

Soviet territory must not be off-limits

The NATO modernization debate: There's a solution to the dilemma! By Michael Liebig.

The Bush administration, along with the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom, has been playing up the issue of West Germany's immediate agreement to implement a "modernization" of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons, as *the* key question in the future of the Alliance. The "modernization question" dominated not only this year's Wehrkunde defense roundtable in Munich, but also U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's visit to Bonn, and the meeting in Frankfurt between Thatcher and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. From the Anglo-American side, the Kohl government's refusal to immediately agree to modernize, was held up as "proof" of West Germany's unreliability as a NATO member.

Characteristically, Anglo-American circles are talking only about the necessity not to postpone modernization of *ground-based* tactical nuclear systems—i.e., the successors to the Lance missiles. But neither the Lance, with a range of 120 kilometers, nor its hotly contested successor, the FOTL/AMS, with a range of 450 kilometers, can even reach the territory of the Soviet Union! All ground-based nuclear missiles and cruise missiles with a range of over 500 kilometers are banned by the U.S.-Soviet INF treaty. *Airborne* nuclear systems, on the other hand, are not covered by the INF treaty, and are quite capable of reaching Soviet territory!

So, why have the Anglo-Americans been putting up such a fuss about modernizing the Lance missiles? Mrs. Thatcher, at her meeting with Kohl in Frankfurt, went so far as to declare that "the security of future generations" would be gravely endangered if West Germany says "no" to the "Lance modernization."

To put it quite bluntly: The entire "modernization question," as it has been played up by Anglo-American circles, is *not* aimed at solving one of NATO's vital security problems, nor is it aimed at strengthening the Alliance; on the contrary, its intent is to weaken the Alliance. The "modernization fracas" has been pushed by the same Anglo-American Establishment circles who are also out to force the "downgrading" of NATO. It is a typical diplomatic *pretext*, which has been inserted onto the scene consciously and deliberately, in order to justify the stepwise erosion of NATO. Another concrete and practical outcome of the "modernization debate," is the

destabilization of the pro-NATO Kohl government, bringing with it a strengthening of West Germany's pro-neutrality forces—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Social Democrats (SPD), the Green party, the so-called Republicans, and the "Genscherites" within Kohl's own Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The "modernization debate" is thus paving the way for a "new order" in Continental Europe, along the lines of the Kissinger Plan.

Inside West Germany, there are two diametrically opposed motivating reasons behind Germany's refusal to agree to modernize the Lance missiles. One grouping, which we have already mentioned—Genscher, CDU "Genscherites," the Greens, the Republicans—want a de-nuclearized Federal Republic of Germany in order to appease Moscow and in order to impose West German neutrality. This grouping's ability to pressure and blackmail the administration, combined with Kohl's own personal weaknesses and the prospect of Gorbachov's upcoming visit to Bonn, is responsible for Kohl's confused and wishy-washy behavior on the modernization question.

The second grouping inside West Germany stands firmly by NATO; however, it perceives, with varying degrees of clarity, Anglo-American circles' true intention behind the debate, namely, a downgrading of NATO in the context of the global condominium with Moscow. The position of this grouping is aptly illustrated by a paper on the modernization question presented by Alfred Dregger, chairman of the CDU/CSU, on Feb. 2. Dregger wants to postpone a modernization decision on the successor to the Lance missile until 1992, but does *not* want a "triple-zero option" for ground-based nuclear systems with ranges up to 500 kilometers. The major burden of NATO's undisputably necessary nuclear deterrence capability, he argues, must be with airborne nuclear standoff weapons. Therefore, it is not a question of *whether* NATO's nuclear systems in Europe should be modernized, but of *how* they will be modernized.

The question as to whether modernization should focus on ground-based or airborne tactical nuclear weapons, is by no means a purely technical one. It goes to the very heart of the problem of nuclear deterrence: Are nuclear weapons a threat to the aggressor, or do they threaten the aggressor's

victims? And herein lies the perfidy of the Anglo-American condominium with Moscow, in the form of the INF treaty, since the treaty has already *removed* precisely those ground-based nuclear weapons which were threatening Soviet territory! What now remains in Europe, are NATO ground-based nuclear weapons which could only be deployed against the nations of Eastern and Central Europe—especially against West Germany itself. In the event of Soviet aggression against Western Europe, NATO would have to use its ground-based nuclear weapons against Germans, Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks, across whose territory the Red Army would be moving in order to attack Western Europe.

Only the Soviet leadership—and not the Honeckers, the Jakes, or the Jaruzelskis—would ever risk an attack on Western Europe. But ever since the INF treaty has been in force, the Soviet Union's own territory has lain beyond the range of NATO's ground-based nuclear weapons—modernized or not! That is the underlying reason why those Germans who firmly back NATO, are less than enthusiastic about modernization.

The way out of the "modernization dilemma"—insofar as it concerns actual problems of NATO's deterrence—must therefore be to modernize those NATO nuclear weapons which can effectively deter the Soviet Union itself.

Airborne nuclear standoff weapons offer just such a potential. These include missiles, or cruise missiles, which are carried by fighter-bombers (such as the Tornado or the Mirage 2000), and are launched at a distance from their target. The range of the standoff weapon is limited only by the carrying capacity of the "mother plane," making its effective range the sum of both. Standoff weapons make it possible to attack targets without ever exposing the combat aircraft carrying them to the target's anti-aircraft defense. The French Air Force already possesses a standoff weapon called ASMP with a range of 120 kilometers. The U.S. Air Force is currently developing a standoff weapon called SRAM (Short Range Air Launched Missile) with a range of about 200 kilometers, which, in collaboration with Great Britain, is to be boosted to over 400 kilometers. In addition to these ballistic missiles, the U.S. Air Force is working on a tactical cruise missile. NATO already has available an adequate number of carrier aircraft which can penetrate enemy defenses—especially the West German Air Force's Tornado fighter-bomber. Beyond that, West Germany, in cooperation with France, ought to get to work on the further modernization of the French ASMP standoff weapon.

Thus, if the actual issue at hand is the modernization of NATO's nuclear weapons, then the development and production of such airborne standoff weapons must be energetically pursued. Indeed, this solution to the "modernization dilemma" corresponds to NATO's overall military and political necessities. Anyone, on the other hand, who acts to prolong the current "modernization fracas," is merely revealing his intentions against NATO as a whole, and against West Germany in particular.

'Paddock Plan' for is back on the U.S.

by D.E. Pettingell

The "Paddock Plan," named after its main author, American agronomist William C. Paddock, has been brought to the center of U.S.-Mexican relations. In August 1980, the Mexican press published front-page stories on Lyndon H. LaRouche's charges of how then-National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was trying to implement the Paddock Plan, a blueprint for genocide against the Mexican people.

The original impetus for LaRouche's charges were statements made by Paddock in the 1975-76 period that "the Mexican population must be reduced by half. Seal the border and watch them scream." Asked how population would fall so drastically, Paddock explained at the time: "By the usual means—famine, war, and pestilence."

On Jan. 26, the Washington-based Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), founded by Paddock in 1979, proposed just that. In a 90-page report titled "Ten Steps to Securing America's Border," which has been widely distributed in Congress and sent to the Bush administration, FAIR argues that closing the U.S.-Mexican border "is not as difficult as it might seem at first." FAIR proposes to build a "sunken fence" along the "most heavily crossed stretches" of the border, identified as the areas near the cities of San Diego, California and El Paso, Texas.

As the accompanying drawing shows, the "sunken fence" is a concrete wall topped by a metal fence "curved at the top" to make it impossible for Mexicans to climb. On the side facing Mexico, FAIR proposes to dig a ditch 12 feet deep. "The concrete construction and dirt backfill of the sunken fence makes it virtually impossible to cut," the report states. FAIR proposes that the construction of the sunken wall be done by the Army Corps of Engineers at a cost of \$3 million per mile. Where does FAIR plan to find the financial resources for sealing the border? Very simple: From the Mexicans crossing "legally." "By collecting a \$2 toll from each land border crosser," says FAIR, the U.S. government can raise over \$500 million a year.

In addition to the wall, FAIR has called for increased use of electronic sensors, lighting, night-vision devices, helicopters, all-terrain vehicles, horses, and dogs along the border, and permanent highway check-points in U.S. border states to catch illegals. On the U.S. side, FAIR demands that the