

EIR Books

In Anthony Blunt, we trust

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Mask of Treachery

by John Costello

William Morrow & Company, Inc., New York,
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To the degree the relevant portions of our official and unofficial establishment have moved toward what is commonly identified as pragmatic "pluralism," and therefore away from the principles of natural law and reason upon which the United States was founded, the relevant agencies of the U.S., like Britain, have become incapacitated in respect to fulfillment of their national security functions.

This is the most general cause of serious breakdowns in U.S. national-security's counterintelligence functions. There is a second, somewhat related difficulty, more specific in nature, but of approximately comparable importance. The celebrated cases of Britain's Anthony Blunt, H.A.R. "Kim" Philby, Donald Maclean, and Anthony Burgess illustrate both classes of problems.

On this account, John Costello's new book, *Mask of Treachery*, is to be welcomed.

Author-researcher Costello has not set the story quite right, but the book covers and enlarges the established terrain of the Blunt story, and affords the reader a better appreciation

of the enormous damage done by Blunt than has been previously available in the public domain.

The largest flaw in Costello's account is summed up in a single word, "Trust," as that term was employed in the vocabulary of Soviet Cheka chief Feliks Dzerzhinsky. Perhaps the author would acknowledge the importance of that feature of the case; we concede that mentioning that connection places the incautious author in the target-area of extraordinary unpleasantness. For those who prefer to avoid such risks, the legend which places Philby and Blunt among the biggest Soviet fish inside British intelligence may not be truthful, but it is a tale whose telling brings one many cozy evenings this side of one's tomb.

To the degree we might obtain profit while subscribing to the myth of Philby's and Blunt's relative position as the "big Soviet fish reeled in," the author's work is of exemplary usefulness. No review could do justice to the full scope of the material covered in that text and its appended materials; better the reviewer select one or more of the topics within the text.

So, we shall view several selections among the book's points. The center of our attention shall be matters emphasized in Chapter 12 (pp. 219-229). Our interest shall be the first of the two topics identified at the outset of this review. Our subject is the fact that a certain social type, usefully termed "the anti-authoritarian personality," is always inherently a national-security *risk*, as the comparison of Anthony Blunt with Bertrand Russell illustrates the type in view.

The issue which Costello attacks in this chapter, is the hoax Blunt perpetrated in his public utterances of 1979, after he had been exposed publicly as a former Soviet spy. Costello reports:

At his carefully staged press conference in 1979, Blunt appeared before the television cameras in a rumpled tweed jacket. On the only occasion he was called to account for his treachery before the bar of British public opinion, the silver-haired old English gentlemen offered the nation an offhand apology for what he admitted was his "appalling mistake."

... His invocation of the Official Secrets Act constraints was his excuse for being conveniently vague, particularly regarding the events that had overtaken him over forty years earlier when he had shortsightedly succumbed to appeals of his best friend: "to try to help anti-Fascism which was obviously the issue of the moment."

... Andrew Boyle told reporters afterward ... that [his book *The Fourth Man*] ... had finally forced the [British] government to disclose Blunt's treachery. Boyle was one of the few not taken in by Blunt's claim that he had not become a Marxist until the mid-thirties.

A few pages later, Costello's comes to this point again:

[Goronwy] Rees graduated from Oxford in 1930, before the major political upheavals of the decade. His communism and Blunt's therefore had nothing to do with saving democracy from Fascism. The motives that impelled Rees toward Marxist philosophy, as in Blunt's case, appear to have had more in common with intellectual snobbery than with direct political action. Both discovered in Marxism the attraction of a secret shrine of individual rebellion. Their inspiration appears to have been more opportunistic—the need to ensure their membership among the intellectual elite by becoming the clandestine outriders of the Communist revolution.

Costello's arraying of evidence to such effect is most persuasive. It detracts nothing from his work, that on this point he is not ploughing virgin wasteland. The track of the British establishment young darlings turned Soviet spies dates to the mid-1920s, to the rising young dissolutes attracted to the circles of the older generation of high-flown Fabians of the likes of Bertrand Russell, Aleister Crowley, and H.G. Wells.

This new generation of upper- and middle-class academic intellectuals was deeply imbued with that downward spiralling cultural pessimism which gripped a dismayed British youth whose friends and older brothers Field Marshal Haig had draped as corpses upon the barbed wire of the World War I battlefields.

As Bertrand Russell put the point in 1951:

... when I first became politically conscious Gladstone and Disraeli still confronted each other amid Victorian solidities, the British Empire seemed eternal, a threat to British naval supremacy was unthinkable, the country was aristocratic, rich and growing richer. ... For an old man, with such a background, it is difficult to feel at home in a world of ... American supremacy.

Like the leading German recruits to the Thule Society's Nazi Party, those from the privileged strata of young educated Britons who drifted variously into fascist or socialist movements, were morally pathologues, wandering in a milieu of eccentric sexual fads, and lurid occultisms varying from cults of the *Bogomil* sort to the outright Satan-worship offered by Crowley and his anthroposophs. On this account, being thus already hardened traitors to Western European civilization, and resentful to the point of envious hatred against the great English-speaking sovereign republic across the Atlantic, it became a relatively small step further to become also traitors to Britain.

It was not Marxism as such which attracted those who fancied themselves in league with Moscow; it was Russian Bolshevism. From the beginning of the Soviet NEP period, when Dzerzhinsky's Trust arrangements were rampant in Moscow's relations with powerful financier interests of the West, through the 1927-29 overthrow of the Comintern oppositionist factions, the Trust-linked Western financiers' influence made Moscow almost as acceptable as a "peace-loving partner" as has been proposed increasingly by most Western industrialized nations' governments and liberal establishments over the course of our own recent four years.

The key to the reactions among the relevant strata of privileged young Britons, as was the case with the rise of communist and fascist parties on the continent, is not the inherent attractive power of communist or fascist doctrines as such. The key is the fact, that under conditions of deepening cultural pessimism, during and following World War I, the influence of the kind of "New Age," or "Age of Aquarius," dogmas associated with the like of Fyodor Dostoevsky, Maxim Gorky, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Aleister Crowley, spread extensively among these strata.

What made Bolshevism and fascism attractive among these depraved types was not any yearning for an instrument of justice, but rather the persuasion that Bolshevism and fascism as the Romulus and Remus of the "dawning of the Age of Aquarius," offered one the means to leave the camp of Christianity for the camp of that Lucifer-Dionysos-Satan they were certain must soon triumph.

The fascist and Bolshevik recruits of this sort, did not become evil because they had become fascists or Bolsheviks; rather, they became fascists or Bolsheviks because

they had already become evil.

So, Costello paints the Anthony Blunt entering Oxford's New College in 1928.

We employ the term "evil" in a very rigorous, specific sense. We do not mean a person who has committed a great amount of sin. We mean the distinction between the person who commits a wicked act, such as robbery, murder, or rape, as an ill-chosen means to gain those objects which may or may not be wicked in themselves, and the person who seeks ends which serve as a pretext for doing evil. We mean, in the latter case, the person whose keenest pleasure is in the sense of doing evil for evil's sake. We include in the class of "evil," that person who, like a parricide, delights in destroying the society which has nurtured him, not with any clear benefit in view except the pleasure of destroying for the sake of the pleasure of destroying.

Above, we promised not to veer into this other topic, but we must make a passing reference to it here. We do not accept the proposition, that Anthony Blunt and "Kim" Philby became traitors in the Soviet service solely because of the complexities of their personal motivations. They could not have functioned in Soviet service as they did, without high-level protection from authorities much more powerful than themselves. The paradigm for this sort of higher authority is "Trust," those powerful interests which yearn for the establishment of the kind of world-federalism which a global power-sharing agreement with Moscow promises to bring about, and see that sort of agreement as the lever by means of which to rid this planet of the institutions of the sovereign nation-state, and of anti-aristocratic institutions of constituency organization under terms of representative self-government.

Yet, that usually avoided feature of the Philby and Blunt cases taken into account, the fact remains that it was the satanic tendencies of their flawed personal character which qualified them as suitable instruments for the role they played. With such proviso, we may limit our attention here to the propositions posed by Costello.

Blunt as a type

The portrait of Anthony Blunt is a picture of a type fairly identified as "the anti-authoritarian personality." He is of the type admired by Hannah Arendt, by Lukacs, Horkheimer, and the evil Adorno, before Arendt's popularized rendering of the Frankfurt School theses on "the authoritarian personality." This type is always a security-risk to any nation.

The dogma of "the authoritarian personality" has two overlapping origins.

In philosophy, it is immediately a product of the influence of Husserl's implicitly satanic dogmas of *phenomenology*, blended with the irrationalist existentialism of Martin Buber and his some-time Nazi-sympathizer co-thinkers, Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. By way of Heidegger's participating parentage, the Frankfurt School's "authoritarian per-

sonality" dogma is step-brother to Karl Rahner's "liberation theology," and kindred "charismatic" cult-movements in the name of religion.

Politically, this Frankfurt School project was conceived as a means to destroy those features of the Western European cultural matrix which were the principal obstacles to the introduction of Bolshevism, or something akin to it, among the nations of the West. Hence, on this account, the advocacy of the "authoritarian personality" dogma is a treasonous intent *per se*.

In practice, that dogma has been treasonous. By the latter part of the 1950s, the Anglo-American occupying authorities' fostering of this "authoritarian personality" dogma as part of the "democratic reeducation" of Germans had accumulated effects to the point that Frankfurt School influences of Horkheimer and Adorno were employed directly to transform the young organization the Social-Democratic Party, SDS, directly into a New Left pioneering project. With aid of elements of the Socialist International engaged in fostering this transformation of Germany's SDS into a New Left movement, the U.S. arms of the Socialist International, including the League for Industrial Democracy (LID) and its student branch, appropriately acronymed SLID, the New Left disease was spread into the United States, and the outgrowth of this was named, quite shamelessly, SDS.

The dogma of the New Left was purely and simply Adorno's "authoritarian personality" dogma. Any personality who was self-governed by reason, and associated belief in some natural law more efficient than caprices of mere popular opinion, was classed as such an "authoritarian personality."

Thus, the dogma of the "authoritarian personality" aimed directly at the goal its pro-Bolshevist fathers had intended for it: the virtual outlawing of the personality-type which is the characteristic, moral, patriotic personality of Western European Judeo-Christian civilization. This dogma of the "authoritarian personality," was and is Bolshevik propaganda transformed into form of warfare, cultural warfare against the "cultural matrix" of Western European civilization.

The treason of Anthony Blunt and "Kim" Philby defines them as the moral type of the "new man" which the dogma of the "authoritarian personality" is designed to bring into being as the characteristic, or at least dominant social type of Western nations.

As we emphasized at this outset of this report, the question posed by the Blunt and Philby cases is, how is it possible that such inherently treasonous social types of "anti-authoritarian personalities" are enabled not only to pass successfully the relevant national-security screenings, but slither into the highest places of national intelligence establishments? Again, Costello's observations are useful.

The "ivory tower" rebellion of Rees and the Oxbridge intellectuals of his generation who became

Marxists flourished at the end of the twenties because of the "peculiar condition," as Rees called it, of the English intellectual establishment. "To be a Communist, with the declared intention of subverting and destroying the fabric of the existing society, was to occupy a respectable and respected position," Rees wrote. His contemporaries saw that "the difference between a communist and a liberal was merely one of those differences of opinion which arise between the best of friends and which both find mutually stimulating." . . . The only issue was one of method.

Here lies the source of the functional disorientation shown by relevant security agencies. In the U.S.A., as in Britain, to the extent that the heritage of what is termed often "nineteenth-century British philosophical radicalism" is deemed an acceptable set of security values, the perceived difference between a modern liberal and an active security risk is not a qualitative one, but essentially one of degree. Outwardly, the values openly expressed by an active security risk will be consistent with the range of values expressed by a significant number of liberals who are not security risks.

True, as we have stressed, the incidence of those from Oxbridge circles of the mid-1920s or slightly later, who turned up as openly or covertly Communists or fascists during the 1930s and later, is a product of the *Weltschmerz* pervading that stratum, and of the spread of "New Age" cultishness during that period.

However, the roots of what Costello cites Rees as naming "the 'peculiar condition' of the English intellectual establishment" of the 1920s is a state of affairs found widespread as early as the rise of Hell-Fire Club liberalism under Horace Walpole, which was, in turn, an echo of the exotic ideas and practices among the circles of Sir Francis Bacon and his secretary Thomas Hobbes. David Hume's popularization as a writer, and position in the Edinburgh branch of the British Secret Intelligence Service was a reflection of the heyday of Walpole liberalism. The more openly radical turn in Hume's work during the period Adam Smith became his acolyte, and, later Lord Shelbourne's agent, reflects the continuation of this sort of trend of rise of empiricist liberalism. Shelbourne's agent Jeremy Bentham, and the British East India Company's Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, James Mill, and Bertrand Russell's un-godfather, John Stuart Mill, represent the progress of progressive degeneration of the British intellectual establishment's radical forms of liberalism through the emergence of Oxford's John Ruskin, and so on. Russell, Crowley, and H.G. Wells during the 1920s typify the cultural bridge linking the generation influenced directly by J.S. Mill and Ruskin to the Fabianized strata of the British intellectual establishment of the 1920s and 1930s.

Had not there been this process of successive steps of conditioning of the British intellectual establishment, and

population more generally, over no less than two centuries, the proliferation of so many cultural pervers from among the British intellectuals of the 1920s would not have been possible, even given the depressive circumstances following World War I. Rees's point, referenced by Costello, is extremely important; it requires such amplification.

The moral flaw in liberalism is axiomatic: It allows no firm moral values, but only more or less arbitrary ones, in the included sense that a moral value upheld merely because it is customary does not represent an intelligible sort of commitment. This axiomatic flaw in liberalism is the key to the way in which the dogma of the "authoritarian personality" functions in practice.

Adorno's and Arendt's dogma simply turns liberalism inside-out. Where liberalism says that an intelligible form of moral certainties is an arbitrary choice, not a necessary one, Adorno et al. say that whoever insists on ordering their own belief and practice according to intelligible sorts of moral principles is a bad person, to be put into the same classification of "extremist" as the Nazis. Of course, it is absurd to suggest that Adolf Hitler and his immediate circle were advocates of natural law or a notion of reason based upon intelligible moral principles, but when did Adorno, et al. ever reject a thought merely because it was patently an absurd one?

We may insist that the "authoritarian personality" dogma is not merely a treasonous dogma, but an absurd one. Since the purpose of Adorno et al., like Hitler's Nazis, is the triumph of the absurdities of the irrational will over reason, to inform an Adorno that his argument is an absurd sort of sophistry would merely convince him that it were the sort of dogma which his adult life was dedicated to promoting. Like Hitler, Adorno and his leftist ilk are dedicated to the triumph of the absurd over sanity.

"All is permitted," the Nazis proclaimed, echoing Nietzsche. Not only does Adorno insist, also, that "All is permitted"; Adorno insists that anyone who resists that standard of conduct as a potential tyrant who must be destroyed.

British liberalism is a British gentleman diddling the downstairs maid for his own pleasure. All such is allowed, on condition that customary appearances are maintained. The devotee of the "authoritarian personality" dogma, is a homosexual gentleman, who shudders in horror at the thought of the touch of a woman's body, who rapes his ten-year-old niece for no motive but the perverse pleasure of doing an evil thing. The latter gentleman will damn anyone who interferes with his act, as oppressing the perpetrator's "own free will."

Such an "anti-authoritarian personality" would betray Britain to Moscow for no deeper reason than enjoying the pleasure of doing an evil thing, and perhaps because, also, like Bertrand Russell, he enjoys betraying Britain to Moscow as an act against the hated United States.

So, reading Martin Buber, one thinks that the chief cause

of his resentment of Hitler's anti-Semitism, is that this denied him the company of his co-thinkers Jaspers and Heidegger in boosting the Nazi cause, or even of wearing the swastika brassard himself. Such evil as Buber's requires plain speech, even if speaking plainly is very unpleasant.

Rules for national security

The case of the "anti-authoritarian personality" begs comparison with the lesson of Communist-directed guerrilla warfare. Once the armed insurgents reach the level of having one-tenth the strength of the threatened nation's regular armed forces, and there are also no fewer than 70 to 100 political supporters of the guerrilla cause for each armed insurgent, the existence of the threatened nation is in imminent jeopardy.

A people which is morally corrupted—or, the same thing, culturally degraded—has no national security protection against Communist insurgency.

By and large, national-security screening of prospective and actual occupants of highly sensitive positions, has the function of preventing security risks or emotionally unstable persons from infesting a small minority of the total number of adult work-places in the society at large. As long as the majority accepts the use of certain moral values and related standards as the yardsticks for security screening, national security is feasible.

What happens, then, if a very large minority of the intellectual establishment adopts a form of liberalism which borders on susceptibility to support of a dogma such as Adorno's and Arendt's "authoritarian personality" deviltry? What if, a majority, or a very large minority of that establishment find their differences with the converts to Adorno's cult to be "merely one of those differences of opinion which arise among the best of friends and which both find mutually stimulating"? To the degree that nation's intellectual establishment is able to impose its inclinations on the policies of government, that nation has no effective national security.

Putting aside the issue of powerful "Trust"-like interests in Britain and elsewhere, no one who has studied the pattern of British intellectuals turned Soviet spies overlooks the fact that many covered up for these spies because the traitors were protected by the prevailing instinct of the intellectual establishment during the relevant period of time.

A nation which is not dominated by social strata committed to clear and intelligible sorts of cultural and related moral values, is already as good as doomed to defeat by the first credible adversary who resorts to the methods of cultural warfare plotted against Western civilization by the likes of Adorno and Arendt. So, the United States is being destroyed from the inside today.

The remedy for our resulting condition ought to be obvious. As one completes the reading of Costello's book, a sense of the urgency of effecting such a change overwhelms one.

Deadly poker, or we bet your life

by John Grauerholz, M.D.

Doctors of Deceit and the AIDS Epidemic: A View From the Inside

by Gus G. Sermos

GGP Publishing, Jackson, Mississippi, 1988

53 pages paperbound, \$5.95.

If you were to suddenly realize that you had become involved in a massive plot which would result in the death of millions of people, and that this plot was being carried out by those to whom the potential victims had entrusted their lives, what would you do? Speak up or shut up? Lie low, or go with the flow? This book is the product of a man caught in such a situation, or as he succinctly states it, "I am a witness; this is my testimony."

Gus G. Sermos was a Public Health Adviser and AIDS researcher at the Centers for Disease Control, who, according to *The Miami Herald*, "labored for 2½ years with scant assistance and considerable resistance from the state to document the burgeoning epidemic of acquired immune-deficiency syndrome (AIDS) in Florida." For his troubles he was fired and stripped of benefits to which he was entitled for no legitimate reason.

For all that has happened to him and his family as a consequence of his refusal to compromise his responsibilities in accordance with the official "line," this book is not the "complaint of a disgruntled former employee." Rather, using the same keen intelligence and observational skills which he brought to bear on documenting and reporting on AIDS and other diseases, Gus Sermos describes the explosive evolution of AIDS in Florida and the criminally negligent response of state and federal health authorities to the epidemic.

As any good expert witness, he educates his audience (jury) so that they understand the basis on which he arrives at his opinions and the thought processes underlying his conclusions. In fact, the book is one of the most accessible expositions of the basic principles of public health and epi-