

Moscow aims toward the Balkan flank

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The following analysis was written on Oct. 6, 1988.

In the processes leading into the past week's Moscow developments, nearly all leading intelligence and related sources have been consistently wrong in the most essential features of their forecasts and after-action assessments. The problem so noted admits of a simple characterization: the more our intelligence and related institutions contort themselves, to avoid appearing to adopt a "conspiratorial view of history," the more their comprehension of events resembles the script of a TV soap-opera.

Sometimes, the views transmitted were directly contrary to the bare facts of the matter. More frequently, the current events listed were rightly identified as events, and some of the content of that sort was valuable material; but the attached explanation of the dynamic within the Soviet leadership was something from a Sovietologist's version of "Dallas."

For the latter class of instances, the parable of the bungling physician is suggested. Some of the symptoms which the physician identified actually existed. A short time later, the certificate of death read "cardiac failure"; are not all deaths brought on by heart failure? The pathologist who performed the autopsy knew, that the real cause of the patient's death was a wrong diagnosis by the attending physician.

The following report has two purposes: A) to sum up the recent Soviet developments, indicating their leading significance; B) to attempt to make clear why most reports so far received mis-diagnose the dynamic within the Soviet leadership.

1. What happened in the extraordinary proceedings

Begin with a list of what might be termed "The Andropov-Ogarkov Kindergarten": persons rising to higher and higher positions of power within the Soviet command, whose association with Andropov and Ogarkov dates from a time as early as the wartime Leningrad period. In the significant, if only preliminary restructuring (*perestroika*) of the Soviet command which occurred over the past weekend, this "Kindergarten" consolidated its power greatly.

Its power-bases are chiefly the military and the Chekist apparatus. Ogarkov has a rising "Kindergarten" of his own in the military, while others associated with Andropov in the KGB command dominate the Chekist apparatus as such.

This direction of "restructuring" within the Soviet command has been identical with what I had forecast, during Winter 1985, would be the result of Gorbachov's impending appointment. Which persons from the "Kindergarten's" total roster of 1985 might secure which position, at what date, was all that was open to question then, and the same caution respecting individual personalities must be employed now. With that one qualification, there has been no recent event, nor any since early 1985, which can be considered rightly a causal factor in shaping the form of the restructuring effected during the past weekend's plenary sessions.

In the language of classical tragedy, the collective body of Soviet actors behaved last weekend, as their character already determined the collective fate of the "Kindergarten" back during early 1985.

I will elaborate the relevance of the following, interpo-

lated observation in the closing portion of this report. However, it is useful to append this much here, referencing the allusion to classical tragedy just made, immediately above.

The mastery of a collection of Friedrich Schiller's writings on both history and the composition of classical tragedy, ought to be mandatory for every leading intelligence analyst. Great classical tragedy, that of Aeschylus, Shakespeare, and Schiller, and also, implicitly, Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, is true to history in the sense that Schiller explains the reasons the two must differ in some respects. The analogy is Leonardo da Vinci's and Raphael's use of spherical perspective to paint with greater accuracy than ordinary sense-certainty shows. It is the essence of history which is placed on stage in great tragedy; hence the power of Shakespeare's and Schiller's tragedies in their time. The principles of composition of great classical tragedy, are the true principles of real history's dynamic.

Like actors on the classical tragedy's stage, the leading Soviet actors of this period are in the grip of a force which dominates, and usually overrides the impulses otherwise arising from interpersonal and related transactions. In the West, the situation of the establishment, governments, and political parties, is constrained analogously, although the imperative supplied by the gripping force differs from Soviet imperatives. It is possible for individual real-life actors, and groups, to control this gripping force by act of will, but the opportunities for doing so are much more narrowly defined than present Western Sovietology presumes. In the main, the personal will affects only the tertiary matters, including the tertiary issues of personal strife between Gorbachov and Ligachov.

This is rather easily recognized if one but looks at the recent [Sept. 30-Oct. 1] weekend's events in the proper perspective. The question becomes, then, not how this or that personality fared, but how the "Kindergarten" fared. By focusing upon the "Kindergarten," rather than its individual members, and seeing the past weekend's events in those corrected terms of reference, our attention is focused upon the pattern of events, not only since March 1985, but since the formal adoption of Andropov as Brezhnev's successor, back in late spring 1982.

Since the *Raskolniki* current in Russian culture, which the *Bolsheviki* represent, rejects Western belief in the individual soul, and believes in the collective soul of the *Rodina*, instead, these Russians are more gripped by their *fate* than the forces of the more individualistic West. In the Bolshevik case, this Russian tendency toward fatalism has been reinforced by the "anti-voluntarist" cult of "objectivity."

Compare the illustrative case of MacArthur's counteroffensive in the Pacific. Japan had an excellent war-plan, but lacked the ability to improvise effectively when MacArthur changed the rules of the game. During the last war, the best Soviet commanders were not as bad as Marshal Montgomery (who would still be regrouping allied forces—perhaps in

western Canada—had he been Supreme Allied Commander); however, the German officer's and non-com's training in improvisation, and the Soviet response to that improvisation, shows us how the Soviet cultural weakness is reflected as a potentially exploitable strategic factor in warfare.

Thus, against a defensive posture by the West, the Soviets have relatively the greatest strategic advantage. Flank them with appropriate strategic improvisations, in general, and successively, and their margin of advantage is significantly reduced. Let them set the agenda, and they have the advantage. Confront them with the unexpected, and they are thrown mentally off-balance. So, to the same effect, the trouble with Soviet agriculture and industry is that they are operated and managed by today's Soviet Russians, whose anti-Western, Dostoevskyan cultural inferiority incapacitates most of them in attempting to deal with technological progress. This same flaw we see in the Russian's work-a-day life, is reflected in the mental processes of those characters from the pages of a Dostoevsky novel, the real-life brothers Karamazov, today's Soviet leadership.

Hence, the current economic trends in North America and Western Europe are sheer lunacy. This is true in many ways, but the relevant consideration here, is the roles of the high-technology independent farmer and small high-technology firms. The crushing of the smaller independent entrepreneurial enterprise, by the food cartels, and so on, is hailed as assuring greater financial efficiency and lower prices. On the contrary, the successes of large U.S. and German enterprises depended upon those small entrepreneurial firms, their vendors, such as the machine-tool shops and related smaller concerns, who did what they did with an efficiency no large enterprise could muster. In the liquidation of such smaller entrepreneurs, here in the U.S.A., and, largely through the role of the supranational Brussels European Commission in Western Europe, we are imitating the Russians at their worst, and our standard of living and productivities will be shaped accordingly.

We resume the summary of the past weekend's developments as such. Although it was not any of the things which most sources suggested, which caused the restructuring done, events did play a crucial part in the timing of the development, and in the choice of immediate mission assigned to the reformed structure.

The October 1988 plenary sessions had been scheduled for more than six months. This was affirmed, even underlined during the sessions earlier this year. Then, during the past month, the information supplied from Moscow was that the sessions were postponed until January 1989. This state of affairs continued until last Wednesday. What caused the sudden reversal, the announcement of the extraordinary plenary sessions?

Trace the itinerary of Yazov. Follow him to the Carpathian "wolf's lair" of the Soviet western command. Note the

military exercise to which no Western observers were invited. Note the emergency meeting of the Warsaw Pact defense ministers. Note, in the same period, the sudden deployment of a major Soviet alert—directed toward the West! In this setting, there is the sudden announcement of the emergency plenary sessions.

Why the alert? Afghanistan? No, that is all prediscounted as of August. Transcaucasia? That, too, is prediscounted. Iran? Less likely than Romania. Flight forward into West Germany, in search of food? That is a possibility, although I think speculative at this time. I think the target is Romania, preparatory to a blow-up of Yugoslavia not far down the line. The Romania option is interesting. Morbid, but interesting. Also, examining this option, if only as an option, is a convenient way of putting the most important features of the extraordinary sessions' timing into perspective.

During the period of the last national elections in Greece, I noted the significance of Papandreou's probable election to be the development of three Soviet strategic options: 1) The targeting of Turkey's membership in NATO; this was borne out by Papandreou's anti-Turkey alliance with Warsaw Pact members Syria and Bulgaria. 2) Soviet Middle East objectives. 3) Most strategically crucial of all, the destabilization of Yugoslavia.

A Soviet operation in Yugoslavia would probably be of the following form:

1) Dividing Yugoslavia three ways: Albania and Kosovo; Croatia and Slovenia tilted traditionally toward the West; Soviet-tilted Serbia allied with Montenegro, with Macedonia tilted toward Serbia-Montenegro, against Croatia and Slovenia. The historically determined lines of cultural division.

2) The Moscow-oriented Serbian military, and the Serbian nationalists moving toward the options of a Serb-dominated military rule, or some option chosen in a kindred spirit.

3) The partitioning of Yugoslavia, accordingly, placing the Serbian faction under Soviet protection.

The key to a Soviet role in this scenario is Romania. The treaty between Tito and Ceaușescu, for the case of a Soviet aggressive action, illustrates the point. Study of the relevant kinds of maps is useful. Implicitly, Soviet forces must be poised inside Romania in readiness for the indicated role in Yugoslavia developments. This means eliminating Ceaușescu.

Eliminating Ceaușescu must be done as a Warsaw Pact, not a Soviet unilateral action. This means Soviet and Hungarian units, primarily, not without help from Bulgaria. A Warsaw Pact meeting must prepare the final details. The meeting would be run, not on the military level as such, but by the defense ministers, since this involves a political decision of the relevant governments. That meeting would occur at the Carpathian command center of the western command.

The Socialist International is now poised to bless such an expedition. Ceaușescu's obituary notices are now set in type, so to speak. The lion is afoot, on the hunt, and the jackals are already yipping and drooling in anticipation. Among optional Soviet enterprises of this nature, given the quality of Western leaders and Western public opinion, both the military and the political risks are relatively minimal. Western nerves will receive a slight jolt of pain, if it happens, but not so much that present trends in global-power-sharing agreements will suffer noticeably. The risks are minimal, and the strategic gains at the expense of a foolish West, relatively maximal.

Except when cornered, the Soviet animal fights only as a brutish bully does. When he commits rape, he prefers just enough resistance from the victim to add zest to the occasion, but never so much as to put the desired outcome in jeopardy.

Noting that a Romania expedition is merely a deployment in readiness for a Yugoslavia development, examine the map of the Balkans and entire eastern Mediterranean from this standpoint. Given the deployment of militant Islamic fundamentalism in Sunni regions, including Egypt, what is the strategic character of the eastern Mediterranean under the conditions of a partitioned Yugoslavia and Islamic fundamentalism sweeping out of Egypt, throughout most of the Arab world—and beyond?

At that point, very little more is required to deliver as much of the tormented Middle East into Soviet hands as they might desire to take, whenever they might be pleased to exploit that persisting opportunity. Turkey is outflanked acutely, for example, and Moscow is in reach of Istanbul next.

This, and other Soviet military options are energized by the spirit of surging food crises and nationalities crises, and interact with those crises. Thus, the coincidence of timing between the military alert and the extraordinary sessions.

Examine last weekend's Moscow developments from the standpoint of the outcome for the "Andropov Kindergarten." How do the results of this restructuring bear upon the military option referenced, and also the circumstances of food crisis and nationalities insurgencies? If you were a Russian, and a member of the Andropov "Kindergarten," what changes in government would you consider imperative for this combination of circumstances?

The placing of "Crown Prince Mikhail V" in his new position in respect to the Soviet Council of Ministers, occurs as a feature of increased power by the combined forces of the military and Chekist apparatus. The entire Soviet command is now dominated by a "war cabinet." The significance of the weekend's restructuring, in the setting in which it occurred, is clearing the decks for possible action, both internally and also externally.

Then, look at what many experts say is the "murder" of Bavaria's Franz Josef Strauss this past weekend. Strauss was a kind of political-strategic "Potemkin Village," who was more public-relations image than real toughness. However,

'Andropov's Kindergarten'

Contrary to the rubbish flooding the Western media, the Sept. 30 Soviet Central Committee Plenum did not demote KGB boss **Viktor Chebrikov**; it promoted him to "czar" of all the internal security organs of the U.S.S.R., making him the most powerful KGB figure since Lavrenti Beria after the death of Stalin. Politburo member Chebrikov was named a Central Committee Secretary, the only new addition to the CC Secretariat, which runs the party machine. He now heads one of the six newly established CC Commissions, the one on Questions of Legal Policy, which has charge of law and order questions, and of the CC's Administrative Organs Department, which oversees the KGB, the military, the interior ministry, and the judiciary and state prosecution apparatus. As *EIR* reported on Feb. 5, 1988, two officers from the Soviet Army's High Command West, run by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, Generals Lt. I.A. Larin and N. Shlyaga, became leaders in the Administrative Organs Department during 1987.

This also marks the first time since the spring of 1982, with Yuri Andropov's promotion to the CC Secretariat, that a KGB boss holds simultaneous membership on the Politburo and Secretariat. Six months after Andropov's promotion, he became general secretary. Any forecasts concerning Chebrikov at this time are out of order, but he is certainly a prime contender for the succession, should Gorbachov not survive the crisis.

Chebrikov's coup capped the vast increase in the institutional power of the KGB scored at the plenum. The

key promotions involved, without exception, extremely close associates of the late Yuri Andropov:

Vadim Medvedev, promoted to full membership on the Politburo and number four on the CC Secretariat (after, in order of protocol, Gorbachov, Yegor Ligachov, and Lev Zaikov). Medvedev was a close associate of Andropov going back to the late 1960s. His promotion demonstrates that solving internal and Eastern European problems has the highest priority. Since 1986, Medvedev, an economic expert, has headed the CC department for relations with "ruling parties," i.e., the East bloc.

Boris Pugo, KGB career officer, was appointed to the powerful post of chairman of the Party Control Commission, which oversees and executes party purges. Before becoming party boss in Latvia in 1984, Pugo headed the KGB in Latvia (1980-84). Pugo's taking over the Party Control Commission from Politburo member Mikhail Solomentsev marks the transfer of control over the purge apparatus from the party to the KGB.

Vladimir Kryuchkov was appointed Chebrikov's successor as KGB head. Kryuchkov was perhaps the closest confidant of the late Yuri Andropov. Their relationship dated back to 1955-56, when Andropov was ambassador to Hungary, and KGB officer Kryuchkov was Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Budapest. In 1957, when Andropov was named CC Department head for East bloc relations, he appointed Kryuchkov to head the Hungarian sector. In 1967, when Andropov became KGB head, Kryuchkov was appointed deputy head of the KGB First Main Directorate (foreign intelligence), then first deputy head, and finally, from 1974 to the present, head of KGB Intelligence.—*Konstantin George*

that Munich "Potemkin Village" provided many networks, and institutions of Germany (and elsewhere) a friendly *Kneipe* (tavern), where Strauss the back-slapping, tough-talking tavern-keeper, played host. The strategic significance of the death of Strauss is that, with the tavern-keeper dead, the *Kneipe* is closed indefinitely. Now, the habitués who used to meet there, have no such place to go; to that degree, important connecting links have been broken.

Strauss was murdered while on a hunting trip, hosted by Johannes Prinz von Thurn und Taxis. He had just recently escaped death, while returning from an earlier hunting trip, hosted by Bulgaria's Bogomil Commissar-King Todor Zhivkov. A curious failure of the cabin-pressure system, forced pilot Strauss to dive from 11,000 meters, narrowly escaping death. Soon, he was dead, on the same weekend as the succession of special events in Moscow.

Could the Chekists prediscuss the strategic after-effects of such a Strauss death? Certainly. In the world of KGB

assassinations, where accidents are seldom accidental, there are virtually no accidental fatalities: When death follows an unsuccessful putative accident shortly before, and that death comes of putative cardiac arrhythmia, with kidney and lung shock, so suddenly, the possibility that an accident is an accident drops toward fractions of a single percentage point.

2. Conspiracy and tragedy

To the degree that history is shaped by conspiracy of a significant duration, those facts of the sort usually regarded as possible evidence of conspiracy, are merely an outgrowth of a true, much deeper, less conscious conspiracy among the participants. In chief, most durable conspiracies, especially of the sort which bridge successive generations, have the primary form of a political-philosophical coincidence of views, aiming at the undermining of the influence of some contrary political-philosophical current.

Usually, one does not choose to participate in a conspir-

acy of that quality; rather, at least to a very meaningful degree, the conspiracy chooses its participants. There is nothing occult in these connections; the principles are elementary, on condition one regards the matter in a properly informed way.

A person says he does something, because "I thought that was the right decision." The "I" in this case, is not a pure "I," not the simple "I" of an individual's bare social identity. The decision was not made by a pure and simple "I." It was shaped on the basis of a largely unconscious set of adopted assumptions, assumptions analogous to a set of axioms and postulates underlying a formal-deductive theorem-lattice.

Among the included leading significances of the Socratic dialogue in general, is that this is a form in which such usually unconscious underlying assumptions are examined, and altered, in an intelligible fashion. In the Socratic dialogue in general, a proposition is considered. Is it true or false, and is there a better proposition which ought to be substituted for that one? The method is to adduce the assumptions immediately underlying the proposition, and then, in turn, to examine similarly the assumptions underlying each of that first set of adduced assumptions. By defining such an implied assumption as faulty, and replacing it properly, a new proposition is generated, replacing that initially considered.

In formal mathematics, we say that each and all of the theorems fully consistent with an initial set of axioms and postulates, form a *lattice*, or theorem-lattice. It follows, that the principle of deductive consistency creates the effect, that no theorem of any such one theorem-lattice says anything which was not already implicit in the set of axioms and postulates from which the theorem-lattice as a whole is derived. This "property" of a deductive theorem-lattice is sometimes termed "the hereditary property," and this for reasons which should require no explanation.

This would be the picture of the mind of a truly (deductively) consistent person. Most persons are not. Yet, in the case of the significantly irrationalist person, even in the case of the paranoid psychotic, a certain form of the "hereditary principle" obtains.

The more profound, and more effective forms of study of human behaviors, examine all of the subject individual's or group's behavior from the vantage-point just described. This approach greatly simplifies the tasks of understanding. If we recognize that no "theorem" of a theorem-lattice, even an irrationalist lattice, contains anything not already implicit in underlying axiomatic assumptions, we can study behavior by focusing directly on those axiomatic assumptions, and treating particular opinions of subject persons as implicitly predetermined by the relevant "hereditary principle" adduced from study of the axiomatic assumptions alone. In physics, this is the method of "strong hypothesis," of so-called "crucial experiments."

Ordinarily, thus, individuals have very little "free will." To the degree they are not conscious of the axiomatic as-

sumptions shaping their choices of opinions and impulses, they are much less free than if they are. Thus, the Socratic dialogue is a model of personal freedom of will. It is to the degree that we are not only conscious of our assumptions, but are able to change them willfully on the basis of discovering that they are false, that our will is free.

When the implications of this fact are thought through, it should not be difficult to recognize why Socratic dialogue is the secret of composition of great classical tragedy. The point here, is to show how this principle of classical tragedy applies to the analysis of real-life settings, such as strategic diagnoses, and prognoses, of the behavior of the Soviet leadership.

Above, in reviewing the relationship between underlying (axiomatic-like) assumptions and theorems, we identified the simplest kind of case, the case in which the set of assumptions is more or less fixed. In most cases, in societies in real life, these assumptions undergo more or less gradual changes from generation to generation, such as the long process of change, away from the doctrines of natural law accepted by the majority of the writers of our federal Constitution, to the amoral philosophical liberalism which predominates in government today. That example illustrates the fact, that the patterns of shifts in underlying assumptions by large bodies of people have, most of the time, a consistent direction, moving away from some kinds of values, toward other kinds of values.

So, those parts of the population which are less "free"—i.e., less Socratic—in their thinking, more suggestible, may change their individual assumptions significantly, but they tend to adopt changes which continue the evolution of underlying values, away from, and toward, as earlier. This sort of "away from/toward" movement in their shifts of underlying values, has the character of an acquired habit. Under appropriate degrees of stress, or kindred pressures, when they are impelled to modify their underlying values, even unconsciously, they tend to adopt changes which are consistent with the direction in which they have been shifting their values up to that point.

There are exceptions to this, both in isolated cases, and in mass behavior, but the indicated kind of force of habit is more frequently the case.

The point, that we are habituated to a certain direction in our evolution of underlying values, essentially reflects the fact that people are human.

The beasts' behavior is limited, to an effect approximated by a society whose culture is associated with a fanatically "traditionalist" form of economy. The beasts can adapt, and learn, but the range of learning available to them is limited, as if by instinct. Human beings modify their cultures to a degree which amounts, by comparison with beasts, to choosing a new set of "instincts." This distinction has been developed to relatively the highest degree in Western European culture, with our emphasis on high rates of scientific and technological progress.

Therefore, the most important kinds of habits we meet in nations, or other large social formations, are not the seemingly fixed habits, and fixed ideas, but rather the habits which govern the way in which a population evolves its choices of axiom-like, underlying value-assumptions.

The problems which arise from those more important kinds of habits, are the characteristic subject of great classical tragedy. In *Don Quixote*, for example, the character Don Quixote, who some say, credibly, is modeled upon Philip II, is trying to preserve an old world of feudalist chivalry, out of time. He is therefore, unfit to cope with the real-life problems of his age. The alternative, is to put government into the hands of the common folk, represented by Sancho Panza. The problem of the work, is the question, whether Sancho Panza can rise above his old, greedy habits, to become qualified to govern an island (an "island" such as 16th-century Spain)?

What the classical tragedian puts on stage, is a moment of the history of a people, in which the accumulation of policies generated by prevailing policy-shaping and related habits, has brought the society to the brink of some sort of general catastrophe, as is the case with the world as a whole today. The key to the tragedy's development is an interplay between two kinds of choices. If the society reacts to the problem according to its established habits of policy-shaping, the society is doomed to suffer the calamity threatening it. On the other side, a real solution to the problem is indicated to be available. Will one of the key characters, usually the chief character of that drama, find in himself, or herself the ability to recognize that solution, and to act upon it as the opportunity to do so is presented?

So, the tragedy unfolds, reaching a point which Schiller identifies as the *punctum saliens*. Crudely, this is the "point of no return." Either the hero seizes opportunity to insert the solution by that point in time, or all concerned are fated to the bloody mess looming ahead of them, as in the conclusion of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*.

For these reasons, the classical tragedy is a classical Socratic dialogue in the guise of dramatic entertainment. The great tragedian uses the medium of dramatic entertainment, to lead the audience, step by step, through the same kinds of processes we meet in any of Plato's dialogues. The audience's attention is led to the assumptions underlying the opinions and policies of the characters. In this way, the deeper reaches of each character's inner self are shown on stage. This occurs at the same time that the falseness of certain of the underlying assumptions is demonstrated dramatically. The "unhappy ending" for the hero, is a necessary part of a tragedy, since it is the author's duty to demonstrate the consequences of failure to act upon the kind of solution shown to be available.

The following bits of historical fact suffice, one may hope, to make the connection between tragic principles and strategic analysis clearer.

It is little known today, but is documented from that period; Schiller's dramas affected the population of Germany more, and more profoundly than any other modern dramatist. Hence, numbers of volunteers enlisting to fight the Liberation Wars against Napoleon's tyranny, made a pilgrimage to the house of Schiller's widow, seeking some token of Schiller's work to carry with them into battle. She responded by cutting snippets of his manuscripts, which she gave to each, which they, in turn, carried into battle in their rucksacks.

Schiller's influence on the Germany of the 1812-14 period extended to areas other than the profound love for his memory among so many of his dramatic audiences. He was a poet, dramatist, and historian, but also, in the last decade-odd of his life, the political and cultural leader of the leaders of the German Classical movement, including Wilhelm von Humboldt. So, in an ironical way, his hand reached out from the grave to destroy Napoleon.

The circle of German leaders around vom Stein, Humboldt, and Scharnhorst, who brought Napoleon down, did so by means of turning Napoleon's Russian campaign into a gigantic trap. They succeeded in obliging the Russian commanders to avoid a decisive battle with Napoleon, where Napoleon would have crushed them, and rather to stage a rear-guard retreat, luring Napoleon into the capture and occupation of Moscow. The city was mined, to be brought down around Napoleon's ears during the Russian winter. So, by this means, and by the Scharnhorst circle's mobilizing the concerted attack on the retreating Napoleon before he could reach France and regroup his forces, Napoleon was destroyed.

The design of this strategic trap was based upon the extended historical study of the 1618-48 Thirty Years War which Schiller had completed as preparation for the composition of his *Wallenstein* dramas. These studies, and the *Wallenstein* drama itself, were directly the basis for the Prussian war-plan for the Russian campaign of 1812.

It is to the degree that we are able to adduce from the governing elements of behavior and circumstance, the forces controlling the behavior of the actors in our present, imminently apocalyptic crisis-period, on the Soviet leadership, our own, and otherwise, that we comprehend these processes with the clarity and precision a Schiller commanded in composing his tragedies.

Since this is not a manual on that matter, I shall say no more in this memorandum than I do. See those Russians, not in terms of a tawdry, Sovietologist's soap-opera scenario; see them in the grip of habituated trends of behavior they may not become able to control, and in the grip of circumstances shaped by forces beyond their will to control. See their present and probable future conduct shaped by such constraints. That is the criticism, and the recommended remedy of outlook, respecting the dangerous flaws in partly wishful diagnoses featured in the relatively better among the reports I have recently received on the past week's events.