

Why the Senate must reject INF: a German military leader's view

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The U.S. Senate has now begun its hearings on the ratification of the INF treaty—also known as the “double zero option.” The governments of the NATO member countries, with the exception of France, have almost euphorically celebrated this treaty as the first concrete disarmament treaty. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany is particularly prominent in this regard, although there are individuals within the coalition parties and important editorialists in the major news media, who have raised urgent warnings. When considering the official statements of representatives of the Federal Republic, you should keep in mind, that there are state elections this year in Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-Holstein, the outcome of which may be decisive, both for the strongest party in the federal coalition, the CDU, and for the future generally.

Other personalities, who have been either skeptical or have warned of the dire consequences of this treaty, cannot be ignored either: the Democratic presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche, as well as the former U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, from the United States; in France the Socialist President Mitterrand and the conservative Prime Minister Chirac.

The crucial question to be asked in judging the treaty, the question which ultimately requires a political answer, is whether, under the real and present conditions, this treaty brings our world more international security and more individual freedom, or not. There is no one, and there is no institution, empowered to answer this question frivolously, or to answer it merely from the standpoint of possible electoral results.

All expert and qualified observers of global strategic developments ought to have been perplexed at the main argument of the adherents of this treaty: This treaty is supposedly the first successful accord with the Soviet Union not only on

a real disarmament—the destruction of medium-range missiles, but not including the destruction of the warheads they carry—but beyond that, this is supposedly the first time that the Soviets have agreed to an unequal solution.

Why are the Soviet Russians concluding a treaty allegedly to their disadvantage, at a time when the so-called capitalist West appears to be on the verge of the predicted economic, and thus also moral and political collapse? The signing of the INF treaty followed “Black Monday.”

The weak economic performance of the Soviet Union itself—ultimately one of the reasons for the high-risk operation known as perestroika—cannot be the explanation. We know from diverse sources, that the East is continuing unabated with its new development of weapons- and space-systems. The argument commonly heard in the West, that the Soviet Union wants to spend less on armaments, proves to be nothing more than Western wishful thinking. We can also rule out the suggestion that the Soviet Union is fundamentally giving up an offensive political strategy aimed at what Gorbachov calls “world socialism” in his book, *Perestroika*. There is not a shred of evidence from ongoing Soviet diplomacy in all crisis areas in the world, particularly recently in Europe, that there has been a change in Soviet political strategy. Mere shifts in political *tactics* are irrelevant as evidence when we are dealing with treaties fundamentally important for the future of the world.

My argument with respect to the INF treaty is as follows: This treaty is to the advantage of the Soviet Union, globally, and particularly for the region of Europe which is so decisive for the Soviets themselves, and it is disadvantageous for the West.

I will attempt to explain.

At the very latest, with the Khrushchov Berlin ultimatum of Nov. 27, 1958, and the fact that this ultimatum could not be imposed against the will of the Western powers, it became clear to the leadership of the Soviet Union that with the sole strategic factor at their disposal, that of military might, they could not, or could no longer, impose their demands directly.

Since the beginning of the 1960s, the Soviet leadership therefore developed a multi-dimensional, and thus indirect strategy, a strategy which exploited the strengths of their spheres of power as well as the weaknesses of their adversary—the free industrial countries and the non-communist developing countries—in order to achieve their political aims, unchanged since Lenin and his predecessors, the Russian czars, i.e., Russian world domination or the “Third Rome.” It is fundamental to all strategy to achieve one’s aims without endangering oneself at the same time, in this case endangering the existence of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the West has either not exploited, or exploited only ineffectively, the weakness which lies in this Soviet strategy, for example, to achieve rights to self-determination and human rights among those peoples imprisoned by Moscow since the end of World War II. An important tenet of this indirect strategy is regionalization. This signifies a military constellation which allows the Soviet Union to threaten the homeland of its adversary directly—the North American continent—but from a clearly delimited geographical area, far away from the Soviet motherland itself.

What the Cuban Missiles Crisis was about

Thus, the attempted stationing of Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles on Cuba. The mutual capability already existing at that time, to hit the respective homeland areas with strike and counter-strike, was decisive for the solution of the Cuba crisis. The solution, however, did not consist *only* in the Soviet Union’s withdrawal of nuclear-armed medium-range missiles from Cuba, but also in the American withdrawal of medium-range missiles from Turkey and Italy, as well as the withdrawal of MACE—the early ground-launched cruise missile—from the Federal Republic of Germany. The MACE was capable of reaching the western part of the Soviet Union with one nuclear warhead, and had sufficient penetrative ability relative to the defense capabilities at that time.

Those who claim today, that the INF treaty is the first concrete disarmament accord between the Soviet Union and the United States, are well advised to reexamine the correctness of their claim in view of the solution to the Cuban Missiles Crisis.

Soviet ‘regionalization’ strategy

This is not the place to discuss in detail the many attempts of the Soviet Union to activate the strategic principle of regionalization by means of indirect operations, modern irregular warfare/low-intensity conflict, “peaceful coexistence,” through to the formal changes introduced by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress in the summer of 1987. But I will have to come back to Soviet operations in modern irregular warfare, because these were crucial in order to prepare Western populations for the INF treaty, pave the way for its acceptance, as well as its potential exploitation

following its ratification, which unfortunately cannot be ruled out, at least in the West. The next significant attempt at regionalization by the Soviet Russian leadership was the introduction of the SS-20 medium-range missile. As a consequence of its limited range and its deployment in the Soviet Union itself—presuming that Western intelligence on this point is accurate—the SS-20 did not represent an immediate threat to the North American continent, with the exception of Alaska. Before the United States stationed the Pershing II and the new ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union had the strategic option of limiting its nuclear threat to Europe or Japan, and in a way which was credible to the U.S. leadership. In other words, by means of the SS-20, the Soviet Union could compel the U.S. leadership to make a choice between the physical integrity of its homeland and defense against a threat to its alliance partners in Europe. With this option, achieved by the Soviet leadership by procuring a weapon system aimed at just that result, the Soviet leadership would be able to test the firmness of NATO’s will to defend, and thus insert the wedge to politically decouple Europe from the U.S.A.

The Federal Chancellor at that time, Helmut Schmidt, recognized this danger to NATO, and called for a strategic counterweight, the stationing of American nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe, which would be capable of reaching targets within Soviet territory from their European deployment areas. The range of the Pershing Ia already stationed in Europe at that time was not sufficient for that purpose. Just how important the political option, which the Soviet leadership won with the SS-20, was, became evident following the NATO resolution in Reykjavik on Dec. 12, 1979, the so-called “Two Track Resolution.” The Soviet Union chose not to make use of the opportunity offered, to reduce or remove the SS-20s—to the contrary, they decided to continue the deployment already begun. At the same time, they mobilized their communist networks in the free nations of Western Europe to initiate a so-called peace campaign, with the aim of activating public and published opinion among Europeans against the NATO armament decision. In addition to the demonization of nuclear weapons which was already far advanced, which had, after all, provided a stabilization for the division of Europe agreed upon in London in 1944, the Soviets promoted a wave of anti-Americanism, particularly among youth, and practically attempted to prevent the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles with a large number of operations. At that time, Soviet operations were not crowned with the success they had hoped for. The governments of most European NATO member states were able to have the stationing of U.S. medium-range missiles approved in their parliaments. The Defense White Book 1983, *The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany*, asserted that “American nuclear weapons in Europe are the indispensable connecting link between the conventional armed forces in

Europe and the nuclear-strategic American potential.”

The imminent neutralization of the Soviet medium-range weapons by U.S. medium-range weapons then compelled the Soviet leadership to change its policy toward the West, especially its disarmament policy.

While the Soviets had exploited their bilateral arms-control policy up through SALT II in order to have treaty approval for their strategic build-up, under the umbrella of agreed ceilings, they had to take account of two strategic developments.

1) The increase of their nuclear potentials had not yielded any new political options.

2) The increase of their nuclear potentials in fact reduced the political significance of their conventional superiority. In addition, they began to view the option of waging nuclear war over Europe as no longer useful, contrary to earlier thinking. Gorbachov says in his recent book, that such a war would destroy all of Europe.

The threat to Europe, which represents the immediate goal of Soviet policy, was counterproductive. This appears to be one reason for the shift in Soviet political strategy. The shift itself appears to be certain.

Another reason was most likely the announcement by President Reagan that offensive nuclear deterrence would be transformed into a defensive and non-nuclear posture—SDI. Given the relative invulnerability of the Soviet Union, enhanced by an ABM system, the efficacy of which is not known, and given the relative vulnerability of the U.S.A., which possesses no such ABM system, the Soviet Union necessarily saw the SDI project as an additional curtailment of its political options.

In order to regain political mobility, the Soviets had to achieve the following things in negotiations with the U.S.A., corresponding to this evaluation:

1) A far-ranging denuclearization of NATO and Warsaw Pact.

2) Maintenance of their own ABM system while simultaneously preventing the realization of SDI.

3) A mental-political split between the U.S.A. and Europe, including the dissolution of NATO.

At the non-summit conference at Reykjavik, it became clear to the Soviets that they had set their sights too high. The denuclearization package they had conceived fell apart, in spite of conference tactics which surprised the Americans. Thanks to the newly won flexibility of the Soviet leadership, generally attributed to Gorbachov, the Soviets quickly found out how to gift-wrap the Reykjavik package, and offered the Americans negotiations on the nuclear medium-range missiles.

The process and outcome of these negotiations are known. The INF treaty itself is a hotly contested issue.

First, the military argument. It is undoubtedly correct, that were the treaty implemented—if it is ratified despite all

Under INF, if NATO is attacked, the leadership of NATO and the U.S. President will confront the choice, either to decide to release tactical nuclear weapons, and thus leave Europe to its destruction; or to dare to initiate a nuclear strategic exchange, with the risk of the destruction of the United States itself; or, finally, to capitulate to the Soviets in Europe. Thus, ratification of the INF treaty would grant the Soviet Union a real chance to wage and win a war in Europe—a chance they do not have today.

political doubts and criticism—about 3% of the global nuclear launcher potential would disappear, but *only* the launchers. For lack of a solution to problems of verification, the warheads themselves are not included in the treaty. The consequences for Europe are far more severe than this 3% might lead one to suspect. While the Soviets are able to replace the SS-20—which would be an obsolete system in three years in any case—with more modern missiles, the SS-24, SS-25, or the SS-27, NATO has no realistic options to compensate for what it loses through the treaty. When I say “realistic” here, I do not mean to say that such options would not be technically available, but rather that for primarily political reasons these options cannot be realized. The years of propaganda which made nuclear weapons appear to be especially satanic weapons has borne its fruit in favor of the Soviet Union. The consequence of that, is that NATO no longer has effective weapon systems at its disposal, which could directly attack Soviet reinforcements in an attack—and NATO can only go into action if it is attacked—and thus prevent the Soviets from supplying and reinforcing their assault forces. This deficiency is further aggravated by the German Federal Chancellor’s voluntarily giving up the 96 Pershing Ia. These are, by the way, weapon systems whose nuclear warheads are in the possession, and under the total control, of the U.S.A.

INF would give Europe to the Russians

In the simplest terms, the crucial military consequence of

the INF treaty in Europe will be the relative aggravation of the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact over NATO. If NATO is attacked, the cohesion and integrity of the alliance will break apart relatively quickly. At that point, the leadership of NATO and the President of the United States will confront the choice, either to decide to release tactical nuclear weapons, and thus leave Europe to its destruction, or to dare to initiate a nuclear strategic exchange, with the risk of the destruction of the United States itself, or, finally, to capitulate to the Soviets in Europe. Since the last of these alternatives is the most likely, the ratification of the INF treaty by the U.S. Senate signifies nothing else than granting the Soviet Union, at least as far as Europe is concerned, a real chance to wage and win a war in Europe—a chance they do not have today. Or, to express the strategic state of affairs in different terms, this means that the administration of the United States must grant the Soviet Union far-reaching options of exerting political domination over the still free part of Europe, in order to avoid having to make the decision to capitulate directly.

The form and manner in which the Soviet foreign minister stated his demands during his visits recently to Bonn, Paris, and Madrid, are just a taste of what is breaking out all over Europe right now. The Soviet Union, strengthened by the technological and economic capacities of Western Europe, will then become a complete, and thus dominant, world power.

Let me note here, that the Western demands brought forward for additional disarmament negotiations are, from a strategic as well as from the political point of view, *merely* demands, which the Soviet Union—once the INF treaty has gone into effect—can accept or refuse. It is completely predictable that the Soviet Union will only agree to whatever is to its own advantage. Another consequence of a ratification of the INF treaty should also be kept in mind. The political-strategic significance of stationing the United States' own Pershing II missiles and the Cruise Missiles was to strengthen the links between the individual elements of the escalation ladder of "Flexible Response," and thus strengthen the credibility of the strategy on the whole. If these missiles are withdrawn, Europeans' confidence in the firm resolve of the Americans to defend their own freedom in Europe will be severely weakened. In Europe nowadays, a great deal of attention is paid to statements by one or another American politician calling for thinning out the U.S. troop presence in Europe—for reasons which may be superficially plausible—or when U.S. officials start talking about changing the status of Berlin.

The assurances that these things are all intended to serve the preservation of peace and freedom in Europe, or contribute to improving human relations in Europe, or relations between the two states in Germany, have already lost what was always a thin mantle of credibility. Outside the ranks of

official government representatives in Europe, the ratification of the INF treaty is already understood to be an American signal to the Soviet leadership that America's interest in Europe has diminished. For many Europeans, the INF treaty calls up memories of the political events on the eve of the Korean War.

Once official America looks at Europe as an alliance territory with lower security requirements relative to those applying to CONUS (Continental United States), this will be the beginning of the European dissolution of NATO.

Soviet penetration in West

The relative enhancement of the Soviet superiority militarily will have yet another consequence. The Soviet leadership already employs the network of Communist parties in Western countries whenever this appears to be politically opportune. The events around German nuclear power plants and the German steel industry are the most recent examples. We know that the trade-unions, particularly at the level of the factory-councilors, have been infiltrated by communists. This provides the Soviet Union with an infrastructure in peacetime which can be exploited at any time by spetsnaz forces, the Soviet Special Forces trained for just that purpose. This element of Soviet strategy becomes all the stronger, the weaker the confidence of our citizens in NATO, and thus also the weaker their confidence that America will assist us in the defense of our freedom—the threat to our freedom we witness daily in what our fellow Germans suffer under the SED regime in East Germany.

The ratification of the INF treaty by the U.S. Senate is a major step in the direction of giving up the economic and cultural unity of the Western world. The question has to be asked, whether there is still any correspondence between such a policy and the moral principles and ethical foundations of our common Western culture. Hopefully, we will not have to wait for this question to be answered by history.

There is still time to turn back. The United States does have men and women who have the necessary overview, who are ready to draw the necessary cultural, economic, military, and thus political conclusions, and to act accordingly. The most prominent mind among these true American patriots is Lyndon H. LaRouche. He has launched his bid as a conservative Democrat for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination. The obstacles thrown against him personally, and against his candidacy, are a testimony to the fact, that those who fear a strong America, an America capable of truly leading in the Western world, are co-governing now with their long arms even in your beautiful country.

We Europeans, and I as a German, appeal to you: Let the world economy be saved from collapse, let the Soviets be compelled toward a worldwide cooperation which serves all people on this planet, and which secures the dignity, the right to self-determination, and the freedom of all people.