

## Congressional Closeup by William Jones

### Senators traverse Europe on INF investigative trip

A variety of U.S. senators have been criss-crossing the Atlantic in past weeks in order to better determine the effects of the INF treaty on the European defense situation. However, much like the five-day tours of Europe that Americans used to take when the dollar was still a going concern, the senators' well-orchestrated rounds allow them to see the lovely monuments, but not "the way things really are."

The official word has it that the Europeans, almost to a man, support the INF treaty, and that non-ratification would lead to a revival of the peace movement in the European countries and serious political instability. The heads of the Senate Intelligence, Foreign Relations, and Armed Services Committees who attended the meeting of the Wehrkunde in Munich, and then did a tour of the various NATO capitals, were told just that.

But even at the Munich meeting, the reality principle asserted itself when French Defense Minister André Giraud presented two maps of Europe (before and after INF) demonstrating that the treaty is a disaster—and the Europeans know it.

Other problems resulting from the "new geometry" in post-treaty Europe could not have passed our senators unnoticed. A withdrawal of intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe, so reason the legislators, puts a premium on the modernization and improvement of the short-range nuclear missiles, a condition agreed upon at the meeting in Montebello in 1983. But that was before INF.

With the INF treaty ratified, how-

ever, the presence of such missiles simply means that any limited nuclear exchange (short of all-out strategic nuclear war) would be fought solely in Central Europe, and primarily limited to the two Germanys, due to the limited range of these missiles.

No wonder that Chancellor Helmut Kohl is not so keen on taking immediate steps to modernize these missiles. Not only would such a move serve as a focal point for the "peace movement" (a "peace movement" under Moscow's control, which will be mobilized regardless of what the European nations do). It would also only confirm to the Europeans that the United States, which will have withdrawn the only real means for countering a Soviet attack, is willing to permit the nuclear destruction of Germany.

As a result, what previously had seemed merely a strengthening of one arm of an overall effective defense system, the short-range tactical nuclear missiles, now appears as the guarantor of national extinction.

### Gaffney faces off against treaty's friends

In a debate organized on Capitol Hill by the Atlantic Council, Ambassador Maynard Glitman, chief U.S. negotiator of the INF treaty, faced off against Frank Gaffney, former assistant secretary-designate for international security policy at the Department of Defense and author of a widely read point-by-point critique of the treaty. Glitman began by describing the negotiations as a blood, sweat, and tears grappling with the determined Soviet negotiators, who finally gave ground on all the major points of contention.

Gaffney began his reply to Glitman in a rather low-key manner, praising Glitman for his abilities as a negotiator, and saying that he was not opposed to the INF treaty if a zero solution on intermediate nuclear weapons were the actual result of that treaty. He then proceeded to examine the details of the treaty to show that that was by no means the case.

Gaffney went through the arguments raised in his published critique of the treaty: the difficulties raised by the similarities between the stages of the SS-20s (banned by the treaty) and the SS-25s (not affected by the treaty), and the possibility of using the one to replace the function of the other; the possibility of modifying the launchers (rather than destroying them as the treaty stipulates); the questionable nature of the Soviet data, important sections of which will not be delivered until 30 days after the treaty is signed; the inestimable problems of verification and the limitless possibilities for Soviet cheating.

The crux of the matter, however, is the circumstance under which the treaty had been negotiated. This circumstance, Gaffney pointed out, was slanted in favor of the more intransigent party. The INF was negotiated under a rigorous deadline in order for it to be ready for the Dec. 7 summit meeting. "It was insane," said Gaffney, "to sign a treaty even before you have finished negotiating it."

Second, the crucial negotiating responsibility was removed to a back-channel arrangement. And third, because of the free-form style of negotiations, all kinds of concessions were made, as had been the case at the Reykjavik meeting between Gorbachov and President Reagan, where the President, in a mood of mushy good-

will, almost gave away the kitchen sink.

## **Nunn straitjackets open committee debate on INF**

While using the INF debate to force the administration to accept the narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) is also doing his best to prevent any real examination of the consequences of the treaty. Nunn is effectively restricting the persons testifying at the hearings of his Armed Services Committee to those who are in agreement with the treaty. Only a token number of opponents will be permitted.

These tactics, typical of Nunn's "committee style," has created a bit of rancor among other members of the committee. Sen. Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.) is considering increasing the number of people to be questioned by the committee and would like to hear more from opponents of the treaty, although Senator Nunn's stonewalling tactics are making that extremely difficult to accomplish.

In spite of the fact that the the committee hearings have been tightly controlled by Nunn, initial estimates of the present vote-count in the Armed Services Committee give a 14-6 majority in favor of the INF. Even senators like Pete Wilson (R-Calif.), who have already announced in favor of the treaty, are showing concern about the implications of the treaty for the SDI and the conventional balance of forces in Western Europe.

On the Democratic side, Sen. Richard Shelby (D-Ala.) is said to be also seriously concerned about the effects of the treaty on the overall balance of forces in Western Europe.

In order for the Senate to make any competent decision on the INF treaty, Gaffney insisted, they must examine the negotiating record to find out what went on during those hectic days.

During the question period, a representative from the Ad Hoc Committee to Stop the INF, which has been playing a key role in fighting the treaty, confronted Glitman with the fact that the INF had been forced on the Europeans in a series of *faits accomplis*, beginning with the Reykjavik meeting. Glitman pointed to the initial positive response of the Europeans to the notion of a zero-option way back in 1981, in order to claim that the Europeans have been on board all along.

Glitman added what sounded like a threat. "It would be better if nobody tried to frighten them [the Europeans] about the implications of this treaty either."

Gaffney, sensitive to the controlled environment of the INF debate, had not explicitly called for non-ratification, but when asked what he would tell a senator to do, Gaffney stated, "I would tell him to try to defeat it."

## **Dutch defense minister's testimony sparks debate**

Dutch Defense Minister W.F. van Eekelen caused some controversy in testimony given on Feb. 16 to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Van Eekelen, a member of the Christian Democratic Party of the Netherlands, gave his support to the INF treaty, but met a line of opposition from both Democratic and Republican members of the committee when he urged that a new summit be consolidated quickly

to deal with the remaining problems of the strategic nuclear forces and the imbalance of conventional forces.

The Dutch defense minister affirmed that NATO should abide by the 1983 Montebello agreements, as far as the modernization of the short-range nuclear weapons were concerned, but stressed that since the modernized versions of the short-range Lance missiles were still at an experimental stage, there was no need to modernize immediately.

## **General Rogers tries to explain European dilemma**

In further testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Gen. Bernard Rogers, the former NATO commander in chief, continued his fight to get the Senate to understand the dangerous implications of the INF treaty. "I am concerned," said Rogers, "that the treaty puts NATO on the slippery slope of denuclearization of Western Europe, a long-time stated objective of the Soviet Union. . . . This treaty reduces the range of NATO's nuclear weapon systems from 1,500 miles (cruise missiles) and 1,100 miles (Pershing IIs) to less than 300 miles.

"The ranges of NATO's residual weapons will mainly cause them to strike German targets—either in East or West Germany. It is for this reason that we have noted some West German officials—with Soviet and East German support—pressing for a third zero-option agreement to eliminate the remaining short-range nuclear forces. . . . The treaty may be considered by the U.S. as being in its short-term political interests, but it is not in those of its Western European allies nor the long-term interests of either."