

and decide on a resolution to mobilize reservists at a time when Soviet spetsnaz guerrillas and other coordinated irregular-warfare operations are turning life in the Federal Republic into pure chaos, and parliamentarians are instilled with fear that the decision would only increase the chaos? Is it conceivable that the Parliament will take a decision to mobilize reserves at a point in the crisis, when such a decision cannot be kept secret, when large sections of the media and influential politicians claim that the decision would only escalate the crisis? This would be only a decision to fill out the rump-brigades to *peacetime strength* of 495,000, not to mention the decision to mobilize 1.34 million soldiers for war. The decision would clearly take many more days than mere "technical warning," and even the Social Democrats' wildest dreams of a 150-km-deep nuclear-free and heavy armor-free corridor east of the West German border, will not save the Federal Republic. There will be little if any integrity left of either Forward Defense or deterrence.

Moscow can either mobilize or only threaten to mobilize, knowing that the Federal Republic, and thus NATO as a whole, has no reaction-capability, and hence can impose its demands at will. Thus Moscow achieves all of its aims of disarming the West, at no cost or risk to itself. And Moscow receives the largest package of risk-free blackmail potential it could ever have dreamt of.

But the situation is worse. Nominally, the defense budget for 1988 will rise 1.5%, but this increase is already swallowed up by a 3.2% increase in operating costs, of which maintenance costs alone rose 6.2%. On the other hand, investment outlays will drop in 1988 by at least 1.9%, among which outlays for military facilities (NATO infrastructure included) will drop by 4.8%, and procurement by 1.6%. This contrasts with the hold-the-line sum quoted for procurements by the Ministry of Defense of at least 400 million deutsche-marks annually. A more detailed account would show that while a conservatively estimated 40% of priority targets cannot be hit with near-border artillery for lack of ammunition, 50 million DM was slashed from the munitions budget last year as part of the funds reallocated to help farmers over the Chernobyl panic.

Now, the figures stated last year by General von Sandrart, that the minimal investment in army equipment over the next 12 years is 118 billion DM, but the currently planned allocations are only 67 billion DM, are again making the rounds in the press. If no fist is slammed on the table hard enough to shatter these political and financial calculations, the 67 billion DM figure will go down in history as an optimistic dream.

Von Sandrart's judgment is backed up by a stern warning from his successor as Army Inspector, Lt. Gen. Henning von Ondarza: "The Army is left now with only 21% for investment, although it is generally agreed that we need to have 30%. At this rate, it will not be possible to keep our Army modern."

U.S. plays cat and mouse with Kohl

West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit to Washington Feb. 18-19 could only have added to the impression already prevailing in Bonn in the wake of the INF treaty signing: that the United States is playing cat and mouse with its most important NATO ally, and has already, in fact, decided to sacrifice West Germany to the tender mercies of the Russians.

As Kohl noted in his discussions in the American capital, the Germans are being exposed to alternating hot and cold showers. First, plans for U.S. troop withdrawal from Germany are made (through such channels as the Wohlstetter-Iklé report on long-term strategy); then the plans are denied; then launched again in the media, commented on, and then denied again. First, the U.S. insists that Germany agree to modernization of short-range nuclear weapons, and then that is described as being not so urgent.

In Washington, the Reagan administration put a gun to Kohl's head and the demand was made: Only if you Germans take over a major portion of the costs of stationing our troops will the troops remain in the Federal Republic, and only if you go along with the current insane U.S. economic and currency policies, will we Americans consider continuing security protection for Germany. Kohl was told that Reagan has already decided for a reduced American presence, but there may be some adjustments possible here and there if the Germans are "good."

But massive cuts were proposed for the U.S. defense budget just as Kohl arrived in Washington. The U.S. budget cuts speak much more loudly and clearly than the numerous contradictory statements by the politicians.

Kohl, Americans were told by the news media, thoroughly approves of the new arms pact, and came to Washington "to lobby for passage of the INF treaty." Kohl did do his best to ingratiate himself with his hosts by uttering the prescribed hosannas in praise of the treaty, but his mission was really to attempt damage control to preserve at least the scraps of the Atlantic Alliance.

"It is decisive for NATO that there be no zones of different security," he said at his press conference Feb. 22, after the subject of the Wohlstetter-Iklé report advocating a U.S. pullout came up. "We must see defense as one whole—indivisible."

Kohl described NATO as "a community of shared risk," which, he said, "is particularly true of West Germany, be-

cause, in geopolitical terms, we are the forefront.”

The chancellor reminded his American audience that 500,000 West German troops are deployed on the front lines of NATO. “This is, speaking personally again, a generation of our sons. We have mandatory conscription. We tell them they must serve, to make a personal sacrifice,” just extended to 18 months on active duty. “It is natural they want the same treatment, the same assurances as everyone else.”

Kohl strongly reiterated his nation’s commitment to nuclear deterrence for Europe. He said that he had made it clear to President Reagan that West Germany is: 1) against the denuclearization of Europe, including against the so-called “triple-zero” proposal to remove all battlefield nuclear weapons; 2) opposed to zones of different security within NATO; 3) in favor of a “flexible response” capacity that is balanced between conventional and nuclear forces; 4) recognizes that effective deterrence is not possible without nuclear weapons maintained on West German soil.

French warn of U.S. decoupling

On Feb. 10, a delegation of five U.S. senators led by Sam Nunn of Georgia, stopped in Paris to sweet-talk the French with promises that the INF deal won’t imply further U.S. withdrawals from Europe.

But in *Le Monde* newspaper of Feb. 13, Minister of Cooperation Michel Aurillac warned that the Wohlstetter report augurs U.S. “withdrawal—political, if not yet military—from Europe” as more likely “than the reassuring speeches and deeds of today let one suppose.” And “we cannot see what would lead them to reverse this tendency, not even a significant (and tardy) effort by the Europeans, which remains very unlikely since the strategy proposed to NATO presupposes growing expenses for research, development, and equipment. ‘Decoupling,’ ‘the abandonment of Europe’ by the United States, to use certain of the terms employed since the INF accord was signed, may have appeared as a result of that accord.”

François Fillon, who chairs the French National Assembly’s defense committee, recently told members of the U.S. Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee that he finds most worrisome the “eventual offshoots of the accord,” namely, that “this accord would only be the first stage in a vaster process of denuclearization of Europe”; “an aggravation of ‘decoupling’ between Europe and the United States . . . which the evolution of American public opinion on nuclear weapons and the need to reduce the budget deficit—with its eventual impact on the level of troops stationed in Europe—could render plausible”; and “the psychological and political offensive which the Soviets have not failed to carry out in Western Europe, and especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, around the problem of German reunification.”

This article was written by EIR staff from reports by Nicholas Benton in Washington, Yves Messer in Paris, and Rainer Apel in Bonn.

European defense: ‘the double zero challenge’

by Christine Schier

An analysis of the dangers inherent in the double zero option appeared in the February issue of the French military magazine, *Revue de la Défense Nationale*, authored by the *Renouveau-Défense* group. This group is made up of high-ranking military officers, strategists, and diplomats who have held or are holding important positions, such as former Chief of Staff Gen. Guy Méry, Amb. Jean-Marie Soutou, Vice Adm. Paul Delahousse (ret.), General Thiry (ret.), and Adm. Marc de Joybert (ret.). In “The Double Zero Challenge,” as the report is called, the dangers facing Europe are clearly laid out, as well as the direction of possible solutions.

“The stationing of Pershing 2 and Tomahawks on European soil from December 1983 on, because of the American nationality of these missiles, their range, their penetration capability, and their precision, gave credibility to the ‘intermediate’ nuclear echelon of Western deterrence; this echelon is essential and, as it poses a deep threat against enemy forces, it ensures an effective forward deterrence, which is in turn an indispensable element of global deterrence.

“The INF double zero does away not only with these missiles, but also those of 500-1,000 km range which are capable, albeit in limited number on the allied side, of reaching the second echelon of the Soviet offensive position. This leaves in Europe, excepting French and British capabilities, only airborne American nuclear means based on this side of the Atlantic, and sea-based ones, as well as very short-range nuclear weapons, called battlefield arms. Therefore, the double zero considerably weakens allied capabilities in Europe, especially as they will have a very reduced power for hitting Soviet territory.”

Germany’s paradoxical situation

The authors of the report state that the treaty could push Germany into opting for the triple zero option: “We have to understand Germany’s position. She is in the paradoxical situation where, after she was urged to give up the umbrella