

Atlantic Commission: Will NATO survive?

by Dean Andromidas

Oct. 9 and 10 saw the Netherlands' Atlantic Commission and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis of Washington hold their "Third International Roundtable Conference on East West Relations in the 1990s: Politics and Technology." The conference brought to the Hague political figures, security experts, and government spokesmen from throughout Western Europe and the United States, including NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, U.S. Rep. Dave McCurdy (D-Okla.), and others. The conference demonstrated the dangerous "New Yalta" drift precipitated by the Reagan administration's dash for a summit and arms control agreement with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachov.

Echoing the fears of leading European political figures and security experts seated before him, Kissinger declared that the signing of the INF agreement would signal "the end of nuclear coupling" between Europe and the United States. Going one step further than any of the official American spokesmen present, he asserted that the Reagan administration *had already agreed* to a 10-year moratorium on SDI deployment: "Under START negotiations, strategic warheads will be reduced by 50%. . . . We have already deferred deployment of SDI for at least 10 years."

Kissinger then added, regarding the ABM morato-

rium, "There is no record of any moratorium that the U.S. has ever entered into, being abandoned by the U.S."

Kissinger's comments, not without a little self-serving calculation, captured the attention of many of the European Atlanticists present at Knights Hall in the Netherlands Parliament complex. They were still reeling from earlier presentations by U.S. State Department and congressional spokesmen. Although apparently intended to mollify Western European doubts, official U.S. statements only served to transform concern into desperation among conservative circles present.

Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at his dinner speech, went so far as to chastise his audience for not admitting that "we won" by forcing the Soviets to withdraw their SS-20s. Although Adelman resorted to quotes from no less than nine personages, ranging from Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to his own 10-year-old daughter, he only strengthened the conviction of many that the Reagan administration has lost all comprehension of the political and military realities facing Western Europe.

Lord Carrington not only encouraged NATO nations to say "yes" to the INF agreement, but spoke of "unprecedented prospects for genuine reductions in nuclear arsenals." In a swipe at the Strategic Defense Initiative, he declared that he was "suspicious of those who see a technological fix just around the corner." Carrington asserted that the leading problem facing NATO was "the perception in public opinion that NATO is becoming merely reactive and is losing the initiative in arms control and East-West relations to a more imaginative Soviet leadership." Note his concern for perception, not reality.

His "business as usual" tone was broken by one participant who charged that "by taking out the only missiles that can strike at the Soviet Union, we are telling them they can strike at Europe with impunity."

Despite Kissinger's polemics against the INF agree-

shortened by months. Clearly, either Montgomery had not studied his von Schlieffen, or failed to understand it.

By psychology, we mean the discovery of some political-cultural flaw in the mind set of the opposing commanders and the forces under their command, a flaw which we may exploit by deploying and applying our forces in such a manner as to achieve a flanking and enveloping position.

Military technology partakes of the nature of both. It was the stubborn technological backwardness of the French command under Napoleon III which assisted the Prussian forces greatly in defeating France. It was the efficient use of superior French industrial technology, by Lazare Carnot, which is featured in Carnot's revolutionizing the design of the combat

forces of France, to create a force against which no opposing power could stand until the brilliant exploitation of Napoleon's strategic blundering by Scharnhorst, vom Stein, et al. in the Russian campaign of 1812-13.

The advance in technology can always be translated into gains in firepower, mobility, and depth of combatants. Whichever party neglects this, or refuses to adjust the order of battle to such new realities, loses. Thus, the technological aspects of military science partake of both physical geometry and psychology.

The engrained weakness of the Russian strategists, is their culturally determined commitment to the doctrine of the "offensive." France's World War I commander, Joffre, was

ment and the idea that the Gorbachov reforms hold any hope for peace in Western Europe, he posed no alternative. Rather, his fatalistic tone and assertion that the agreement was already a foregone conclusion, leaving Europe to its own devices, had a calculated demoralizing effect on the European leadership.

One leading conservative Dutch parliamentarian told this correspondent, "Listen, President Reagan is considered a right-wing politician. When he extols the same line as the peace movement, how are we expected to mobilize public opinion for the additional 500 million guilders we need for defense?" Another leading Dutch political figure expressed a more direct form of rage, labeling Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek "a coward" for delivering a conciliatory opening conference speech.

'Strengthen the forces of détente'

The hard cop/soft cop routine posed by Dr. Kissinger, on the one hand, and Adelman, Lord Carrington, et al., on the other, merely set the stage for the airing of real "New Yalta" policies. Dr. K. von Dohnanyi, Lord Mayor of Hamburg and a leading German Social Democrat, reminded people of the "better times" of 1972 when the *Ostpolitik* policies of Willy Brandt prevailed. While welcoming the INF agreement, he predicted that the next 15 years would see a United States preoccupied with its economic problems, facing "the dangers of isolationism." While admitting that the U.S. contribution to NATO could never be replaced by resources within Europe, he encouraged his audience to "strengthen the forces of détente," since the Gorbachov reforms have the sole purpose of "making the Soviet economy competitive in the world economy."

Dr. von Dohnanyi surprised his audience by concluding that the Soviets have all the advantages in Europe. He denied that German reunification and neutralization was being seriously entertained. But, he then declared, "If the

Stalin Note of 1952," proposing German reunification and "neutrality," "were placed again on the desk of a German Chancellor today, one thing is for sure, it would not be answered within 24 hours following consultation with the French High Commissioner. If we really want to change the situation in Central Europe, the playing cards are in the pockets of the Soviet Union."

Dr. von Dohnanyi's appeasement was echoed by Prof. Wisse Dekker, chairman of the supervisory board of the huge Dutch electronics multinational, Phillips. Dekker quoted van den Broek: "Détente between East and West will not be possible if the Soviet economy does not see some chance of further expansion." He not only welcomed the opportunities for "joint ventures," but called for the easing of CoCom rules on technology transfer to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Dekker in later discussions welcomed a proposal by Italian industrialist Carlo De Benedetti for a "Marshall Plan" for the Soviet bloc.

SDI: the only real alternative

Clearly out of step with other speakers was Dr. Allen T. Mense, chief scientist for the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. Side-stepping the INF issue, he delivered a pointed presentation of the concept and progress of the SDI program, systematically refuting those who ridicule it as some sort of "technology fix."

Mense asserted that the only guarantee for any arms control process is the deployment of SDI, which represents a program that has already developed "technologies which are here now, that have the capabilities now for better ensuring the security of the Alliance." Since its purpose is to "devalue" Soviet missiles in the minds of Soviet offensive-mission planners, SDI shifts the bases of deterrence from one that "is based on swift uncontrolled offensive nuclear missiles to one which is based on non-nuclear defensive anti-weapons. By anti-weapons, I mean weapons that kill weapons, not people."

a military giant matching the quality of the German commanders, but this excellence was not pervasive among other leading French commanders. After World War I, a half-baked dogma known as the "theory of the offensive" became popular among circles around Marshal Foch, a dogma which naturally enraptured admiring Soviet war-planners at the Frunze Academy and Marshal Tukachevsky.

In consequence, even after Stalin shot Tukachevsky, the Tukachevsky doctrine of the offensive prevailed in the Soviet command. Potentialities of Soviet tactical defense were stripped to build up still more the offensive force which Stalin intended to overrun continental Europe as soon as the Wehrmacht might be bogged down in the invasion of Britain. The

Wehrmacht command recognized both the Soviet military threat to central Europe and the fatal flaw in Soviet deployment. A Wehrmacht attack, before Stalin was prepared to launch his attack, would catch the Soviet forces without a tactical defense capability.

The Wehrmacht had the strategic misfortune known as Adolf Hitler. Hitler vetoed Wehrmacht sponsorship of independence of the Ukraine, and forced German troops to force the Soviets to realize a very powerful tactical defensive potential, the cities of Moscow and Leningrad. Wehrmacht attrition there set the stage for the Stalingrad scenario. At the battle of Kursk, Marshal Zhukov et al. had a free hand to conduct the war according to the Soviet doctrine of the offen-