

Prospects for the Iceland summit

by Criton Zoakos

The principal subject of discussion between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov at their scheduled, Oct. 11-12, meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, will be the Strategic Defense Initiative. Specifically, President Reagan insisted on holding this meeting because he considers it useful to repeat his July 25 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) offer in a person-to-person squaring off with Mr. Gorbachov. That July 25 offer, as *EIR* reported at the time and as the President made public in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly, includes the following elements: 1) The United States intends to continue unconditionally all aspects of research, testing, and development required for a comprehensive anti-missile shield. 2) The United States offers to share with the Soviet Union the fruits of this R&D effort, provided the Soviets agree to an eventual joint or parallel deployment of anti-missile defense. 3) The United States is willing to provide Moscow with all reasonable guarantees that the SDI cannot be used for "first strike" purposes.

Since then, propagandists and negotiators from the Soviet side have insisted that the American "Star Wars" program must be scrapped, as a precondition for "progress" in "offensive weapons reductions." The American side rejects such linkage between SDI and "offensive weapons." It was against this background noise that Gorbachov sent his letter to President Reagan, suggesting the Oct. 11-12 "non-summit" summit in Iceland.

What are the Soviet leaders' objectives for such a meeting? It seems that Gorbachov is interested in making a political evaluation of whether President Reagan possesses the political support to impose his SDI program as the national policy of the United States, even after his term in office expires. The Kremlin has been pestered by a consistent mis-evaluation, both of the President and of the administration, at least since March 23, 1983, when the President announced his SDI program. The source of the constant Soviet misreading appears to be located in the "Americanologist" circle of IMEMO and in Georgii Arbatov's U.S.A.-Canada Institute. Repeatedly, these specialists had assured the government that the liberal, pro-appeasement forces in the United States would prevail over Reagan and deflect him from the SDI. Repeat-

edly they were proven wrong.

A further concern for Mr. Gorbachov is the LaRouche issue. During the last summit with the President, Gorbachov tried to raise the subject, but, according to reports, the President cut him off on grounds that domestic U.S. politics is none of Gorbachov's business. Since then, the Soviets' massive international propaganda machine has focused on Democratic presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche as the number-one target of their venom. Following the March 18 primary elections in Illinois, the official U.S. declaration of a war on drugs, and LaRouche's leading role in the politically explosive AIDS issue, the Kremlin's concern over LaRouche has grown into alarm.

Essentially, Gorbachov, in trying to arrive at a usable evaluation of what is going on, politically, in the United States, will be watching and comparing three things: 1) what President Reagan will tell him at Reykjavik and how the President will be reacting to what the Russians will have to say; 2) what the liberal Congress and other liberal forces, such as the State Department, will be doing to obstruct President Reagan; 3) to what extent LaRouche and the LaRouche movement in U.S. politics are able to curb the influence of liberals, both in Congress and in U.S. foreign policymaking.

The *EIR* estimate of the Soviet's strategic posture is that the Soviet command is proceeding from two immediate premises. First, President Reagan is unshakably committed to the SDI; second, the nuclear "correlation of forces" at present, is not propitious for Moscow to launch general war. Their principal foreign policy task, therefore, is to ascertain if there are any chinks in Reagan's armor—either in his confrontation with Congress or in his personal psychological makeup, for instance, his subjective attitude toward the "LaRouche issue." Hence the Soviet interest in the "non-summit" of Reykjavik.

President Reagan is aware of at least one aspect of these Soviet probes. He knows that there is a concerted effort, before the summit, to mobilize Congress as an effective barrier to his foreign and national security policies.

The President knows that the State Department was the principal organizer of the Senate's successful override of his veto of economic sanctions against South Africa. To that extent, the State Department and George Shultz will have that much less influence over what transpires at the summit. However, the more the arrogant State Department liberals see the President taking foreign policy into his hands and away from them, the more they will connive with congressional allies to underline the President—which is what Gorbachov is counting on.

The President devoted his Oct. 4 radio address to an appeal to the American population, over the heads of Congress, to force Congress, both parties, to support his foreign policy. President Reagan said: "The Soviets must not think delay could work to their advantage by gaining from the Congress what they can't win at the negotiating table."