

have made them be turned into slaves, and that the courage of the people in cold climates may have kept them free. It is a consequence that derives from natural causes.”

To sum it up, we can see that the Pelagian naturalism in all its currents crystalized in the Enlightenment. Even more, it is that idea of “natural goodness” which is behind the slogans of the French Revolution: Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, which their propagandists thought were the qualities of earthly paradise, the Golden Age in which man lived before original sin, and from which the Indians of the New World supposedly descended. The Jacobin Terror of the French Revolution was a necessary outcome of the right of rebellion, not based on the divine rights of the individual, proceeding from grace, but the natural “Grotian” right that returns man to the “state of nature,” where man avenges himself against man.

The New Order and sustainable development

The attack on grace, as the essence of Christianity, is expressed, also in a nested manner, in the concept of sustainable development. To exemplify the preceding, let me quote from a recent article by [Brazilian] President Fernando Collor de Mello:

“Scientific and technological evolution, which radically altered life on the planet, is only one dimension of the civilizing process. The other dimension that completes this process, and gives it an ethical sense, is the universalization of the cardinal values of the Enlightenment. . . . One of the central reflections of our time is the conception and implementation of the idea of sustainable development.”

The essence of sustainable development is that it establishes a fixed relationship between man and nature, between society and the means for creating the preconditions for its reproduction, which implies zero technological growth. This is the antithesis of Lyndon LaRouche’s conception of potential relative population density. St. Augustine would tell the defenders of “sustainability,” as he told the Pelagians—“Try to merge grace with nature”—when what is actually happening is that an arbitrary specific relationship with nature is imposed on man. He thus becomes incapable of altering nature through the discovery of new laws of the universe.

So, the human mind is effectively reduced to a simple receptor of sensations and experiences just like any other animal, as Locke explains. Through the elimination of divine grace, man’s creative capability and divine spark, which is only kindled in relationship to the charity of the living God, is taken from him. Thus man is *incapax Dei*, unable to participate in divine creation or creative scientific thought, unable to change ideas and behavior, incapable of perfection—a slave to nature, which coheres very well with Aristotelian systems of logic and with malthusianism.

For St. Augustine, the sanctification of man demands close cooperation between grace and free will, between a divine force and the human being. “With grace, God inspires

Leibniz writings in a recent popular collection

Anyone who has tried to follow Lyndon LaRouche’s lead and get into the reading of Gottfried Leibniz, rather quickly encounters the problem of a dearth of available, in-print editions—not to mention the inadequacy of many translations. Happily, there is a trickle of paperbound editions coming into print over the past three years.

One such volume—the source of the translation from Leibniz’s *Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason* (1714) which is quoted in the accompanying article—is the 1989 edition edited by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber and put out by the Hackett Publishing Company in Indianapolis and Cambridge. *Philosophical Essays* by G.W. Leibniz, 346 pages long with indexes and a non-nonsense buff-colored paper cover, sells reasonably for \$10.95 (cloth, \$37.50).

It includes the familiar “Discourse on Metaphysics” and “Monadology” in new translations, but also renders into English a selection of Leibniz’s less known writings about other philosophers, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke, and Berkeley, plus some of his writings on Newton. As Ariew and Garber stress in their introduction, “Leibniz’s thought can only be understood fully in the context of the contrasts he draws between his thought and that of others.”

One problem the editors identify, is that a definitive edition of Leibniz’s complete works in the original languages (he wrote mainly in Latin and French, sometimes in German) is only very slowly being published. The only comprehensive editions are those edited over a century ago by C.I. Gerhardt. Ultimately, all modern translators are hindered by the lack of definitive originals, and many Leibniz works remain unpublished in any form.

A particular strength of this edition—besides the fact that it contains the full *Discourse on Metaphysics* and much of the correspondence it provoked—is the stress on Leibniz’s relation to the scientific debates of his time. Numerous writings, illustrated with his own clear diagrams, delineate the great thinker’s criticisms of the reductionism of Descartes, Spinoza, and Newton. One unusual short piece offers an interesting solution, after his visit to Italy in 1689, to overcoming the Church’s opposition at that time to the Copernican system of planetary motion.—*Nora Hamerman*