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## SDI Revisited

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# Ten years ago, LaRouche briefed Washington on 'beam weapons'

The speech by Lyndon LaRouche on Feb. 17, 1982, in which he laid out the broad outlines of the policy which later became known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), was a crucial element in Ronald Reagan's historic March 23, 1983 announcement that this would be the policy of the U. S. government.

The speech was the beginning of a campaign by LaRouche and his associates to steer U.S. foreign policy away from Kissingerian brinkmanship and balance-of-power politics, and toward a sane war-avoidance stance. Key in this was defense of the European-American alliance—with special emphasis on the need to support European development of their own tactical defense initiative against intermediate-range ballistic missiles—in parallel to the strategic defense initiative of the United States.

The Soviets—and their allies in the Israeli Mossad and the U. S. government—were well represented at the two-day Washington conference, keynoted by LaRouche. When, 13 months later, President Reagan announced the SDI, they drew the appropriate conclusion that he (or at least his advisers) had listened to and been influenced by LaRouche. They and the U.S. Kissinger faction were furious at the extent of LaRouche's influence.

Antiballistic-missile defense was a subject which LaRouche had been thinking about for almost a decade before his historic 1982 speech. By following developments in the field of fusion-energy research, LaRouche and associates of his in the Fusion Energy Foundation became convinced that the Soviets were intensively researching "beam weapons" which they intended as the keystone of an antiballistic-missile (ABM) defense system. Having assured himself of this capability, LaRouche then collaborated in the production of a series of reports by the staff of *EIR*, under the title *Global Showdown: The Russian Imperial War Plan for 1988*, which described how the Soviets cynically used the "peace" movement and various treaties such as the SALT and antiballistic-missile treaties, to further their own military advantage.

In 1983, the Soviets began a campaign to destroy LaRouche's influence with the Reagan administration. This

created the opening for Henry Kissinger—and his cronies—to reemerge as major policy shapers in the second Reagan administration, and the present Bush administration.

The first *Global Showdown* report appeared in 1985. Meanwhile LaRouche, despite the fact that he had been on a terrorist hit list since the late 1970s, stepped up his campaign in Europe and the United States to see that the SDI was implemented as an effective policy, rather than the kind of parody being promoted by Kissinger's co-thinker Lt. Gen. Danny Graham—the policy being pushed today as the "new" Strategic Defense Initiative.

Graham was proposing an SDI which would use off-the-shelf missile technology, in place of deploying directed-energy weapons. This is the sort of defense which deployed Patriot missiles against Scud missiles in Desert Storm last year. *EIR's* contention last year that the Patriots were ineffective, has now been recognized as precisely on the mark. Yet new plans for an SDI, as discussed by Vice President Dan Quayle and the Pentagon, and seconded by the Congress, call for upgraded versions of the Patriot missile which will be little—if any—better than the Patriot.

While the SDI topic has resurfaced, and indeed Russian President Yeltsin has apparently reversed Soviet policy of the past decade, to propose joint collaboration with the United States on ABM defense, the context of the proposal is the renewed Anglo-American thrust toward a condominium (now with Russia) to recolonize the developing sector. Certainly when Quayle speaks of the SDI, he has in mind a defensive capability which would be operative in a limited North-against-South conflict. Nonetheless, LaRouche's SDI proposal was the actual basis for ensuring global peace, and it can still work—but only on the basis laid out by LaRouche and originally implemented by President Reagan.

The Bush administration is planning to replace President Reagan's idea of a global ABM shield, with what is now called Theater Missile Defense. The 100 continental anti-missiles would be located in Grand Forks, North Dakota under a plan for a limited national missile defense (LNMD). This system would include Patriot-type missiles and a faster

missile, The High Altitude Area Defense missile (THAD). There is also discussion of a still-secret defense capability which presumably could defend against cruise missiles. The only space deployment would be for so-called brilliant eyes, which would offer low-altitude infrared surveillance, in combination with a ground-based radar tracking system.

LaRouche's 1982 speech could have been written today. It is especially relevant today, in face of the growing poverty in the United States itself, as well as in Africa, Ibero-America, and Asia. LaRouche emphasized that his defense shield initiative would act as a science driver for a U.S. economy which could then fulfill its historic role as the technology-driver for the world. Only such a policy can rescue the world from the present, almost ineluctable descent into global war.

In May 1982, the National Democratic Policy Committee issued a pamphlet titled, "Only Beam-Weapons Could Bring to an End the Kissingerian Age of Mutual Thermonuclear Terror. A Proposed Modern Military Policy of the United States," by Lyndon LaRouche. This was an expanded version of his February speech, from which we excerpt below.

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Lyndon LaRouche, February 1982

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## An end to Mutually Assured Destruction

It is now approximately 30 years since the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively, developed a deployable form of thermonuclear bomb. It is now approximately a quarter-century since the likes of John Foster Dulles and then-youthful Henry A. Kissinger introduced to the United States a thermonuclear strategic policy appropriately known by the acronym MAD—Mutually Assured Destruction.

So, for a quarter-century, the population of the world has lived under the perpetual terror of ever-ready intercontinental thermonuclear warfare. . . .

Beginning in the April-May 1982 period, into the scheduled European-missile showdown with Moscow during early 1983, the world is faced with an unprecedented scale and intensity of eruption of strategic hot-spots. [This is occurring] under conditions in which [chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul] Volcker's wrecking of the U. S. economy has plunged most of the world into the initial phase of a new general depression. . . .

The worst feature of the Kissingerian MADness doctrine is the false assumption that the foreknown consequences of thermonuclear warfare are sufficient to prevent any super-

power from actually launching a general thermonuclear assault. This obsession with MADness has gone so far as to foster the doctrine that Moscow would tolerate a limited, Europe-based nuclear assault on Russia itself without unleashing a general thermonuclear barrage against the mainland U. S. A.

The consequences of thermonuclear warfare are an awesome deterrent. It is false to the point of suicidal absurdity, to assume that the deterrent effect is an *absolute deterrent*. . . . Any superpower would do so if it believed that failure to launch such a salvo meant the assured *political* destruction of its homeland. . . .

If the government of the United States continues its adherence to the monetary policies set into motion August 1971, or worse, the Volcker monetarist policies of the present moment, most of the world is already plunging into the depths of a new general depression far deeper, more prolonged and qualitatively more devastating than the economic depression preceding the war of 1939-45. . . . Unless the United States changes drastically its present monetary and military policies, the thermonuclear catastrophe born of Kissingerian MADness threatens to become the kind of war no one wished to believe could actually happen.

As we approach this early period of acute crisis, it is urgent that the government of the United States be prepared to proceed from both monetary policies and military policies fundamentally different from the policy-trends which have increasingly dominated our policy-making over the recent 15 years. . . .

Today, a growing number of nations have nuclear-weapons capabilities. Rapidly, those same nations will acquire missile delivery-capabilities for nuclear weapons-systems. Thus, even if the balance of terror between the two superpowers were regulated, third powers, increasingly, have the potential for starting a thermonuclear war which must more or less immediately embroil the superpowers' own thermonuclear arsenals.

Under these conditions, the military component of Washington-Moscow negotiations must include agreement to rapid development of relativistic beam anti-missile weapons-systems by both superpowers. Two urgent benefits are to be realized by such agreement. First, to the degree we create conditions of assured destruction for intercontinental thermonuclear weapons-systems under war-fighting regimes, the value of such thermonuclear weapons is reduced, and then, and only under such conditions, both superpowers can agree to demobilize such components of their respective arsenals. Second, neither superpower must tolerate the use of even limited thermonuclear warfare by third powers. We must agree to shoot down third-power nuclear weapons on launch by aid of means including orbiting beam-weapons-armed space platforms. . . .

We do not specify dollar-amounts for such development here. Rather, we indicate now the considerations upon which