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## The President's Report

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# The Soviet record on treaty violations

*On Jan. 1, 1986, the White House announced that it would extend compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty indefinitely. Yet just a week before, on Dec. 23, the President had issued an unclassified report on the expanding pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control treaties. We publish excerpts from that report.*

. . . The current unclassified report examines one new issue and updates all of the issues studied in the classified report of February 1985, except the issue of *Yankee*-Class submarine reconfiguration. There are violations in nine cases. Of the nine cases involving violations, one SALT II issue—that of Soviet concealment of the association between missiles and their launchers—is examined for the first time. The Soviet Union has now also violated its commitment to the SALT I Interim Agreement through the prohibited use of remaining facilities at former SS-7 ICBM sites. In addition, Soviet deployment of the SS-25 ICBM during 1985 constitutes a further violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second new type of ICBM. . . .

The current unclassified report reaffirms the February 1985 classified report concerning ABM issues, making public two of them for the first time. It also reaffirms the February findings concerning SALT II issues involving violations, including one concerning strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which has not previously been made public. In two SALT II issues with respect to which the Soviets were not judged to be in clear violation in the classified report of last February, the findings are altered or updated. These two issues are the SS-16 and an issue made public for the first time—Backfire bomber production rate.

The Administration's most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance. As documented in this and previous reports, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligation under or political commitment to the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT II agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the U.S.S.R. has likely violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. . . .

## Soviet noncompliance

**ABM violations:** The radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is disturbing for both political and military reasons. Politically, the radar demonstrates that the Soviets are capable of violating arms control obligations and commitments even when they are negotiating with the United States or when they know we will detect a violation. The 1972 ABM Treaty prohibits the Soviets from siting an ABM radar, or siting and orienting a ballistic missile detection and tracking radar, as the Krasnoyarsk radar is sited and oriented. . . .

The Krasnoyarsk radar appears even more menacing when considered in the context of other Soviet ABM-related activities. Together they cause concern that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM territorial defense. Some of these activities, such as permitted LPARs [large phased-array radars] and the Moscow ABM deployment area, are consistent with the ABM Treaty. Others involve potential or probable Soviet violations or other ambiguous activity, including:

- the apparent testing and deployment of components required for an ABM system which could be deployed to a site in months rather than years;
- the probable concurrent testing of air defense components and ABM components;
- the development of a modern air defense system, the SA-X-12, which may have some ABM capabilities; and
- the demonstration of an ability to reload ABM launchers and to refire the interceptor missile in a period of time shorter than previously noted.

Soviet deployment of an ABM territorial defense contrary to the ABM Treaty would have profound implications for Western security and the vital East-West strategic balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its credibility. Such a capability might encourage the Soviets to take increased risks in crises, thus degrading crisis stability.

**SS-25:** The SS-25, a clear and irreversible violation of the Soviet Union's SALT II commitment, also has important political and military implications. Testing and deployment of this missile violates a central provision of the SALT II Treaty, which was intended to limit the number of new ICBMs. . . . Under the pretext of permitted modernization, the Soviets, since the last compliance report, have deployed a prohibited second new type of missile, the SS-25, which is mobile and could be made more lethal. The SS-25 also could be modified to carry more than a single warhead. . . .

**Telemetry encryption and concealment of missile/launcher association:** Two other Soviet violations impede our ability to verify the Soviet Union's compliance with its political commitments. Soviet use of encryption impedes U.S. verification of Soviet compliance and thus contravenes the provision of the SALT II Treaty which prohibits use of deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance by national technical means. A new finding of

this report is that current Soviet activities violate the provision of the Treaty which prohibits use of deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing. These deliberate Soviet concealment activities impede our ability to know whether a type of missile is in compliance with SALT II requirements. They could also make it more difficult for the United States to assess accurately the critical parameters of any future missile. . . .

### The detailed findings

*[We summarize here from the report's elaboration of Soviet violations, choosing particularly those sections which present new conclusions—ed.]*

**ABM systems:** The U.S. Government judges that the evidence on Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the U.S.S.R.'s development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively limited site preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

The U.S. Government judges that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload and ABM mobility) suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

**SS-25 ICBM:** The U.S. Government judges, based on convincing evidence about the SS-25, that the throw-weight of the Soviet SS-25 exceeds by more than five percent the throw-weight of the Soviet SS-13 ICBM and cannot therefore be considered a permitted modernization of the SS-13 as the Soviets claim. The SS-25 is a prohibited second "new type" of ICBM and its testing, in addition to the testing of the second SS-X-24 ICBM, thereby is a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the "new type" provision of the SALT II Treaty. The deployment of this missile during 1985 constitutes a further violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second "new type" of ICBM.

**Backfire bomber:** The U.S. Government judges that the temporary deployment of Backfires to Arctic bases is cause for concern and continued careful monitoring. By such temporary deployment of Backfires, the Soviet Union acted in a manner inconsistent with its political commitment in the June 1979 Backfire statement not to give Backfire the capability to strike targets on the territory of the United States.

The Soviet Union is obligated to produce no more than 30 Backfire bomber aircraft per year. There are ambiguities concerning the data. However, there is evidence that the Soviet Backfire production rate was constant at slightly more than 30 per year until 1984, and decreased since that time to slightly below 30 per year.

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## Interview: James Lee Clingan

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# Legislator sought to stop the Trilaterals

*Mr. Clingan is a Democratic state representative from Indiana's 42nd District. He served for 8 years in the state Senate (1960-68) and for 14 years in the state House (1971-85). His Senate service ended when his district was eliminated by a reapportionment engineered by the Democratic Party leadership, which considered him too independent.*

**EIR:** You were imprisoned by the Nazis during World War II in the Hammelburg POW camp, where George Patton's son-in-law was also a prisoner, and had to fight your way out in heavy combat. Can you tell me how that experience affected your political thinking today?

**Clingan:** We have a lot of fine young men, but there's a lot of difference [between veterans of World War II and others], because when we fought that war, it was a war to win. Now, the boys are involved in losing their lives like they did in Vietnam and Korea, in no-win wars. It's a shame, what's going on in this country. Of course, Patton foresaw this at the end of World War II, and when they were bowing to the Russians and giving them territory that contained free people, who should have been free, like Poland and eastern Germany, Patton foresaw this where a lot of others didn't.

**EIR:** You were in the Third Army?

**Clingan:** Yes, I fought with the Seventh Armored Division, 40th Armored Infantry Battalion, as a platoon leader. I was the third platoon leader for this platoon in about a month, there were so many people getting killed.

**EIR:** Today, you're very involved with veterans organizations?

**Clingan:** Yes, I've helped many veterans get the medals they had coming, and get into the VA hospitals and various other things.

**EIR:** The VFW has passed a resolution in opposition to the Council on Foreign Relations.

**Clingan:** That was at the national convention in 1981. The national convention of the American Legion, held in Hawaii in 1981, also passed a resolution to investigate the Council on Foreign Relations.