

A changed view of U.S. maritime strategy

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., candidate for the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination, released the following statement for publication by news agencies and other journals on Jan. 5.

I take as a point of reference the report, *The Maritime Strategy, January 1986*, issued by the U.S. Naval Institute. I shall assume that criticisms of my remarks here will take into account the expert views expressed in that January 1986 publication. I merely add, that while the following argument is aimed most directly to U.S. policy-shapers, it is also addressed to relevant thinkers among our European allies, and our citizens.

One of the shattering consequences of Otto Hahn's 1938 proof, that nuclear weapons were imminently feasible on principle, was the Anglo-American decision to conquer Germany before Hitler's regime developed such a weapon. By 1940, Josef Stalin had constituted his own government's "Atom Project" task force, under the leadership of a leading nuclear specialist, Academician Vernadsky.

During the 1938-40 period, there began discussions, among quite limited circles, of the effect of such systems on the possibility of conducting future general wars after World War II had been won. These very restricted speculations of the 1938-45 interval burst into the open with the bombing of Hiroshima. On the Western side, the view prevailed, that as soon as the Soviet empire might possess nuclear arsenals, general wars such as those earlier in the century, could not be fought, because of the awesome destructiveness of nuclear explosions. This view was never accepted by the Soviet command.

Beginning the initial period of back-channel private dis-

cussions between the Khrushchov regime and the Anglo-American liberal establishments, 1955-58, the Soviets were guided by the view, that although surviving and winning a general thermonuclear war was a feasible proposition in military doctrine theoretically, as Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii's 1962 *Military Strategy* specified, Moscow would have to build up the preconditions indispensable for launching such a war, and that this would require decades of work, accompanied by successful deception of the Western powers. This did not signify that Moscow believed that thermonuclear conflict was "unthinkable." It signified that Moscow considered such warfare temporarily unthinkable, until such time as Moscow had the required margin of advantage in the specific capabilities needed to launch, survive, and win such a form of warfare against the U.S.A.

During the entire span of the Brezhnev period, the Soviets succeeded in lulling the Western powers into a posture of "détente." This successful strategic deception enabled Moscow to build up a massive margin of strategic superiority over the half-sleeping Western powers, and also to lay the foundations for a strategic ballistic missile defense which would provide the crucial added element indispensable to launching a first-strike assault against the United States.

For Moscow, the period of "détente" came to an end during the spring and summer of 1982, as the Soviets decided to allow Leonid Brezhnev to take a well-earned, permanent rest, and to bring former KGB chief Yuri Andropov to power. The Soviets are a deeply mystical people, who define their steps toward unchanging long-range objectives in terms of a succession of "periods." Each period is defined by an interpretation of circumstances, paralleling the way an extremely superstitious American studies a personal horoscope. The


Russian's view of the transitions under Stalin, and through Khrushchov, through Brezhnev, into the present, Andropov period, must be understood as, to a very large degree, reflecting the way in which the highly superstitious, brooding Russian's mind is organized.

The point is made clearer, by emphasizing that while Soviet domestic press is a pack of lies to an extraordinary degree, the fact that the Soviet government lies wildly most of the time, is relatively incidental. To handle a pack of wildly superstitious people, one must employ the arts of the witch-doctor. For the Bolshevik "liturgists," witch-doctors such as Mikhail Suslov or Yegor Ligachov, the question whether a Soviet official statement is true or not, by the standards of the real world, is a matter of the utmost irrelevance. The question is, what does the Bolshevik's current liturgical outpouring signify, symbolically, to the deeper recesses of the Russian's paranoid state of mind.

Western Europeans and North Americans should have learned to take this schizophrenic periodicity in Soviet mysticism very seriously, with dictator Josef Stalin's launching of what was called "The Third Period," the ruthless industrialization drive launching the First Five Year Plan. Suddenly, the N. Bukharin who represented all of the agreements with Western establishments, put "solidly" into place over the course of the "New Economic Policy" period, was out of power. Then, came the "Popular Front" period, with the accompanying Moscow purge-trials. And so on. Unfortunately, since the time, in 1955, that the Khrushchov government signaled publicly, acceptance of Bertrand Russell's "nuclear deterrence" agenda, the Anglo-American establishment forgot the lessons it should have learned about Soviet "periods" from painful experiences of the late 1920s and 1930s.

The Andropov period is the "period" of pre-war mobilization, up to, and including the prospect of general warfare launched according to the war-plan elaborated under the direction of Andropov and Andropov's favorite Soviet military planner, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov. General Secretary Gorbachov and his wife, Raisa, are to be recognized as instrumentalities of what is fairly described as the "Andropov dynasty." The present Soviet war-plan is to be seen as the outcome of long-range objectives which span the successive, Stalin, Khrushchov, Brezhnev, and Andropov "periods." In this respect, the Andropov "period" has the special quality of being the time chosen as mystically and objectively auspicious for bringing the implementation of that war-plan into the open, as the characteristic response of the Soviet state. The preceding "periods," are to be seen, not as antagonistic to the Andropov "period," but as metamorphical steps to the surfacing of the present "period."

In the West, we have been bemused by both a false interpretation of the preceding Soviet "periods," and our own foolish assumption that thermonuclear war is an "unthinkable" from the Soviet standpoint, as our own wishful dreamers



The nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser USS Virginia sails the Atlantic Ocean.

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suppose such warfare to be. This misassessment of the Soviet view has shaped our military doctrine, and weapons policies. It is the bearing of such U.S. wishful thinking on the subject of a 600-surface-unit Navy, whether pro or con, which is the subject of this report.

The issue is not whether or not we ought to have a 600-surface-unit Navy. The issue is whether such a fleet must be set afloat on a sea of wishful delusion, the delusion that the implementation of the maximum options of the Ogarkov Plan is more or less "unthinkable." The issue is not really what Secretary John F. Lehman, Jr. thinks about such a fleet of that size; the issue is what Secretary Lehman, or any other Defense official, is permitted to say about the "unthinkable." If we design a maritime strategy, and define its implementation in terms of avoiding mention of the "unthinkable," we ensure that what budgets will authorize is a kind of fleet-capability which might become a tragic nightmare down the way.

Restate the point this way. Whatever naval leaders as accomplished as Adm. James D. Watkins think, they are constrained to frame their proposals for presentation in what Washington, D.C. recognizes as a "politically realistic way." What result they may intend to further, being hidden from view, is much less likely to be what the U.S. Navy gets, than the design hewed out by much debate over the literal reading of the "politically realistic" guise of proposals.

The most obvious of the errors in our military doctrine, is an increasing drift away from even the appearance of classical war-planning. This drift can be traced to the period of the Versailles Treaty, the naval parity negotiations of the early 1920s, and the infantile delusions of the Kellogg-Briand doctrine. The trend away from war-planning did not begin with the nuclear-weapons mootings of 1938-45 interval; Hiroshima merely cast more or less in concrete, a trend already under way.

The effect of this trend, has been to locate a substitute for war-planning, in the planning of a kind of Sears Roebuck catalogue of shopping lists for weapons-systems. So, our Defense budgets take the form of a Sears Roebuck catalogue's order form. Our military posture tends to be defined, increasingly, by the habits of procurement policies so cultivated. With Robert S. McNamara's incumbency at Defense, almost the worst of this sort of thinking was institutionalized. The absolute worst was introduced during Kissinger's tenure at the National Security Council, under the auspices of "arms control."

This affects our thinking on maritime strategy, as it does every other aspect of strategic thinking. Even strategists whose knowledge and training incline them to classical war-planning, including naval strategists, adapt their propositions and supporting arguments to the limits of what can be "sold" to the political establishment, in terms of presently prevailing policies, methods, channels, and procedures.

I am an economist by profession, and, although I am the best living economist today, I am not trained as a naval strategist. Yet, there are crucial features of the role of naval forces in warfare which lie uniquely within the province of my specialty of "physical economy." Thus, in limiting my remarks to those aspects of maritime strategy which lie within my expertise, I leave important matters untouched and important questions either unanswered, or incompletely answered. The shortcomings of my report are offset by the fact, that certain crucial aspects of this important matter are not adequately treated by anyone else writing in the public domain. Also, I am free to speak openly of what is known of Soviet war-plans, as our serving military officers are not presently permitted by our government to hint that they might brood over this "unthinkable" contingency, in their formulations of policies and budgetary requests.

Acknowledging categorically, that I leave many among the important specialized aspects of the matter of maritime strategy out of consideration here, what I emphasize is of crucial importance for our strategic planning, and is not likely to be presented by sources other than myself.

To be brutally frank, a large surface fleet well designed for "conventional warfare" missions, or even limited nuclear escalation under "conventional" conditions, is, in an actual general warfare, a sitting target for instant obliteration. Even advanced modes of point-defense built into flotillas, could be a failure, if this is imagined to be a part of a capability

essentially self-contained in fleet as such. We certainly require an awesome surface-maritime capability, but in the same sense that land armies require capable regiments of infantry and armored units. The question of armed maritime strategic capability, is a question of the effectiveness and survivability of such units and flotillas within the total division of labor of an integrated, overall war-fighting capability for surviving, and winning a general war at the level of the Ogarkov Plan's maximum options.

For example, the Soviets intend to defend their surface naval forces in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic, by aid of an integral and indispensable role of land-bases in Mozambique, Angola, and other locations. Overrunning at least part of Norway, is integral to Soviet future naval operations out of a controlled region behind the Greenland-Iceland-Britain-Scandinavian straits base of naval deployment into the North Atlantic. Soviet naval bases in Vietnam, Kampuchea, and others, are adjunct to land-based defense of surface fleets in the Asiatic Rim region. Similarly, Soviet use of Iranian airspace, is key to a major Syrian war against Israel now looming as a contingency. Soviet naval policy is attuned to the realities of war-fighting and related operations, with designs based on maximum levels of operation according to the Ogarkov war-plan. The Soviets are right; start from a war-plan for general thermonuclear war-fighting's environment, and design capabilities at that level of contingency.

We proceed wrongly, in the opposite way. The structure of allowed formulations of budgetary policy for defense, prescribes that we start from limited forms of "conventional" war-fighting, and adapt such capabilities to various levels of possible escalation, never quite taking the level of full-scale warfare into account.

We have only one credible general adversary in sight, the Soviet adversary. His capabilities are those reflected in the development of Soviet capabilities to meet the war-planning requirements of the Ogarkov war-plan. We have no credible military policy, unless we have a plan which is so discouraging to Moscow, that the costs of their implementing the maximum options of the Ogarkov Plan are vastly in excess of the risks which that Soviet plan pre-discounts. This must represent both the means for neutralizing quite significantly the initial Soviet strategic assaults, and also the capability for carrying the war promptly and successfully to Warsaw Pact territory.

War-planning must never be limited to military subjects alone. The conflicts out of which general warfare springs, are immediately political-economic conflicts, and, at a higher level, conflicting cultural imperatives. These higher, political and cultural aspects of "grand strategy" must be defined, and taken fully into account in design of the military side of the war-plan. So, before turning to the matters of maritime strategy as such, I must indicate the broad cultural and political-economic context within which our military planning must be situated.

Defining issues of the strategic conflict

The first fact to understand, in approaching the issues of military war-planning, is that the 1917 Russian Revolution never happened, at least not in the way popular myth views the matter. The February and October revolutions of 1917 were both coups d'état, run from both inside the Czarist government and by foreign agencies. Both coups were run on the basis of dress-rehearsals run in 1905, and with capabilities developed prior to and out of the lessons of the 1905 experiment.

From the inside of Russia itself, the coups replaced the Romanov dynasty and its institutions with a new dynasty of the principal, long-standing adversaries of the Romanovs inside Russia, the peasantry-based "traditionalists" identified with the anti-Romanov factions known to Western literature as the "Old Believers," the Raskolniki. The ideology and perspective of these victorious insurgents are those of Fyodor Dostoevsky.

Inside Russia, the "revolutions" were run by circles including the Czar's Minister of War and the Czar's secret police, the Okhrana. The Bolsheviks, like the Populists and the Odessa-based Zionists, were creations of, and instruments of the Okhrana, in a process unleashed during the 1880s, a process associated with the assassinations of czars Alexander II and Alexander III, and the pogroms of the 1880s.

From outside Russia, the Russian coups d'état were run by a consortium of forces earlier associated with the terms of the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, which had made Russian troops "the policeman of Europe" over the period 1815-1849. The special features of the 1917 coups, included the fact that the British interest was a dominant factor in the February coup d'état, and the German interest a dominant factor in backing the October coup.

Two distinct but more or less allied sets of motivations were involved.

Inside Russia, the cultural imperative is a continuation of the issue defined by Russia's rejection of the terms of agreement between East and West reached at the A.D. 1439-40 Council of Florence. The Russian cultural imperative, especially since the A.D. 1453 Fall of Constantinople, has been to establish Moscow as the world capital of a "Third Roman Empire," to rule the world forever. This goal of Ivan the Terrible's time, has been the Soviet imperative from the beginning, with the bringing of industrialized Germany into the Soviet orbit the central feature of Soviet strategic planning to the present time. This goal is the objective of the Andropov-Ogarkov war-plan.

Outside Russia, the backers of the 1917 coups intended to use a Raskolniki-ruled Russia, under the revolutionaries, as a combination of Eastern barbarian hordes and geopolitical battering-ram, to destroy the existing political philosophy of the Western European and American sovereign nation-states. This faction outside Russia is what has been self-described

since the close of the last century as the "New Age" faction of Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, Aleister Crowley, and so forth: a faction centered around those extremist ideologues, such as Nietzsche and Crowley, who proposed to make the 20th century the century of destruction of the "Age of Pisces" (Christianity) and "The Dawning of the (countercultural) Age of Aquarius" (Dionysos, Lucifer). These forces outside Russia gave us, during this century, not only Bolshevism, but also Nazism and other forms of fascism: instruments to destroy the culture of Western civilization, both from within and from the East.

The intersection of these two factions, typified by the "Trust" arrangements of the post-1917 period, and by the "Trust"-echoing "détente" accommodations of the period to date beginning 1955, is the enemy of our civilization in general, and of the United States in particular, the enemy we must contain, defeat, and destroy. Within this framework, the Soviet empire is the chief armed expression of this enemy, and, during the postwar period to date, the only credible form of such military adversary.

That is the beginning-point for war-planning.

We must assert the values of our civilization, uprooting the influence of the counterculture within our nations, building a network of community of principle among nations, ringing the Soviet empire, and containing that empire to the degree that it finds the risk of military and related adventures so great, that it accustoms itself to abandon mad, "Third Rome" ambitions. Our strategy is therefore a complex of interdependent cultural (moral), political-economic, and supporting military actions. The requirements of military war-planning are so situated.

The Soviet empire today, is a system of colonies and satrapies, ruled over by a Russian ruling class. This ruling class is a classical Oriental oligarchy, a complex of ruling families associated with the Soviet Nomenklatura.

During the Brezhnev period, the institutions of Soviet society underwent a final stage of evolution, emerging as the institutions of the Andropov period. The bloody transition from the Romanov to the new dynasty is now being completed, as the mystical celebration of 1988 approaches. The present purges, openly demanded by Marshal Ogarkov in 1983, and implemented by the Gorbachov administration according to Ogarkov's specifications, are aimed at completing the permanent form of the Soviet state.

The present form of the Soviet state is a Mongoloid echo of the Byzantine state from about the ninth century A.D. It represents thus, the form of Muscovite Russian culture developed under the approximately two centuries Russia was almost entirely a system of Mongol satrapies, in which the Russian monasteries were the dictatorial force within the Mongol's Russian satrapies. The general matrix is Byzantine; the special features are those determined by the shaping of Muscovite cultural traditions during the period of the Mongol satrapies.

The Muscovite dictatorship of the Soviet empire is presently composed of three elements: the Nomenklatura, as the ruling oligarchical class; the Russian state church, which has become an integral part of the present form of the Soviet state; and the Soviet military. The symbiosis of the Russian church and the Soviet military, established in the form of restoration of Russian officer's epaulets during the Stalin period, is a dominant current within the dictatorship, identified as the "Russian Party." This Russian Party echoes, in a Russian way, Augustus Caesar's agreements with the Syrian priests of the cult of Mithra, agreements which established the empire of the Roman legions as the Roman Empire. Marshal Ogarkov is the symbol of the military side of the Russian Party. Raisa Gorbachov's, Armand Hammer-funded Soviet Culture Fund, is the expression of the Russian Party in the top strata of the Nomenklatura more generally. The official restoration of Fyodor Dostoevsky by Raisa Gorbachov et al., is the ideological marker for the philosophical world-outlook of the Russian Party as a whole. The history of the once-Bulgaria-based Bogomils, is key, in more respects than one, to the Byzantine character of the Soviet dictatorship today.

The Russian state church, is professedly pagan. It traces the theology of the present-day Russian church to pre-Christian pagan religious beliefs. *Rus* was a Scandinavian (Varangian) name for serfs, much as the word *Slav* was adapted to the words "slave" in English, and *Sklav* in German. The collections of various peoples migrating into the territories ruled by the Varangian assets of Byzantium, were thus afforded certain common cultural characteristics, including those other conquerors had introduced to the region during earlier periods. The predominant pagan belief among these subject peoples became the worship of a form of the Phrygian cult of Cybele-Dionysos, the worship of the earth-mother-goddess, Matushka Rus. This sort of "blood and soil" pagan mysticism is the characteristic feature of Russian culture today. This paganism has infected the churches of Russia syncretically, and was the root of the fanaticism of the Raskolniki insurrections against Peter the Great and his successors, including that Raskolniki revolt called the Russian Revolution of 1917. This hideous, Nazi-like paganism is the officially avowed essence of Russian state church doctrine today.

It is this cultural characteristic of Muscovite Raskolniki culture, which was the basis for constituting the street disturbances and strikes of the 1905 and 1917 periods, and was the essence of Bolshevism from the beginning. The influence of Marx on Bolshevism inside Russia itself was more opportunistic than fundamental. Russian communism, the doctrine of *Mir*, is an ancient pagan tradition antedating A.D. 988.

This sort of deeply pagan, mystical character of the Raskolniki, is the driving force behind Soviet strategy today. One of the rare, true public statements of Bertrand Russell, was to emphasize, that one expects the Russian people to

choose a government composed of characters from the pages of a Dostoevsky novel. The assumption that, because the present regime is a dictatorship, that the Russian people dislike it, is the sort of ignorant liberal's delusion which one might expect of a Washington, D.C. cocktail hour. The Russian peasant, is a superstitious manic-depressive paranoid type, whose proclivity for explosions of the most extremely bestial sort of violence, is legendary among those familiar with the type. The fact that the internal life of Russia is pregnant with violence, may lead to killing of large portions of the regime again, as it has in the past; this does not portend an inclination to make the regime less dictatorial; dictatorship is the only stable form of government possible for a people whose culture is a mysticism-ridden, violence-prone sort such as the Russians'.

In broad terms, the idea of the human individual, as we know this in Western European culture, does not exist as an efficient belief in Russia. With some few exceptions, Russians do not have individual souls; Russians have a collective soul. Apart from keen feelings for members of family and close friends, they do not view the death of millions of Russians as we would view the deaths of millions of Americans. The "Russian race," the "Muscovite race" most emphatically, is the location of their sense of such matters. If 40 millions of Russians must die, to make the Russian race the ruler of the world, they will accept that penalty. They are disposed, if that seems the only pathway to world-rule, to suffer the same amount of human and other losses they endured during the last general war. That is the way the Soviet command calculates.

We must never commit the blunder, of attempting to explain the motives of persons of cultures different than our own, by projecting our standards of behavior upon them.

An analogous sort of thinking prevails among the hardcore ideologues of the "New Age" in the West. The extinction of entire nations, including a savage reduction in the size of the U.S. population, has been openly advocated among some of those leading figures of our Eastern Establishment who represent a "New Age" outlook. Bertrand Russell, for example, repeatedly advocated the use of biological warfare to reduce massively the world's number of persons of skin-hues darker than the Anglo-Saxon.

We must never delude ourselves, by imagining that "they would not do such a thing, because" of some moral value of our own we choose to project upon the Soviets or New Agers.

The Soviet dictatorship is essentially a collection of fanatical, Muscovite racists, who can not tolerate a world which their race does not rule. That is what drives them, a motive they will never give up, as long as their personalities are shaped by the Raskolniki's variety of Muscovite culture. If they do, on occasion, express a different motivation, this is pure Russian peasant slyness, calculating deception.

For the foreseeable future, the key to relations with the Soviet dictatorship, is based on the fact that there are only

three qualities they respect in a prospective victim or adversary. The first is sheer power. The second is will to use power. The third, is a prospective penalty to the Muscovite race itself, which they estimate to be greater than Matushka Rus will be willing to tolerate. Our strategic policy toward Moscow ought to be a strategy of "peace through strength" which meets these three conditions. As long as they perceive those three conditions to be met, they will not attack unless they themselves are attacked.

For the longer term, we can do better than secure war-avoidance by peace through strength. If the Russian ever reaches the point, that he loses faith in Matushka Rus herself, he will agree, however reluctantly, to become civilized. If he is induced to believe, that Russian culture itself is incurably inferior to Western European culture, respecting both power and the will to use power, he will seek to copy Western European culture, as well as our technology. We must aim to lay the basis for his believing that, during the remainder of this present century, and leave the harvesting of durable peace with Russia to our leaders of the coming generations.

The root of the power of our culture, in Russian eyes, is our labor force's superior disposition and capacity for assimilating successive levels of technological progress rapidly. We have an advantage of the sort a Russian can understand, only to the degree that we draw upon this expression of our innate cultural superiority.

The chief cause of the military side of our worsening strategic crisis today, is the fact that we have thrown away this key cultural advantage. By drifting into "post-industrial" decay of our basic economic infrastructure, and basic agriculture and industry, we have created a growing weakness of nations and military capabilities among both the nations of Western Europe and North America, and the developing sector generally. It is this "post-industrial" drift which has enabled the Soviet empire to catch up with us in many respects, to overtake us in military power, and to extend Soviet influence into new regions of the world.

There are two general ways in which we might, theoretically, eliminate the Soviet threat. We might, if we had the means, eliminate the threat by military conquest. Or, we might contain the Soviet strategic threat by a war-avoidance policy of peace through strength, and use this containment to win the peace over the course of the two generations or so immediately ahead. I am confident that effective commitment to the second course of action will succeed, but only on condition we are equipped and resolved to be able to employ the first, should Moscow choose war.

It must be emphasized, that effective war-avoidance with the Soviet empire requires us to be able to survive and win war should they launch it. That requires a form of war-planning aimed at the contingencies of a full-scale nuclear war, in which the Soviet forces would begin war with an attempted first-strike, knockout-blow against the U.S.A. and each and all of our primary military capabilities throughout

this planet. A weapons policy which is not addressed efficiently to this potential problem, is an invitation to the Soviets to launch a first-strike assault, and nothing less than such an assault. Those among us, who argue against such a peace-through-strength doctrine, are actually demanding that we suffer a thermonuclear attack, unless we were to surrender instead. Those who propose a military doctrine at a lesser level of capability, are proposing the same choice between nuclear holocaust and abject surrender.

I examine certain among the key parameters of maritime strategy in that setting.

The two primary tasks of maritime capabilities

A competent strategic doctrine can not be developed as the sum of capabilities of four separate military arms: army, navy, air force, and special forces. The four arms must surrender the key functions of war-planning to a common general staff. You oppose a general staff? You are a loser.

We require an integrated capability, designed to operate in warfare under a unified command, and a single commander, a command which is the complement to the general staff. In principle, it makes no difference whether the military arm of the commander is army, navy, or air force; he must direct all arms in an integrated way to singleness of effect. The arms of warfare are a division of labor in a common, integrated effort.

Within this setting, there is a subordinate war-planning function within the leadership of each arm. This function is twofold. It is part of the process of general war-planning. It is also addressed to the development of distinct capabilities of that arm as such. It is also addressed to the functions of that arm under either peacetime conditions or combat operations at a level below that of general war-fighting. The maritime forces of the United States have a rather distinctive sort of special function by virtue of two circumstances. In the main, the naval arm is constantly deployed at something approximating a war-footing at all times. Second, it is chiefly a maritime force.

The fact that naval forces are predominantly a maritime force makes its peacetime functions of a special character, its relationship to those commercial maritime activities which are integral to military capabilities in time of war. This includes not only the flag merchant fleet of the United States, but shipyard and related facilities, and the development of maritime choke-points such as critical ocean passageways and canals. The naval arm's functioning has been associated traditionally also with land-based coastal defense, a function which is represented today chiefly by functions of anti-submarine warfare.

To a significant degree, large chunks of a competent maritime strategy can be developed within the context of functions of the naval arm itself. However, ultimately, this function can not be defined adequately without defining the maritime forces' portion of the division of labor within a



The late Admiral Hyman Rickover, in a visit to the USS Nautilus. Will the advantages he achieved endure?

unified capability for general warfare. Here is where the present problem lies chiefly. With these broad observations so stated, I turn to the nub of the problem.

During the period 1981-82, I completed preliminary work on designing and presenting a new strategic defense policy for the United States. The gist of this was adopted during 1983 as what is known as the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Following the adoption of that general doctrine, much time and money was wasted in researching issues not even worthy of debate, and the "crash program" which should have been launched immediately was held back by a lack of sufficient political momentum supplied to the program, and by the effects of budgetary pressures. Nonetheless, despite all distractions and other troubles, the SDI has become institutionalized to the extent that the doctrine itself has now become all but irreversible.

In presenting the new strategic defense doctrine, I was obliged, for educational reasons, to emphasize the feasibility of effective strategic defense against the fastest and least accessible of nuclear weapons, intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Once it is clear, that ICBMs can be intercepted by weapons based on "new physical principles," such as lasers, the general means for strategic and tactical defense at all levels is demonstrated on principle. Others who worked to educate the military, politicians, and

the general population in these matters, were obliged to place the initial emphasis of their explanations in the same terms of reference.

So, during 1983-85, those of us pushing for the strategic defense policy as a whole, were obliged to repeat our arguments all over again to our European allies, and to some others as well. Yes, we affirmed over and over again, SDI included defense against such devices as depressed-trajectory missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and also naval and ground forces. So, my friends invented the term TDI (Tactical Defense Initiative), and spoke of an SDI/TDI combination, as a way of leaving no doubt of our original intention. Then, we had to explain, again and again, that the basic research, development, and manufacturing capabilities for SDI and TDI were essentially the same.

TDI types of point-defense of naval craft and flotillas had to be emphasized, too. The tough fight, was to make clear that one could not speak of an effective SDI without a commitment to qualitative advances in anti-submarine warfare. Another tough duty, which I emphasize in this report, is the essential role of a combined global SDI defense, plus land-based TDI, in the deployment of naval surface flotillas.

We must assume, that Moscow knows the position of every surface naval vessel of the United States to within a few feet of its actual location. Under most conditions short of general war-fighting, what protects a U.S. carrier task force is nothing but a political screen. A Soviet missile-attack on a U.S. carrier task force is virtually a *casus belli* for full-scale war. Under three conditions, that political screen drops: the launching of full-scale war, Soviet selective action under very special cases, or missile-attack by a Soviet surrogate. At the outbreak of general warfare, each such carrier task force is a prime target of attack in the first assault. Unless the carrier task force, for example, can survive such targeting as a functioning force, of what use will that task force be after a few minutes into World War III? You get my drift?

At present, if Moscow is willing to commit sufficient concentration of strategic firepower against the few carrier task forces we possess, a not unlikely action, those forces could not avoid having their point-defense capabilities supersaturated by the volley. With effective SDI supplemented by nearby land-based terminal defense of the region in the vicinity of the task force, the chances of the task force's survival are greatly improved. If anti-submarine warfare capabilities are also effectively deployed into the task force's vicinity, the carrier task force becomes a probably surviving asset of continuing warfare.

The indicated requirements for maximum levels of war-fighting, cover the contingencies at lower levels of war-fighting.

In approaching such matters, we must take into account the factor of technological attrition. A warship should have a life of approximately 20 years or so. So, the investment in naval capabilities must be designed to meet the requirements

of technologies deployed 10 or more years ahead, not merely those of today or the coming five years. The mere fact that we might estimate that Soviet forces could not do something today, does not mean Moscow will not be able to 5 to 10 years ahead.

Putting momentarily to one side, the functions of naval forces under conditions below general war-fighting, let us pose a very elementary question. Why should we believe it indispensable that combat surface naval forces should exist following the initial missile barrages of a Soviet first-strike? In other words, is it the case, that our surface naval forces' combat capabilities are written off with the onset of general warfare? Let us look directly into the monstrously ugly face of the "unthinkable." What is the situation after our SDI/TDI has largely neutralized a Soviet first-strike assault?

Except under the condition that Moscow were assured we lacked the will to act against a Soviet invasion of West Germany, Moscow would never conduct a so-called "conventional" war in Western Europe. Moscow would begin World War III with a first-strike assault, concentrated against military, population-center, and logistical targets in the United States, and against military targets in Western Europe and other parts of the world. These attacks would be launched against all points simultaneously. In the case we lacked SDI, the United States would be unable to begin a credible response against Moscow after some few minutes into the initial Soviet launch. This is usually seen as a "worst-case scenario"; unless we either have an SDI deployed, or launch our missiles immediately at the first detection of Soviet launch, it is the only scenario.

At the same instant, Moscow would aim to eliminate every possible U.S. nuclear submarine everywhere in the world, and obliterate our surface flotillas. In the same time-frame, Warsaw Pact forces would attempt a breakthrough into Western Europe, chiefly through East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

On principle, we could have deployed the means virtually to obliterate Soviet land, air, and surface-naval forces engaged in the assault, and to administer savage punishment on Warsaw Pact forces' rear echelons. At that point, we would go over immediately to counteroffensive, with the liberation of Poland a principal objective. This would be part of a global counteroffensive. It is in that setting that surviving naval combat forces' function come fully into play.

Had we such a war-fighting capability, Moscow would not risk war. That should be our policy: to avoid such a war's ever occurring. The point is, we must actually possess such a capability, otherwise we shall never induce Moscow to give up the Ogarkov war-plan, or any future plan like it. Only wishful dreamers imagine we shall secure peace in any other way.

Putting submarine forces into a distinct category for the moment, the first question to be asked is: Do we require the survival of functioning naval surface combat forces past the

initial barrages of general warfare, or do we accept the proposition that they are written off in such a contingency? The President of the United States must have a non-evasive and reliable response to that question. If they are to survive, what is their function in the global counteroffensive? If they are to survive, then, in light of their mission in counteroffensive, how to we design them and deploy them, and how do we ensure the survival of this capability?

These are cold-blooded questions, but they must be asked, accepted, and answered rightly.

Either way, we must cease dilly-dallying over the issue of adequate anti-submarine warfare. We require a global detection and tracking system, such that we have on our crisis-management maps constantly, the precise location of every Soviet submarine in their inventory. No one known means of detection and tracking is adequate. A combination of means is at least nearly adequate. About \$10 billion initial outlay for combined measures would be about a minimal requirement. Don't worry so much about the price tag; think of the price to be paid for not having such means. This must include both passive and active modes of detection and tracking the relevant objects in the world's oceans. It does not include the means for eliminating Soviet submarines on signal at the appropriate moment.

Anti-submarine warfare is today, what coastal defense was during the early 19th century and somewhat later. Since the naval arm has the most directly personal concern with such matters, it is properly a part of their functional capabilities.

Through and beyond the initial phases of general warfare, the nuclear submarine force is the pivot of maritime war-fighting capabilities. However, the assumption, that submarine-based "second strike" capability is invulnerable to a significant degree, is no longer a tenable one. Generally, technologies of detection and tracking available for deployment today, leave few regions of the world's open oceans secret niches for submarines. Efficient tracking in open waters, by tracing submarines into less transparent coastal regions, is a precondition for employing effective detection and countermeasures in coastal waters. Once a submarine is located within a sufficiently small area and volume of water, it is almost as good as dead under full-scale warfare conditions. Submarines exist in a race of technological attrition between submarine design and deployment of improved anti-submarine warfare measures.

The difficulties confronting the submarine branch lie increasingly in the manufacturing technology of the United States. It is become painfully clear, that the durability of the advantages gained through the leading role of Adm. Hyman Rickover depended upon the assumption of a wide margin of advantage in the resources upon which we could draw from the civilian economy's manufacturing and related capacities.

The strength of materials, and heat toleration of materials, are of prime concern today. We have open to us the

means for developing new kinds of materials, representing both required improvements in strength and heat-toleration, and also offering desirable magnetic qualities. New modes of propulsion are open to development. In technological potentials, the way is open to winning the war of technological attrition against Soviet submersibles. We are in danger of losing the war of technological attrition in our basic industry.

Similarly, by concentrating attention upon the alternative modes of detection and tracking of submarines, both present and in sight for the future, we have the possibility of diminishing significantly, if not eliminating, the detectability of our vessels.

All such programs demand a degree of retooling of primary vendors which is qualitative today, and also some fundamental improvements in technological levels of capacity upstream.

The same technological considerations, of special urgency for the submarine branch, apply to the surface vessels.

So far, we have reviewed points bearing upon the forces deployed. This brings us to the matter of determining the global environment in which they are deployed. Pre-war control of the oceans and their crucial choke-points, and logistical development of that global environment, must be considered.

Since the work of Leonardo da Vinci, on principle, and since the French work on geometry of fields of fire, respecting defense and offense, during the 18th century, we have gained generally improving capabilities for expressing military functions geometrically. The prime such function is identical in nature to that employed in the science of physical economy.

As in measuring productivity of labor, in terms of output both per capita and per square kilometer, so we must measure firepower and mobility, both respecting offense and defense. How much firepower, for example, can we deploy, both per capita and per square kilometer used by our attacking forces? How much firepower, for example, must be concentrated upon a square kilometer of target-area defended? The combined mobility and ability to concentrate great firepower per area from dispersed small portions of occupied area, is at a premium. The more dispersed a deployment, from which great firepower can be concentrated upon the target-areas, and the greater freedom in choosing rapidly among such dispersed positions, the greater the advantage with which our firepower can be deployed, while enjoying the greatest relative degree of inherent defensibility.

In space-deployed components of SDI, the fact that beam-pulses at the speed of light, can be employed to defend a unit beyond vulnerable low-orbiting positions, and that attacking devices can be detected prior to attacking such units, illustrates the way in which the volume of space works to advantage. The analogy to naval deployment is worth stressing. By improving the range and accuracy of SLBMs, and controlling larger reaches of the world's oceans, the inherent

potentials of the naval arm are underscored. The area of surface, and volumes of air- and water-space controlled, are crucial aspects of the geometric function.

The foe's firepower is finite. The greater the finite area over which he must deploy that firepower, and the smaller the finite area from which he must deploy it, the greater our defensive and offensive potentials. This consideration is of great, almost decisive importance for the medium-term, in simplifying the performance requirements of SDI. Here, maritime strategy's central importance is shown.

This requires wartime control of the choke-points and proximate land areas, both our access to such, and denial of the adversary's access. The broad definitions of maritime strategy, are hinged precisely on this point.

These "geopolitical" considerations at the center of maritime strategy, define the naval strategy as an integral feature of an encompassing maritime strategy. The encompassing maritime strategy is fundamentally cultural, political, and economic.

The Monroe Doctrine as strategy

The importance of St. Augustine for modern U.S. strategy, is that Augustine elaborated the form of society consistent with Christian principles, as a sweeping replacement for the Roman institutions of law, at the crucial point Roman institutions in the West were collapsing of their matured internal rottenness. The reforms of Charlemagne, Otho I, and the Staufer, each an attempt to implement Augustine's design, were given corrected form, in conception, in the aftermath of the 14th-century "New Dark Age," this accomplished chiefly by a reconstituted Papacy, in which the work of Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa was key, in a series of developments centered upon the 1439-40 Council of Florence. It was the developments, centered upon the issue of the reforms adopted at that Council, and upon the circumstances of the 1453 Fall of Constantinople, which set the entirety of subsequent world-history into motion, including the new form of expression of East-West conflict in Europe, which has reached a critical point in the present East-West conflict.

The positive developments for secular society, flowing from the point of origin of Augustine's design, reached a high point in the 18th-century international conspiracy which established the independence of the United States, through the guidance and aid of that international conspiracy. This conspiracy, to establish a new form of republic in the Americas, was an outgrowth of the proposals to that effect by Robert Dudley and others, during the 16th century. The English settlements in New England during the 17th century, were an adaptation of Dudley's proposal to the special circumstances of England, immediately, and Europe more generally, during that century. Under Queen Anne, the development and future role of the English colonies in North America were adopted by an international conspiracy extended to the networks around Gottfried Leibniz and others, a

conspiracy which came under the emerging leadership of Benjamin Franklin from about a decade prior to our Declaration of Independence into the adoption of our federal Constitution. Our young republic, so established, became the rallying-point for the republican cause throughout Europe and the Americas.

Our republic's proper destiny, is not a geographic one, but a moral destiny. This was most clearly recognized by a U.S. foreign-service officer, trained under Franklin, who became secretary of state under President James Monroe, John Quincy Adams. If we lay over the Declaration of Independence, and the *Federalist Papers'* insight into our Constitution, the letters and other papers of Adams's work as secretary of state, the grand strategy of the United States, from the beginning to the present time, is rightly implicit.

Our proper maritime strategy flows from the considerations we have just listed.

Those nations which aspire to the same general notions of Renaissance natural law expressed by our Declaration of Independence, *Federalist Papers*, and Adams's opinions as secretary of state, constitute, in Adams's words, a "community of principle." During the early 19th century, when the terms of the 1815 Treaty of Vienna made all the governments of Europe our common adversary, the immediate prospects for establishing such a community of principle in fact were limited to the emerging sovereign republics of the Americas. We had allies in Europe, centered around the networks coordinated by Gilbert Marquis de Lafayette and the Prussian reformers earlier associated with Friedrich Schiller, but the powers of Europe were arrayed against us until Czar Alexander II broke with those powers and arrayed his power against France, Britain, and Spain in our defense, during the 1860s.

In the emergence of new nations from amid the remains of the colonial system, between the two World Wars of this century, leading movements among those nations hoped, for a time, that our national heritage, as expressed by the Declaration of Independence and the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, would be employed to extend the notion of community of republican principle to these new states. We spoiled that postwar opportunity with bad foreign policy, and continue to do so to the present time.

The foundation of an effective maritime strategy now, is to enter into a compact with our allies in Western Europe and among developing nations, to the effect of establishing a new global doctrine, consistent with Secretary Adams's view of the Monroe Doctrine. Under this doctrine, the friendly nations of the world are composed of two general classes. First, are those whose aspirations conform to Adams's definition of a community of principle. The second tier is nations which wish to be integrated into the advantages of close cooperation with such a community of principle.

Our maritime strategy must be premised on an efficient determination to cement such relations, and to base a com-

mon strategy upon strengthening the economic development of the bloc of nations as a whole. The role of ocean-borne freight in such a process of strategic economic development defines implicitly the proper maritime strategy of the United States. This strategy is based on integrated economic development of the ocean basins and adjoining land-masses of the area of the planet encompassed by the new policy. Strategic economic development, with included emphasis upon development of choke-points, of both maritime activity and of regions radiating from port-regions generally, is a central feature of maritime strategy.

The activities this requires, by public and also private agencies of the United States, are scarcely limited to the specific functions of the U.S. Navy. Yet, the Navy is the branch of our armed services with the principal ongoing concern with the end-result. The Navy has the function of indicating what must be included features of the work accomplished.

In the nature of things, most of the Navy should be deployed at sea all of the time. The way it is deployed must always be in a state of war-readiness, never more than a few minutes away from full combat readiness. The peacetime functions of the naval forces must always have a form consistent with that degree of combat-readiness. In total, our naval forces must always be deployed globally in a configuration close to the assortment of positions they must assume under conditions of general warfare. So, naval forces must be designed so that their peacetime functions are consistent with their functions under conditions of general warfare, and their capacities for general warfare must be adapted to their peacetime functions.

All of these considerations add up to a way of determining how large our fleet must be. For example, given the inevitable losses beginning the onset of general warfare, we must have the dispersed firepower we require in the assorted kinds of global locations our war-plan requires, and, therefore, a corresponding amount of reserve capacity built into our forces being deployed at any time. At the same time, the fact that the naval forces must be deployed for peacetime functions, plus special military assignments occasionally, means that we must have sufficient total force-strength constantly at sea to cover all of the combined functions all of the time. The fact that a certain portion of total capabilities must be tied up in ports some of the time, enables us to estimate a total force requirement.

The present strategic situation is qualitatively different than during the two preceding world wars. Two facts must be considered. First, the Soviet war-planners are right in the way they have defined this difference. Second, Soviet forces' capabilities are developed to fit the circumstances defined by this difference.

In preceding wars, the pre-war mobilization was at a much lower level of force-capability than was reached later during the war. The onset of war was the signal for an in-

creased rate of war-economy and military mobilization. President Franklin Roosevelt knew that we were going to go to war with Germany, and possibly also Japan, about 1938. The attack on Pearl Harbor was the political change which enabled Roosevelt to launch an escalation to full-scale war-mobilization. Our capabilities approximately peaked during 1943, about two years after the United States had entered the war.

The Soviet planners have stressed, that, in the war which they are preparing to launch with a global first-strike, the peak-intensity of war-fighting is reached during the first hour of the war, and de-escalates as the course of the planned continuation of warfare proceeds. Therefore, the Ogarkov war-plan, under which the Soviet government is currently operating, requires that a peak-level of wartime economic and military mobilization must be reached prior to launching the first-strike assault, and that the losses caused by strategic bombardment will lower the potential levels of continued mobilization significantly below whatever levels existed prior to the initial assault. For the same reason, Soviet forces are required to prepare for conditions of nearly complete surprise, in launching the attack, without visible mobilization or forces' deployments which, as changes, might signal the imminence of probable launch of first-strike. Generally, all components of Soviet missile, air, naval, and ground attack, will be deployed simultaneously from peacetime status in barracks and field positions.

There is no time to round up ship's officers and men to put out to sea because war has begun. A full-scale wartime level of deployment in combat-readiness must be not more than minutes away from the proper nuclear-warfare configuration. Generally, what we have deployed during those minutes, and what survives those initial minutes, is what we have, to fight our way to survival and victory. Once Moscow begins to deploy the strategic defense it has been developing, as a full-scale strategic defense, our military forces must be operating under those requirements of readiness. According to Soviet doctrine, they are ready for a full-scale first-strike assault and correlated actions, as soon as their strategic defense is in place.

I stress again, that if we have an adequate capability, and a President who represents the corresponding degree of political will, the Soviets will not launch general war unless they are threatened with actual attack. They know, for example, that were I President I have the quality of political will which they most fear, but that I would not start a general war. Under those conditions, we have little reason to fear the horrors of general nuclear war; however, unless it is credible to Moscow, that their attack would mean assured penalties for them way beyond anything the wildest among them are willing to tolerate, we have no choice but either abject surrender or war. We must think effectively about surviving and winning a general nuclear war, because if we do not think and act so, we assuredly will not survive.

It is the record of modern history, that peace movements and diplomacy cause wars, and that military capabilities bring them to an end, or even prevent, or, at least, delay them.

The case of the U.S. war in Indochina is no exception to this. It was the politicians and diplomats who caused that war, and imposed an insane doctrine upon our assigned military forces. We assigned military forces to fight to maintain the division of a nation, and ordered our military to fight an endless war of attrition contrary to the fundamental principles of military science settled between the years 1793 and 1814.

The fears we conquer, including the just fear of the horrors of nuclear warfare, are those fears we look straight in the eye, with a willingness to conquer the "unthinkable" by thinking through the way to conquer such dangers. Cowards are often rewarded with precisely that from which they flee, or, often, something much worse.

In the name of theater-limited warfare, consolidated under the influence of the Johnson and Nixon State Departments and National Security Councils, the United States reverted in practice to what is called "18th-century cabinet warfare," in the worst form of that sort of warfare, protracted attrition. Our military failed for one reason: It followed faithfully the orders of foolish politicians and diplomats seeking to develop "global society" arrangements between the United States and Moscow.

Worse, that war was essentially unnecessary. Had our postwar policy been consistent with the principles expressed by the Monroe Doctrine, had we carried forward President Franklin Roosevelt's doctrine for what we call the developing sector today, a positive strategy for the Pacific Rim, extending from Japan, throughout Southeast Asia, into the Indian subcontinent, would have secured the area, affording the standpoint from which to deal successfully with the admittedly difficult problems of Indo-China itself. Our actions of 1945, in abruptly reversing preexisting U.S. policy for Indo-China, our actions of 1954, and our course over the 1954-60 period, trapped us into that land war in Asia against which Gen. Douglas MacArthur, among others, had warned us.

The military errors in Indo-China were monstrous, but they were the precalculable consequence of the terms dictated

to our military by the politicians and diplomats, the same politicians and diplomats, such as McGeorge Bundy, who first created the mess, and then led in organizing the peace movement. Worse, Bundy et al. never rejected the strategic doctrines which had led into the war and which had been imposed upon the military arms. We should put the blame where it belongs. The blame lies with the strategic philosophy expressed by today's opponents of SDI who seek to impose upon us their own wishful delusions about Moscow's inclination to adopt peaceful intentions.

The only peace movement which will do any good, is one based entirely among the subjects of Soviet rule. Such pacifism will be induced in only one way, when it is perceived as the only option available to Moscow. The Russians are like that. Peace movements among us, will do nothing except to increase the likelihood that we are left no choices, but the choice between thermonuclear war and abject surrender.

The fears we conquer, including the just fear of the horrors of nuclear warfare, are those fears we look straight in the eye, with a willingness to conquer the "unthinkable" by thinking through the way to conquer such dangers. Cowards are often rewarded with precisely that from which they flee, or, often, something much worse.

Apart from the special historical considerations imposed by the evolving characteristics of modern military technology, U.S. maritime strategy is indistinguishable from a maritime peace strategy. We begin by analyzing our planet in terms of a network of ocean basins. We focus upon the requirements of growing volumes of ocean freight. We estimate those requirements in terms of estimated potential rates of growth productivity among the populations in nations abutting those basins. We design an expandable grid-system of waterways, ports, inland waterways, inland fresh-water-management developments, railways, power-grids, and land development of the interior. All of these sorts of requirements are objectively foreseeable, in a way which is more or less independent of choices by the governments involved: It is what geography and population levels require them to do if they are to avoid catastrophes down the line.

The development of the world's agriculture and industry, and trade, hangs like beads on a string, on the network of such energy-transport infrastructure within each nation and among nations of the network of basins.

The key parameter for planning levels and qualities of U.S. maritime forces as a whole, is an estimation of the levels of traffic of capital goods with high value per ton exported from the United States into the countries of these basins. All other capacity-requirements of ocean-borne freight correlate with this key requirement. We must then project a fleet of high performance U.S.-flag merchant ships on this basis. The movement of these ships, through maritime choke-points, from port to port, overlapping the merchant-fleet traffic of friendly nations, defines the baseline of U.S. naval deployment.

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