special envoy and former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Nov. 5, 1991:

Vance had been appointed U.N. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar's envoy to Yugoslavia in October. At the conclusion of his mission in November, Vance had declared that he opposed sanctions against the Serbs on grounds that

they would hit other nations, too. Vance claimed that it was “not at all clear who is the aggressor and who the victim in this conflict.”

EC mediator Lord Carrington, Nov. 5, 1991:

Carrington stuck to his policy of “equidistance” between aggressor and victim. “The problem we have . . . is that we don’t really have [the possibility of] any sanction. We don’t have any weapons with which we can stop this.” He spelled out his solution: “I am going to see both the Croatian and Serbian ministers of defense and the chiefs of staff and I am going to do what I can to bang their heads together.”

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Nov. 6, 1991:

Speaking to the German parliament in a major foreign policy address, Kohl called for the immediate recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. The chancellor said that such recognition was a necessary precondition to stop the war. “The point is above all to convince the Serbian camp that their policy of force is in vain,” Kohl stated. To this end, he said, “the German government will continue to press for speedy international recognition of those republics that want it.”

The day before, Serbia rejected a European Community-sponsored peace plan for the third time. The EC had threatened sanctions against the party who rejected it. Under the sponsorship of the European “mediator,” Lord Carrington, the plan dropped any demand to respect the autonomy of the ethnic Albanian region of Kosovo, and the predominantly Hungarian Vojvodina, which Serbia annexed a year earlier. This was rather ironic, as Serbia’s war against Croatia has been based on the pretext of defending the Serbian minority there—a minority that voted to a large extent for Croatian independence.

U.S. President George Bush, Nov. 9, 1991:

Speaking in The Hague on Nov. 9, Bush condemned nationalism as the problem in the former Yugoslavia. There is no room, he said, for nationalism that “feeds on old, stale prejudices, teaches intolerance and suspicion and even racism and anti-Semitism. There can be no place for these old animosities in the new Europe. We see in Yugoslavia how the proud name of nationalism can splinter a country into bloody civil war.”

Deputy U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, Nov. 18, 1991:

There must be no outside interference in Yugoslavia, it is an internal conflict, said Eagleburger in a German television interview. He disavowed any advocacy of the deployment of either a United Nations or a European peacekeeping force into former Yugoslavia. “This should be fought out among the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves,” declared Eagleburger, saying that was also the view of the State Department.

French President François Mitterrand, Nov. 29, 1991:

Croatia has a Nazi past, whereas Serbia hasn’t, said Mitterrand in an interview with the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. Mitterrand stated his view that the Yugoslav conflict is an internal one and does not require international intervention, as was allegedly needed in the case of the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. Refusing to name the aggressor, Mitterrand said: “All I know is that the history of Serbia and Croatia has been filled with such dramas for a long time. Especially during the last world war, many Serbs were killed in Croatian camps. As you know, Croatia was part of the Nazi bloc, Serbia wasn’t. . . . Since the death of Tito, the latent conflict between Serbs and Croats had to break out, once again. The time for that has come now. I do not think that Serbia intends to launch war to keep Croatia, but rather to achieve a redrawing of the borders and some kind of direct or indirect control of the Serbian minorities.”

German government spokesman Dieter Vogel, Dec. 5, 1991:

“The chancellor confirmed that the German government was ready to take the definite step [of recognizing Croatia and Slovenia] along with as many EC states as possible and to do so before Christmas.” Chancellor Kohl made the same promise to Slovenia two days earlier. Germany at that time was pressing the EC to recognize the sovereignty of both republics by Christmas as a way to end

U.S. State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler, Dec. 5, 1991:

The Reuters news agency reported that “the United States, taking a firm stance against German Chancellor Kohl, said it strongly opposes recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.” Said Tutwiler, “We believe the best hope of ending the violence in Yugoslavia and making progress towards a just and comprehensive solution is to stick to the principles we have been advocating since this crisis began.” The principles are: “no recognition of changes in the internal or external borders achieved through force, intimidation or threats; resolving disputes through negotiation; respect for the human rights of all citizens including ethnic minorities.” civil war.

U.N. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar, Dec. 10, 1991:

The secretary general sent a statement to the German government, demanding that Germany not recognize Croatia and Slovenia. He claimed that recognition “could have grave consequences for the Balkan region as a whole, and it would seriously undermine my own efforts and those of my personal envoy.”

German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher replied to Pérez de Cuellar on Dec. 13, 1991:

“Dear Mr. Secretary General. . . . I would like to express my deep concern that [your] statements—and their subsequent publication—are apt to encourage those elements in Yugoslavia which have been vehemently resisting the suc-

cessful conclusion of the peace process. . . . To refuse recognition to those republics which desire independence must lead to a further escalation of the use of force by the Yugoslav National Army, which would construe it as a validation of its policy of conquest.”

According to news coverage, President Bush personally intervened against the German government at this time to force its capitulation. He also launched a series of last-minute telephone conversations, including with British Prime Minister John Major, in an effort to block recognition.

U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman, Dec. 23, 1991:

In an interview with the Serbian Vreme news agency, the ambassador claimed that recognition of Croatia and Slovenia could deepen the war, and assured the Serbs that the U.S. government was pressuring European countries against this recognition:

“We have been concerned about the dangers of unsecured recognition because we were worried about the possibility of increased violence this could cause. We are saying to the Croats in this period that choice of a military option by Croatia, because of the recognition or any other reason, would be a disastrous choice. It would certainly bring no military support from the western countries and it could only cause greater devastation to Croatia. . . . We have felt that unsecured recognition could increase the dangers of violence.

“We made an effort with all of the members of the European Community to get them to see the dangers we felt were inherent in a rush to recognition. You can call it pressure if you will, but I would say it was primarily an effort to make absolutely certain that our views were well known.”

U.N. envoy Cyrus Vance, Dec. 31, 1991:

Vance traveled to Yugoslavia where, according to the Yugoslav government press agency Tanjug, he proposed that Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia remain within Yugoslavia under a redesigned confederation. Vance “carried a proposal for a three-tier solution, with Serbia and Montenegro as the core of a new Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in confederation with them, and Croatia and Slovenia in loose association with them all,” the news agency reported.

Vance also refused to condemn Serbia for the continuing war. “It seems both sides are violating the cease-fire,” he told reporters after meeting with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Vance continued to rule out any deployment of U.N. peacekeeping troops in Yugoslavia until a solid cease-fire was in place. “I have said many, many times that until we have a durable cease-fire we cannot go forward with a peacekeeping operation and that is not happening.” For his part, Milosevic said, “I can say that there is not a single point of contention concerning Cyrus Vance’s plan from the point of view of the policies of the Republic of Serbia.”

State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler,

Jan. 14, 1992:

Immediately following recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by Germany, the Vatican, and a handful of other European states, Tutwiler commented: “Concerning the United States—I’m speaking today—our policy on recognition has not changed. We will accept any outcome that is chosen peacefully, democratically, and through negotiation.” Repeating the Serbian claim that Croatia was mistreating Serbian minorities, she added that “any settlement must include strong protections for the rights of all national groups in all republics.” Tutwiler repeated the Bush administration claim that recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would encourage further violence. “The United States would not want to do anything that, in their opinion, could somehow be misinterpreted and could contribute to any violence.”

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, April 23, 1992:

Eagleburger summed up the position of the Bush administration concerning Serbia’s increasing attacks on Bosnia, which had also seceded from Yugoslavia. Eagleburger told the MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour television program that Serbia’s war with Bosnia would only end through mutual exhaustion. “The only issue that finally made a difference” in the Serbian war with Croatia was that Croats and Serbs “got tired of killing each other,” he said. “They were exhausted, and the U.N. and the European Community were there—once the situation reached the stage where the two were prepared to stop killing each other.” He added that it was only then that “the U.N. and the EC could find ways to separate the parties and bring some sort of at least temporary solution.”

State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler, May 5, 1992:

Tutwiler was asked what had been the followup of an April 14 statement by Secretary of State Baker that he would make Serbia an “international pariah” if the aggression against Bosnia was not stopped. The statement followed Baker’s meeting with the Bosnian foreign minister. Tutwiler replied: “When the minister was here, we made quite clear that our effort was an emergency humanitarian effort. We have consistently called on all parties, all groups to stop the violence, to stop the fighting. Now, I don’t know, what will ever eventually cause them to stop. But in the meantime we have innocent people being killed.” She added that it was an error to blame the Serbs for the violence. “There are also others who have been involved in contributing to the violence,” she said, “and in fact, excuse me, some of them were Bosnian armed individuals.”

Secretary of State James Baker, May 24, 1992:

In an abrupt, dramatic change of policy, Secretary of State Baker called for mandatory U.N. sanctions against Serbia to end the war in Bosnia. Speaking at the end of a Lisbon

conference on aid to former Soviet republics, Baker told other countries to stop looking for excuses for not taking action that the U.S. allegedly had always advocated. He said:

“There are 35,000 diabetics now who have no insulin. There are 6,000 women and babies who have no medicine, baby formula, or milk. There are reports in the last 48 hours of hunger-related deaths. . . . Anyone who is looking for reason not to act, or arguing somehow that action in the face of this kind of nightmare is not warranted at this time . . . is on the wrong wavelength.”

Mooting the possibility of military action against Serbia, Baker added, “We are having discussion with others at the United Nations in New York about the possibility of some Chapter 7 [military] actions.”

Baker’s claim that certain parties were reluctant to act against Serbia was an allusion to France and Germany, according to widely reported unattributed comments by State Department officials. “The Germans blew it,” “the Europeans are impotent,” were typical of these comments at the time.

U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, May 27, 1992:

“We think the time for excuses and procrastinations has gone, and that we need to move forward,” said Boucher, regarding possible military actions against Serbia. Asked if Washington might again take unilateral action, he said: “It will depend on how quickly we move with others and how quickly things move at the United Nations. We said last week that we were willing to consider concrete measures alone or in concert with others. We’ve taken some steps alone. We’re also discussing steps we can take in consultation and coordination with others, but I don’t want to limit the options for what might transpire.”

U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman, May 29, 1992:

Commenting on a U.S.-sponsored resolution to impose a total embargo on Serbia, Zimmerman said in a television interview: “The resolution essentially gets to economic sanctions on Serbia. It calls for a trade embargo; it calls for some other things as well, most important, perhaps, an embargo on oil supplies. . . . But it’s basically intended as a message to the Serbian leadership and to the Serbian people that they’re going to isolate themselves economically if they continue in this aggressive course.”

Asked about potential military actions, Zimmermann said this would be “a very difficult choice. Our view is it would be better to at least try to exhaust the political and economic options before we put ourselves into a quagmire which a military intervention would be.”

U.S. Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), June 11, 1992:

Lugar called for a “Desert Storm” against Serbia in a guest column in the *Washington Times*. The ranking Republi-

can member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Lugar wrote: “The time for drawing the line has come. The United Nations should authorize the use of force. NATO should draw up plans for a comprehensive use of force as thorough as that formulated for air, sea, and ground forces in Desert Storm. . . . If the Yugoslavia-Serbian government does not yield, it should face sufficient military force to ensure its certain and swift defeat.

“The United States should take leadership of the process immediately. We alone have the military and moral authority needed for peaceful settlement. . . . We should prepare now for strong diplomatic and, if necessary, military action in Yugoslavia.

“I argued during November and December 1990 that the U.S. should promptly debate authorizing President Bush to use military force to push Iraq out of Kuwait. . . . Some will argue that Yugoslavia is not Kuwait. . . . But now the United Nations has concluded that such civil warfare does have international security consequences. This finding comes at the same time that NATO leadership is trying to determine future missions for the alliance. The mission for NATO currently should be provision of stability and expanded human freedom in Europe.”

British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, Aug. 16, 1992:

Speaking on BBC to motivate the convening of an international conference on the Balkan war, Hurd said, “We have to make it absolutely plain to the Serbs that they are not going to be allowed to retain land they have grabbed and their policies—I refer to ethnic cleansing—are a disgrace and they will be treated as a pariah state until these policies have been reversed.” Yet, still condemning the Bosnians, he added, “one of the problems is at the moment the Bosnian Muslims are not willing to talk, whereas the other two [Croatia and Serbia] say that they are.”

President George Bush, Aug. 17, 1992:

In an interview with *U.S. News and World Report* published on Aug. 17, the President disputed reports that the Serbians are committing genocide. “We’re trying very hard to get whatever intelligence we can on the charge that there’s a genocidal wave sweeping through these [Serbian concentration] camps. But in all fairness I have to say to the American people there is no evidence that what’s happening is genocide.”

Acting U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, Aug. 21, 1992:

“I think there’s a real chance that this conflict can spread,” Eagleburger said, referring to possible Serbian moves against the Serbian-controlled province of Kosovo. “I don’t think this tragic situation is going to end in any short period of time,” he told *Voice of America*, “no matter what we do to try and bring it to an end.”