

EIR Conference Report

Moon-led 'Kremlinologists' back Soviet military rule

by Luba George and Mary McCourt

To date, over 250 representatives of the press, diplomatic corps, and others have attended the press conferences given throughout Western Europe by *EIR* on the looming military threat from the Soviet Union, detailed in its *Global Show-down* report. But, at the same time, those madly peddling the fraudulent, wishful doctrine of a crumbling Soviet empire have been hard at work. The week of Aug. 13-17, the Professors' World Peace Academy, founded by Rev. Sun Myung Moon, brought some 265 "Sovietologists," journalists, and over 100 observers to Geneva, Switzerland to build a consensus of opinion that the Soviet Union is in grave danger of collapse from within—and therefore, poses no real military threat to the West.

The conference went beyond earlier efforts to convince the governments of NATO nations that preparations for defense against the Soviet Union are unnecessary. Here, Alexander Shtromas, of the Department of Politics and Contemporary History of the University of Salford, England, organizer of the conference, endorsed outright the policies of the "nationalist," Third Rome military clique in the Kremlin, while purporting to do combat with the straw-man of "a-national" Soviet communism.

"Russian nationalism is incompatible with Soviet communism. . . . Whatever unpleasant aspects Russian nationalism may have . . . it is a much more humane and popular ideology than abstract and a-national communism. . . . The political victory of Russian nationalism over communism would therefore be welcomed. . . . There are no genuine Russian national interests that would be in real conflict with those of the U.S.A. or most West European nations."

Shtromas' paper was entitled, "How the End of the Soviet

System May Come About: Historical Precedents and Possible Scenarios."

Shtromas, interestingly, is a Soviet emigré. In another paper presented at the conference, "Marxist Ideology and Soviet Dissent," he wrote: "There is in the Soviet Union simply no room any more for any utopian ideologies and movements. In this respect, one could say that the politically backward Russia is a pioneer of a new political mentality which, if mankind is to survive, has to conquer the world."

The Russian monks who first proclaimed that Moscow would become the world's "Third and Final Rome" could not have said it better.

Buying souls

The Professors' World Peace Academy (PWPA) is an organization Moon personally set up at a meeting of 163 university professors in South Korea in 1973. The Geneva conference was conducted under extremely tight security and intense and constant scrutiny from members of Moon's Unification Church. Conference "security" and staffers filmed and photographed participants continually, during sessions, at meals, and in private discussions.

Papers presented included such titles as "Implications of the Fall of the Soviet Regime on Cuba and Cuba-sponsored Revolutionary Regimes and Movements in Latin America," and "The Prospects for Poland in the Event of a Cessation of Soviet Control."

Many of the participants, most of whom were Russian emigrés, admitted privately that they did not believe that the Soviet empire was in any danger of collapsing, now or in the foreseeable future, and cynically joked that they had only

come to the conference as an all-expenses-paid junket, including air fare, meals, and first-class hotels.

As the conference proceeded, however, any dissent was stilled. Discussion was tightly controlled, and only 80 of the many papers submitted were finally published by the PWPA. Any which dissented from the conclusion that the Soviet empire—and any war danger—were no longer a threat, were rejected by the conference organizers, and dissenting views were strongly criticized by Moon followers who chaired the conference panels.

One prominent conference participant told a journalist afterwards that the topic of the conference was “ridiculous. Why have a conference on the fall of the Soviet empire . . . when five-sixths of the papers proved that it is not crumbling. . . ? As the conference went on, the control over it by Reverend Moon became more and more open.”

But apparently, the PWPA was encouraged by the outcome. A huge conference is now planned on the same subject for Washington, D.C. on March 4-5, 1986. In contrast to this conference, where media access was limited, PWPA organizers are planning to maximize media publicity around the Washington event.

Immediately following the conference, a second one was held in Geneva’s Hotel Penta, this time for the “activists.” CAUSA, another Moonie front operation that runs intense “anti-communist” recruiting campaigns among military and other layers in the Americas, sponsored this conference to demand a program of action “with some meat in it,” according to the *Tribune de Genève*. The CAUSA meeting was led by PWPA international head Morton Kaplan of the University of Chicago’s Political Science Department, as well as Shtromas, and Karl Pribam, president of PWPA-USA and professor of neuroscience at Stanford University in California.

Again, all discussion was dominated by the policy papers of Shtromas, who organized the papers written by participants, many of whom admitted later that they had no idea that the conference was going to endorse “Russian nationalism.” Some participants, of Russian Jewish origin, have historical reason to know what “Russian nationalism” really is.

Shtromas was most keen on endorsing a military dictatorship in the Soviet Union: “The heavier the Soviet leadership’s reliance on confrontational and expansionist policies is, the more dependent it becomes upon the military in overall terms,” he wrote. “The . . . Chilean model of change (. . . the same model of military takeover) can also be envisaged as applicable for the beginning of the process of political change in the Soviet Union.”

Call for decoupling

R. V. Burks of Wayne State University in Michigan, began the major speeches by proclaiming: “The chances that a system breakdown may take place in the Soviet Union within the next five years are probably better than even.”

He was followed by the keynote speech by Morton Ka-

plan, a straight-out endorsement of “decoupling” the United States from its allies in Western Europe, leaving Europe a “neutralized” region—right in the Soviets’ front yard. Kaplan’s paper, “American Policy in the Event of a Soviet Crisis,” states: “The obvious Russian counter [to a U.S. provocation during a Soviet “regime crisis”]—since it knows that NATO will not start either a war or a war crisis—is to not allow itself to be provoked into escalatory military spending. . . . Policies designed to reassure the internal contestants for power in the Soviet Union of American non-aggressive intentions are far more likely to convey credibility if they occur within the framework of a prior policy emphasizing such restraint. Thus, some variant of my proposal for mutual withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from the central theater and massive reductions in military strength in all nations of the central area might provide that credibility.”

Reality intervenes

Also in Geneva on Aug. 14, *EIR* gave the most recent in its series of press conferences in Western Europe on its *Global Showdown* report, “The Russian Imperial War Plan for 1988,” this time to 23 diplomats, press, and military representatives. Later, at one Moonie conference session, on “frictions among the political-military elites” in the Soviet Union, report co-author Konstantin George made a brief, effective statement on the massive Soviet war buildup and the ascendancy of Marshal Ogarkov and his war plan. George focused on the war-time high commands created since the “demotion” of Ogarkov last September.

Reaction was immediate. Max Planck Institute Kremlinologist Mikhail Voslensky, one of the most widely accepted “authorities” on the Soviets in Western Europe, demanded that the panel not “waste our time . . . discussing Ogarkov, where he is and what he’s doing. Ogarkov is not important.” He demanded that the panel close for lunch, and the chairman promptly complied.

There were others, however, who didn’t follow the Moonie line. Michael Checinski, Soviet military analyst at the United States Army Institute in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, West Germany, shocked the conference when he blasted Henry Kissinger for aiding the Soviets in achieving military superiority over the West in a 10-minute impromptu speech (see *Kissinger Watch*, page 61). “President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative has upset the Soviet goal,” Checinski continued. The Russians had not expected Reagan’s SDI announcement, he said. “The SDI is a real threat to the Soviets. It’s not a military challenge, but an economic challenge” which would force the Soviet Union to modernize its entire economy.

British Soviet expert Alec Nove was among those whom Checinski upset: “Checinski’s remarks make one believe that anyone who believes in greater inter-cooperation between East and West are agents of Moscow . . . and that people like myself would be helping Moscow.”

Indeed.

'Russian military rule is welcome'

Excerpts from "How the End of the Soviet System May Come About: Historical Precedents and Possible Scenarios" by Alexander Shtromas, Organizing Chairman of the PWPA conference in Geneva, and professor at the Department of Politics and Contemporary History at the University of Salford, England.

. . . Russian nationalism is incompatible with Soviet communism for reasons whose explanation lies far beyond the limits of this paper. Whatever unpleasant aspects Russian nationalism may have (as have any other nationalism, especially in its exaggerated chauvinistic and/or jingoistic forms), it is a much more humane and popular ideology than abstract and a-national communism. The political victory of Russian nationalism over communism would therefore be welcomed; for the polity that would be created on its basis could be able to establish peace with its own people and substantially to reduce international confrontation, limiting it to those issues only which have a bearing on Russia's genuine national interests in contrast with the global communist ones. And there are no such genuine Russian national interests that would be in real conflict with those of the U.S.A. or most West European nations.

Moreover, the heavier the Soviet leadership's reliance on confrontational and expansionist policies is, the more dependent it becomes upon the military in overall terms. And not only because the military is the most important executioner of such policies, but also, and mainly because these policies, being likely to alienate other establishments, make the Party heavily dependent for its survival in power on the Army's support (which may one day turn from unconditional into a very "conditional" one indeed, thus undermining the authority of the Party and establishing the military's supremacy).

The experience of history shows that if a government becomes dependent for its survival on the exclusive support of one particular outside-government force, this supporting force acquires more power than the government itself and finally replaces it altogether.

This actually shows that, along with the Portuguese, the Chilean model of change (both being merely variations of

basically the same model of a military takeover) can also be envisaged as applicable for the beginning of the process of political change in the Soviet Union.

The removal of Communist totalitarianism and its replacement with Russian nationalist authoritarianism (e.g., in the form of a military dictatorship) would certainly introduce into Soviet society, at least to some extent, political pluralism which in itself is sufficient to change the country's whole social outfit from a static (and rotting) to a dynamic (and improving via adjustment) one. It will also put an end to expansionist Communist policies of the U.S.S.R. now threatening mankind on a global scale.

Excerpts from "American Policy in the Event of a Soviet Crisis" by Morton Kaplan, president of PWPA International, and a professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.

. . . It might seem to be obvious to some that the U.S. should do everything it can to stimulate, to provoke, and even to exacerbate the development of a system or regime crisis in the Soviet Union. Indeed, Georgi Arbatov of the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada has proclaimed that such is the policy of the Reagan administration. . . . And even if the Reagan administration had such an objective, the obvious Russian counter—since it knows that NATO will not start either a war or a war crisis—is to not allow itself to be provoked into escalatory military spending. . . .

Policies designed to reassure the internal contestants for power in the Soviet Union of American non-aggressive intentions are far more likely to convey credibility if they occur within the framework of a prior policy emphasizing such restraint. Thus, for instance, some variant of my proposal for mutual withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from the central theater and massive reductions in military strength in all nations of the central area might provide that credibility. In the absence of such a radical program, at least modest reductions in military forces, including perhaps the placement of intermediate range nuclear forces into the seas, and the implementation of advanced crisis management proposals that are now being negotiated, might play a useful role.

. . . During a crisis itself, it would be advisable to coordinate with the West German government so that we can jointly announce that the territorial readjustments involving Germany and Poland that resulted from World War II will not be challenged. . . .

It may not be possible to maintain a completely hands off attitude toward developments in Eastern Europe, where Soviet hegemony lacks any legitimacy and where American sympathies will be so readily aroused. However, it might be useful during a crisis to emphasize the much maligned Yalta Accords. . . . If most of Eastern Europe appears to be pulling out of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, we should be in a position to announce that we are ready to negotiate the con-

ditions for the dissolution of NATO and for massive arms reductions in Europe. . . . The Helsinki accords to which the Soviet Union is party could also be used in similar fashion.

Despite efforts of the former kind, turmoil in the Soviet Union might produce military adventurism on the part of the leading cadres in the regime. Therefore it is highly important that the prospects for such successful aggressive behavior be shown to be minimal. This means that the defenses of the NATO area must be exceptionally strong and not vulnerable to a tactical surprise attack, because many of the measures that would be defensive would also be consistent with an offensive posture, it is extremely important that a full range of crisis control measures be in force.

. . . A Soviet system with a rational economy, and a liberated managerial class, might have much less need to expand or to threaten areas vital to American interests. Its legitimacy might be served best by technology transfers and by improved relations with the capitalist powers. It probably would be forced into certain compromises with the military, but these need not be threatening to Western interests.

Political pluralism . . . might set off the most provocative tendencies in terms of the territorial integrity of what is now the Soviet Union. Russian reaction to these nationality claims might be extremely cruel and xenophobic, producing relative pluralism only for the Russian areas but dictatorial domination for the rest. . . . It is possible that such a Russia might seek an alliance with the West against the Chinese and colored races of the world. . . .

There are forces that feel so threatened by demographic changes inside the Soviet Union that they would like to get rid of all the Asian and colored peoples and retreat to a small Russia policy. They would increase strength and fight anarchy by allying with Europe, and with other white nations. Secretary Brezhnev once said to President Nixon that a war between the United States and the Soviet Union would be a terrible thing because the world would be taken by the black and the yellow peoples.

Excerpts from "Soviet Muslims And Self-Determination: Trends And Prospects," presented by Sovietologist Alexander Bennigsen to the PWPA's Geneva conference. After reporting that the Soviet Muslim population will reach 70 million by the year 2000, he continues:

Such a situation is tolerable for Soviet leaders as long as the Muslims remain submissive and quiet. But will they?

. . . Various super-national identities—pan-Turkic, pan-Islamic, or Turkestanian—are likely to find more adherents as Muslims rediscover their cultural patrimony and as Soviet cultural forms became even more boring and oppressive. . . .

The strength of modern nationalism, which is a purely Muslim affair, will almost certainly grow, and it is possible that by the year 2000, one national group, the Uzbeks, who

by then will number about 25 million, will emerge as the dominant national force. This evolution could include the merging of Turkestanian consciousness with Uzbek consciousness, a truly important merger, for it would establish the Uzbeks as the *primus inter pares* among Soviet Muslims. History tells us that if Turkestan is to be united again as it has been many times in the past . . . it will once more be around the cities of Bukhara, Tashkent, Samarkand and under Uzbek leadership.

To my knowledge, for the time being at least, there is no organized Muslim nationalist dissent movement . . . but, it is already possible to see the first trends in the evolution of native nationalism and to speculate on the different ways in which it could mold itself. . . .

[Soviet Muslim] intellectuals believe that for the foreseeable future the cultural and economic prosperity of the Mus-

The political victory of Russian nationalism over communism would be welcomed; for the polity that would be created on its basis could be able to establish peace with its own people and substantially reduce international confrontation, limiting it to those issues in Russia's genuine national interests in contrast with the global communist ones.

lim nations of the U.S.S.R. is better linked with the prosperity and might of the Soviet Union as a whole. They conclude that the U.S.S.R. must maintain its present form. In exchange, Muslims have to be treated as partners and be allowed greater access to decision-level positions. . . .

Those who advocate or are likely followers of this line of argument are members of the native nomenklatura, who will undoubtedly remain loyal to Moscow through self-interest, rather than ideology. . . .

These intellectuals—including many from the younger generations—believe that the Soviet Union will someday crumble and that the Muslim republics will be free to make other political and economic alliances. Russians and other "European" settlers will be expelled and natives will assume responsibility for their own affairs. Events along the Soviet Central Asian borders—in Afghanistan, Iran, and increasingly, China—will encourage this line of thinking, as will the growth of the younger Muslim population.

Excerpts from "The Impact of Defense Policy Options on the Dynamics of Soviet Economy," presented by Michael Chencinski, Soviet military analyst at the United States Army Institute, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, West Germany, to the Geneva PWPA conference.

. . . We will not understand the connections between Soviet defense and economic policies *only* by looking at the current economic development of the U.S.S.R. and its urgent military needs. Any comparison with the military programming of Western countries is also unproductive because of the U.S.S.R.'s peculiar economic phenomenon already outlined, and also because of the very different economic and military-political philosophy by which the Soviet decision-makers operate.

To start with Soviet military technology and military acquisition planning: Western scholars often err in thinking that this planning is directly related to economic growth or to the living standard of the population, or as a response only to the military-technological challenges of the West. While each of these factors influences Soviet military planning in some respects, the short- and long-run supply and R&D plans of the Soviet Armed Forces are guided by the following main priorities:

1) The technological and industrial capacities of the country (not necessarily equal to the economic capacities).

2) The abilities of the Soviet Armed Forces to adopt the supplied weapons and equipment in peacetime and wartime.

3) The military (strategic, tactical) advantages which the quality of the weapons and equipment delivered may have, and how fast they can change the current or potential balance of power with the expected enemy.

These priorities may be overruled under extraordinary technological, economic, military or political circumstances. This may be the case with the American SDI. . . .

There is no doubt that finding an "answer" to the American SDI program will dominate military-technological priorities for the years to come. We can predict a large-scale undertaking in the economic and technological programs to modernize Soviet military-related industries, and to develop as fast as possible their micro-computer, laser, robot, and similarly important technologies. Into these main programs most available resources will be channeled. Technological spying and sophisticated foreign trade operations will help fill the most troublesome gaps in their know-how. This does not mean, however, that in the process of carrying out both their military and their economic modernization programs, the U.S.S.R. must duplicate Western technological solutions. The Soviets will strive to be independent in all respects in military-technological fields.

The U.S.S.R. has 5-10 years to achieve its military-technological space program. With their tremendous capacities and very centralized and planned economy, this is plenty of time to solve even very difficult technological and economic programs. But, if 5-10 years will not be enough to

meet fully the American technological challenge, the Soviet leaders know perfectly well that the mercy of the "imperialists" is abundant, and there will be no danger of a war unless it is provoked by the Soviets themselves.

The American SDI program makes the U.S.S.R. nervous not because of its purely military consequences, but because of its implications for the Soviet economy. To repeat, the seriously outmoded industry, agriculture, infrastructure, etc. urgently need tremendous costly investments. A large share of resources and much of the R&D capacities will be devoted to the "Counter SDI" program. We should ask, why the necessity to develop the Soviets' "star wars" technology faster, when, for many years in any case, this program has been part of the Soviet space technology program, has frustrated the Soviet military commanders and political leaders for primarily economic reasons?

In the early seventies the U.S.S.R. started an unprecedented military build-up to become equal to and even stronger than NATO. The program absorbed all those resources which were so badly needed to modernize basic industry. Most probably Soviet military-industrial planners, directed by Brezhnev and his closest advisers, believed that, with the creation of a superior military power, they would be free to act around the world without worrying about Western interests or a military threat from the U.S.A. and its allies. Being strong, they could then divert resources for modernizing the basic and military industries in order to meet the technological revolution of the coming century. President Reagan's SDI program, from the day it gained financial support and started developing, created a fear that this interim period of superiority would very quickly be replaced by a period of weakness. . . .

Yet, despite its very high costs the program can be fulfilled by using part of the large production and R&D reserves of existing industrial branches. For a faster "counter-SDI" program, the Soviet Union must build extremely modern and very costly new facilities, new R&D institutes and testing ranges, as well as totally new industrial branches, whose size and kind cannot even be correctly forecasted. Such a formidable combination explains why Soviet political and military leaders are so frustrated. This frustration may force them to consider more seriously the consequences of their current difficulties and expected troubles. All this may subsequently influence their arms policy and their behavior in international affairs.

If all this comes true, we will be able to say that for the first time a leader of the USA initiated a program with the potential from space to force the most aggressive nation on earth to look for a common language with its adversaries and to find a way to a more peaceful coexistence. This can become a reality if the interim period of Soviet military weakness will be long enough to substantially change the political thinking among the ruling elite of the U.S.S.R. If this happens, the biggest winners will be the long-suffering nations of the U.S.S.R. and its East European captured "allies."