

strongly anti-Nazi, and knew of the involvement of her own section chief and friend, Adam von Trott, in the evolving script.

The picture she gives of the developments in Germany before, during, and after the failed assassination attempt is one of quiet bravery and resolute determination to eliminate a tyrannical regime. After the assassination plot had been exposed, von Trott's main concern was to assure that people like Missie, who knew of and supported the plot, not be exposed, in order to guarantee that there would still be people around who could make another attempt. (The July 20th assassination attempt was just one of several attempts which had been tried since the beginning of the war.)

Despite the often lighthearted manner and day-to-day reminiscing of much of the material, the *Berlin Diaries* of Marie Vassiltchikov is worthwhile reading for Americans today, both as a means of setting the record straight on the question of "German collective war guilt," but, more importantly, to take a measure of what people did under extremely difficult and dangerous conditions in the fight against Nazism in Germany itself.

Being patriotic in war or in some other endeavor, behind which stands the authority of the government, or of popular opinion, is one thing. Fighting for the survival of one's nation when the nation's own representatives are the main enemy, requires a higher sense of patriotism and a more profound concept of duty.

The stuff that Rambo's made of

by Edward M. Corpus

America's Wars and Military Excursions

by Edwin P. Hoyt III

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Journalist Edwin Hoyt's work, in which he purports to trace continuity in American military policy from colonial conflicts with the Indians to the 1986 bombing of Libya, provokes more interest by what it systematically leaves out, than by what it contains.

While stating its purpose to be "preventing some of the

blunders in the future and offering the hope that United States military policy ought really to serve the nation's needs rather than the perceptions of the moment," Hoyt's attitudes toward the American Revolution and Douglas MacArthur are paradigmatic of why it fails in this.

For Hoyt, the "American Revolution was the result of a basic and growing misunderstanding among Englishmen," i.e., no more than King George III's bullheadedness over defense expenditures and taxes versus the propagandizing of hotheaded radicals.

This snail's-eye view must be set against the reality, well-known among Americans until the present century, that the military history of the United States is about its struggle for existence as a nation *unique among nations*. The American Revolution is a watershed in that conflict between the republican and the oligarchic, since the New World was the battleground for a global conflict centuries in the making. At stake was the individual's inalienable right to advance the condition of mankind through mastery of science and industry, under the auspices of the nation-state.

The benchmark of historiography was set by Friedrich Schiller in the 19th century. In his concept of *universal history*, events have significance as they affect *all history for all time*. As paradigms, Schiller drew upon classical Athens and Sparta—one representative of republican nation-building, the latter representing the oligarchic empire—two ultimately irreconcilable views of the state and of the individual.

Schiller, a contemporary witness who ardently supported the American Revolution, referred to it as "the favorite subject of the decade." Is it, then, out of ignorance or deliberate lying that Hoyt asserts, "While the Americans were winning their freedom from England the world was scarcely watching"?

"With trade, and the opening of Canton to American vessels, came consular relations . . . [and] American marines. . . . We simply followed the French and the British," declares Hoyt.

His conclusion? "The essence of it all is that times change, and wars change, and military excursions take on different faces and even different meanings." American military policy has been and still is the result of "political evangelism." That America *may actually have a mission* in the world is an anathema to him.

Admittedly, gross injustices were committed against the American Indian. Americans did participate in the opium and slave trade. But these were examples of the parasitic imposition of oligarchic policies upon America by a traitorous elite—a faction Hoyt barely mentions as such.

It was at the behest of European elites and their junior partners in Boston and New York, that the Anglophile Theodore Roosevelt virtually guaranteed the Spanish-American War and perverted the Monroe Doctrine, originally drafted to stop further European colonialism in the hemisphere, with the "Roosevelt corollary," which turned the United States

into a policeman for debt collection.

However, the Third Expeditionary Force to the Philippines was headed by Gen. Arthur MacArthur, who represented the opposite policy. His governorship positively shaped the relations of the Philippines and United States for generations to come. This was continued by his son, Douglas, one of the best advocates of that American mission.

Hatred for MacArthur

Hoyt, of course, leaves all this out of the picture. Nor are we to be spared from “psychohistory.” In an early chapter, Hoyt states, “The early 19th century was not blessed with psychiatrists, but had there been one in Washington, he might have seen in [Gen. Andrew] Jackson the same combination of paranoia and enormous ego that marked MacArthur’s career.”

Later, on the Civil War: General “McClellan took leave of his army . . . a performance worthy of John Wilkes Booth . . . somewhat reminiscent of the act of Gen. Douglas MacArthur when he made his ‘Old soldiers never die’ speech to Congress after being fired by Harry Truman.”

Early secessionist plotter Jackson, saboteur McClellan, presidential assassin Booth, and Douglas MacArthur, almost in the same breath! As much gratuitous snipes at MacArthur as descriptions of Jackson or McClellan, these statements foreshadow what will be undisguised hatred for MacArthur.

The entire chapter on “Pacific Victory” contains only *two* pitiful references to MacArthur (his “brilliant polemical coup” in wresting overall command—not his role in winning World War II in the Pacific). No mention is given MacArthur’s remoralization of a Philippine resistance that felt betrayed by Washington. While food control policies were being imposed upon Germany, and State Department officials were calling for the humiliation of Japan and the public execution of its emperor, Douglas MacArthur began the process of “winning the peace,” rebuilding that nation and developing its creative human resources. Incredibly, Hoyt states: “The gulf of cultural understanding was so wide that there was no one in authority in the American military who understood the Japanese attitude.”

The OWI background

Who is author Edwin P. Hoyt III? “War and foreign correspondent in Asia and the Mideast” (for United Press Associations in Vietnam at the end of World War II); reporter, editor, and writer for the *Denver Post* and *San Francisco Chronicle*; producer-director-writer for CBS News. However, his role as news editor for the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) and member of its psychological warfare team in China, Burma, and India is most interesting.

The U.S. Office of War Information’s role was often indistinguishable from the wartime propaganda functions of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and later the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters, Al-

lied Expeditionary Forces (PWD/SHAEP). In the European theater PWD/SHAEP coordinated the firebombings and then the psychological profiling of civilian population centers. After the war the OWI produced the myriad of literature used in “re-educating” the battered German population with the myth of “collective guilt.”

In India, the OWI censored Franklin Roosevelt’s speech calling for equality regardless of race, color, or creed so as not to inflame the population against the British. Shunned and under suspicion by the military leadership in the Pacific, the OWI was purposely kept from the front. Only during the close of the war was the OWI given a role by MacArthur in preparation for his victorious return to the Philippines.

Hoyt was in a position to see first hand the contrast between the brutalization of postwar Germany by John J. McCloy, Gen. Lucius Clay, et al., and General MacArthur’s statecraft toward Japan. Yet under the assumption that America has no historical mission, that any attempt to delineate such a mission is “political evangelism,” and that it is an amorphous “America” which historically blunders into its foreign policy and military disasters, Hoyt runs cover for those who calculated these policies.

The closest reference he makes to the conspiracy of the Eastern liberal establishment is in regard to the War of 1812:

“Another aspect . . . that has always interested me is the virtual disloyalty of Boston and New England to the American cause . . . New England . . . derived most of its profit from trade that involved England or English colonies. Boston bankers were notorious for trading with the enemy. Indeed, there was secession talk in New England.”

No mention of the Boston families, such as Cabot Lodge—early advocates of Hitler and eugenics. No mention of the Dulles brothers’ collaboration with Wall Street, London, and Swiss banking interests in imposing the Nazis upon pre-World War II Germany. No further mention of Averell Harriman’s influence on the State Department’s appeasement of Moscow and China leading to MacArthur’s removal from command in Korea.

Hoyt continues to parrot the standard line concerning the Philippines today, pointing to U.S. support for overthrowing Ferdinand Marcos and the “popular revolution” of Corazon Aquino as a rare example that Washington “had learned something from all the failures all across the years.” The “popular revolution” was run, as *EIR* documented, by the U.S. State Department with the irreplaceable aid of the American media.

As a matter of fact, though the exhausting succession of glosses in Hoyt’s volume “ain’t history,” it is the stuff television “docu-drama” or action-movie scenarios currently substituting for reality are made of. Besides Hoyt, the Office of War Information produced such other notables in communications and entertainment as movie-maker Frank Capra, mini-series historian Bruce Catton, and CBS’s William S. Paley.