

Pentagon to obtain "surge" (on-demand, all-out production) capability of such items as the M1A1 tank gun tubes, Stinger missiles, the Multiple Launch Rocket System, Sidewinder missiles, and combined effects munitions. The TOW II missile is the only weapons system funded for surge.

In reality, what Congress demands is the strategic insanity of the "short war" doctrine: Plan for a short war because budget and economic constraints over many years dictate that

stockpiles and the lack of industrial "surge" capacity will only support a conventional war for a month or so. Either this is changed, under the realities presented by the Persian Gulf and other demands, and U.S. defense and the economy are restored by harnessing the new technologies of superconductivity, energy beam, and nuclear fusion systems; or else, a nation with as hollow a defense as the United States, goes down to defeat, with or without a war.

## The drop in preparedness: many warnings

**1976:** "Industrial Readiness Plans and Programs" study by the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force:

"The Task Force also questioned whether the defense industrial base is capable of accelerating the production of weapons (e.g., tanks, artillery, tactical aircraft, helicopters, etc.) and many critical consumables and spares beyond peacetime delivery rates within acceptable time frames. The response time for many major weapons systems is on the order of 18 months to two years or more for the first additional delivery over the peacetime rate. Insufficient money is being spent each fiscal year on Industrial Preparedness Measures (IPM) and Industrial Preparedness Planning (IPP) to bring the defense industrial base to the point where it can contribute increased production in support of the forces in the time needed to support possible conflicts. Present and expected War Reserve Matériel (WRM) stocks are inadequate to support certain conflicts of short duration, and the defense industrial base is incapable of accelerating production rates rapidly enough to make the offsetting contribution in that time.

". . . For these and other reasons developed during the study, the Task Force has concluded that the time has come to reenergize our national planning in order to use our position as the preeminent industrial and technological nation in the world to adequately support our national security objectives. Industrial preparedness could be used as an effective element in support of the Nation's deterrent posture but it is not. Warning signals of enemy intent can frequently be discerned long before strategic or tactical warning can be perceived. The U.S. has essentially three strategic options available to it: 1) to deter strategic war, 2) to deter a theater war with conventional or nuclear weapons, and 3) to conduct military R&D programs which will enable us to maintain a dynamic deterrent. The industrial and economic resources of the U.S. could be em-

ployed as an additional means of indicating credible intent to the Soviets and thereby inhibit their threatened actions. At present, there are no plans or programs by means of which the industrial base could be caused to respond in order to indicate to the Soviets our intention of deterring them from exercising various of their strategic options."

**1981.** "Report of the Defense Science Board 1980 Summer Study Panel on Industrial Responsiveness." From the information memorandum, Feb. 2, 1981, from the Board chairman, Norman R. Augustine:

"The objective of the study was to investigate the state of industrial responsiveness to support current acquisition needs. An added task involved an investigation into inflation factors in weapon systems; this was more thoroughly addressed in a follow-on effort, the findings of which validate conclusions in the attached DSB report.

"The Task Force's principal finding is that since this area was last reviewed by a DSB panel (Nov. 1976) it has been given little effective attention by the DoD and Congress. Meanwhile, the ability of industry to respond to defense needs has deteriorated and costs continue to increase. Other findings are that the instability in programs has often made Defense business less attractive to industry than commercial work, and many disincentives exist which discourage the capital investments needed to reduce costs, improve productivity and enhance industrial responsiveness.

"This DSB effort became the subject of testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and led to the formation of a special Defense Industrial Base Panel chaired by Congressman Ichord. The HASC report is entitled 'The Ailing Defense Industrial Base: Unready for Crisis.' "

**1987.** July 28, hearing in the House Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, testimony from William G. Phillips, vice president of the National Council to Preserve the U.S. Industrial Base:

"We still lack for an effective industrial preparedness strategy and policy capable of being implemented by the government departments and U.S. industry. . . . [There has been] a dangerous weakening of the U.S. defense industrial base, particularly at the second and third tier subcontractor levels."