

are we ready for such an experiment in the Soviet Union? Senator Lievers reasons in the following way: The Soviet Union for many years remained a closed society, outside of the drug trade. Now that it has begun to open up to the outside world, *it could become a colossal market for drug trafficking.* Drug addiction, stressed the Italian senator, should not impede the process of democracy in the Soviet Union. The 'war on drugs' in the American fashion could have such an adverse effect. *If the legalization of drugs came on the initiative of the Soviet government, it would have an enormous positive impact*" (emphasis added).

### The KGB and drugs

To understand what is behind this otherwise inexplicable event in Moscow, and the reportage appearing in an official Soviet magazine, consider a few facts.

It was the Soviet KGB, under Andropov, which in 1967 took over the controlling share in the illegal narcotics traffic, run up to that time by the British, the Chinese, and parts of the U.S. intelligence and financial elite. Detailed information on the Soviet role released by high-level defectors from Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, have since been confirmed in the revelations regarding East German Stasi (secret police) drug and terrorist operations, around such figures as Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, Erich Honecker, and Markus Wolf. Further confirmation has been provided in breaking scandals around the CIA funding of similar operations run by the Masonic lodge P-2. The Iran-Contra case established down to the finest detail how the drugs were run from the American side. And all the pieces fit together, like a jigsaw puzzle, to compose the picture of the international narcotics cartel, stretching from the opium fields in China and the cocaine plantations in Peru, to the consumers throughout the world.

That most highly articulated, militarily protected structure, which turns over anywhere from \$600 billion to \$1 trillion a year, is now being threatened by the revolutionary developments sweeping Eastern Europe, developments which, by opening up a new era of productive growth and cultural progress, could wipe out the scourge of drugs. Such economic process would also threaten the fragile banking empire resting on dirty drug money. Politically, it would have the power to take on the drug mafia seriously, and dismantle its network, which consists not only of former communist rulers, but of many highly placed government officials still in the West.

Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the drug mafia would seek to keep its monetary and political clout, by turning the newly opened nations of Eastern Europe into a vast new market. This would kill two birds with one stone: keep the speculative finances afloat, and break the morale of the targeted populations, thus sabotaging healthy economic progress. And what better means exists than to use the insidious argument that legalizing drugs is a sign of "democracy"?

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# Bhutto is removed; says the President

by Susan Maitra and Ramtanu Maitra

The teetering Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government led by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was summarily dismissed Aug. 6 through a proclamation by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. In his statement the President charged the government with corruption, nepotism, and ineffectiveness, and accused it of defeating the "utility and efficacy" of the parliament and undermining the constitution.

In one fell swoop, President Ishaq Khan also dissolved the National Assembly and four provincial assemblies and sacked all four chief ministers. The President announced that fresh elections will be held on Oct. 24, and, later, declared a state of emergency nationwide. Almost at once, President Ishaq Khan named a five-member caretaker cabinet to be headed by the combined opposition parties' parliamentary chief, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. Later, three more members were added to the cabinet.

The final nail may have been driven into the political coffin of Benazir Bhutto, when, on Aug. 2, the Iraqi tanks rolled over Kuwaiti borders, posing a threat to Saudi Arabia. Since Pakistan has strong military links with Saudi Arabia, the United States might expect substantial Pakistani help to protect Saudi Arabia, an expectation that may have contributed to suddenly boosting the Army's say in the affairs of the country.

Further, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mirza Beg, whose frustration with the Bhutto government has been building up for months, is keen to build a "Fortress Pakistan," impregnable by its enemy in the east, India, and as a result, has developed a military doctrine which will form a strategic consensus among Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan. However far-fetched the particular scheme may be, it is based on a vision of the Army as the protector of the nation and not the keepers of law and order, much less administrators. General Beg strongly resented the Army being used for keeping law and order in the restive Sindh province, and repeatedly reminded the administration that Sindh is not a military but a political problem which the PPP and the Mohajirs, who settled there after the partition of the subcontinent, must resolve.

In the event, a series of mistakes and underlying disasso-

# promises betrayed, of Pakistan

ciation from reality have led to the fall of the Bhutto government. It can only blame itself. As one analyst put it: "The party was long over. Now the guests have been told to go."

To be sure, there is a somewhat hollow ring to President Ishaq Khan's charges of "nepotism and corruption," in a country where that is another name for politics. A truer indictment might be that that is *all* the Bhutto government was doing.

The order issued by President Ishaq Khan on Aug. 6 cites, among other things, the Bhutto administration's failure to pass any legislation other than the budget in 19 months in office; its having "willfully undermined" the working of constitutional arrangements between the federal government and the provinces, resulting in "discord, confrontation and deadlock"; and failure in its constitutional duty to protect the province of Sindh against internal disturbances and to ensure constitutional government in the province.

## Anatomy of drift

There is hardly any question that the Bhutto government has been foundering from the outset. Laden with politicians of doubtful loyalty and questionable integrity, the administration remained deeply involved in petty quibbling and failed to resolve any of the major political or economic problems at hand. Public order deteriorated, typified by the violence in major Sindh cities, to the point where the administration had no choice but to hand the province over to the Army for maintain peace.

During the past 19 months Bhutto had gotten herself involved in a seemingly endless series of nitpicking fights with the Punjab state government, ruled by the opposition IJI under an equally quarrelsome Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif. Bhutto's apparent lack of political will to resolve the sticky Sindhi-Mohajir problem in Sindh resulted in a spiral of killings that has turned Karachi into a "mini-Lebanon." The Mohajirs were with Bhutto in 1988 when she rose to power. But, during these 19 months, things have come to such a pass that the Mohajirs and PPP members have become sworn enemies. The mindless government operation in May, ostensibly to arrest the killers in riots in Hyderabad, resulted in a

massacre of Mohajirs. Subsequently, Bhutto did little to allay the Mohajirs' growing fears that the PPP had joined hands with the chauvinist Sindhis to deny them their due rights.

Equally disturbing were the events that preceded the no-confidence motion brought by the Opposition last November. The event turned out to be a bonanza for horsetraders and money was collected, reportedly even from the well-known heroin traffickers, to buy off National Assembly members. Bhutto's slender victory on that occasion did not bring new strength. Meanwhile, allegations of massive corruption against her ministers, and even her husband, began to make the rounds. While it is not clear how widespread the corruption actually was, the Pakistanis have little doubt of the substance of the charges, and even if they are mere slanders, it is unlikely that Bhutto or any of her party bigwigs could make a dent in what the people have come to believe. It is a political failure, as in Sindh, for which she has to pay dearly.

## Other dangers ahead

These and many other events had vitiated the political atmosphere badly. Bhutto's willingness to go along with the International Monetary Fund prescription of economic austerity, pushed through her coterie of Harvard-trained economic experts, has not only undermined her party's manifesto completely, but has worsened the living conditions of the common man. In the process, the country has become firmly caught in a debt trap and the IMF is continuing with demands for "structural adjustments" which will bring the economy to complete ruin (see p. 11). During Bhutto's 19 months of democratic leadership, the food situation has deteriorated, and law and order has hit the nadir, while the narcotics traders, whom she had promised to eradicate, have flourished as never before.

Yet another danger was looming ahead. On May 13 the Senate adopted the Shariat Bill, and it was scheduled to be presented in the National Assembly this month, where it would have passed and become law. The Shariat Bill would supplant the Constitution with the orthodox Sunni interpretation of the Shariah, as the highest law of the land, and subject each citizen to a code of conduct derived from it. Under the Shariat Bill, most of the Islamic sects, including the Shias, who are 20% of Pakistan's population, are considered heretics. There is hardly any doubt that passage of the bill would have unleashed sectarian riots the likes of which Pakistan has never seen before.

That the Shariat Bill was not stopped is yet another example of the colossal failure of the Bhutto administration, and one weighted with irony. On May 13, after sheer negligence allowed the bill to get through the Senate, Bhutto said she "would not like to go down in history as the one who opposed the Shariat Bill." In 1986 when the Senate had adopted the same bill, Gen. Mohammed Zia ul-Haq's handpicked Majlis-e-shoora, allegedly loaded with born-again Muslims, simply ignored it. But the Bhutto government fell into the

trap of trying to compromise with a fundamentally unconstitutional measure, apparently without really thinking through what it would mean for the country.

### **Collision course with Army, bureaucracy**

All this and more led the government directly on the path of confrontation with the other two power blocs in the country: the bureaucracy, headed by the President, and the Army. After the Hyderabad massacre, President Ishaq Khan called a press conference where he strongly condemned the government for the mindless operation and also spoke pointedly of the growing corruption and nepotism. There is every reason to believe that he was ready to dismiss the government at that point but didn't, because neither the Army nor the United States was ready to accede to this drastic step.

The Bhutto administration's confrontation with the Army came when Chief of Staff Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg was asked to restore law and order in Sindh after the state PPP government had aggravated the situation to a point of no return. Bhutto and her party members labeled the Mohajirs as terrorists and gave the PPP activists a clean chit, when everyone in Karachi and Hyderabad knows that both were equally responsible for the growing law and order problems. If the Mohajirs are trading illegal arms, so are the PPP members; if the Mohajirs are dealing drugs, so are the PPP members. Bhutto's petty partisanship only made things worse.

When the Army took over the streets, Bhutto wanted the troops to arrest all those whom the PPP government in Sindh fingered. The culprits would be subsequently handed over to the nation's courts for trial. Foreseeing a design by the PPP government to eradicate the Mohajir toughs, leaving the PPP goons in control, the Army refused to comply, and demanded special authority to arrest all lawbreakers and try them in military courts.

Bhutto opposed the demand. It became evident that the President would have to decide how the resulting deadlock between the government and the Army was to be resolved. So far, no decision has been made, but it is clear that the Army grew decidedly critical of the PPP government.

### **Democracy back in deep-freeze?**

Benazir Bhutto described her government's sudden dismissal as "unconstitutional and wholly illegal," and expressed apprehension over the President's promise to hold a free and fair election. "If the democratic process is not restored, I see dark days ahead," she added. At this writing, Bhutto is in Karachi, where a meeting of her party's Central Committee will decide what steps to take.

Although troops were deployed to protect certain key government installations in Islamabad following the dismissal of the duly elected government, the country remained calm and business carried on in a normal manner. Within 24 hours the troops were withdrawn by the caretaker cabinet.

Whether the democratic process in Pakistan has again

been put in the deep-freeze by the President's decision—no doubt with the military's concurrence—to halt the drift, remains to be seen. If the composition of the caretaker cabinet and the interim governors' roster is any indication, the kind of organized revenge-taking one might expect with an anti-democratic thrust does not seem to be in the cards.

### **The caretaker cabinet**

As of this writing, Pakistan's caretaker cabinet consists of eight persons. The prime minister's job went to Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, a Cambridge University-educated landlord from Sindh and co-founder of the PPP, who is a bitter critic of Bhutto's government. Once a close comrade of Benazir Bhutto's father, the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Jatoi was also chief minister of Sindh and acting leader of the PPP during the 1970s. In 1986 Jatoi fell out with Bhutto and left the party.

During the 1988 election, Jatoi's effort to get elected to the National Assembly from Sindh under the banner of the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) failed in the face of a PPP wave in the state, but he was later accommodated by his old friend, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, who got Jatoi elected to the National Assembly from Kot Addu, Punjab in a by-election. During the 11 years of military rule (1977-88) under General Zia ul-Haq, Jatoi had remained an active figure with the Movement for Restoration of Democracy, a PPP-dominated alliance, but had developed close ties to the military rulers.

The second most important individual in the cabinet is the former chief minister of Punjab, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, a Punjabi landlord who was also a very close associate of the late Z.A. Bhutto. Khar, who had left the PPP earlier, came back into the fold recently and is still a member of the party. Though recently he raised a voice of dissent against Benazir Bhutto, he hedged his bets and stayed with the party. Khar is considered a shrewd politician with close links to the military.

Others in the cabinet include Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, an emigré from India following partition of the sub-continent; Elahi Bux Soomro, a former member of the Muslim League who had earlier served in the late General Zia's caretaker cabinet; and Chaudhury Shujaat Hussain, a tough-talking Punjabi landlord and a close associate of the dismissed Punjab chief minister and IJI leader Nawaz Sharif.

While, except for Khar and Jatoi, the interim cabinet members are all associated with the previous military regime, the selection of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi as prime minister and the inclusion of Ghulam Mustafa Khar at all suggests that the legacy of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto has not acted as a barrier. It is expected that these former Bhutto colleagues will not be involved in revenge-seeking against either Bhutto or her mother, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, who were once their comrades-in-arms. Yet another former Bhutto colleague, Jam Sadig Ali, has been made caretaker chief of the volatile Sindh province.