The INF Treaty: for America a unilateral 'double zero'

by Konstantin George

Even in its own terms, the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty signed by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet party boss Mikhail Gorbachov on Dec. 8 is a fraud, giving the Russians a unilateral "double zero" at the West's expense. As *EIR* has stressed, the treaty ignores the Soviet Union's actual Order of Battle, which compensates for the withdrawal of nuclear missiles from Europe with irregular warfare and emerging "radio frequency weapon" capabilities. But even when it comes to counting missiles, the treaty is fatally flawed. Every senator should consider the following facts and figures, documenting that, while the U.S. missile forces are to be eliminated, Moscow will retain a large number of missiles, supposedly banned by the treaty.

The United States accepted the Soviet figure of 405 SS-20 launchers and 45 SS-12 launchers to be scrapped under the treaty. The U.S. also accepted Moscow's declaration that there exists for each launcher, SS-20, SS-22, and SS-23, only two missiles, one for ready launching, and one instant reload. In doing so, the Reagan administration threw out the window its own rock-bottom 1987 estimates of Soviet medium-range missile strength (the SS-20 and its predecessor, the SS-4), and NATO and neutral European estimates concerning Soviet reload missile figures.

Up to the eve of the INF Treaty signing, the Pentagon had insisted that a minimum of 441 SS-20 launchers existed in the U.S.S.R., and a minimum of 112 SS-4 launchers. Thus, there are, somewhere in the U.S.S.R., at least 36 SS-20 and 67 SS-4 launchers unaccounted for in the INF Treaty. The Soviet cheating only starts there. Even the military publications for neutral European countries, such as the highly respected *Oesterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* of Austria, have estimated a minimum of three to four missiles per SS-20 launcher, and that such a figure comprises the norm for all cold-launched Soviet mobile missile systems. This means that between one-third and one-half of Soviet SS-20 missile, as opposed to launcher, strength is not covered in the INF Treaty.

The U.S. senator pondering over ratification cannot dismiss the SS-20 cheating by claiming "only" 36 unaccounted-for launchers. These are 36 launchers with an unlimited supply of reload missiles.

The SS-22 and SS-23 numbers fraud

The Soviet cheating is much worse concerning the ludicrously low figures "admitted" by Moscow and accepted by Washington, regarding the number of SS-22 and SS-23 missiles. The first order of the fraud is demonstrated ironically by Moscow's fairly truthful admissions concerning SS-22 and SS-23 missile strength in the relatively tiny area of East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Here, Russia admitted having a missile strength of 197 SS-22 and SS-23 launchers, catching NATO off guard. NATO had estimated—and this concerns a small area of territory where NATO intelligence surveillance is relatively good—a total of only 130-140 such missile launchers. Given such a shocker, one would have thought that the Reagan administration would never have made such fools of themselves in accepting the Russian "admission" of a mere 33 SS-23 launchers existing in the entire Soviet Union. Equally ludicrous was Washington's acceptance of Soviet SS-23s based in the U.S.S.R. as "reserve" forces.

Here it is important to reveal the "secret" as to why *EIR*, in the summer of 1985, with no access to satellite reconnaissance or anything of the sort, was able to arrive at a "bulls-

eye" estimate of at least 198 SS-22 and SS-23 launchers in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and by the same token to arrive at fair estimates of a far higher number of such missiles inside the U.S.S.R. than the mere 33 admitted by Moscow. Our analysis was based on knowing the function of the missile units in the Soviet Order of Battle. What we knew was the number of such units assigned to the armies and "fronts" (two or more armies) in the Order of Battle of the Soviet Ground Forces, and roughly how many such armies and "fronts" were based in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Our next order of analysis was debunking the false axiom that Soviet forces inside the U.S.S.R. were somehow "reserve," with a different missile unit configuration in their Order of Battle. Soviet medium-range missiles had and have the function of blanketing targets in NATO countries and other U.S. allies, such as Japan in the Far East. Therefore, Military Districts inside the U.S.S.R., such as the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts which face Scandinavia; the Odessa, North Caucasus, and Transcaucasus which face Turkey and NATO's Southern Flank; and the Far East Military District, facing Japan, to say nothing of the large "2nd Echelon" Soviet forces in the Western U.S.S.R. Military Districts of Byelorussia and the Carpathian region, all have a "front line" Order of Battle with the requisite high SS-22 and SS-23 missile strength.

To cite but one prime example, let us take the Far East Military District. Soviet military strength there is approximately equal to Soviet forces in East Germany. Also, as NATO has always noted, new Soviet military hardware is always, as the case of the T-80 tank showed, first dispatched to the forces in East Germany and the Far East. Any military intelligence professional would have to assume at least a rough parity in Soviet medium-range missile strength deployed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and in the Far East, deployed against Japan, South Korea, and on a contingency basis, against China.

Concerning the Southern Flank, there was even the admission at the beginning of July 1987 by Soviet General Staff Col. Gen. Nikolai Chervov, that SS-22s and SS-23s were stationed in the south of the U.S.S.R., facing Turkey. Regarding the Northern Flank, one ought to consider the shock that hit NATO when, in the INF Treaty, Moscow admitted it had 96 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles in the Baltic Military District, facing Scandinavia. NATO hadn't counted any. Again, NATO was caught with its pants down regarding one of the smallest land area military districts in the Soviet Union. Imagine what can and is being hidden in the larger land expanses of the U.S.S.R.

Last but not least, NATO knows that Soviet SS-23s are based with the Soviet Groups of Forces in both Poland (cited in the respected *Jane's Defence Weekly,* for example) and Hungary, and, probably SS-22s in Hungary as well. The INF Treaty does not even provide for nominal inspection in these two countries.

Forces gear up for Senate INF battle

by William Jones

The week before the reconvening of the Senate on Jan. 25 has been characterized by a flurry of activity and an alignment of forces in preparation for the decisive battle to prevent the consolidation of a "New Yalta" agreement, under the terms of the INF Treaty. Preliminary signs of combativeness have been forthcoming from Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, one of the three committees in which the treaty will be scrutinized before being sent to the Senate floor for a vote.

Senator Helms announced on Jan. 13 that the treaty contained "significant defects and loopholes" that will require amendments. Two major problems that he wants to focus on, are the question of whether the verification requirements of the treaty are adequate, and the fact that no nuclear warheads are actually destroyed, only the missiles and the launchers. The warheads can therefore be placed on other missiles.

More significantly, Helms states that the removal of nuclear missiles from Western Europe would place the United States "on the nuclear front line," thus emphasizing that the U.S. military presence in Western Europe exists not only for the defense of Europe, but also as the front-line defense for the United States itself. Earlier in the week, Republican presidential candidate Jack Kemp had accused the Soviets of having already broken the treaty, when they sent the United States phony pictures of what they claimed to be SS-20 and SS-23 missiles.

The previous, docile acceptance of the INF Treaty by Western European leaders, who had given their consent under extreme pressure from U.S. government officials, including Vice President George Bush, who continues to wave the INF flag on behalf of his presidential campaign, has begun to give way to a mild outcry of protest from these same leaders, particularly since the publication of the Wohlstetter-Iklé report on "Discriminate Deterrence."

The reverberations of the European protests are just beginning to be felt in Washington and are creating an atmosphere of apprehension with regard to the full ramifications of the treaty. It is finally beginning to dawn on some people, that the treaty may indeed be that "new Munich," which *EIR* warned about when the treaty was signed. The battle in the Senate in the weeks ahead promises to be wild and woolly. Well may it be so, for the stakes are higher than most of the participants realize.