

European experts: Soviet arms control is a fraud!

by Luba George and Dean Andromidas

A conference in The Hague, Netherlands, Nov. 13 on the theme, "Europe's Security After the Zero Option," heard an alarming report on the advanced state of the Soviets' own "Strategic Defense Initiative," confirming estimates previously unique to *EIR*. Otherwise, the estimates presented of Soviet war-winning intentions and policies more generally, including a reorganization of Soviet Ground Forces for war-time offensives employing radio frequency weapons (for example), were coherent with those originally presented in *EIR*'s 1985 "Global Showdown" special report, and its just-released update, "Global Showdown Escalates."

The conference, jointly sponsored by the Netherlands Institute for International Relations (Institute Clingendael) and the Netherlands Royal Society for the Study of Military Science, was chaired by Lt. Gen. G.C. Berkhof, a former Chief of Staff of NATO's Allied Forces Central Front and a board member of the Royal Society. Attending the conference were the defense policy elite of the Netherlands, including high-ranking military officers, defense ministry officials, and representatives of defense-related institutions.

It featured, in addition to experts from the Netherlands and West Germany, Prof. John Erickson, professor of defense studies at Edinburgh University, Scotland, who had just returned from a visit to the U.S.S.R. Erickson was involved in talks with U.S. and Soviet military figures, and went into detail in his conference speech about Soviet intentions, plans, and war preparations, for the coming "post-INF" period—including their version of SDI, called, he said, "KSO." He presented an unmistakable picture of Soviet buildup for war, and made clear that Party Chief Mikhail

Gorbachov's fabled *perestroika* is an integral feature of such preparations.

'Never sign such an agreement again'

The tone was set by the opening speech, given by Weeck Zandee, member of the Planning Staff of the Royal Netherlands Army. His speech betrayed deep misgivings if not outspoken opposition to the INF agreement and its potential effects for the security of the Atlantic Alliance.

Zandee opened by attacking the INF agreement, declaring that "the euphoria about this agreement has gradually made way for *more critical responses*. The slogan for this criticism seems to be, 'Sign the double-zero agreement, but never sign such an agreement again.' " Zandee emphasized that a "serious crisis of confidence" exists "within NATO as a result of the double zero. . . . We cannot eliminate whole categories of nuclear weapons, when our strategy is based on nuclear deterrence," he emphasized.

"We will have to decide what type of nuclear weapons we need, what the relationship must be between nuclear and conventional forces, and what is a realistic level of conventional forces. As long as these fundamental questions remain unanswered, the alliance is in an adverse, vulnerable, and even dangerous position."

Zandee pointed out the INF agreement sacrifices "security interests" for "short-term political needs," and is particularly devastating for the security of West Germany. As a result of the zero option, there now exists what he called a "singularization" of West Germany. The bulk of the U.S. nuclear presence on German soil will be gone, while all

Soviet short-range missiles (up to 500 km range) which target West Germany will remain in place, facing a de-nuclearized West Germany. As Zandee expressed it: "The shorter the missiles, the more dead the Germans are."

Zandee went on to assert that the signing of the agreement will put pressure on ongoing negotiations for conventional forces reduction, citing Sen. Sam Nunn's proposal for the withdrawal of 13 Soviet divisions from Central Europe in return for the withdrawal of 2 American divisions. Zandee warned that the nations of the Alliance must formulate "a clear and well-defined conventional arms control policy" that takes into full account the Soviets' highly offensive strategic doctrine and not merely the relatively meaningless counting of tanks, divisions, and aircraft.

Soviets admit having SDI program

The main presentation at the conference was delivered by Professor Erickson, head of the Edinburgh, Scotland Defence Studies Institute. Erickson's address concerning Soviet actions and intentions once the INF accord is signed, contrasted sharply with the prevailing assessment in the Western media regarding Gorbachov's *perestroika*. His speech painstakingly documented how the "post-INF environment" fits into the active war preparations of the Soviet High Command.

Erickson revealed publicly some of the results of two years' of work conducted by his team at Edinburgh, on a new Soviet "post-INF" offensive doctrine for the European theater, centered on the incorporation of emerging technologies (ET), including radio frequency weapons, into the Soviet arsenal. This new, ET-based "conventional option" (i.e., non-nuclear, but certainly not conventional in the sense of weapons less lethal than nuclear weapons), is also being reflected, Erickson disclosed, in an ongoing total reorganization of Soviet Ground Forces, especially in East Germany and Eastern Europe.

According to Erickson's Soviet sources, the Russian SDI program is called by the Russians "KSO," meaning either Space Strategic Defense or Command Strategic Defense.

Erickson emphasized that for the Soviets, their SDI is viewed as a vital, integral component of a "combined arms" war-winning mix: "They tend to look at this correlation of nuclear, ET, and SDI, as a form of force multiplier. You can argue with them 'til you're black in the face, but it's very difficult to dissuade them from this point of view."

ET and the Ogarkov Doctrine

Erickson stressed that Gorbachov's *perestroika* (restructuring), or "Ogarkov's *perestroika*," as other military figures attending the conference put it, referring to Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, commander in chief of all Western Theater Soviet Forces, is designed to reorganize the Soviet industrial base, to achieve what the Russians call the "sustainability" of wartime operations, which will feature weapons based on emerg-

ing technologies.

In response to a question by one of the Netherlands' leading retired officers, on Soviet advances in radio frequency weapons development, Erickson, while admitting that Soviet computer technology is well behind that of the West, nonetheless underscored that "they are well advanced in . . . as you say, radio frequency weapons, and their laser technology is very interesting. . . . In terms of their fundamental research, that is very good, indeed."

In his conference presentation, Erickson emphasized that *perestroika* is a war-preparation policy, based on Ogarkov's doctrine.

"They tend to believe that what they're up against is probably more protracted war . . . and that, really, I think, was Ogarkov's point," which "brings into sharp focus Gorbachov's reconstruction . . . and what you might call, what you should call, the entirely modernized industrial base for this protracted war effort."

According to Erickson, for the Soviet military, *perestroika* is crucial, because "reliable defense and sufficiency will be assured by Mr. Gorbachov's reconstruction policy, which will provide in the long term that industrial base which will enable them to acquire, achieve, and maintain sustainability."

Wartime reorganization of the Ground Forces

The bulk of Erickson's address presented in detail the ongoing thorough reorganization of the Soviet Ground, Air, and Air Defense Forces, into a wartime Order of Battle, and under a wartime command-and-control structure. He did not go into detail concerning the Air and Air Defense reorganizations, but stressed their importance. Here, given the military-professional composition of the audience, he did not have to state the obvious, namely, that the Air Defense reorganization is being directed by Ogarkov's close associate, Gen. Ivan Tretyak, recently brought in to command the Air Defense Forces.

Erickson detailed the Ground Forces reorganization, making two essential points beforehand:

1) that the command-and-control features of the current reorganization are an across-the-board implementation of what was begun by Ogarkov in 1984 with the setting up of the wartime theater commands;

2) that the wartime reorganization, premised on incorporating ET weapons into the Soviet military, is a "post-INF" reorganization, taking full advantage of NATO's disastrous post-INF weaknesses.

He presented the Soviet Ground Forces' reorganization in the following manner:

"If they are to pursue this conventional option under present conditions of ET and so on, something has got to change in their system. . . . There was a very serious command-and-control problem at the strategic level, which they began to solve, by setting up the intermediate theater com-

mands" under Ogarkov in 1984.

Now, the Soviet Ground Forces are being reorganized into a structure of Corps and Brigades, under the Theater Commands.

"The Soviet military has developed and is in the process of implementing a new concept, where the Ground Forces are being reorganized, based on new Corps/Brigades structures. . . The Soviet Ground Forces will be structured along Corps, composed of Brigades. The Division (except for training and officer/commander training purposes) will soon disappear from the Soviet Order of Battle. . . . What we're really seeing now in the 1980s, is a Soviet military reorganization which will last until the mid-1990s."

The purpose of these new structures is to effect a "breakthrough" against NATO forces in West Germany, radically upgrading Soviet "deeper and deeper strike capability."

The new corps/brigade structure has already been implemented in Hungary with the Soviet Southern Group of Forces (under the command of the Southwest Theater Command), where "three, and possibly four" such corps now exist. The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) has also begun restructuring along these lines, having set up a new tank corps. The GSFG will soon be reorganized to contain "four Field Armies [presently five] of 12 corps." A base strength for each Corps will be 24,000 troops, but, that can be very rapidly raised "up to 41,000 troops each." The reorganization in the GSFG has begun with the creation of a "tank corps" out of what used to be the "3rd Shock Army" at Magdeburg.

Moscow's post-INF game

The reorganization of GSFG, and the Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary along these lines gives Moscow a huge "propaganda" bonus in "the post-INF period," by permitting apparently large-scale troop withdrawals from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, etc. Erickson told the participants that in the "post-INF environment," Moscow will announce, say, "the withdrawal of seven divisions" from East Germany, and make similar announcements concerning its forces in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Soviets will play to the hilt the game of negotiating conventional forces cuts with NATO. The net result will be a further drastic weakening of NATO. For the Russians, the new Corps/Brigades structures will actually mean the ability to play the "conventional cuts" game, without in any way weakening, even numerically—and in fact, actually strengthening—Soviet

This works as follows. With the new Corps structure, Moscow can maintain a "post-conventional cuts" Order of Battle in East Germany and Eastern Europe of Corps with a strength of 24,000 men each. If and when Moscow decides for war, each Corps can be almost overnight filled to a wartime strength of 41,000 men. And what counts the most, Moscow will have a structure which can best accomplish a "deep strike offensive" and "breakthrough" on the central

front, i.e., against West Germany.

The new structure greatly augments the military "assets" per soldier, and per unit—greater firepower, with streamlined command, simplified and streamlined logistics, upgraded offensive speed, and so forth. Erickson went into this in some detail.

"Now, if you had the old army and division and regiment system, if you were going to war, you had to take everything with you. You don't need it. But what you can do with a corps, you can go back to the wartime model, where an Army and Corps were distributed assets in the rear area, so, if you need nuclear weapons, you can get them, decentralize it down to the brigade, but if you don't need them, you don't have to have them.

"And, you can also do something else as well with a corps on this scale. You can raise it to a strength of 41,862 men where you have the full assets to a Soviet corps. Then you've done a number of things. You've doubled the size of your force and you have possibly the same number or even less of command-and-control modules with which to manage the operations. The third thing you have are brigades of very good combined-arms units, both in terms of simpler command and control, and you can get the requisite elements of firepower, mobility, and air defense of a brigade-sized group. . . .

"They do in fact enable them . . . to establish for breakthrough operations a superiority of 4:1; for offensive operations, and for the defensive side, they can actually maintain a 1:1 superiority; or they can do something else; they can decentralize their brigades and take on NATO counter-thrusts as such."

One point unfortunately not made in the presentation was that prior to this reorganization, the brigade structure has existed in the Soviet military for the elite *spetsnaz* commando units, and the equally elite Air Assault Brigades. In short, the new reorganization will, among other things, "mesh" the structure of the entire Soviet Ground Forces, to quote Erickson, "under present conditions of emerging technologies," with the structure of the *spetsnaz* and Air Assault Brigades, who are slated to play the decisive role in employing radio frequency weapons in the NATO rear to wreck NATO's vital installations, *before* the reorganized Ground Forces leave their jumping-off positions.

Certain military analysts are not unaware of this. In discussions with *EIR*, they agreed that the Soviet military leadership is giving hitherto unprecedented weight to the role offensive force *spetsnaz* and Air Assault components of the Soviet military in future wars, employing ET. They also agreed with the conclusion drawn by *EIR* from the unprecedented fact that the two most recently appointed Soviet deputy defense ministers, Generals of the Army M.I. Sorokin and D.S. Sukhokukov, are both figures who spent significant portions of their careers building and shaping Soviet Airborne and *spetsnaz* forces.