

important matters with far greater emotional and intellectual detachment than perhaps any other international public figure of this period of time. I am not obliged, as most members of the establishment currents are, to contort my mind into the state required to rationalize support for a foolish policy currently in vogue among either a current within the establishment, or the establishment as a whole. As long as I take the personal risk I incur so, I am free to call the shots as I see them. It is a hazardous profession, but the only one which permits one to view events with a clear head.

Implications of 1983

The "transitional period," from the day after the election, until the next inauguration, will be one of the most dangerous periods in modern history. If Michael Dukakis were elected, most Americans, especially the poor and the minorities generally, would wish the proposed permanent colony on Mars were already accepting immigrants. The looming new international financial crisis, the deepening economic crisis generally, the global food-crisis to worsen over the coming two years, and the dangerous situation in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean generally, indicate what will confront the next President, beginning in the transitional period.

During this period, the U.S. and other governments will be faced with crises far worse than the Soviet bluff of late 1983. If the next government reacts no better, or even worse, than the U.S. government reacted to the bluff of 1983, the U.S. situation will deteriorate more or less irreversibly; there might be no next election in 1992.

This will not be a happy period for Moscow. It might possibly come to dominate the world by 1992, or some time near to that. However, the internal self-destruction of the Soviet empire is already in progress; if Moscow continues to play out the classical tragedy in progress there now, Moscow is doomed only soon after Israel is obliterated by Middle East developments which will assuredly occur were Dukakis elected.

Mainland China is in a parallel state of internal crisis. Entire Third World nations, such as Uganda, are presently vanishing from the political map, biologically. Presently, hundreds of millions of deaths from famine and related causes, are to be expected around this planet, and surely so were Dukakis elected. We are looking into the red eyes and black soul of a hideous monster, the prospect, that over the coming years, this entire planet might be plunged into a New Dark Age.

Presuming Bush were elected, this is the nature of the situation which confronts his administration. If he reacts in a centrist way, his performance will be poorer than the referenced 1983-86 response to Soviet bluffs by the Reagan administration. It is therefore urgent now, that the 1983 fairytale from London be seen as the nonsense it is, in order that the next President not repeat the same kind of blunder, with global results akin to the final scene of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*.

Autumn Forge: Will NATO maneuvers be

by Dean Andromidas

Since Sept. 12, NATO has been holding its Autumn Forge series of military exercises, which are scheduled to be completed by the end of November. Two of the most important of these were the American Reforger (Return of Forces to Germany) and Certain Challenge, the annual field training exercise of the U.S. Army Europe with the participation of the West German Army, the Canadian Army in Europe and elements of the Danish and French Armies. Cold Fire, the annual exercise of all the NATO air forces in Central Europe, was held concurrently.

This year's exercises occur in an atmosphere of unprecedented political and economic pressure on the Atlantic Alliance. Almost two years of arms-control talks have already led to the withdrawal of American Cruise and Pershing II missiles, fueling doubts about the American commitment to maintain its troops and air forces, if not its commitment to the defense of Europe. If talks between Washington and Moscow had not left doubts, the continued economic crisis and budget cuts have. Despite NATO Supreme Commander Gen. John L. Galvin's assertion that Reforger will be held "every year into the foreseeable future," rumors in the field among American troops were that this year's exercise would be the last—the future ones falling victim to congressional budget cutters.

With the ink hardly dry on the signatures to the INF treaty, the Soviet propaganda machine and its allies in the peace movement and Russian lobby in the West, have targeted NATO conventional forces, particularly NATO air forces and maneuvers of all kinds. *Krasnaya Zvezda* (*Red Star*), the official daily of the Soviet military, charged in language not seen in the last several years, that Autumn Forge was "provocative," with its exercises being held "dangerously close to the boundaries of the Warsaw Pact." On Oct. 14, East Germany's Communist Party paper, *Neues Deutschland*, attacked NATO's Autumn Forge exercises as a violation of the agreements of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe and a threat to world peace. *Neues Deutschland's* concern with world peace has hardly prevented the Warsaw Pact's own exercises from being carried out since September throughout East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslova-

this year's the last?

kia, and all the western military districts of the Soviet Union.

Despite the uncertainties of the political climate, one thing is certain—the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact has not suffered from either arms-control talks or budget cuts. In fact the Soviet Union's own military modernization and buildup has continued unabated. Moreover, they are in the midst of a fundamental reorganization of their military structure along the lines of special air operations and incorporation of weapons based on new physical principles. It is this context that makes this year's NATO exercises perhaps the most significant. NATO Supreme Commander Gen. John Galvin said at a Reforger press conference that despite economic and political turmoil throughout the East bloc and Soviet Russia, "I see very few weaknesses" in the current ability of the Soviet Union to carry out and sustain offensive operations.

Reforger: reinforcing Western Europe

Reforger exercises the ability of the United States to rapidly reinforce Europe in time of tension, prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Although the reinforcement, aided by prepositioning of almost all necessary equipment in Europe including tanks and armored personnel carriers, could take less than a week, no one entertains the illusion that such a complex maneuver could be held in the heat of battle without encountering almost insurmountable obstacles. Its purpose is to demonstrate a commitment for the reinforcement of Europe by the United States. In his press conference held during the exercise, General Galvin replied to a question on whether Reforger would not fall victim to arms control talks, by stating in unequivocal terms that Reforger would be held every year into the foreseeable future.

Nonetheless, this journalist heard soldiers in the field report that "rumors" in command circles had it that this would be the last, as future exercises would fall victim to budget cuts. Important to note is the fact that the exercise was introduced in 1967 following agreement among West Germany, Great Britain, and the United States authorizing the removal of certain U.S. and British forces from the Federal Republic of Germany.

This year's Reforger troops included the 1st Infantry Di-

vision, based in Fort Riley, Kansas, the 197th U.S. Infantry Brigade, based in Fort Benning, Georgia, and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, based in Fort Bliss, Texas. All these units have a celebrated past in American military history, particularly in the European Theater. Following their arrival in Europe through the port of Rotterdam, they took part in Landesverteidigung 88 where West German forces exercised "host nation support" which included deployment of West German reservists to lend logistical support to U.S. forces. Here American units were transported across the Rhine by military ferries and bridges built by West German military engineering brigades. But their major role was taking part in Certain Challenge.


Certain Challenge

The most dramatic exercise, if not the most important, is the annual autumn field training exercise (FTX). Designated Certain Challenge, this year's FTX was a marked departure from the previous year's exercises. Comprising over 125,000 men from the armies of the United States, West Germany, and Canada, as well as France and Denmark, it was one of the largest ever held. Having been in planning for over two years, it reflected some of the better ideas and programs that were put into effect in the American military when Caspar Weinberger was still heading the Defense Department.

Traditionally Reforger and the accompanying FTX would merely serve as an opportunity to get the soldiers out in the field and go through the motions of deployment. This year's was clearly different, reflecting some of the thinking that has been going on within the U.S. Army and its new doctrine, Air Land Battle. More importantly, it reflected some of the thinking going on within NATO in light of changes within the Soviet army's order of battle under the guidance of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov.

The planners of this year's Certain Challenge had as their purpose the development of an exercise that would give the corps commands, the most important "operational" command level in NATO, an opportunity to actually exercise its responsibilities. This was accomplished through the introduction of "free play" into the exercise. This contrasted sharply with previous years' FTXs, which took on the characteristics of 18th century set-piece battles where they usually followed highly scripted scenarios. The scenario would begin following a period of tensions and build up on both sides of the international border. One would then expect a fictional "Orange" force to conduct a simulated "attack" from the east followed by a simulated "defense" by "Blue" forces in the west, who on Day 3 would automatically conduct a simulated "counterattack." Its most important effect was giving the individual soldier the opportunity to exercise his ability to maneuver his tank, artillery piece, or even his soup kitchen. As far as the ability of the higher command, especially the corps command, the FTX gave very little opportunity to do anything more than act as "battle managers."

Exercise Certain Challenge in West Germany, October 1988




Key

Divisional or regimental front

Forward line of troops

Scale



GOLD FORCES (Southland) VII Corps



1st Infantry Division



4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group



3rd Infantry Division



2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment




12 Panzerdivision (F.R.G.)

In a free play scenario, the only thing fixed was the initial attack. Furthermore, the scenario pitted two equal-sized forces: in this case, the entire Vth Corps reinforced with elements of the Reforger troops, as well as a West German panzer division, against the entire VIIth Corps also reinforced by a German panzer division and a Canadian brigade, as well as elements of Reforger troops (see key). To avoid political controversy—as it was put by General Saint, Commander of U.S. Army Europe—the exercise was configured on a North-South axis with a scenario for a conflict between two fictional countries, Northland (Vth Corps) and Southland (VIIth Corps). In the scenario, Northland is occupying “disputed” territory, and Southland, following a political deliberation, initiates an “attack” to reoccupy territory.







Both the emphasis on corps-level training and this battle

scenario are of interest in light of changes in the Soviet order of battle. The corps formation is the basic operational formation of NATO’s military structure. Each nation deployed in the Central Region has its forces organized in corps. This includes the British Ist Corps, the Netherlands Ist Corps, and Belgian Ist Corps. The United States has two (the Vth and the VIIth), and West Germany has its forces organized in three corps (I, II, and III). Each corps is responsible for a sector of the Central Front along the German-German and the German-Czech border. Furthermore, it has been suggested by leading observers of the Soviet military that they are reorganizing, from a traditional division-army-front structure to a corps-brigade structure similar to Western armies. The development of operational maneuver groups and airborne operations are considered part of this. Therefore, the

MAP 3



BLUE FORCES (Northland) V Corps

- | | |
|---|---|
| 8  8th Infantry Division | 197  197th Separate Infantry Brigade |
| 3  3rd Armored Division | 3  3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment |
| 10  10th Panzerdivision (F.R.G.) | 11  11th Armored Cavalry Regiment |


exercise of corps command is crucial.

By contrast, the fictional political scenario, in the view of this author who has had no access to the actual planners of the exercise, is typical of limited war doctrines still floating around NATO circles. This author believes that it reflects thinking that has been expressed, that the Soviets would take a limited action, an occupation of the City of Hamburg, for example, as a military provocation to cause either a political collapse of NATO or an equally limited military counteraction. It would seem from the scenarios that a "limited military action" was executed in Certain Challenge; in this case Southland initiated an attack on Northland who had been occupying "disputed territory."

If that was the case, Certain Challenge held out some interesting surprises. In the two free play engagements where

The zone of the exercise

MAP 4



Southland initiated the attack, against a Northland prepared to meet that attack, Northland appeared to get the upper hand, a stunning demonstration of the fallacy of "limited set-piece" engagements. But more on this below. The free play also held out some surprises from the corps headquarters staff, down to the individual soldier, whose own deployments corresponded more to missions initiated in an unfolding battle than *pro forma* tasks.

Limited engagement disproved

Although it might be too bold to assert that Certain Challenge served as a sort of crucial experiment to show that limited wars or engagements are simply not compatible with the natural laws of war, this author feels the argument can be made. The exercise zone straddled the West German states of Hessen, Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland Palatinate, and northern Bavaria in the Central Region of the Federal Republic of Germany. The zone (see Map 4) is amid six major cities with a regional population of over 15 million people. The main "battle" takes place between the cities of Würzburg and Nuremberg.

Maps 1, 2, and 3 are derived from the official maps of the exercise. The first depicts the opening engagement, where

NATO Supreme
Commander Gen. John
Galvin, at the Autumn
Forge exercises.

Dean Andromidas



Southland attacks Northland. The second shows the near-encirclement of Southland by an immediate counterattack by Northland, and the third is the end of the second engagement held in the second week of the exercise.

Map 1

Both corps are deployed on their respective side of the forward line of troops (FLOT). Southland has apparently been given an order by its political leaders to retake the "disputed" territory. It initiates a straightforward two-prong attack along its front. It becomes apparent to Northland that Southland's left wing is the main attacking force, comprising the 12th German Panzer Division and the 4th Canadian Brigade Group, while its right wing, comprising the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Infantry Division, is conducting a secondary or holding action, and one division, the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, is being held in reserve. It also appears that Southland expects Northland to conduct a defensive action in preparation for a counterattack.

Meanwhile, Northland is by no means surprised. It is occupying "disputed" territory, in a dispute that has already led to a mobilization of not only its enemy, Southland, but of course its own forces. Northland is not only expecting an attack, but is already fully mobilized and behind relatively

well prepared positions. The corps staff of Northland, being competent military officers, have made careful dispositions. A glance at the map will show that Northland's right flank is prepared in classic fashion. The principal force here is the 10th German Panzer Division, which has the American 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment conducting a screening operation to its front. The latter's mission is to act as a screening force to "feel out" the enemy's strength. On the left, the principal force is the 3rd Armored Division with the 197th Infantry Brigade and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment on its flanks. It holds the 8th Infantry Division in reserve.

Departing from "set-piece" scenarios, the corps staff dispenses with the defensive action. As soon as it has determined the main axis of Southland's attack, it throws in its reserve division against Southland's left flank. Since Northland was occupying "disputed" territory, it could be said that they were simply renewing their own attack.

Map 2

Northland's flanking maneuver is devastatingly successful. The left flank of Southland's left-wing spearhead is driven back to a point where Northland conducts a classic turning maneuver, driving through Southland's spearhead. By the end of Day 2, a considerable portion of Southland's forces

are about to be encircled. Although Northland's stroke is a classic maneuver, it is also very similar to one of the favorite maneuvers in Soviet tactical doctrine.

On Day 3, Southland conducts a counterattack against the flank of Northland's now turning spearhead. The counterattack, although damaging, fails. Its failure was owed to the simple fact that the counterattack took, as could be expected, a matter of hours to organize and then execute. For every hour Southland is preparing, Northland is not only maintaining the momentum of its attack but is "digging in" preparing defensive positions as it occupies Northland's territory.

This author had the opportunity to have been on the ground at the "point" of Southland's counterattack. Its execution reflected all the esprit and enthusiasm that this author has always seen on NATO maneuvers. It appeared effective and even caught an entire battery of eight in artillery totally by surprise, including a few humble journalists. The "umpires" were not so surprised. The decision was a failure, because Northland held those positions for 18 hours, giving them a tremendous amount of time to dig in.

Days 4 and 5 saw a simulated weekend "truce" and withdrawal to holding areas. This aspect is wholly the result of the fact that these exercises are held in the midst of the West German countryside, one of the most densely populated in the world. That circumstance makes the exercise rather like conducting a "war" involving 125,000 men, in suburban New Jersey!

Map 3

On Monday of Week 2, the truce is broken by Southland once more. In a similar two-prong attack, Southland pushes its left wing forward into the right wing of Northland. Northland this time meets that attack with a defense, falling back into defensive positions. Throwing in its reserves, it breaks through Southland's right flank and initiates another flanking maneuver by Day 3.

It would appear that Southland's two opening attacks failed not because of execution, but simply because they were attacking an enemy in motion protected by prepared defenses.

At first glance the "battle" seemed like two teams on a scrimmage line of a football field, with Northland being the better "team," a view one hopes is not entertained by too many officers. On closer examination, this author feels a fundamental observation can be made. In modern warfare, the margin of success between two opposing forces of equal strength and depth, both being fully mobilized and prepared, is quite small indeed. It is clear that the idea that war would begin only following such a buildup and preparation leaves too little margin for success and too much of a possibility of failure.

It served to underscore two facts concerning the defense

of Europe: 1) the absolute necessity of stationing American Army and Air Forces in the Central Region in view of the massive Soviet superiority; and 2) the fact that the decisive factors in defending the Central Front do not lie simply within the confines of Western Europe, let alone the Federal Republic of Germany. That defense must be premised on NATO's ability to counteract, on a global scale, the full circumference of the Soviet perimeter, thus negating their inherent advantage of having internal lines of supply and great topographic depth, as was demonstrated in the failure of Napoleon, and of the Nazi armies of World War II.

For the same reasons it should be clear that the Soviets, being competent commanders, also would not conduct war planning on such narrow margins. (For full discussion of Soviet airborne operations see *EIR* Vol. 15, No. 38, Sept. 23, 1988, page 30).

On the other hand, on a lower level this type of "free play" held out excellent possibilities for training, with the following being most exemplary:

- *Interoperability among the respective NATO armies.* This was one of the first exercises with multinational forces operating within the same corps command, in this case the 10th German Panzer Division with the Vth Corps (Northland) and the 12th German Panzer Division and the 4th Canadian Brigade Group with the VIIth Corps (Southland). Cooperation apparently worked out with the very characteristic *esprit* within NATO, despite the differences in language, equipment, and procedures.

- *Air Force/Army cooperation.* NATO air forces were conducting their own Cold Fire exercise which interfaced with Certain Challenge. The "free play" held out quite a few surprises for the Air Force-Army interface. Here the "real time" factor or time lag between the time intelligence was received and used for battle mission planning, and then its execution, held out a few surprises as A-10 group attack jet fighters failed to find expected targets or transport planes, and dropped their supplies in empty fields because maneuver units advanced a lot faster than the planning schedules in use.

As with all other military exercises, there were many lessons learned, some as small as field testing a new soup kitchen and rations, all the way up to the more glamorous weapon systems such as the new, very lethal, Apache attack helicopter, the M1 Abrams tank, and Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles. Most of all, they serve as a proving ground for the soldiers to test their abilities and build their morale which is absolutely essential for NATO's preparedness.

If future Reforgers and Certain Challenges fall victim to the budget cutters, the losers are clearly our defense effort. If the rumors heard in the field of this being the "last Reforger" become reality, one can expect a wave of demoralization as during the disastrous days of the Carter administration—a lesson that should be carefully considered in times that are strategically more dangerous than in the late 1970s.