

EIR Books

Pavlov is a Russian soldier's weak flank

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Spetsnaz, the Story Behind the Soviet SAS
by Viktor Suvorov, translated by Hamish Hamilton and David Lloyd
Hamish Hamilton, London, 1987.
213 pp., clothbound. with appendices and general index, £12.95.

This recent book from a former Soviet military intelligence officer is perhaps the best introduction to the subject of Soviet military special-purpose forces so far available to the general public. The layman will find the brisk literary style convenient, all the more so because it conveys the modern Russian mind-set and its prejudices with shocking clarity and directness.

The military specialist will recognize most of the book's content from the extensive briefings on this subject-matter already widely circulated within Western commands. A specialist might quibble that the book does not take into account the radical changes, now in progress, in the Soviet order of battle for assault against Western Europe; but that does not impair the book's success as a background briefing for the concerned layman.

For me, the most startling feature of the book is two subtopics, casually worked into the text, which stand out as going way beyond the scope of the layman's competencies, matters bearing directly on crucial features of Western strategic planning. It is those two special features of the text which prompt my undertaking this review.

The first is that author's conceptually accurate refutation of the doctrine which Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov has derived from critical analysis of Josef Stalin's military policy dur-

ing the 1935-41 Soviet preparations for assault against Germany.

The second of these topics is the emphasis which Suvorov places upon the intensity of the application of Soviet Academician I.P. Pavlov's famous methods of "conditioned reflex" to the selection and training of Soviet spetsnaz.

I shall turn now to the first of these points, and then show how the Pavlovian training of Soviet military personnel bears upon that point in a way of utmost relevance to Western strategic planners today.

The 'theory of the offensive'

The most important of L.D. Trotsky's military writings, is his attack on the Soviet military command's adoption of French Marshal Foch's 1920s version of the so-called "theory of the offensive." This "theory of the offensive" formed the doctrinal basis for what became known as "the Tukachevsky Plan," and is the underlying theme of the plan of assault within the current Soviet war plan, the so-called "Ogarkov Plan."

If Suvorov's facts given in this connection are correct, and there is overwhelming preponderance of evidence to suggest so, then Suvorov has pointed to the same kind of potentially fatal flaw within current Soviet doctrine which led to the Red Army's initial, massive defeats by the Wehrmacht onslaught.

Suvorov introduces his facts bearing upon this, first, in the second chapter of the book, "A History of Spetsnaz," where the most directly relevant passages are located on pp. 20-24. He returns to stress the governing role of the "theory of the offensive" within Chapter 12, "Control and Combined Operations," over the span of pp. 150-155.

I go directly to the part which will most shock popular opinion on the subject of World War II. I excerpt the most relevant passages from the text and footnotes on pp. 23-24:

"It is easy to understand why Hitler took the decision in . . . July 1940, to prepare for war against the U.S.S.R. . . . Hitler guessed rightly what Stalin's plans were, as is apparent from his letter to Mussolini of 21 June 1941."

Suvorov cites the following excerpt from that letter:

I cannot take responsibility for the waiting any longer, because I cannot see any way that the danger will disappear. . . . The concentration of Soviet force is enormous. . . . All available Soviet armed forces are now on our border. . . . It is quite possible that Russia will try to destroy the Rumanian oilfields.

Suvorov quotes Stalin on this, from (*Moscow Pravda*) of March 11, 1939. Suvorov's argument is subject to criticism, but his argument is fully relevant, as I shall indicate:

in his speech at the 18th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Stalin has this to say about Britain and France: "In their policy of non-intervention can be detected an attempt and a desire both to prevent the aggressors from doing their dirty work . . . not to prevent, let us say, Germany getting bogged down in European affairs and involved in a war . . . to let all the participants in the war get stuck deep in the mud of battle, to encourage them to do this on the quiet, to let them weaken and exhaust each other and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, to enter the arena with fresh forces, acting of course 'in the interests of peace,' and to dictate their own conditions to the crippled participants in the war." Once again, he [Stalin] was attributing to others motives which impelled him in his ambitions. Stalin wanted Europe to exhaust itself.

Before continuing Suvorov's argument, let us pause over this characterization of Chamberlain's, Daladier's, and Stalin's motives at that (March 1939) juncture. Stalin's cited remarks did not represent, at that time, up-to-date knowledge of the British position.

During 1939, very highly placed anti-Hitler forces in Germany had caused Britain to be informed of Dr. Otto Hahn's discovery of proof of principle for the feasibility of constructing fission weapons. The British, in turn, caused this to be leaked to President Franklin Roosevelt, via Albert Einstein et al. Whereas, the informed Western perspective up through 1938, was to support Hitler and Mussolini for a war against Russia, once London and Washington's highest circles knew of Otto Hahn's results, the Anglo-American command was committed to war against Hitler. (Hence, Winston Churchill never attacked Neville Chamberlain personally over the issue of the 1938 Munich Pact with Hitler.)

The motives which Stalin could have attributed to 1938

London did reappear in slightly altered circumstances over the issue of launching the "Second Front" in Western Europe in 1943, or 1944, and also in such forms as Gen. George Patton's quarrels with Field Marshal Montgomery and Eisenhower's command over U.S. military policy in Germany. There was an intent to bleed Germany to the utmost before opening a "Second Front," and to prevent the German military from succeeding in their plans to overthrow Hitler, so that the dismemberment of Germany might proceed as intended, hoping also to drain Russia sufficiently with protracted warfare that a postwar Stalin might be more malleable. (As Churchill discovered, reluctantly, not long after the Potsdam agreements, Stalin was by no means malleable.)

With that important qualification, Stalin's strategic estimate of Anglo-French policy was sound; and Suvorov, who, to his credit, is apparently not privy to the relevant archive material, might thus imagine wrongly that Stalin was merely projecting his own motives on London. Nonetheless, Suvorov's reading of Stalin's own policy is correct.

Then, Suvorov comes to what we should adopt as the crux of our present-day concern in this historical lesson:

Hitler managed to upset Stalin's plans by starting the war first. The huge forces intended for the "liberation" of Russia's neighbors were quite unnecessary in the war of defense against Germany. The airborne corps were used as ordinary infantry against advancing German tanks. . . .

I shall elaborate upon this with particular emphasis.

The reshaping of the whole philosophy of the Red Army, which had been taught to conduct an offensive war on other people's territory, was very painful but relatively short. Six months later the Red Army had learned to defend itself and in another year it had gone over to offensive operations. From that moment everything fell into place and the Red Army, created only for offensive operations, became once again victorious.

Then, on pp. 150-155, Suvorov returns to the more recent evidence bearing upon continuation of "the theory of the offensive." One citation is sufficient for our purposes here:

In other armies different criteria are applied to measure a commander's success. . . . In the Soviet army [such other criteria are] of secondary importance, and may be of no importance at all, because a commander's value is judged by one criterion only: the speed with which his troops advance.

He provides rather detailed explanation of what this signifies in tactical practice, and cites examples from battles.

There is no doubt that the purge of Tukachevsky et al. did not change Stalin's military strategy in the slightest. The

Red Army's pre-war deployments of 1939-41 represented a continued build-up consistent with the Soviet war planning of Tukachevsky earlier. This could have had no military purpose, but that of launching a Soviet offensive into Germany not many months after the time "Barbarossa" was launched, perhaps, indeed, at the point Hitler might have been engaged in an attempted conquest of Britain.

Whether the Red Army's logistics, especially supplies of ammunition, were at the level required for launching of this Soviet offensive, is another important matter. However the Red Army's logistical condition is assessed, the Red Army posture on Russia's Western front was totally offensive, rather including an offensive capability within a defensive one.

This fact is well known to Western specialists, although not the general public. The policy motives for the long-standing suppression of this evidence are not difficult to locate: the World War II myth of our "brave Soviet ally, defending itself against a surprise attack by foreign aggression," the political rationale of the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences, and the Eisenhower-Zhukov sentimentality of the 1950s, demanded that the charge of "planning and preparation of aggressive warfare" be attributed solely to the Axis Powers. For the sake of the official myth, Stalin's own plans for "aggressive warfare" were delicately kept from public attention.

Hitler's Nazis were the evil that they were, and the end of their rule over Germany and Germany's forces to be sought by the earliest and most efficient means—even prior to 1938, when prominent forces in London and New York were still sympathetic to the Nazis'; and Mussolini's continued rule. We might consider, also, that had the German invasion of the Russian empire been totally under Wehrmacht control, without meddling from Nazi butchers and bunglers, the German invaders would have continued to be received as liberators in the Ukraine and among other oppressed minorities of Moscow's dictatorship, and Moscow so defeated. There are these and other matters to be considered in their proper location.

In this location, we are looking simply at the question of whether the Red Army posture of the pre-war 1939-41 interval was overwhelmingly a deployment for an offensive into central Europe, rather than a defense of Soviet borders. The fact is: It was entirely a preparation for launching of an unprovoked attack into Central Europe, and, naturally, westernmost Europe as well.

In serious matters of strategy and history, we must look the relevant facts square in the eye, whether or not those facts are popular ones.

For technical reasons which ought to be obvious enough, I doubt strongly, personally, that Adolf Hitler made the crucial war planning decisions leading to his adoption of "Operation Barbarossa." Anybody of the Wehrmacht general staff, working from classical 19th-century German military tradition, with the special function of modern armored

columns taken into account, would have stated that the only proper way to deal with a Red Army massing for assault according to the Russian "theory of the offensive," was that this must be treated by a preemptive strategic assault. Hitler's role was to adopt expert strategic assessments in this matter, and, obviously, as head of state of his dictatorship, to make the decision to act upon that expert assessment.

The technical point is, that the classical principle of warfare requires an integrated capability for tactical defense and strategic offensive. A military force lacking either competent capabilities of tactical defense, or appropriate forms of capability for strategic offense, has a fatal vulnerability waiting for its exploitation by a well-matched adversary.

In 1940, the lack of an Anglo-French-Belgian strategic offensive capability developed and deployed, led to the collapse of the defense, as de Gaulle and Guderian understood, and as most of the French command did not: the example of the kind of catastrophes inherent in a defense without adequate matching offensive potential. In the state of affairs on Germany's 1940-41 Russian front, the opposite case prevailed.

Once the Red Army launched its prepared offensive against Germany, the Wehrmacht was in serious difficulty, because the full capability of the Russian forces would be deployed according to their design. However, for reason of lack of adequate defensive preparations on the Russian side, but for the effective, improvised defenses of Leningrad, Moscow, and, later, Stalingrad, the initial shattering of the Red Army's main forces in the Western region would have led to Germany's rapid rout of all Russian regular forces. It was the improvised, desperately successful defense of those cities which permitted the Red Army, as Suvorov stresses, to resume the mode of offensive warfare for which it had been shaped.

Soviet offensive dogma today

The same potentially fatal flaw exists in the Soviet strategic posture as a whole today. This shows in the cases of Chad's counteroffensive against invading Libyan forces, and the Franco-American-British posture in the theater of the Persian Gulf. These two developments, involving avoidance of any direct clash with Moscow's own forces, have effectively flanked the entire Soviet strategic position globally. If the diplomats and nervous nellys of other varieties are kept out of the conduct of policy in these two theaters, and present military policy conducted for effective fulfillment of the specific military mission in both cases, the entire Soviet strategic thrust is thrown off-balance politically.

At first glance, it may appear to some that I have switched gears here. I was directing my attention entirely to the military side of the strategic equations. Then, by introducing the cases of Chad and the Persian Gulf, I seem to have switched to the domain in which cultural and political factors predominate, rather than simply military ones. This is not only intentional, but entirely sound reasoning.

Even in regular warfare the total effort deployed to secure victory is approximately 80% expended in cultural, economic, and political measures of support for military action. Although military capability is a decisive factor in forms of conflict short of regular war-fighting, military action is but a sometimes indispensable extension of combined non-military forms of cultural-economic-political action. The essence of strategy is cultural, economic, and political, and military force merely a special way of expressing the development of the combined cultural, economic, and political potential of the respective forces.

My point is, that not only is Soviet military philosophy dominated by the "theory of the offensive." All aspects of Soviet strategy—cultural, economic, political, and military—are so shaped. Thus, the same defects which exist in Soviet military philosophy, exist with more or less equal force, and vulnerability, in all combined aspects of Soviet strategic conflict.

The accelerating tendency for error in Western strategy has been the replacement of classical strategic thinking by the dogmas of Metternichian "crisis management." This means, that since the wartime "summits" at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, and in all "crisis management" dealings with Moscow since, the Western governments have bargained over the amount of offensive advance Moscow will be permitted to enjoy. Moscow has rarely been thrown on the strategic defensive.

The two most notable exceptions to this pattern of "crisis management" retreat in face of Moscow's offensive have been, the March 23, 1983 announcement of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, and the recent interactions between the Chad counteroffensive and military containment, under rules of military engagement, of Khomeini's aggression into the Gulf region.

Although, even before March 1983, Moscow was already moving at relatively maximum speed to deploy its own version of "SDI," the U.S. adoption of a policy matching the Soviets' in this dimension, had the effect of the West's setting the agenda of the East-West strategic conflict. Only the slowing of the pace of the U.S. SDI to about 10-20% the level projected for this in early 1983, gave Moscow the ability to recover the strategic initiative globally.

Chad is the strategic center of Africa; whoever controls Chad controls implicitly all of Africa. The crushing defeat of Moscow's surrogate, Qaddafi, in this quarter, threatened the Soviet strategic flanks in Africa and the Mediterranean—especially if Qaddafi were to fall, no matter what replaced him. The successes of the Chad counteroffensive made possible the allied cooperation achieved thus far in the Persian Gulf, and the two actions interact strategically to produce a combined effect much greater than the sum total of the two actions each occurring independently of the existence of the other.

It is doubtful that Moscow's commitment to Iran would tend to go beyond measured, simultaneous and alternating

doses of political and other support for both Iran and sundry Sunni forces. Iran's value to Moscow is the factor of spreading chaos which the mere existence of the Khomeinist regime represents for the Islamic world as a whole. Moscow will do all possible to avoid being placed in the position of aligning with Iran in opposition to the Sunni world generally!

Yet, if the United States and its partners absolutely humiliate Khomeini by military actions excluding a land war in Asia by Western forces, the discredit to the cause of Khomeini and his imitators has effects throughout not only the Middle East and Islamic world generally, but in Africa, Asia, and Central and South America generally. The West's military force, deployed with that precise form of sophistication, represents the conquering power of reason in arms, as a lesson to irrationalism everywhere.

This cuts through the essence of Soviet cultural-political-economic strategy: the combined forces of international narcoterrorism and fanatical irrationalisms, Moscow's first echelon of strategic assault, as the instrument for eroding the West's stability in its own nations and spheres of influence.

Moscow's general strategy is based on the assumption that the West will continue to be self-duped into pursuing measures of "crisis management" including the utterly futile "arms control" negotiations. Once that factor of folly is removed, once classical standards of reason govern Western responses to conflict, Moscow is thrown on the strategic defensive, and its capabilities for effective offensive action are forced to adapt to those defensive postures for which they are ill-suited by their development.

Ogarkov's argument for 'perestroika'

The inclusion of a pre-war economic mobilization, called *perestroika*, in the Red Army's plans for preparing to launch World War III, has been based on a convergence of two leading lines of argument.

The first line of argument, is the insistence, by Ogarkov and others, that Stalin caused the unnecessary loss of 20 million Soviet lives during World War II. It is charged, that by his economic policies of the 1935-41 period, Stalin failed to develop adequately the logistics required for military needs. So, *perestroika* is an up-to-date Soviet military-planning version of that which Ogarkov, the Voroshilov Academy, and others agree should have been Stalin's economic war drive during the 1935-41 pre-war interval.

The second line of argument, is the simple fact, that the destructive power of today's strategic assault weapons is such that all nations will suffer devastating losses of economic depth during the first hours of general warfare. Thus, no postwar military build-up is possible, except in the imagination of those wishful fools who tell us of the depth of forces which will be mobilized during the first two weeks after the outbreak of warfare—possibly after the war has been won by the side who does not believe such fairy-tale planning.

So, *perestroika* is a build-up to a maximum intensity of war economy, a level of mobilization for total warfare to be

reached prior to launching the general assault.

Marshal Ogarkov's argument is obviously sound war planning, within the limits of certain assumptions. The chief assumption is, that since Moscow will start the war with its launching of its prepared offensive, the only defense Moscow will require will be a combination of general air defense and strategic ballistic missile defense—both measures Ogarkov et al. are planning to have fully deployed, under *perestroika*, by about 1992. Moscow is still operating on the same general "theory of the offensive" on which Trotsky focused his attention over 60 years ago.

As I have noted, this "offensive" doctrine governs not only military posture and planning, but also cultural, economic, and political conflict actions. In all these dimensions, Moscow is repeating the same potentially devastating error it committed during 1935-41. Ogarkov has addressed a significant aspect of Stalin's policy errors, but has overlooked the most fundamental of those errors.

Moscow's predicament, in seeking to discover an effective response to the unblemished persistence of the present U.S. military policies for Chad and the Persian Gulf theater of operations, is symptomatic of that crucial vulnerability in Soviet strategic planning and operations.

The effects of Pavlovian conditioning

The general flaw in Suvorov's book is that he is a Russian who thinks like a Russian; he is a Russian military intelligence specialist, who wears his old Soviet officer's uniform with pride, as he writes to advise his former adversary today.

Although he has come over to the opposing side, he effuses the greatest, Russian veteran's admiration for the qualities of the Soviet military intelligence's (GRU) spetsnaz (special forces) troops. The impressionable layman might almost reach for his telephone, to warn President Reagan to surrender at any price, rather than subject the United States to invasion by these terrifying Soviet supermen, the spetsnaz as Suvorov describes them.

From Suvorov's own description of the training of those spetsnaz, I draw a different estimate of their capabilities than he does.

In short, any victim of present Muscovite culture—Dostoevsky-Gorky culture, whose training is conducted according to brutishly Pavlovian rules, is intrinsically inferior as a human being to the normal officer or infantryman of the West. He can be very clever, and a very effectively trained killer, but he can not think in the real sense of the term. He has a resemblance to those military dogs which Suvorov says the Red Army uses so abundantly.

Pavlovian, or Skinnerian conditioning is not good training for dogs, either; a dog will do better for love of its master, if the master recognizes what this involves, than a dog tortured into a specifically conditioned response.

The rules for dealing with the spetsnaz problem are chiefly two. 1) Do not allow the legalized proliferation of those "radical counterculture" strata on which the Red Army today depends chiefly for inserting spetsnaz infiltrators and their prepared bases in the West. Dry out the sea in which the spetsnaz are trained to swim like fish; cut the available water

The offensive culture of the Rodina

On August 21, the Soviet daily Pravda carried a full-page tract by Vera Tkachenko, entitled "The Motherland Is Given to Us Only Once and to the Very Death." Rodina may be translated Motherland, Homeland, or Birthland.

A person is born into the world and inherits, with life, perhaps his most priceless wealth: the Rodina.

The Rodina is a given. She is not chosen according to one's taste and desire—just as one doesn't choose one's own mother. . . . The Rodina, like the birth mother, is your fate, bestowed on you for joy and for grief. . . .

In reality, for us, a multinational people, there is one common Rodina, stretching its boundless reach from the Barents Sea to the Pacific Ocean. But each of us—the Russian, the Ukrainian, the Byelorussian, or the Kazakh—preserves in the depths of his soul the image also

of his little Rodina . . . the village where he was born and ran as a barefoot boy in the morning dew. . . . And when, in 1941, the hour struck and the Rodina called him to the battlefield, he fought above all for the Fatherland, for the freedom and independence of his Soviet people. . . . And very far from last in his mind, more likely foremost in his mind, for his home, his family, and the quiet little stream he remembered. . . . The big Rodina, the Country of the Soviets, took no offense for the "preference" given to the little Rodina, and did not grudge her sons the soldier's love for his native patch of earth. . . .

Why does the heart of an emigré . . . yearn, in the twilight of his life, for his native place. . . . For only one thing not only pulls him, but torments him with consuming longing—the thirst for forgiveness and something more, to breathe with all his chest the air of the Rodina, before he closes his eyes. . . . Such is the magic of the Rodina . . . irrepressibly, with magnetic force attracting her sons to herself. From the first cry of the newborn to the last, difficult old man's breath, the umbilical cord binding a person with the mother-Rodina is not torn. And woe unto him, who tears it by his own will.

of that sort down to a few scattered pools. 2) Do not play the game of strategic conflict according to rules acceptable to Moscow; by rejecting those rules, one destroys the circumstances in which spetsnaz are specifically conditioned to operate most effectively.

Never gamble against the house! Play the game in the way the Soviets consider acceptable, by the rules they negotiate with us, and we are gambling the existence of our civilization on their tables. Play by Russian rules, and none of the inherent inferiorities of the trained spetsnaz will appear as a significant factor in the situation. Rather, devise rules of the game which exploit to the maximum the blind side of the spetsnaz mind, a potentially crippling flaw which is inherent in the spetsnaz because of his Dostoevskian culture and Pavlovian conditioning.

For example, Suvorov insists that spetsnaz are, psychologically, Russian wolfpacks, and hence terrified of that beast they esteem themselves to imitate. I would read Suvorov's insistence on this point, as an implied recommendation that we besiege them with what they would interpret in their minds as really terrifying wolves. There are perhaps a few dozen specialists of a certain sort in the United States who will recognize immediately one of the workable ideas which come to my mind. Let me keep my list of ideas a mystery otherwise, for the moment; the best way to deal with a Pavlovian mind, is to surprise it. You may be certain that my proposals will be known in the right quarters.

On this strategically crucial, cultural aspect of the matter, I am perhaps a leading specialist today. Our modern sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists have popularized notions of "culture," which, if tolerated, tend to obscure to modern minds principles of cultural warfare considered elementary prior to the rise of Romantic irrationalism and the so-called "new (social) sciences" during the course of the last century. Since my views are premised upon the classical standpoint, I recognize "handles" to be pulled where most modern academics would not recognize such a "factor to be played."

More specifically, my own leading professional work, in economic science, is focused upon the feasibility of intelligible representation of what can be defined rigorously as creative mental productivity, as distinguished from uncreative thinking such as "logical thinking." Although my work has been concentrated on the production of technological progress (and the causal relationship between this and physical economic growth per capita and per hectare), the kinds of implicitly measurable mental processes which generate scientific discoveries, and enable others to assimilate them, are the same mental processes which generate true creativity in classical art, and so forth.

Consequently, my important contributions to finding solutions to policy problems, where other experts may fail to find them, generally lie in recognizing the existence and practical relevance of the kinds of distinctions in mental

processes associated with greater or lesser potentials for scientific and technological progress.

Since current Russian ideology prohibits even the most expert Soviet specialists from recognizing Russian cultural inferiority to Western civilization, it has been increasingly clear to me that even the most perfected strategies of the Russian empire's Bolshevik dynasty must contain a built-in vulnerability determined in just this way. In the language of the layman, I emphasize the importance of defining the specific kinds of Russian cultural weaknesses and blind spots which occur because of the Russian's cultural flaw. We must devise the rules of conflict in such a way, that the conflict always situates the weak point in Soviet culture vis-à-vis the strong points of our own.

Suvorov's book is useful for my work on this point in several ways. First, he elaborates the Pavlovian conditioning program of spetsnaz training. Aha! I respond; here is a weak spot which we can surely find a way to exploit. Second, he reveals much of the mind of my Russian adversary in his expression of his own anti-intellectual prejudices. Let us identify those prejudices.

There is a marked similarity on this point between the typical Russian I have studied, and the typical leftist I have known in the United States, Western Europe, and elsewhere. Any serious thinker I know abhors our typical U.S. leftist as a disgusting "philistine." By serious thinker, I mean the kind of thinking associated with rigorous scientific work. Personally, over the 45-odd years I have known leftists, I seethed in anger at merely being in their presence, even persons I found likable apart from this obnoxious trait. Not only were they all intellectually mediocre; it was a matter of ideological pride for them to insist upon being nothing else. In some of the weirder circles, this sort of banality was called "the proletarian world-outlook."

This does not come from "Marxism." Official Marxism merely puts a point on it. The most disgusting examples of this are typified by that boorish Friedrich Engels's insistence that the higher mental life of the human species is an epiphenomenon of "the opposable thumb." It is, Marxism aside, populism at its lowest extreme of banality.

The leftist places the highest moral value on "practical knowledge," such as that gained in a skilled trade; he does this to the point of making a mystical cult dogma of such "practical knowledge." He does this to the degree of being anti-intellectual to the point of something akin to "racism." He bitterly regrets that some "scientific workers" may have been necessary. That is Suvorov's self-portrait to a tee.

This sort of mind is incapable of any genuine creative thinking, and thus can not solve problems whose solutions depend upon rigorous development of habits of creative thinking.

To defeat this sort of mind in strategic conflict, and in tactics, I propose two general conditions be imposed upon the circumstances of conflict:

1) Let warfare and other aspects of conflict be dominated by the highest possible rate of technological attrition we can introduce, thus creating a situation with which his mind can not keep pace.

2) Introduce those rapid alterations in underlying policy premises which are efficient service of our national mission, but which defy formal-logical consistency. Under those conditions, a vulgar materialist, and also mystical Russian, especially a Pavlovian zombie of this type, is a fish out of water.

Summary: why Muscovites are incurably offensive

Trotsky's criticism of "the theory of the offensive," was technically apt in parts, but was fundamentally in error as a critique addressed to his Russian comrades. Their predilection for being "offensive" is not simply some induced military fad to which they have become habituated. It was adopted and persists, because it is the only sort of strategic doctrine which fits the Russian character.


"Peace-loving Bolsheviks" exist only in the pacifist delusions of those sorts whom Lenin aptly described as "useful fools." The compelling thrust of Muscovite culture, for more than five centuries, has been world conquest; with the rise of the Bolsheviks, that impulse has been reheated to the fury it once knew in the breast of Ivan the Terrible. "Defense" is not a concept which exists in the Muscovite mind, especially not the Russian mind under Bolshevik cultural conditioning; what we in the West signify by the word "defense" is not translatable into those Russian usages.

You can not induce such a mind to desire either "peace" or "defense." You might induce him to understand that it is imprudent for him to conduct war, but he would never love any peace but the *Pax Rus* of a world securely under Moscow's imperial domination forever. If anyone says I am wrong on this point, that critic is either a fool, or a Bolshevik liar engaging in his ritual exercise of *maskirovka*.

The only purpose of Soviet strategic forces and Soviet diplomacy, is to prepare and to conduct the offensive. A Russian is not happy with the defense of his own territory; he is not happy unless he is grabbing someone else's territory, preferably in very large chunks. That has been the consistent behavior of Moscow since the middle of the 15th century; the Bolsheviks are only more fanatical about this than any of the Czars before them.

Do not mistake me. I am not selecting defensible insults against Russians. On the contrary. Strategically, I do not object to such compulsive offensiveness in our Muscovite foe. I do not object, because I recognize this as his potentially fatal weakness, which I intend to exploit as fully as possible for the sake of defending civilization.


Otherwise, notwithstanding Viktor Suvorov's enthusiastic admiration of the superman-like, "Rambo"-like capabilities of his former spetsnaz comrades, the spetsnaz are not unbeatable, but have vulnerabilities well worth exploiting.



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
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
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