

# After INF treaty signing, American establishment grows more isolationist

by Scott Thompson

In a series of interviews with current and former senior policymakers in major U.S. institutions, *EIR* asked the following questions: 1) Do you distrust West Germany in terms of its drift toward neutralism and the East bloc? 2) How do you stand on the "Neville Chamberlain" INF treaty? and 3) Do you support the position of the recently released Iklé-Wohlstetter report, *Discriminate Deterrence* that calls for lifting the nuclear umbrella over Western Europe that is part of the U.S. defense commitment to the NATO alliance?

Almost uniformly the interviews revealed a growing "neo-isolationism" in the U.S. establishment, which points to further fissuring of the Atlantic Alliance of the sort presaged by the INF treaty and the Iklé-Wohlstetter report. Even among those opposed to the INF treaty, the position taken was all too frequently that the medium-range missiles were necessary, because it is more credible they would be used than the nuclear strategic power of the United States, for the defense of Western Europe. The interviews, whether for or against the INF treaty, also reflected a growing consensus that the U.S. should prepare to reduce its conventional forces commitment to NATO.

The following are highlights of some of the interviews, broken down into positions of whether the individual was for or against the INF treaty:

## Pro-INF treaty

Charles Heck, the North American director of the Trilateral Commission, said that the strongest concern about growing West German neutrality is to be found in France, which is seeking closer rapprochement in defense policy with West Germany in an attempt to deal with this problem. While Heck supports the INF treaty, he said, "I am concerned that some people perceive it as a decoupling move. One of the ultimate effects of the treaty will be the perceptions of it." Heck thinks that the United States still has sufficient nuclear weapons in submarines and aircraft for adequate defense of Western Europe. "It would be far more disruptive to the Atlantic Alliance if the INF treaty were not ratified," Heck said. "The Europeans would find this incomprehensible." Although Heck concluded that "Europe is clearly less important than 40 years ago" to U.S. defense, he said that he

"cannot imagine lifting the nuclear umbrella."

Evangeline Bell Bruce, a former OSS agent and the widow of establishment Atlanticist David Bruce, said that she is alarmed at the growing "neo-isolationism" of the U.S. establishment. She takes Henry Kissinger's position that the INF treaty is flawed, but ought to be ratified because of European public support for the treaty. "I can understand the concern about the treaty that is being expressed by West Germany. My real concern is what is happening inside Germany," Mrs. Bruce said. "There is a drift toward neutrality and the East."

Pamela Churchill Harriman, a leader of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party and the widow of Averell Harriman, said, "The issues are so complex that the new President will have to carry out a thorough reassessment of U.S. policy toward Western Europe. In the global epoch, the trends are toward Asia. Still, we must not give the Europeans the impression that we are going to pull out on them."

Robert Bowie, formerly with the Harvard Center for International Affairs and most recently with Brookings Institution, said that "The Germans are restive now. They are a queasy people. Any change makes them uncomfortable, but I think what is happening can be repaired. Right now the Europeans are concerned that no one within the Reagan administration establishment has a feel for Europe and a concern for Europe's problems." Bowie said that the INF treaty would have been more palatable to the Europeans had it not been preceded by the Reykjavik mini-summit. "The whole defense of the West was treated as a poker game at Reykjavik, and the Europeans believe that the guy playing poker with Gorbachov doesn't know the cards." Bowie asserted that the "decoupling" issue was first raised by Henry Kissinger, when he said at Brussels a few years ago that the Europeans were kidding themselves if they thought the U.S. would use its strategic nuclear arsenal in Western Europe's defense.

## Anti-INF treaty

Susan Crow with the Committee on the Present Danger, said that the CPD had no formal statement on the treaty other than that "It should not be ratified unless there was Soviet compliance with past agreements." She said that the CPD

had not considered the Iklé-Wohlstetter report to lift the nuclear umbrella from Western Europe.

Fritz Kraemer, former senior Pentagon policy analyst and the mentor of Henry Kissinger, Gen. Alexander Haig, and Gen. Vernon Walters, said, "The danger is already so that Germany is going irretrievably toward neutralism. The Germans are fearful, and this leaves them vulnerable to Finlandization. The United States should increase its conventional commitment to NATO." After the NATO alliance went through the trauma of the Pershing-cruise deployment, the U.S. suddenly told Chancellor Helmut Kohl that unless he gave up the 72 Pershing 1s he was "acting as an obstacle to peace." "Kohl forever will know that we are not reliable," Kraemer said.

"Of course the Senate could block the INF treaty," Kraemer added. "All that has to be done is to link the treaty with reservations to things that are already being done by the Soviet Union, such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan."

Although he said that "such reports are meaningless," Kraemer supported the Iklé-Wohlstetter report's conclusion that the nuclear umbrella should be lifted from Western Europe. "Neither Iklé nor Wohlstetter are decouplers. . . . De Gaulle was the most realistic. He said that whatever the theory is, the United States will not risk Philadelphia, Chicago, and Washington for the defense of Hamburg. Of course, I wouldn't say it to a European, but it is inconceivable that within this great democracy, anyone would give that order." Kraemer concluded that the INF treaty was bad, because "the most credible weapons were the medium range ones."

Midge Decter of the Committee for a Free World said that she was thinking of forming a group with former Pentagon official Frank Gaffney, members of the Committee on the Present Danger, and her own committee to stop the START negotiations. She said that debate within the group was mixed over the INF treaty, but her own view was: "INF is a waste of time. I don't see how anyone can do anything about it now." "If the Germans feel they are being decoupled, what can you say?" Decter said, adding that "They are being decoupled." Decter criticized the European leadership for acting like Central American Presidents toward the INF treaty. "I have it from sources who speak to Margaret Thatcher that, in private, she dressed down Ronald Reagan, saying the INF treaty was disastrous. But, publicly Thatcher supports the treaty."

James Hackett, a senior defense analyst at the Heritage Foundation, said, "We are concerned that the INF treaty creates the atmosphere for the denuclearization of Central Europe." He said that the Heritage Foundation had published the statements of Evan Galbraith, the former U.S. ambassador to France, who has taken a strong stand on the decoupling danger to West Germany. Asked what could be done to block the INF treaty, Hackett said, "The Senate should review it with great care. The position of Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft that although the treaty is flawed, it should be

ratified because of European response, is ridiculous."

Asked about the *Discriminate Deterrence* report's call for lifting the nuclear umbrella from Western Europe, Hackett said: "I haven't formed an opinion yet. I am concerned about the large U.S. expenditures, when Europe is back on its feet economically. We need to take a hard look at our NATO commitment . . . including Senator Nunn's proposal for reducing the force level committed to Western Europe. Greater European responsibility for defense means that we can eventually withdraw some of our forces."

Dr. Andrew Goldberg, a senior defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said, "There is no question that Germans are more distrustful of U.S. intentions, I think, in many ways even more than Soviet intentions on the mass public level. German leaders like Hans-Dietrich Genscher support a process that is becoming denuclearization. It is giving the Germans the idea that the amount of room which they have with the Soviet Union is increasing. They have much more to gain out of dealing with the Soviets than with the U.S. . . . What Genscher wants is the historic process that relations between East and West Germany improve and that this whole process of *Ostpolitik*—opening up relations with the East—is something that they want to advance. The man who holds the key to that whole process is really Gorbachov. . . . You see not just on the left wing, but on the right wing where you have Franz Josef Strauss going to the Soviet Union and coming back with 'Gorbachov is a man we can bargain with.' It's quite clearly that the Germans see this as a time of opportunity. What the Germans are most worried about is that the United States is going to make them stop that process. . . . For the leadership, it's a much broader diplomatic gambit."

Although he said that the process of decoupling has been under way for a long time, beginning with the chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt in West Germany, Goldberg agreed that the process is "accelerating." "INF is symbolic of that acceleration. It's America saying there's no need for us to be as prominently linked to the defense of Europe. . . . I'm pessimistic about the future of the Atlantic Alliance."

Asked about the Iklé-Wohlstetter report, Goldberg said: "I opposed the INF treaty, because the nature of our relationship to European defense should be nuclear. I really believe that it's the Europeans' business to handle much of the conventional defense for themselves. . . . But, because nukes are relatively less expensive than conventional forces, it was in our interest to deploy INF to maintain nuclear deterrence. . . . Our nuclear commitment should be seamless. . . . When you get around to the conventional level, I really believe that we have overemphasized to a great degree our commitment and our presence in Europe. I mean this business of 325,000 troops over there, that number does not bear any relationship, to any objective measure of threat. There is nothing that says: '300,000 is good; 200,000 is bad.' "