

Strong smell of 'New Yalta' swindle in arms control, Israel, and Afghan deals

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The contents of the current issue of *Foreign Affairs* magazine, and the proceedings of the recent Japan meeting of the Trilateral Commission, should be closely examined by all serious persons as bearing upon the pattern in U.S. State Department policy-shaping in the matters of arms-control, Central America, the Middle East, and Afghanistan.

As Henry A. Kissinger has asserted repeatedly earlier, and as Zbigniew Brzezinski asserts today, the United States under Carter-Mondale and the second Reagan-Bush administration, is moving in the direction of withdrawal from all former commitments to its friends in Western Europe, Africa, and Asia, and accepting increased Soviet domination of these portions of the planet. The majority of the Anglo-American liberal Establishment is solidly behind a policy of seeking to transform this planet into a single empire ruled by a condominium of three quarreling powers, the U.S.A., the Soviet Empire, and the Peoples' Republic of China.

This development came to the surface in the most stunning way during President Reagan's 1986 Reykjavik "summit" conference with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov, in the November 1987 INF agreements, and the present START negotiations. It was also the most prominent feature of Secretary of State George Shultz's catastrophic failures during his recent Middle East negotiations. It is key to the apparent willingness of the U.S. State Department to accept a condominium with Moscow over Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Shultz's Middle East policy

Some of the points in Secretary Shultz's proposals were not bad. Sooner or later, the elementary rights of the Palestinian Arabs must be respected. The majority of the Israeli political leaders know this, and perhaps a third of those are

prepared to take some measures of positive action now.

With certain assurances from the United States, Israel would be ready to consider some long-overdue changes in that direction right now. Some of the points in Shultz's proposed agenda would be workable, if certain other assurances were made in a believable way.

However, the government of Israel had solid reasons for believing that Shultz's proposals for political solutions were not serious. What influential Israelis found most objectionable, were three facts:

1) Broadly, the United States has been pulling back from commitments in the Middle East. President Reagan's withdrawal of U.S. commitments to defense of Western Europe, persuades all governments in the Middle East that the United States no longer has any serious commitments in that region. So, Shultz was received in Israel and Jordan, not as a prospective partner to an agreement, but an annoying kibbitzer.

2) Shultz made it clear to the government of Israel, that the only serious element of his packaged proposal, was the demand that Israel submit to a joint U.S.-Soviet condominium over the Middle East. Since the United States is in the process of withdrawing its former commitments to both Western Europe and the Middle East, what Shultz proposed would, in effect, deliver Israel into the hands of Soviet overlordship. Naturally, the government of Israel rejected this.

3) Shultz rejected rudely, Israeli and other suggestions that an economic-development program for the region be part of an agenda on negotiating political solutions. Without economic-development policies, any otherwise valid political solution would be unworkable.

Soviet Afghanistan policy

Currently, the Reagan administration is claiming credit falsely for bringing about withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. It is true that the State Department was engaged in such negotiations with nominal Soviet General Secretary

Gorbachov, until approximately this past March 13. However, at that point, Gorbachov was shipped into Yugoslavia, for a week's tourism, while many elements of Gorbachov's policies were scrapped by the Soviet government during his absence. At that point, the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on Afghanistan were scrapped.

Since that time, in place of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, the Soviet government has announced that its Afghanistan policy would be determined unilaterally, without consulting the United States or Pakistan. It is that Soviet unilateral plan of partial withdrawal which is being implemented.

There is no indication of any plan for total withdrawal of Soviet military forces by any official Moscow source. What Moscow has decided, and what certain Western channels have accepted, is the north-south partitioning of Afghanistan, with Soviet withdrawal of occupation forces from the southern part, and reduced Soviet occupation forces in the northern part.

Through European and other back-channels, Moscow has proposed to the U.S.A. a similar north-south partitioning of Angola and of South Africa itself, while permitting Israel to take a large part of Jordan's territory on the east bank of the Jordan, on condition that Israel accept the entirety of Lebanon becoming part of Greater Syria.

Moscow has offered to make the southern region of Afghanistan the territory of all Afghan forces which are unwilling to live under Soviet rule in the northern region. The object is to turn the southern region into a no-man's land of bloody civil war among rival Afghan factions. The object is to accomplish the dismemberment of Pakistan, creating new states of Pushtunistan and Baluchistan, and proceeding toward the general destabilization of India beyond that.

Meanwhile, the 20,000 to 50,000 Soviet troops being pulled back from Afghanistan, are being deployed on the border of Iran. This is accompanied by an ominous flurry of Soviet military specialists' studies of "mountain warfare." Current Soviet policy is to get its troops out of regular military operations in mountainous regions, and to limit such operations within regions of Asia in which Soviet capabilities are sufficient to effect easy victories at a relatively minimal price.

In the mountainous regions, Moscow will concentrate on using controlled and semi-controlled assets in conduct of irregular warfare.

What the U.S. State Department has done in this matter, is nothing better than to give official U.S. backing to a unilateral decision by Moscow. Moscow has conceded nothing. Worse, the U.S. State Department has announced that it intends to sign on as a co-guarantor of the submission of both Pakistan and Afghan rebels to the conditions unilaterally dictated by Moscow. Shades of Chamberlain's and Daladier's conceding to Hitler, at Munich in 1938, the Czechoslovakia which Hitler had intended to grab whether or not Chamberlain and Daladier made such concessions. So much for State Department negotiations!

It is even much worse than that. Through high-level back-channels, Moscow has proposed that the north-south partition of Afghanistan be the pattern for negotiations over Angola, and the Republic of South Africa, and that this pattern be extended to potential hot-spots of U.S.-Soviet "regional matters" agreements generally. So far, the State Department is not admitting that such negotiations are in progress, but they are.

The Brzezinski syndrome

Whether President Reagan understands this fact, or not, the second Reagan-Bush administration has set a worse record in appeasement of aggressors than Chamberlain and Daladier set in the 1938 Munich pact with Adolf Hitler. The majority of the U.S. citizenry may not grasp this fact fully yet, but the majority of the powerful liberal Establishment is in full support of Reagan-Bush policies causing this monstrous sell-out.

The liberal Establishment's current party line was handed out to the faithful Establishment errand-runners at the current Tokyo meeting of the Trilateral Commission. The high points of that party line are explained in two featured articles in the New York Council of Foreign Relations' quarterly, *Foreign Affairs*. The two articles are, first, the magazine's leading item, authored by Trilateral official Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America's New Geostrategy." To translate Brzezinski's gobbledegook into something resembling plain English, it is indispensable to study an accompanying article, "The Dollar and the Defense of the West," by three authors: "patrician" Harlan V.B. Cleveland, John Hopkins' David P. Calleo, and the *New York Times'* Leonard Silk.

Relevant excerpts from the two articles supply the gist of the liberal Establishment policy:

. . . the American deficits suggests . . . the grim possibility that the United States, the country which created the postwar global economy, is now on a course fated to destroy it. . . . History is full of examples of hegemonic powers that brought themselves down because they were unable to sustain a viable relationship between geopolitical pretensions and economic resources. . . .

The American fiscal dilemma must be resolved, and the perpetual instability of the dollar that is its consequence must cease. This will require a radical and resolute policy to stop the United States from perpetually living beyond its means. Austerity will have to include the federal government. . . . Major and durable military cuts are essential and these logically require a readjustment of America's geopolitical role and alliance commitments. . . . Under the circumstances, it is imperative that the United States not become so preoccupied with Soviet relations that it fails to make the fundamental changes in the West

that are the precondition for future stability within the global system.

Despite the more than usual amount of double-talk in these articles, and Trilateral proceedings, too, the general drift of the message is clear. The present majority of the eastern bankers' liberal Establishment is committed to a new system of power-sharing with the Soviet empire. They have decided to end U.S. strategic commitments to the defense of Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia. They intend to cut away not flesh, but major bones of U.S. defense, reducing the United States to the status of a third-rate military power in the hope that Moscow can be trusted to honor the generous power-sharing agreements which the Reagan-Bush administration is delivering on arms-control deals and "regional matters."

They also insist that the next President and Congress will impose a regime of increasingly harsh austerity on the American people, with significant increases in tax rates, and major cuts in Social Security pensions and other entitlements, as well as defense.

By "global system," Brzezinski and so forth mean the present global financial system. From Western Europe, we are informed, repeatedly and emphatically, that this means wiping out about 2,000 local banks in the United States, with the remains of those banks and major New York City banks—except for the Morgan complex—gobbled up by about five international super-banks. Everything will be cut, by austerity measures all calculated to keep the financial "system," then controlled through about five international super-banks, from collapse. For the sake of that "global system," the Establishment is willing to destroy almost everything else, and to make any power-sharing deal with Moscow which seems necessary as part of such a package.

Even if we accepted the idea of maintaining that "global system," as the Trilaterals do, there are three crushing fallacies in what Brzezinski terms the "new geostrategy." None of the three fallacies can be solved within the limits of what is apparently acceptable to the Trilateral Mr. Brzezinski.

There is a fourth fallacy, the fallacy of the Trilaterals' refusal even to consider the obvious alternative to their present, disastrous "geostrategy."

Let us examine each of these four fallacies briefly, in order.

Humpty-Dumpty Gorbachov

The idea of global power-sharing with Moscow dates, of course, from about the time of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. It persisted as a proposed option throughout the Cold War period, 1946-53, and surfaced in Pugwash and related back-channel agreements between the Anglo-American liberal Establishment and Khrushchov during the second half of the 1950s. At the level of the U.S. government itself, the present drive toward what is sometimes called a "New

Yalta" agreement with Stalin's successors took hold under President Johnson, about 1966-67, and surfaced as the Kissinger-led drive for "détente" under the 1969-72 period of the Nixon administration.

The movement in the direction of closer relations with Moscow was built up over the 1970s and 1980s, first, through indirect and then direct foodstuffs concessions to Moscow. It began with indirect, U.S. subsidized delivery of butter to Russia, through New Zealand, and then spread into the form of shipments of U.S.-subsidized grain. These concessions, run through channels of the international grain cartel, became the axis of trade through which more and more of the industrial interest of North America and Western Europe became drawn into economic concessions to the Soviet dictators.

With the selection of KGB chief Yuri Andropov as Leonid Brezhnev's successor, beginning about March of 1982, and special, somewhat secret deals with Andropov sealed about April 1983, moves by Nancy Reagan's cronies among the Reagan administration's palace guard, to maneuver out National Security Advisor William Clark, signalled a much softer line toward Moscow during the second Reagan-Bush administration.

The unexpected death of Andropov created a succession-crisis in Moscow. A virtual "living corpse," Chernenko, was rushed into his role as a temporary place-holder, until the time Mikhail Gorbachov, and old guard Titorenko's daughter Raisa Gorbachova, surfaced in London as Chernenko's putative replacement. From that point on, Western financial interests joined with old Soviet agent Armand Hammer, Dwayne Andreas, and others in seeking new business deals in Moscow. It was this stampede toward Moscow by Western business interests which supplied the energy for the Reagan-Gorbachov "summits," and the present patterns of appeasement.

Without considering those background facts, it is nigh impossible to understand the motivations of Mr. Brzezinski's financier sponsors. These fellows are living out a dream, a memory of the period from 1922 through 1927, when a consortium of Soviet foreign intelligence (the Cheka) and Western bankers participated in a famous partnership-arrangement called "the Anglo-Soviet Trust," or, simply, "the Trust." The Western Soviet darling of that period was Nikolai Bukharin. The masturbatory dream of these financier interests behind Brzezinski, is the hope that Mikhail Gorbachov would become a reincarnation of the Bukharin whom Stalin overthrew to establish the Soviet First Five-Year Plan.

That dream is now collapsing. The important fact is not that Gorbachov's status as General Secretary has become a public issue; the important fact is the reason for that development. Whether Gorbachov is dumped or not, Moscow itself will act to scrap the "neo-Bukharin" features of economic dealings with the West.

During the 1924-27 period, the Trust's financial and po-

litical agreements hung upon export of Soviet grain. At that time, grain prices paid to the Soviets were at such a level that Soviet industry was nearing the brink of collapse. For that reason, the Soviet leadership rallied to eliminate what they considered the dangerous Trotsky, and then backed Stalin for the dumping of Bukharin and, more important, Bukharin's policy. This brought the "Trust" arrangement of the 1922-27, "New Economic Policy" period to an end.

Recently, a rather different set of circumstances has been working to similar net effect.

Throughout the postwar period to date, the civilian sector of the Soviet economy—and, so, indirectly, the vast military sector, too—has been sustained by a critical margin of looting of the Eastern European captive nations. Since 1982, the intensity of the looting of Eastern Europe has been greatly intensified.

Three factors are responsible for this:

1) The massive increase in the rate of Soviet pre-war mobilization has led to an intensification of the looting of Eastern European economies.

2) The same Eastern European economies have been looted still further, to provide the margins for the levels of economic agreements with Western financial interests.

3) As during the middle to late 1920s, when similar conditions developed, a tendency for fall in world prices of raw materials, including petroleum, and related factors, has intensified the effects of looting of Eastern European economies.

In consequence, several of the Eastern European economies are at the point of physical breakdown. This includes Poland, Romania, and less intensely thus far, Bulgaria and Hungary. The strains on the Czech and East German (G.D.R.) economies are being intensified as part of the same pattern. If the only consequence of this were increased potential for social protest in the captive nations, Moscow would probably not flinch. Soviet police-state methods would probably suffice. However, the laws of nature can not be changed by the police-state knout. A threatened physical breakdown in the economies cannot be prevented by mere Chekist exertion of political will. Moscow will not lessen significantly its military build-up, in any case. This element of strain on the Soviet and Eastern European economies will not be alleviated. That means, that burden of marginal economic concessions will be discarded. The obvious Soviet choice of policy-option, as repeatedly proposed by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, is a reversion to the model of 1929-35. It is most probable that this shift will come rapidly, and soon.

This objective economic reality—not ideological strains as such—already put Gorbachov's career in jeopardy last spring. The crisis broke into the open at the June 1987 sessions of the leadership. After a hazardous summer, Gorbachov was allowed, by the October plenary sessions, to retain the title of General Secretary, but with a marked reduction in

his actual powers. A "troika" of Suslov heir Ligachov, KGB chief Chebrikov, and Ogarkov's military assumed a supervisory position over Gorbachov.

Gorbachov's nominal position was maintained for two very obvious reasons. Immediately, the foreign public-relations investment in Gorbachov, the hope of securing massive concessions from President Reagan, was a factor. More profound is the problem of choosing a successor. This is not merely a matter of choosing a personality; but the always difficult process of sorting-out multilateral policy-agreements within the leadership, which are the precondition for selecting a successor. This latter process is now boiling up with unconcealable intensity, and must lead to some sort of dramatic result rather soon. So, the relevant features of what Brzezinski et al. see as the prospective Soviet props to a "global system" are very much in jeopardy during the near-term.

Soviet strategy

Excepting the very important fact, that the Soviets abhor unnecessary risk-taking, the Soviet dictatorship is now committed to establishing Moscow as the eternal capital of a third, worldwide Roman empire during the course of the 1990s, or at least making that result an irreversible, foregone conclusion. In important respects, this mystical commitment in Moscow is as compelling to the Soviets as some of Khomeini's wild fanaticism.

Moscow has no intention of honoring for long any power-sharing agreements reached with the Western liberal Establishments. As the entire history of Soviet postwar practice has shown, Moscow accepts power-sharing agreements only with the view that such agreements are calculated to a weakening of the nations it intends to gobble up. "Finlandization" is but a route to reducing the neutral to either outrightly colonial or, at most, client-state status under Moscow's rule. Moscow does not intend to share power with the Western Establishment for a prolonged period; it intends to gobble up the world, and nothing less.

After we allow for the repertoire of Soviet alternatives to military assault—subversion and so on, Moscow is committed to the doctrine, that peaceful submission of victims can be secured only if Moscow's combined military might and political will each and both are "objectively" sufficient to break the victim's will to resist. Moscow will accept nothing less than absolute military superiority, sufficient for victorious assault with minimal margin of risk, by sometime during the 1990s.

Indeed, by build-up of the picture of the West as the image of the enemy, and using the now powerful Soviet Russian Orthodox Church and the increasingly potent moods expressed by the Pamyat Society for this purpose, Moscow will minimize its internal economic problems.

In the meanwhile, anyone in the West who deludes him-

self that the Soviets will honor the putative intent of arms-control agreements, is playing the strategic fool.

The 1987-89 financial crisis

The Andropov-Ogarkov plan for world-conquest was premised upon the assumption that an inevitable new major international financial crisis would weaken the material potency and political will of the West to the extent of affording the Soviet empire an irreplaceable opportunity for securing global supremacy. The 1982 timing of the selection of Andropov to succeed Brezhnev, was heavily weighted by the acceptance of this calculation by the Nomenklatura.

So, the very circumstances which impel Mr. Brzezinski to seek global power-sharing with Moscow, lessen the political value which the Soviets place upon such arrangements. The time during which Moscow welcomes such arrangements is typified by the Brezhnev period, when Moscow calculates the West to be sufficiently strong in means and will to administer a terrible penalty to the Soviet "homeland."

Simultaneously, this financial crisis generates another problem for Brzezinski, et al. There is no way in which the present "global system" could be perpetuated much longer as a combination of political arrangements and economic-financial policy-structure.

The last time Western European civilization was faced with a kindred circumstance was during the second quarter of the fourteenth century. Then, the spread of famines and epidemics, together with the loss of economic structure represented by the vanishing of half the urban centers of Europe, created the circumstances in which the Lombard financial system of that period simply collapsed, into the "New Dark Age," of its own weight during the middle of that century.

The nearest approximation of that fourteenth-century collapse occurred during the period from the middle of the sixteenth century until the 1653 defeat of the Hapsburgs, a period some have termed a "little dark age." The direction in which Brzezinski's policies would carry the world today, is not an echo of that latter, "little dark age," but the logic of the mid-fourteenth-century's "New Dark Age."

Brzezinski's proposed policy, on this account, suggests the case of some homicidally deranged adolescent, who takes every adult in the town hostage, and begins killing them, one by one, in an attempt to blackmail Santa Claus into delivering him a toy he particularly desires to receive that Christmas. In some matters, such as Brzezinski's "global systems" perspective, even mass-homicidal fervency of political will produces only a strikingly different result than that so devoutly desired.

The alternative

Over and over, the relevant passages in the current *Foreign Affairs* repeat: "No purely economic explanation for today's gathering crisis is adequate. . . . it must be understood that the solution to America's dollar problem is not

purely economic but geopolitical. . . . Purely economic analysis cannot explain why the United States has followed policies so different from the Germans and Japanese." The insistence on this repeated point is fairly described as hysterical, even fanatically so.

The root of the dollar crisis is not "geopolitical"; it is simply economic. The persistence, over approximately 20 years, of four decisions of the past have caused this crisis:

1) The Johnson administration's 1966-67 decision to shift away from a traditional emphasis upon scientific and technological progress, toward a "post-industrial" utopia, toward what Brzezinski lauded in 1967 as "cybernation."

2) The 1971 decision to dump the system of gold-reserve-pegged fixed parities among reserve currencies, to create the "floating exchange-rate system."

3) The 1979 decision by the Carter administration, to launch Paul A. Volcker's "controlled disintegration of the economy," as specified earlier in the 1975-76 series of proposals for Carter administration policy, co-edited by Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, called "1980s Project."

4) President Reagan's decision, during the period from August through October 1982, to attempt to paper over the 1982-83 debt crisis by means of fostering the eruption of the greatest John Law-style international financial bubble in history during the following five years.

The October 1987 "Black Monday" crash has unleashed an augmented revival of the international financial crisis of 1929-32. The nature of this crisis is nothing but conclusive proof that the economic and monetary policies of the past 20 years, under five successive presidents, have been consistently, disastrously wrong. The lesson to be learned is, to save the United States—and Western civilization—we must scrap what Brzezinski hails as his "global system."

There are two leading features of this present "geopolitical" crisis. First, there is the terrible weakness caused entirely by the combination of "post-industrial" utopianism and matching monetarist policies. Second, there is the political erosion of the morale and will of the populations caused by 20 years of living under the persisting economic and related decay caused by those economic and monetary policies.

Brzezinski et al. are flatly wrong in asserting that it has been the burden of global strategic responsibilities which has weakened the dollar. It is the weakening of the dollar at home, by precisely those policies for which Brzezinski has been persistently a leading advocate, which has destroyed the material resources upon which the United States and Western Europe both depend to maintain defense of the security and freedom of the nations and peoples of Western civilization.

There is still time to scrap the failed economic and monetary policies which Mr. Brzezinski so much adores. If we do so, a rapid economic mobilization can be launched, and out of that the means for solving other leading problems, including the strategic ones, will appear rather rapidly.