

How the INF treaty will be stopped

by Nicholas F. Benton

The disastrous Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov in Washington Dec. 8, removing the only effective deterrent to a massive Soviet military arsenal on the borders of Western Europe, is not yet binding. Ratification of the treaty by a two-thirds vote of the U.S. Senate is still required, and serious opposition, which could prevent implementation, is expected to surface as the ratification process begins.

The U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, states that the President "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."

President Reagan wasted no time launching his campaign to secure Senate ratification. In a nationally televised speech Dec. 10, he said, "I will meet with the leadership of Congress here tomorrow morning, and I am confident that the Senate will now act in an expeditious way to fulfill its duty under our Constitution."

However, Senate ratification is far from certain. Right now, according to Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), there are approximately 50 Senators in favor of the treaty, 25 opposed, and 25 undecided. Since it will require 67 votes to ratify the treaty, the question of ratification is very much up in the air, despite attempts by treaty supporters to insist otherwise.

Two factors: LaRouche and timing

To begin with, there is already a dispute among Senators about when the ratification vote will come up. It is generally agreed that consideration of the issue will not begin prior to the Christmas recess, which lasts to Jan. 19.

The timing of the vote could be the most critical factor. For example, the longer the vote is delayed (no one thinks it will come before next February, and some speculate it may

not be until August), the greater the chances are for ratification to be defeated. That is because of the many outside events which could radically change Senators' views in the meantime, such as occurred in 1979, when the SALT II treaty that had been signed by President Carter and Soviet leader Brezhnev was scuttled after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

This time, in addition to a new Soviet atrocity, the most likely factors to torpedo the INF treaty relate to the early 1988 presidential primaries, and the virtual certainty of a financial crash soon after the New Year.

In both cases, the campaign of Democratic presidential contender Lyndon LaRouche is pivotal. LaRouche is the most articulate and outspoken among the presidential candidates against the INF treaty. Therefore, a strong showing for LaRouche in the Iowa caucuses or New Hampshire primary in February, or in the "Super Tuesday" primaries on March 8, will send a loud and clear message to the Senate that the U.S. population wants to see the treaty rejected—and this will affect many Senate votes.

Similarly, the economic crash will be a further vindication of LaRouche's views, and the added credibility he will gain will help catalyze opposition to the INF treaty that will be felt in the Senate.

If the vote on ratification gets pushed back into the summer, then it will run directly into the heat of the 1988 presidential campaign, with the Democratic nominating convention scheduled for July 18-21 in Atlanta, and the Republican convention Aug. 15-18 in New Orleans. By that time, partisanship will become dominant over all other factors, insuring rejection of the treaty by many Democratic Senators who, according to inside sources, already secretly oppose the treaty, but are publicly supporting it for the moment.

The more time elapses, the greater the drumbeat of pop-

ular opposition to the appeasement treaty will mount, building from the series of newspaper ads by the Ad Hoc Committee Against the INF Treaty, signed by over 200 international military, political, and civic leaders, which appeared just prior to and during the summit. Paid for by the Schiller Institute, headed by LaRouche's wife, Helga Zepp-LaRouche, the ads appeared in the *Washington Post* and *Washington Times*, the *International Herald Tribune*, and the *Manchester Union-Leader*, and were the subject of news reports in a number of newspapers in Europe and the United States. A Cuban newspaper in Miami even ran the ad as its editorial.

In addition, at a well-attended press conference during the summit, Adm. Thomas Moorer, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented a petition signed by over 1,100 flag and general officers opposing the INF treaty and any concessions on the SDI. Admiral Moorer, head of the American Security Council, was accompanied by a dozen retired admirals and brigadier generals, and Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.).

What the Senate might do

In addition to the influence of outside factors in preventing ratification, there is the action that will be taken by the Senate itself in its consideration of the treaty.

For example, prior to debating and voting on the treaty on the floor of the Senate, there will be hearings before three Senate committees. They will begin simultaneously, as soon as the Senate returns from its Christmas recess. The hearings will be held before the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence committees.

The committees will hear extensive testimony from as many expert witnesses as can be found, including European specialists, said Sen. Allen Simpson (R-Wyo.).

The Armed Services Committee will focus on the issue of whether or not the treaty will leave Europe with a sufficient deterrent to Soviet forces threatening her. The Intelligence Committee will focus on whether or not the means are sufficient to monitor and guard against Soviet cheating on the treaty. The Foreign Relations Committee will be concerned about the overall impact of the treaty on U.S.-Soviet and allied relations.

Most Senators will base their final decision on one of three factors: 1) whether they are satisfied that the verification provisions of the treaty are sufficient, 2) whether there are any enforcement provisions in the treaty, in the event the Soviets are discovered cheating and 3) loyalty to President Reagan.

For example, many Republican senators, who otherwise express grave reservations about the treaty, say they will vote for it solely out of loyalty to the President. But they must understand that the President Reagan they were loyal to when he was first elected in 1980 is scarcely the same man today. This was reflected in an interview Reagan conducted during

the summit Dec. 9 with four newspaper columnists, where the President revealed a startling abandonment of his previously healthy realism about the Soviets. In the interview, Reagan said that Gorbachov "is the first and only Soviet leader that has never affirmed" the Soviet goal of world domination. Reagan stated, "Possibly the fundamental change is that in the past, Soviet leaders have openly expressed their acceptance of the Marxian theory of the one-world communist state; that their obligation was to expand in the world. They no longer feel that way."

The President obviously has not bothered to read the *Soviet Military Power* report produced by his own Pentagon, which documents that the Soviets maintain an offensive, nuclear first-strike military doctrine. Nor has he considered his administration's own annual report on Soviet treaty violations, issued only days before the summit, which cited massive Soviet violations of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, warning that the Soviets "may be preparing a nationwide ballistic missile defense" in a total breakout from the treaty.

Therefore, it might be pointed out that loyalty to the President can no longer be valid grounds for any Senator to justify ratification of the treaty.

On the issues of verification and enforcement, a careful review of the facts will reveal to the Senate that verification, as ground-breaking and "intrusive" as it is for this treaty, remains impossible. As former Soviet scientist Dmitri Mikhayev said at an anti-INF press conference held during the summit, verification is impossible in the Soviet Union, because "the country is so vast, so secretive, and has so many underground facilities." He said that U.S. on-site inspectors allowed by the INF treaty will stand at the front gate of a factory, while SS-20s are moved out the back, out doors "the Soviets use to go out and buy their vodka."

On the issue of enforcement, there is simply no provision for it in the treaty.

Killer amendments

This introduces the other option the Senate has for blocking the treaty: so-called "killer amendments," which can be added on with a simple majority vote and are binding. Senator Wallop suggested that one such amendment could require an enforcement provision, such as requiring the immediate termination of the treaty upon discovery of a violation. Sen. Dan Quayle (R-Ind.) suggested on national television Dec. 6 that there could be amendments which delay implementation of the treaty contingent upon a number of things, such as: 1) the Soviets' redressing all violations of current treaties in effect, 2) Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, or 3) the achievement of a conventional force balance in Europe.

The addition of any such Senate-authored amendments to the treaty would be immediately binding, requiring Soviet approval. They would quickly send everything back again to the start of the game.