

‘Peace’ deals shaped to lock U.S. into pro-Soviet posture

by Nicholas F. Benton

The apparent “peace epidemic” breaking out all over the world now, makes it clear that progress between the United States and Soviet Union on so-called “regional issues” at the summits in Washington and Moscow was far more substantive than anyone but this magazine reported.

A sudden outpouring of cooperation between Moscow and Washington on a host of regional conflicts—involving Afghanistan, Angola, the Persian Gulf, Vietnam, and even the Middle East—does not portend a more peaceful world. On the contrary, it reflects a new phase in the operation of common interests dominating both superpowers, known as the Trust, toward a one-world fascist order.

For the United States, this new era of collaboration between the superpowers involves a fundamental shift in military strategic posture, which U.S. representatives of the Trust expect the next President—be he George Bush or Michael Dukakis—to implement.

The objective is to bring the entire globe under an iron-fisted genocidal austerity regime, achieved by an unprecedented collaboration between the superpowers to crush all regional resistance and expressions of national sovereignty. This new phase includes moves by both superpowers to abandon some of their own assets that functioned as proxies for their interests in the past.

In the case of Angola, for example, the United States and Soviet Union are cooperating openly to bring the ruling totalitarian Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) into negotiations with Cuba—which has served as a Soviet proxy to deploy over 50,000 troops in Angola—and the Republic of South Africa.

Following the first round of these tripartite talks in Geneva Aug. 2-5, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker reported that all sides “appear ready to bite the bullet” to reach an accord. The aim of these talks is implemen-

tation of U.N. Resolution 435, calling for the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and free elections in that country. This would be premised upon a withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola.

In the case of these negotiations, both the U.S. and Soviet governments appear ready to deal harsh blows to former assets in the region. The Soviets, growing increasingly impatient with Cuba’s Fidel Castro by the hour, are not only supporting the talks aimed at the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, but are also admonishing the MPLA to commence negotiations with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the U.S.-backed force led by Gen. Jonas Savimbi which is engaged in a civil war with the MPLA.

Washington, for its side, appears ready to drop its support for Savimbi the minute the Soviets signal that their estimated \$1 billion per year military aid to the MPLA regime will stop. Crocker said at the State Department Aug. 9 that the United States would consider giving formal recognition to the MPLA government of Angola for the first time, if the Cuban troops withdrew and the Soviet military aid stopped. He implied that this would not be conditional on any provisions for free elections with the involvement of UNITA.

The objective of both superpowers in this situation is twofold: 1) the weakening of the Republic of South Africa, by removing its presence from Namibia and depriving it of its mission as a bastion against Marxism in the region, and 2) the elimination of strong, independent leadership in black Africa, insofar as any rapprochement between the MPLA and UNITA inside Angola would include the elimination of Savimbi as a condition. Taken together, these two objectives weaken potential regional opposition to collaborative exploitation by the superpowers, who will be increasingly willing to back up with military force the genocidal austerity policies

of the International Monetary Fund and related usurious financial agencies.

This twofold objective in the Angola case serves as a model of what the new era of U.S.-Soviet regional cooperation hopes to achieve everywhere. Among other things, it portends a new and more potent role for the United Nations Security Council, which, based on the new era of U.S.-Soviet regional cooperation, suddenly takes on the kind of clout it was intended to have, by those advocates of one-world government and malthusianism who originally set up the U.N. bureaucracy. A strengthened United Nations will supersede national interests to function as a global police force in its own right.

In this mode, United Nations resolutions will begin to carry weight as enforceable international law, and United Nations peace-keeping forces, such as the one being sent into the Gulf to monitor the Iran-Iraq ceasefire, will replace the national forces of the United States and other nations in carrying out that enforcement function.

Blueprint from the CSIS

The nature of this shift in U.S. strategic policy is spelled out with startling candor in a newly published volume of the *Leadership Choices for the 1990s* series by the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), entitled, "Meeting the Mavericks: Regional Challenges for the Next President."

Drafted by Debra van Opstal and Andrew Goldberg, with a preface by Robert Kupperman, the pamphlet embodies, in the kind of summary form that the short attention span of a presidential candidate is capable of absorbing, the basics of how the next President should adapt himself to the new era of U.S.-Soviet collaboration in what it calls the emerging "multipolar" world.

The CSIS is an infamous nest of Trust policymakers, including Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who implement much of their policy through legislative initiatives carried out by Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.).

Kupperman spells out the new reality in his preface to the CSIS pamphlet. He predicts a world "decreasingly influenced by traditional superpower competition," in which "the traditional power paradigm—containing the Soviet Union—may give way to condominiums of interest in which the Soviet Union and the United States together would seek to contain other power centers and regional states."

This is because, he says, "A new global reality has emerged that will tax the military and economic strength of the United States and Soviet Union." This "new global reality" is exemplified by three trends: 1) the rise of more aggressive Third World states; 2) the proliferation of advanced weaponry to these Third World states; and 3) the rise of "other great power rivals, who are likely to attempt to translate their growing economic strength into geopolitical influence."

What Kupperman omits, is the fact that it is the barbaric economic policies of the International Monetary Fund and

related institutions which are driving the Third World and the so-called "other great power rivals" (Japan, Europe, and the newly industrialized nations of Asia) into the adversarial posture that he predicts.

Nonetheless, he insists that the United States "will not be able to depend upon its permanent treaty relationships to share its economic and military burdens," but will have to be increasingly willing "to enter informal, untraditional partnerships," adding, "Most prominent among these unholy alliances will be a closing of ranks with unsavory national leaders as well as with the Soviets and their offerings of *glasnost*."

This requires the ability of the United States to "reallocate" its defense resources "to meet these emerging challenges," he adds. "The United States must determine the military equipment it will need to fight little wars, surreptitiously injecting small forces to meet defined political goals and subsequently extricating them. A whole new era of military thought and technology will arise. . . . Remaining entirely wedded to the technologies of large-scale conventional warfare and the strategic nuclear balance is not the answer."

This policy proposes to turn the world upside down. The Soviet Union, historically the principal strategic adversary of the United States, is now envisioned as an ally. The Third World and historical U.S. allies, including Japan and Europe, are now perceived as likely adversaries. It is advised that U.S. military doctrine be overhauled to adapt to this new vision of the world. "If one accepts the notion that the viability of U.S. security is currently affected far more by regional turbulence and unconventional threats than by Soviet expansionism, then the way in which U.S. leaders define policy must inevitably alter," the authors conclude.

According to the CSIS pamphlet, the new superpower condominium is based on two assumptions:

- The "single-minded U.S. focus on deterring the Soviet Union and avoiding war in Europe" is reflective of "old paradigms of power that are becoming decreasingly relevant. . . . Today, Europe is considered to be the least likely arena of conflict."

- "Even as prospects for direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation decrease, the potential for international collision—political, economic or military—almost everywhere else is on the rise. . . . The growth of Japanese and European economic, military and political influence and the modernization of China portend a more diverse global balance." India, Brazil, Argentina, and "the range of contenders for regional leadership" in the Middle East are singled out as potential major rivals.

What the Western advocates of such a new world condominium ignore, is that their schemes for weakening the Atlantic alliance, strengthening the U.N., and smashing the Third World, will only lead to Soviet domination worldwide—not to the shared superpower leadership which they hope for. In this strategic "great game," it is Moscow which holds all the cards.