

## Geneva unmask's Soviets' 'post-Reagan' intentions

by Konstantin George

The Geneva Summit has now occurred. Behind the atmospherics, the smiles and hand-shaking for the TV cameras, the applause of the journalists assembled in the International Conference Center in Geneva, to hear the prepared statements by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov at the closing ceremony, an obvious question deserves to be asked: What happened?

This writer does not pretend access at this point to a large amount of privileged information. Nonetheless, an examination of the text of the documents—the joint communiqué, Reagan and Gorbachov's closing speeches, and Gorbachov's 95-minute press conference following the closing ceremony—suffice to demolish the false climate of "optimism." There is no "new age of détente," as now promoted by the Western media. To think so is dangerous for the United States and Western Europe.

From the information available to the public, an accurate portrayal of what happened at Geneva and the real Soviet policy intentions revealed by the proceedings is possible. So now, away from the atmospherics and down to the facts.

The core issue involved in the Geneva talks: the American SDI program. On this cardinal point, Reagan stood firm. No concessions were made. Secretary of State Shultz was forced to emphasize this in his post-ceremony press conference, when he announced that Reagan had made "in no way any concessions" on the SDI, and then added: "The SDI will not be dropped."

Gorbachov conceded, bitterly, in his press conference, that the SDI will remain a pillar of U.S. defense policy as long as Reagan is President, complaining that he realized from his talks with Reagan that the U.S. President "believes in the SDI like a grand vision." Gorbachov, sounding far removed from any "spirit of détente," repeated the long-standing Soviet ultimatum: "If the U.S. sticks to the SDI, then in the other areas of talks there will be no progress."

But then, Gorbachov gave away the Soviets orientation—to the *next President*. He drew an unmistakable distinction between Reagan and the "United States": "I think that the United States has not said its last word on the SDI."

From the Soviet standpoint, provided they can "tame" the SDI, time is on their side. The U.S. defense budget under Reagan, thanks to Congress, in real dollar and hardware procurement terms, is lower than the abysmal Carter levels. If present trends continue, Russia will be at peak superiority over the United States between 1988 and 1990—the post-Reagan era.

The Soviets also calculate—unfortunately correctly—that there exists a very good chance of an international financial blow-out in the West, bringing down leading U.S. and Western banks. Gorbachov gloated at his press conference over the "explosive consequences" when countries like Mexico, Brazil, etc., can no longer maintain the fiction of debt payment. "This will lead to a breaking point."

Another reason that time is on Moscow's side is that the process of U.S.-European "decoupling," orchestrated between the State Department and European foreign ministries is well under way, with every prospect that the "neutralist" SPD will come to power in Germany in 1987. The SPD leadership endorsed as a "discussion paper" a recent document by party defense expert Andreas von Bülow, declaring the "goal" of withdrawal of U.S. troops.

A signal of State Department agreement was given by the U.S. Ambassador to Germany, Richard Burt, who, on Nov. 18, told a German audience at a symposium hosted by the Hans-Seidel Foundation in Munich: If Europe doesn't want our help, "we'll go home, and, if the Soviet Union does likewise, then the partition of Europe will be overcome."

The joint communiqué itself makes Moscow's intentions clear. Russia has nothing to lose by keeping all sorts of negotiations and a flashy regularity of summitry going (Gor-

bachov will visit Washington in early 1986 and Reagan is scheduled, at least on paper, to visit Moscow by late 1986 or early 1987). Many things could happen to drastically alter the situation to Moscow's favor: an early termination of the Reagan presidency for health reasons, and the German elections, to name a few.

One of the most important passages in the joint communiqué was the section stating: "Besides the meetings of the two leaders, regular meetings of the two Foreign Ministers [Shultz and Shevardnadze] as well as the heads of other ministries and agencies are planned." In plain English, Russia will pursue a hidden agenda with the State Department faction, getting what it can while Reagan remains in office, and paving the way for potential big giveaways in the post-Reagan era.

### **Gorbachov: Silence Weinberger. . .**

While Burt was speaking in Munich before the summit, the *New York Times*, his one-time employer, splashed on its front page a private, "leaked" letter from Defense Secretary Weinberger to President Reagan, telling him to stand firm on the SDI at Geneva, to agree to no strict interpretation of the ABM treaty, and to make no commitment on renewing adherence to the SALT II treaty. Weinberger cited Russia's massive violations of both treaties.

The *Times* leak was promptly used by the Soviet officials to demand Weinberger's head. The director of the U.S.A.-Canada Institute in Moscow, Georgii Arbatov, present in Geneva, denounced Weinberger: "It is tantamount to Weinberger saying openly what we have suspected: that U.S. officials are seeking to disrupt the whole structure and prevent us from reaching an agreement." Arbatov accused Weinberger of "a direct attempt to torpedo the whole arms negotiations process."

Soviet policy seeks to isolate Reagan from any counsel either within or outside the administration that would steer him away from the appeasement of the State Department, the horrendous conditionality policies of the IMF which are destroying U.S. friends and allies across the world, and the Paul Volcker/Don Regan credit policies destroying U.S. industry and agriculture.

### **. . . and LaRouche!**

Weinberger is the principal target of Soviet wrath inside the administration. But outside the administration, the *bête noire* for the Moscow leadership is declared 1988 U.S. presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche, *EIR*'s founder. In mid-1985, LaRouche commissioned an *EIR* Special Report, *Global Showdown: The Russian Imperial War Plan for 1988*, which circulated in thousands of copies among influential circles in the West. More recently, *EIR* has published a series documenting the Soviet control of those sections of the World Health Organization now covering up the truth about the AIDS pandemic.

Well-placed sources say that Gorbachov complained bit-

terly to Reagan about the sharp attacks against him and the Moscow leadership in *EIR*. The Kremlin dictator actually termed these attacks "human rights violations." According to these sources, Reagan quietly replied, that in a democratic society such as the United States, LaRouche has the right to publish his views.

### **Disarmament optimism: a media fraud**

There is no reason to engage in any speculation regarding possible disarmament agreements arising out of Geneva. President Reagan, in his closing ceremony address, made the following observation after two days of talks with Gorbachov: "There will be no results in either the next months or years." Shultz at his press conference, when asked what he expected in the future, was forced to reply, bluntly; "I have no assurances it will go anywhere."

Gorbachov was equally candid: "There remain between us sharp differences on the principal questions." He stressed, as he did several times, that no agreement is possible unless the U.S. capitulates on the SDI. "Then," said the Soviet leader, "will the work achieved here in Geneva these past days not have been in vain."

The much talked about "50% reduction in strategic weapons" is nothing more than hot air. Besides the unacceptable Soviet pre-condition that the United States scrap the SDI, one must remember that one month before the Geneva Summit, Mikhail Gorbachov in Paris unveiled a new, extremely provocative definition of "strategic weapons," adding the U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles stationed in Europe, as well as all U.S. nuclear-capable forward-based aircraft to the 50% reduction list. In that same single stroke he removed, even in nominal terms, Soviet SS-20s and other missile systems directed against Europe and the Far East from negotiations.

These moves alone relegate future U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks to the level of tragic farce, if they were ever anything else. The danger now is that the siren song of "new détente" will lull the West to complacency.

The different shadings of the appeasement faction in West Germany are already speaking out. On Nov. 21, the foreign policy spokesman of the ruling Christian Democratic faction in parliament, Volker Ruehe, appeared on national television to deliver a verdict on the summit. Saying nothing of substance, he exuded optimism: "A better negotiations climate now exists. . . . 50% reduction, that's the decisive point, that must be concretized." Then when asked whether East German leader Erich Honecker could now visit West Germany, Ruehe stated that we will know "relatively soon."

Opposition Social Democratic leader Horst Ehmke then chirped to German TV: "The time of speechlessness between the two [superpowers] is over," and added: "Geneva represents the confirmation of a security partnership"—i.e., a "security partnership" between Germany and Russia!

Such "new détente" nonsense can be more dangerous than military hardware—and the Kremlin knows this.