

Nitze drafts curbs on SDI for Soviets

by Scott Thompson

The Reagan administration's chief arms control negotiator, Paul Nitze, has been secretly engaged in helping to draft arms control proposals for the Soviet Union. The proposals in question, if accepted by the Reagan administration, would cripple the Strategic Defense Initiative. Nitze's near treason, in this regard, was uncovered by Gregory Fossedal of the Copley News Service, who broke the story in the *Washington Times* Nov. 4 and Nov. 9.

Nitze made his contributions to the Soviet proposals through a "back channel" provided by the Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) at the National Academy of Sciences.

Threshold of treason?

Scientists from the National Academy of Sciences' CISAC met with Soviet officials Oct. 26-28 in Vilnius, Lithuania. Upon their return, they passed drafts of a paper proposing "technical thresholds" for SDI tests to Nitze for "advice and input," a source on the panel told Fossedal. Since July, the Soviets have been attempting to gain agreement on "technical thresholds" to limit SDI tests—e.g., limits on the "brightness" of lasers that could be used in tests—but President Reagan has rejected any negotiating effort of this sort because it would "kill or cripple" effective SDI research. While President Reagan has taken a strong stand on this issue of "threshold limits," he has increasingly waffled on a narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which would place the SDI in the position of being researched to death, but not deployed for as long as 10 years.

In August, President Reagan ordered Nitze to stop encouraging private groups to promote such threshold restrictions on SDI tests, including CISAC, which includes many SDI opponents. Nitze has been involved in such efforts since he helped Henry Kissinger draft the 1972 ABM Treaty. Within the last three years, he has argued that it is important to reach an agreement with the Soviets on defensive arms before reaching an agreement on offensive weapons. According to spokesmen for the SDI office of the Pentagon, Nitze went public with this stand in an article several years ago, and he has been quietly mobilizing support to put limits on SDI

testing ever since.

James P. Timbie, the adviser for strategic policy to Deputy Secretary of State Richard Whitehead, offered Nitze's suggestions for changes to CISAC, so that its proposals would "have a better chance of acceptance" by the President, as a member of the committee told Fossedal. Through Timbie, Nitze maintained "frequent" contact with members of the committee, as did Deputy Secretary Whitehead, who used the committee to give seminars for members of his staff on arms control issues.

At present a group of Republican senators—including Senators McClure, Wallop, and Symms—have written a letter to President Reagan, urging that the White House ask the National Security Adviser and Secretary of State George Shultz to give a full accounting of Timbie's role as a go-between for Nitze and CISAC. The day after the scandal broke, Timbie was summoned to an extraordinary meeting at the White House to begin a probe of the scandal.

Nitze's denial

Paul Nitze weakly denied to this news service that he had any contact with CISAC, while Lyn Rusten, the spokesman for CISAC who arranged its latest trip to the Soviet Union, denied that CISAC has ever carried out official negotiations with the Soviet Union on behalf of Nitze or any other official of the government. But, Rusten refused to discuss whether or not "threshold limits" on the SDI was a topic of discussion at the last meeting with the Soviets, claiming that these were secret meetings which the U.S. press had no business reporting on. Pentagon and State Department officials looking for such "trip reports," which CISAC scientists with clearance for secret materials are obligated to detail, told Fossedal that they have found significant gaps in the accounts of CISAC members of their trip to the Soviet Union.

Those members of CISAC who attended the Vilnius, Lithuania meeting include: Wolfgang Panofsky, the chairman of CISAC, who is with Stanford University; Alexander Flax, president emeritus of the Institute for Defense Analysis; IBM researcher Richard Garwin; Spurgeon Keeney, director of the Arms Control Association; Katherine Kelleher, director of the Johns Hopkins School of International Affairs; Claire Max; Michael May, associate director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; physicist Richard Muller; physicist Marshall Rosenbluth; John Steinbrenner, director of Brookings Foreign Policy Studies; and, Charles Towne. The group met with members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, including the U.S.A.-Canada Institute. Heading the Soviet delegation was Roald Sagdeyev, who is chairman of the Soviet Academy of Science's Space Research Institute; Andrei Sakharov, a leading Soviet propagandist against the SDI, was in attendance.

The goal of the "threshold limits" proposal, according to a CISAC report of Sept. 16 marked "privileged," is for the United States to reach an agreement with the Soviets that

“would mitigate for them the most negative effects of a U.S. program outside the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty,” the 1972 pact negotiated by Henry Kissinger with input from Nitze, which bans a comprehensive shield against nuclear attack. Administration officials who are investigating Nitze’s role with CISAC say they believe the Soviets may submit some form of the proposal to U.S. negotiators at the Geneva arms talks or in Washington right before the summit begins, even though earlier Soviet proposals of this sort were rejected as too restrictive.

Days before CISAC participants left for their Oct. 26-28 trip to the Soviet Union, Wolfgang Panofsky wrote to another member of the panel to describe “Nitze’s suggestions” for promoting SDI testing limits that would restrain the program in a way pleasing to the Soviets, while easing past President Reagan’s earlier objections to such limits.

‘Controversial step’

The minutes of a Sept. 9 session of CISAC describe comments by panel member Michael May, associate director of Lawrence Livermore, which is heavily involved in SDI research, asking Harvard scientist Ashton Carter for “a more careful definition of the boundary between allowed and forbidden activities under the ABM Treaty regime.” “This was a controversial step for Nitze,” the minutes continue, “and so must be kept quiet.” The minutes also indicate that the “back-channel” from Nitze through CISAC to the Soviets was Jim Timbie, who had taken part in preparations for the Shevardnadze-Shultz meeting in September, where Shevardnadze tabled a set of restrictive “threshold limits” for SDI testing, which would have crippled the program.

At another point in the meeting, committee members expressed concern that their studies and talks with the Soviets “not be hostage to one small group in State” working for Nitze. But Wolfgang Panofsky dismissed the fear. “Panofsky said we had the flexibility to feed question ideas to State to then ask us,” the minutes of Sept. 9 state. “Panofsky said he hoped to close the loop with Timbie this afternoon and then assign CISAC members to write outlines of the proposed studies . . . [including] May’s suggestion of defining where to draw the boundary between allowed and forbidden activities under the ABM Treaty.”

Apart from members of the administration, officials at the Justice Department, State Department, National Security Council, and the Pentagon have all begun inquiries into whether or not CISAC members and Paul Nitze, respectively, violated their security clearance and a presidential order to stay away from negotiations that would make the SDI a pawn in arms control. In addition to writing President Reagan, Republican legislators have written to the new FBI Director William Sessions, requesting that a full investigation be conducted to see whether the scientists involved in the Vilnius, Lithuania negotiations violated their security clearance.

‘Flat earth society’ launches a new assault on the SDI

Dr. Richard Garwin of IBM Corp., a leading opponent of the Strategic Defense Initiative, argued in a heavily attended debate on Capitol Hill on Nov. 17, against President Reagan’s conception of a reliable strategic defense that would make the doctrine of nuclear “deterrence” obsolete. He further insisted, against overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that the Soviet Union does *not* have an “SDI” program of its own.

The debate, titled “Is the Strategic Defense Initiative in the National Interest?” pitted Garwin and Carl Sagan of Cornell University, propagandist for the “nuclear winter” hoax, against Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) director Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle. We publish here excerpts.

Garwin: . . . The President’s goal was to be able to give up persuasion of the Soviet leaders not to attack us or our allies, instead rendering a nuclear attack harmless. Last year, in a debate with me in Baltimore, General Abrahamson’s special assistant defined quantitatively what SDI must accomplish for its leaders to believe that they have successfully carried out their mission and deterred nuclear war.

He said the Soviets could right now destroy 6,000 military targets in the United States with their strategic nuclear weapons. He said that if SDIO could show us the way to limiting the Soviet targets destroyed in the United States to 3,000, then the Soviets would be deterred; not accomplishing their military goals, they would never attack. But what about defense of population that we’ve heard about now, that that was the President’s goal? Would they defend our cities? No, he said, there is no military benefit to the Soviets in destroying U.S. or allied cities, so they would not strike them and we would not need to defend our population. According to SDIO, the Russian bear has become the Soviet pussycat. Apparently, SDIO says, we are to forget about preventing Soviet compulsion, coercion of U.S. or its allies. We’re