
Interview: Colonel Michael Hickey



Dealing with the threat of Soviet irregular warfare

Col. Michael Hickey is author of *The Spetsnaz Threat: Can Britain be Defended*, published as an Occasional Paper by the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies. He was interviewed in Winchester (U.K.) by Michael Liebig, EIR executive director for Western Europe, on April 11.

The first part of the interview, published last week, dealt with Colonel Hickey's personal experience as a light aircraft and helicopter pilot in counter-guerrilla operations in Malaya, South Arabia, and East Africa.

EIR: To turn to the advanced sector side, so to speak, of irregular warfare, what in your view is the essence of operational doctrine of Soviet Special Forces like spetsnaz and/or air-assault forces?

Hickey: First of all, I do not regard spetsnaz as air-assault. I think you have to isolate spetsnaz operations from the air assault and amphibious assault. They use a different sort of troop anyway. I regard the spetsnaz as being the absolute cutting edge, and the air-assault (in Soviet terms, *desant*) as such is the man with a club following in behind. I believe the United Kingdom is particularly vulnerable to spetsnaz operations, much less so to *desant*, basically because we are an island, and it is quite difficult to cross the water, of course, once NATO is alerted, and it is quite difficult to insert troops in any quantity by air, given the fact that our air defense in the United Kingdom is quite sound (it's not the best, but will soon be much better).

EIR: You would say that while spetsnaz is a genuine form of irregular warfare, air-assault forces are a more conventional form of warfare?

Hickey: Yes, I see air assault being used against NATO rear

forces on the continent, because one of their objects, of course, is to take out NATO's nuclear capability, take out nuclear units, if you can in their barracks, and neutralize their munition depots in locations which I am quite sure are well known to the opposition throughout the allied zones in West Germany. I am pretty sure these are fairly vulnerable targets. I think also that air assault would be used if there was to be a conventional general assault, it would be used against headquarters, bases, communications, C(3) in other words, radar, and it would also be used in an attempt to eliminate the personalities of the NATO command structure. But that has got to be divorced from the idea of truly deep penetration into the homeland of the Western European NATO allies.

EIR: How would you characterize the specifically spetsnaz doctrine of the Soviet command?

Hickey: Basically in that it can, if necessary, operate independently of air assault and conventional land assault. It could be used with them, or it could be used without, because there is already, let's face it, an infrastructure of spetsnaz agents in existence in the West in all of the NATO European countries. There are people of varying degrees of dedication to the goals of the Kremlin, who can be relied upon to varying degrees to do their stuff if there is a rising period of tension possibly leading to war. I believe that the Soviet planners have assessed, for instance, the strategic value of the United Kingdom, and have identified its importance as the hinge in the door, or "the European pillar in the trans-Atlantic bridge," through which trans-Atlantic NATO reinforcements would pass on their way to northwest Europe.

EIR: So you would say spetsnaz has a high priority in the

Soviet war plan?

Hickey: Oh, yes. You have to put yourself into the position of the people sitting in Moscow, or wherever, making their war plans, and one of their options must surely be to achieve strategic dominance over Western Europe, with the minimal amount of conventional, and certainly without use of *any* nuclear forces. I believe at present the United Kingdom is particularly vulnerable to attack by spetsnaz, because alone, of all the Western Europe allies, we long ago gave up conscription.

EIR: Do you think that was a mistake?

Hickey: I don't think it was a mistake. I think it was inevitable, given the mood of the nation at the time, and of the government of the day, a Conservative one, MacMillan's government.

EIR: These were the historical circumstances then. But in terms of the objective military requirements, must we not have the draft?

Hickey: Yes, well, we kept conscription on for a long time in this country after the war, because we needed a lot of troops to supervise the withdrawal from Empire, and because moving troops still had to be done by slow troop-ship, and when the Korean war was on, and we were fighting in Malaya, there were never less than about 3,000 soldiers at sea, going to and fro at any one time. Nowadays, we couldn't afford that at all, and we don't have to, because we can move troops quite quickly by air, even down to the Falklands if necessary. The last national service man left the service in 1963. At the end of the 1960s, we contracted even more, and we then met our military commitments just by the use of volunteer or regular forces. At that stage we could still recall ex-national servicemen in their 20s and 30s, and they were still fit in the army, but the youngest ex-national serviceman now, in 1987, is 45 years old, and he is *not* very fit! And so we have no true in-depth reserve. This is where we created a vacuum. No one in those days ever envisaged that the homeland could be threatened in the way that it is now.

I think—I hope—people have drawn the lesson from Prague 1968, which was the first major spetsnaz operation, and one of their big developmental exercises, when they seized Prague airport—a spetsnaz *coup de main*. To see how far they have gone in 11 years, see what happened in Kabul in 1979, when the spetsnaz went in and took out the government, I mean the government, its friends and girlfriends, and also prevented the Afghan army from mobilizing. This was all spetsnaz, actually, and this was also the only really successful part of the whole Soviet military operation, because when they moved their second-, third-, and fourth-grade troops in, they got themselves bogged down, in a sense like the American troops in Vietnam. The first-class American troops performed brilliantly in Vietnam, the Green Berets,

the Marines, the air-mobile troops. But when you started sending the third-, fourth-, fifth-rate divisions in, with the conscripts—well, you have to be very careful the way you use them against a really effective guerrilla army, which is what the Viet Cong had become. We had to learn the hard way in Malaya that counterinsurgency warfare is as much a state of mind as the acquisition of new military skills.

EIR: In Britain, you have the experience of the SAS, the SOE during World War II, and the irregular warfare campaigns of the post-World War II period. The French have the Resistance, Vietnam, and Algeria. The Americans had Vietnam. So there is a treasury of experience with irregular warfare in the West. I try to compare that with the experience the Russians have. Do you think the West has learned the right lessons? In comparison, the Russians seem to have drawn the right conclusions.

Hickey: Well, the Russians do not have, for instance, the “Africa touch,” they do not have the “Arab touch,” they don't have it at all. They've tried in Africa, the Russians—and they've tried without success in the Middle East. The French had the “Arab touch” in the old days, but lost it. The British, oddly enough, have always had a very good touch in Southeast Asia and with the Arabs, and in Africa. It is a question of being like a musical comedian: You have to get the pitch of the hall right. The Russians don't. The French were quite incredible in Algeria; after a marvelous start, they lost the hearts and minds of the people and they brutalized themselves. The French military establishment were totally brutal. The British on Cyprus, we brutalized ourselves from time to time there. I think history will show that we behaved very badly against the Enosis movement on Cyprus by using very crude methods to dominate the population, instead of winning the hearts and minds, as we had done very successfully in Malaya. And the Soviets have entirely failed to win *anyone's* minds and hearts in Afghanistan.

EIR: I entirely agree, but nevertheless, they have obviously succeeded quite effectively in building up the irregular warfare spetsnaz capability.

Hickey: Oh, they're doing quite well now. If anything, they're going to win—through penetration. From what I've read, their spetsnaz are about their only troops who are meeting with any success, because they are using chaps who are fairly brown, who are circumcised, who look and talk and speak and feel like Muslims, and cannot be distinguished, and this is the essence of the spetsnaz-type operation. It would be very difficult to differentiate between the local people and the spetsnaz. I believe that if the spetsnaz came to this village, they will not be wearing red stars and spetsnaz on their helmets, bearing AK-47s.

EIR: So you think the psychological-political component is

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at least as important as the military component?

Hickey: Yes, if you can get the local population to believe that the intruder is really a liberator, and is really identifying with the people's grudges against the government, then I think they will win, and I think this is why the spetsnaz forces are succeeding in Afghanistan now, where the regular forces have failed. They move like fish amongst the tribes.

EIR: What in your mind has made the Russians build up this degree of excellence of their spetsnaz apparatus over the last decades?

Hickey: I think they see the weakness of the West's defenses. They appreciate, as any sensible person in the West sees, that nuclear deterrence, like it or not, *works*, and has now reached the stage where the use of nuclear weapons is ritualized—I cannot see any circumstances in which anybody would chance the use of nuclear weapons. I can, however, see a much greater risk of warfare breaking out at the bottom of the ladder. Now, it is at the bottom of the ladder of deterrence that Britain's defenses are at their very weakest. At the top of the ladder we are very strong. We have the umbrella of the American nuclear deterrent, we have our own independent nuclear deterrent, which is shortly to be updated with Trident. Very strong indeed at the top of the ladder—lovely, shining, very expensive rungs! It's when you go down to the bottom of the ladder of deterrence that you will discover that successive British governments have allowed the rungs of the ladder to rot away, or have willfully chopped them away.

Thus it was in the 1960s that we virtually destroyed our territorial army. We destroyed our civil defense.

EIR: To come back to the question: Why are the Russians giving their Special Forces such priority?

Hickey: So that you can neutralize the nerve centers of NATO, and in particular, I believe, the United Kingdom in a period of rising tension which could possibly escalate into war. But rather than have an escalation into war, why not attack the entire nervous system of the United Kingdom, its military, political, and economic and infrastructural systems, so that it is incapable of functioning, either as a mobilization base for its own forces, or to dispatch 155,000 troops to the continent, recognized as being part of our war plan. The preparation of air bases and seaports for the reception and onward transmission of trans-Atlantic reinforcement, the activation of the early-warning system, the transition of the whole population and economy of Great Britain from a peace to a war-footing, and for the use of a number of military air-bases in eastern England as stand-by bases in case the forward bases in Germany and northern Europe are knocked out. They might not be attacked, but if they were attacked, I don't think the airfields in northern Germany would survive more than one day. We certainly would not be operating NATO air forces from German soil much after 24 hours of war. I think

they would have to come back to the bases in East Anglia, where they would be under cover of the United Kingdom air-defense environment, and they could be protected there against Backfire and its lay-down or stand-off weapons.

EIR: Do the Russians base their irregular warfare doctrine their own home-grown experiences? To what extent have they learned from the French, the British, and the Americans?

Hickey: They have a fairly good home-grown tradition, from the days of the revolutionary war. There are things the Russians have always been fairly good at. First of all, fighting for Mother Russia on Russian soil. The further they go away from home, the worse they fight. The closer they are to guarding Mother Russia, which is deeply inside them—you scratch any Russian, and you will find a God-fearing patriot inside—they fight furiously. This is basically what Stalin capitalized on: He knew they wouldn't fight for him after the first three months, and so it became the Great Patriotic War, dear old Mother Russia. They have been good at fighting the invader on their own soil, whether it was Napoleon or the Kaiser, and certainly against Hitler. Brilliant ad hoc warfare—they love it, they take to it, and they play it ruthlessly, harrying the enemy's rear, the destruction of his lines of communication. A great deal of the German effort in World War II had to be dedicated to keeping the lines of communication clear, and making sure that civilian populations were either removed or eliminated, evacuated or protected from Soviet partisans. So they have got a tremendous tradition of what you might well call deep-penetration and irregular warfare. They have always been far better at it than they have ever been in open, conventional warfare.

EIR: Have you seen in the postwar period an evolution of the spetsnaz concept? Was it always there, upholding the continuity from World War II?

Hickey: Yes, they've intensified it, refined it. Unless you refine your military doctrines, you are doomed. The Russians have always been quite good at refining military doctrine after disasters, and God knows they've had enough disasters. They do learn, and they are helped in this by their extraordinarily open military press. Everybody thinks, in the West, that no one in Russia can see what is going on. Of course, I haven't been to the Soviet Union, but my friends, particularly the ones who speak Russian, have been there. And they are amazed to be able to buy, over-the-counter, these huge numbers of Soviet military magazines, which are semi-officially, or totally officially produced by the Soviet military publishing house in Moscow. They are there, and they are bought by serving soldiers or interested civilians, and they are remarkably candid. They talk about exercises which have taken place in the Soviet Union, and how colonel X or colonel Y, who are named, made a thoroughly botched job of a military exercise, and why their sergeant-major thinks they should

go. It's quite an extraordinary self-criticism which goes on.

And there is a case very recently of which I know, involving the missile troops, the strategic rocket troops, which are supposedly the elite of the elite. They were created some 30 years ago, they took all the best of the air force, artillery, and missile troops, and gave them artificial traditions, august traditions, just like it is becoming traditional at some public schools for us to walk around with our left hand in our pockets! It's quite extraordinary. They gave them bogus battle honors, which had nothing whatsoever to do with rockets, going back to the artillery of the 1812 campaign. You fire a missile, and its got letters on it "Borodine"—the British army does this all the time, and I often wonder, what if the Russians suddenly got a missile dud thunking right down next to their headquarters, and they see "Xth Battery . . . Royal Artillery . . . Gibraltar 1783"! The Russians do it as well as we do, and they created these elite forces. But let's face it—if you're on station for two years at a time, out in the sticks on the other side of the Urals, in a hole in the ground, do you really get up every morning and say "Ahh, I am an elite troop, and this is another great day in my life!" sitting downstairs looking at the radar screen. Well, you can't, you just go mad. And they are having terrible problems with absenteeism, desertion, drugs, drink, the lot, and it's worrying them. And it's coming out, of course, in these remarkably candid Soviet military publications.

EIR: What do you think is known about the spetsnaz infrastructure in Britain, and how would you characterize it?

Hickey: Very difficult to quantify it. I would guess, if it followed the same pattern as the Danes, the Dutch, the Norwegians, and the Germans, that the crucial feature is what we have described in our literature: the moles, and volts, the creepers and sleepers. They are all slightly different, the sleepers being people who, for varying reasons, either idealistic or embarrassment involved with blackmail, got themselves willingly or inadvertently recruited many years ago. I've heard that the Danes reckon they have about 5,000 people in their society, in their population, which is not much larger than Greater London, who would be likely to perform in some way as spetsnaz agents if the actual spetsnaz were inserted. These are not chaps with snow on their boots or anything like that. These are not illegals, not spies as such. They are people with a long-standing affinity for Marxism-Leninism, the cause of the Soviet Union as they see it.

EIR: Is that all run through the GRU?

Hickey: Yes, the KGB have a spetsnaz as well, but I am thinking of the GRU, which is the one I have been studying.

EIR: Would you say this is closely coordinated between the KGB and the GRU?

Hickey: Not if they can help it, because they hate each

other's guts! This is one weapon that operates to our favor. The KGB is really the political wing, political assassination and elimination at the highest levels, the economic and political structure. The GRU are targeted basically against the military structure and infrastructure. Obviously they *do* need to be coordinated at the highest level in order to avoid duplication and messy mix-ups.

EIR: Would they themselves be operators, or would they be supporters?

Hickey: They would be supporters, they would provide safehouses, letter drops, dead-letter boxes, equipment. They could provide a car at a given place at a given time, with a full tank of petrol, a set of maps. They could provide medical support, certain stores, guide these people to previously hidden stocks of radio equipment, explosives, could provide them with all sorts of support—and they would. On the other hand, they might just leave a door open, a safe unlocked, a light switched on or off, a window left open, a file uncovered in an office. They might take a photograph. The scope and scale of support is almost unlimited.

EIR: To me the strict distinction between war in an immediate prewar situation and “peacetime” operations in irregular warfare looks almost theological. Are the spetsnaz here right now, or will they come when tensions reach a certain level? How do you see this?

Hickey: The spetsnaz are here all the time. The sleepers have been planted, and of course, on top of them there are the illegals, there are the residents of the GRU and the KGB in embassies and consulates worldwide. The spetsnaz detachments, the actual hard-core troops, who, when they are in Russia, wear the striped pullovers and do their two years' conscript service, and the regular cadre who trained them, they *can* be introduced in peacetime, and they almost certainly *do* come into these countries in peacetime, because it's very easy to get into them, as a seaman, a TIR lorry driver, a flight deck or cabin crew of an Aeroflot airliner, a tourist, a member of sports or cultural delegations—very easy, you can come in and step aside for a few days, and go and look around, or you can be driven around to certain sites and have them pointed out to you, and when you ask, you will be told, “You are now passing the Atomic Energy research establishment for the entire world, look at the lack of proper fences, look how easy it is to walk in.”

You can be unofficially and illegally resident in this country for weeks, months, often for years before people catch up with you, because we don't have identity cards with fingerprints or photographs in this country. These are regarded as a gross infringement of civil liberties, and there is a very strong left-wing lobby which has taken over the old, honorable National Council for Civil Liberties, and who will fight this concept to the last ditch.

EIR: Are you aware of any patterns, or suspicious patterns of an increase of spetsnaz operatives at specific times over the last 15 years, whether at certain times there were more, at certain times less?

Hickey: No, not myself, because I do not have access. I am not a member of the intelligence community, and I do not see intelligence reports. But I would be very surprised if routine Special Branch reports nationwide did not reflect the incidence of suspicious events. Cars parked in obscure parts of Scotland, with maps and photographs, with no explanation for why they should be there. These things have happened, and they are reported through the usual channels. I think it goes on all the time, but it is very difficult in peace time to be alert, unless you know what you are actually looking for. You can't have people looking around on every street like this. One reason for the campaign we've been fighting for the last five years is to create a corps of observers, not fighting soldiers; but people in every community, every village, who in a time of crisis can be mobilized and asked to report anything unusual, not snooping—people won't like it, because that's against the British way of life. But if you see a strange car in your village that you've not seen before, strange people in the pub, don't approach, don't arouse their suspicions, but report this to police, and the picture will then develop very quickly that you are being penetrated. And then of course, once any invaders of this sort realize that the population is alert, they will be obliged to move very slowly and cautiously. At the moment, if I wish to come into this country, disguised as a tourist with a pack on my back and a stick in my hand, and a map showing the tourist places where I can hitch-hike my way around, nobody would question me at all, especially if I was talking decently good English. And these spetsnaz are people who have studied the English language well. We are told that they come here frequently enough to perfect their English accents, so they don't draw attention in Scotland by speaking the way I do, with an Oxford accent, or similarly go to Wales and speak like a Scotsman.

EIR: Their training appears to be superb.

Hickey: Yes, they have real quality training, they can be selected, you see. They can be selected at the age of 14-15, for outstanding ability in school in linguistics, also in sports and athletics. They will receive priority training in the DO-SAAV organization, and by the time they are 18, they will have all the basic military skills anyway. They can shoot straight with simple weapons, they can swim, many will be able to parachute, and therefore a lot of basic training can be left out. They only have two years, but they do work on Saturdays and Sundays, they do not have holidays, and they work their butts off. During that two years of national service training, if they pass the first six months, they will be sent on a training visit to their target country. And if they have been coached in English at school, if they have an ability in En-

glish, they will come to England, quite legally. They will come as part of an athletics team. If they come as part of a dynamo sporting team, they are part of the KGB/spetsnaz. If they come as part of the armed forces sporting group, Spartakus, etc., those teams contain a high number of GRU/spetsnaz trainees.

EIR: Now you say, once the problem is recognized, it can be handled. Do you think that within the British army, let's say at the staff level, and in officer training, the spetsnaz problem been effectively recognized?

Hickey: I think so, yes. I was very interested reading that interview with General Berkhof (*EIR*, Vol. 14, No. 17, April 24, 1987). He says that in the military academies in the West irregular warfare is not taught. That is not entirely correct. At Sandhurst and in our staff colleges, even in the late 1940s, and certainly throughout the the 1950s, '60s and '70s, it was taught very thoroughly. Now this is something we've always been rather good at. Anyway, we've got a longer experience in it than most. The word spetsnaz was almost unknown in this country until 1983, because it was only in 1983 that the articles by Suvorov began to appear in the *International Defense Review*. Until then, the intelligence world had sat very tightly on this. We had, of course, known that the Soviets have commando-type forces, like Marines, good airborne forces.

EIR: What triggered the change with respect to spetsnaz?

Hickey: Oh, I think "Defense Begins at Home." We started in 1982 onwards to talk openly about it, to the embarrassment I think of certain parts of the government, who felt, who admitted in the 1982 *Defence White Paper* that our whole defenses were being reorganized and reexamined in light of the threat posed by "small groups of Soviet special force personnel." They didn't mention the word spetsnaz. And then in 1983 they announced that a home service force, in addition to the territorial army's and defense battalions, was being formed out of older volunteers with prior military experience. And in 1984 they said they were going to hold an exercise in 1985, the exercise "Brave Defender," which was the biggest home defense exercise held in this country since 1941.

EIR: I think this exercise is rather exceptional and unique for NATO.

Hickey: It shouldn't have to be unique, but it was largely a public relations exercise, because none of the real key points in this country was involved at all, they created exercise places at nice neutral locations away from the centers of population. And they also introduced about 5,000 "spetsnaz," (SAS people, troops pulled in from Germany), and even some Americans were brought over from Germany to test our defenses. But of course we don't think that 5,000

troops would be needed to reduce this country to chaos. We've always said that 1,000 to 1,500 spetsnaz troops, in squads of 4 or 5, would produce the necessary chaos, if backed by an effective agent network.

EIR: They could take care of several targets simultaneously.

Hickey: Oh, they could take care of *hundreds* of targets simultaneously. If I wanted to cut Southampton off from London, and Southampton is a very important port, I could probably do so quite easily. This railway that runs past the field, that you were traveling on earlier this morning, carries 200 trains every 24 hours, it is a very vulnerable line, and because it is electric on the third-rail system, it is even more vulnerable, because every 5-8 kilometers there is a transformer station which takes the power from the electrical grid, reduces it from 30,000 to 750 volts, turns it from alternating to direct current, and feeds it into the electric conductor line. You really only have to knock one of those down, and you've neutralized ten miles of railway line, and somebody has to come and repair it. Now if the first man on the scene is shot dead with one shot from a silenced gun, no other railway worker in his right mind is going to come near that place unless there is a battalion of infantry to protect him. Now, there are no spare battalions of infantry. So you will have neutralized that length of line with a few ounces of explosives. You don't even need explosives, just a strong incendiary charge to knock it out. You might electrocute yourself if you do that, though, very dangerous.

But there is *nothing* to protect these targets. We can protect our nuclear air fields, our nuclear power stations, centers of government, our naval ports, but on mobilization, if we were driven as far as that, we send 155,000 troops across to Germany, which leaves 100,000 uniformed personnel, which is 37,000 less than the total of police in England, Scotland, and Wales—it's absurd.

EIR: Another critical question. The Soviets obviously try to exploit the differentiation or the non-communication between the armed forces on the one side, and the police forces on the other side. How great is that a problem in Britain, and what has been done to overcome it?

Hickey: I think you must appreciate that in the United Kingdom the principle, as far as the maintenance of law and order in time of crisis is concerned, is the primacy of the police. British soldiers are not employed to maintain law and order, so that they can get on with defense. There is consequently very considerable liaison in peacetime between the police at all levels and the military. It takes the form of joint exercises at staff colleges, joint conferences, and a considerable amount of contact. Occasionally, when their roles overlap, you will find full-scale exercises being held, say at Heathrow, where the police and the military are both out together, but in fact the operational decisions on these occasions are in the hands

of the police, because they are first of all seen as a law and order operation. But if the thing turns into a military operation, if some suspects lurking in the luggage department at Heathrow turn out to be armed terrorists, the policeman says “over to you,” straight off to the soldier at his side, and the switch is almost instantaneous, and from that moment the soldier is in charge.

EIR: An uncomplicated, unlegalistic process?

Hickey: We are very careful about using troops in this country. Northern Ireland is a very different case, as you appreciate, because we sent in the troops in to replace a particular category of Royal Ulster constabulary in the early '70s, the “B Specials,” who were disbanded, because it was thought they were far too politically involved in a gendarmerie role, and so they were disbanded and the army was put in to fill the vacuum. When the British Army is confronted with a situation in which the control has been put over to them by the civil authorities, the drills are very clearly laid out. If you fire, you do not fire to warn. You select the ringleader, and you shoot to kill, which means that one shot will probably defuse the entire situation. For instance, look at what happened at Berkeley when the National Guards went in. Troops who were untrained to deal with a student riot, and it was nothing more than a student riot. They went in, they lost cohesion, they lost their leaders, and their leaders lost them. The soldiers were faced with what they thought was a hostile lot of young people. They started firing almost indiscriminately in the air, and eventually indiscriminately at groups of students, who they thought were going to attack them. A tragedy. A classic example, still taught here—when I was teaching on this subject, this was one of the examples I used as a case history for what happens when the military go in, and are given carte blanche, are badly led, and the troops are badly trained, and not properly equipped.

When I was in the Far East, in Malaya, we used to have riots in Singapore—nothing to do with the communists, these were Islamic fundamentalists. They were very vicious. The actual request for the army to take action was in writing, and it was handed over by the magistrate to the army commander on the spot, who signed it and acknowledged it formally, whereupon the Riot Act was read, the big banners were hoisted in all languages “Disperse or we will open fire,” and if they didn't disperse, a bugler came to the front and blew “Disperse”—not that a foaming Malay mob knew the British bugle call for disperse, for God's sake, but they knew the army meant business. The next thing that happens is that a row of riflemen comes and ostentatiously loads their rifles. But the chap who actually fires the round, if a round has to be fired, is a designated marksman, unknown to any of the riflemen, so that nobody would actually know who had fired the shot. But the designated marksman would be given explicit orders—“range 100 yards, one round, man in black at the foot of the statue of Queen Victoria,” and pow. It's called the principle of minimum force. Far more effective psycho-

logically and much less likely to shed innocent blood.

EIR: But I would say you have a very different situation here from what we have on the continent, the tight coordination between the police and military.


Hickey: Oh yes, but you see, we have to have a very careful interface, because in Britain we have no gendarmerie. There is nothing like what the Dutch have, the Marechanssee; the French have the gendarmerie; the Italians have the Carabinieri, who have tremendous powers. But in England, no. We have always disliked the arming of the police, we distrusted an armed police force, although in London a hell of a lot of police are armed now, sadly. We don't like that. The police themselves don't like it. It was policemen, not army, who went in to get black gunmen out of the black ghetto, and even in the Tottenham riots last year, when a policeman was hacked to death, the army was not involved in any way, although many people thought they should have been.

EIR: What is your proposal for concrete measures to deal with the spetsnaz threat in Britain?

Hickey: Given the very real restrictions under which all defense planning has to be made in the U.K., one has to go for a solution which is acceptable financially, politically, and socially. After studying a number of options, I am convinced that a modified form of the Danish Home Guard system would work well. That is to say, a citizen volunteer force covering the entire country. Its role to be essentially deterrent, with emphasis on surveillance and guard duties rather than aggressive combat activity. Such a force need not be heavily armed, and its members need not be trained beyond the basic requirements of their duties. These volunteers will be recruited on a local basis so they will know their own operational area intimately. They will be able to recognize any unusual activity, or the arrival of unfamiliar people. The knowledge that such a force is mobilized and active is in itself a deterrent to any would-be infiltrators and saboteurs, whose best hope of success lies in their ability to “swim amongst the people” in the best Maoist style. No Special Force operator is happy if he thinks he's under constant observation and this slows him down significantly. Not only that; it means that his “friends” already in the community are less ready to provide safehouses, information, supplies, and all other forms of assistance.

A Home Guard of this type can be rapidly mobilized for the protection of targets for which there are clearly no resources elsewhere, such as the national infrastructure; the power distribution system, telephone exchanges, gas pipelines; the list is endless. At present these targets are wide open to attack and can be knocked out with ease. It is a very worrying problem and it needs to be addressed now. If whole areas are deprived of the electricity which the population has come to take for granted, there will be a rapid collapse of civilian morale, leading to outbreaks of unrest which would place an unbearable load on the police and security forces.

Make Norway part of the SDI!



Now is the time for Norway, with its unique geographical position and membership in NATO, to play a decisive role in the defense of the Free World.

Norway actively partaking in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would stabilize the strategic situation in Europe for a considerable time. Building the Norwegian part of the SDI also leads to unimagined economical spin-offs — in itself the best defense.

We, Norwegian patriots, invite you to actively lobby to make Norway part of the SDI.

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*When in Tromsø,
see the town from above —
by the Cable Car!*