

the outright KGB-influenced types such as Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) an inordinate power.

While this sad situation dominates the present body, there is a ray of hope, in the potential for a bipartisan coalition on the national interest. The 10-20 potentially sound senators are drawn from both parties; for example, Democratic Senators Tom Heflin (Ala.), Edward Zorinsky (Nebr.), and John Stennis (Miss.) joined seven Republicans in voting against Burt. Lyndon LaRouche, the founder of the NDPC, pointed out that this bipartisanship represented a potentially more important gain in the long run than the short-run defeat suffered in the Burt case ("LaRouche hails patriotic senators who rejected Burt," *EIR*, July 19, 1985, p. 32). Other Democrats who rank in the 50% or better category, in the NDPC's tally, include David Boren (D-Okla.), Russell Long (D-La.), and Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.).

On the other hand, the survey exposes the myth of the so-called middle-of-the-road Democrat, supposedly represented by Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.), Nunn, and John Glenn (D-Ohio). Bentsen scores 65% in the American Conservative Association rating, whereas the NDPC rated him at 12%. The NDPC gave Nunn a shameful 16% and Glenn a marginally higher 19%. To give the reader a better appreciation of the value of the current survey, compare the 90% rating for Nunn and Glenn in the National Security Index of the American Security Council. The methodological flaw of the NSI rating, is to weight all defense-related matters equally, so that a simple vote on appropriations is counted the same as a crucial vote on the SDI, the MX, or troop deployments in Europe. The strength of the NDPC's survey lies in the selection of votes based upon a strategic perspective.

One final observation based on the Senate analysis: There is, on the whole, a clear demarcation between those in the 50% and up category, and those below 50%—with the exceptions of Melcher, Max Baucus (D-Mont.), and James Exon (D-Nebr.), explained above. The former category represents 42 senators, who, while imperfect, to say the least, occasionally display some healthy instincts. For example, Hollings (D-S.C.), who scores 50%, astonished a Democratic caucus meeting by coming out solidly for the Strategic Defense Initiative, because he thought it was right. Those below 50%, with the exceptions cited above, behave like traitors. Here we find Cranston (D-Calif.) scoring 7%, William Proxmire (D-Wisc.) 5%, and Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) a well-deserved 0%.

The conclusion to be drawn is that ruthless pressure must be brought to bear on the 50% and up group, to act as a patriotic bipartisan leadership, while the other 55 senators must be turned out of office. As a weapon to realize this, the NDPC vote-rating report is invaluable.

The report is available for a \$10 contribution, plus handling charges, from Susan Kokinda, NDPC, P.O. Box 17729, Washington, D.C., 20041-0729.

Regan assumes role of 'prime minister'

by Nicholas Benton

As Washington moved into its last week before the great August recess, concern over the growing influence of the White House "Palace Guard," especially the role of Chief of Staff Donald Regan, intensified.

The reasons were well founded: impasse on the budget, inertia in the White House, failure to aggressively pursue the President's key programs—especially the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Did Don Regan have something to do with all this? Many believe so.

The White House chief of staff is supposed to have a position with as much influence as the chief cleaning lady. But Regan has used it to assert more influence, insiders say, on any President since former New Hampshire Gov. Sherman Adams used to decide what President Eisenhower could or could not read.

Not only Regan, but also National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, Secretary of State George Shultz, and Treasury Secretary James Baker III have muscled into much more direct decision-making postures.

Regan's assumption of "prime minister-like" powers first came to wide public attention during the President's brief stay at Bethesda Naval Hospital for his cancer operation. It was Regan, according to reports, George Bush to "take a hike" during the operation, such that Bush didn't even meet with the President for five days. It was Regan, also, who allegedly convinced the President to sign over his powers of office for the brief eight hours that he was in surgery. And finally, there was Regan's role in building the President's operation into an inelegant circus of successionist speculation, making the decision to give the press access to full technical medical briefings on the nature of the President's condition.

However, the deeper danger involved in the Regan-McFarlane-Shultz-Baker "inside putsch" involves undermining the SDI.

Columnists Evans and Novak alluded to this on July 26, commenting, "The lack of a sure political touch under hard-driving Don Regan has hurt the President on the SDI and on chemical warfare." They were referring to the fact that, since April, "for whatever reason, the White House staff distanced itself from herculean efforts of pro-defense congressmen to prevent the new anti-defense mood from gutting Reagan's SDI."

One reason for this, they said, is that "McFarlane's own dedication to the SDI is questioned by some on the Hill," which would help explain why the administration never responded to repeated appeals by Senate loyalists such as Barry Goldwater to launch a major offensive to defend the President's full \$3.7 billion request for SDI. These appeals, Evans and Novak note, were all funnelled through Regan, and probably never got to the President at all. It wasn't until late June that the White House even acknowledged the fight. Even then, it was limited to a phone call by a lower-level White House aide to Rep. William Dickenson, ranking Republican on the House Armed Service Committee, asking him to "lead the battle for the SDI." By then, it was way too late, and the SDI figure had already been chopped to its present \$2.5 billion.

The same thing happened in the case of the administration's chemical warfare program. In this case, a confidential letter from 13 of the 19 members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 3 was never even acknowledged by the White House. The President's "personal involvement" and the "full weight" of his office would be needed to save the program, the senators wrote. Two months went by without a reply, until on June 3, Goldwater and Sen. Sam Nunn attempted a second appeal, stating that Reagan's "active support" would be "essential" to pass the program in the liberal House. It took another few weeks before the White House finally responded by inviting members of the House Armed Services Committee for a briefing. The result was that the House did okay the program, but not without restrictions on NATO deployment totally unacceptable to the President.

Regan, 66, the former chief executive at Merrill Lynch and Treasury Secretary, is loyal to those interests who own the lion's share of the \$2 trillion national debt—that is, Wall Street. His priorities, such as reducing the federal deficit even at the expense of the nation's defense, are guided by this loyalty. By contrast, for the President, not debt collection, but the strategic interests of the United States are a "gut" priority.

The danger represented by the "palace guard," therefore, is not simply defined in terms of personal ambition, but in terms of fundamentally different loyalties. In this context, Regan has done little to disguise his garrish attempt to assume the role of prime minister (as Robert Novak called him on a local television show). Regan became notorious as the White House point-man in two instances of slamming the Congress.

In the first case, he pounded his fist in front of a U.S. Chamber of Commerce breakfast demanding action to break the congressional budget impasse. Then he set up the Senate Republicans on the Social Security one-year freeze issue, telling them the President supported it, and then pulling the rug from under them when they committed themselves and the President reneged.

He capped this with a staged "photo opportunity," posing with Sen. Bob Dole sharing an Indian peace pipe. The mes-

sage his whole public relations campaign was aimed at was clear—when it comes to relations between the White House and the Congress, Mr. Regan represents White House clout.

An anonymous President?

Regan is also credited with the choice of a "yes-man," former Federal Trade Commission chairman James C. Miller III, to replace David Stockman as head of the Office of Management and Budget. Regan, it was reported, did not want someone upstaging him there, grabbing headlines as Stockman did. Next to Regan, everyone is supposed to have a grey anonymity around the White House—increasingly, even the aging President.

Insiders speculate that—with the exception of McFarlane—no one around the White House, including Defense Secretary Weinberger or Press Secretary Patrick Buchanan, can see the President without going through Regan first.

And while Regan and McFarlane are "guarding" the President, Shultz is running his own show, unimpeded, over at the State Department. His latest move was to tell the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 24 that he is considering closing certain U.S. posts overseas because of the dangers of terrorism—thus undermining President Reagan's tough call for decisive action to prevent terrorists from fulfilling their objectives.

Shultz rejected a report on U.S. overseas security needs prepared by a panel headed by former CIA deputy director Bobby R. Inman. It contained 91 recommendations for remodeling and building at 126 of 262 U.S. overseas missions at a cost of \$4 billion. "It may be that the high costs of providing appropriate security safeguards will require the development of alternative ways of carrying on our diplomatic and consular activities in certain cities abroad," Shultz said. That is, pull out!

Shultz combined this with a new proposal for what he called a "diplomatic offensive" against terrorism as an alternative to more decisive action.

The press, meanwhile, has leaped upon the "Palace Guard" coup to proclaim the President a "lame duck." A *Christian Science Monitor* editorial even called on the President to resign now, arguing that the move "would seal Reagan's position in history." Others, like columnist Joe Kraft, have intimated that "everybody will be better off with the decision-making process at the White House being managed by Shultz and McFarlane." This team, Kraft wrote, "is not capable of winning one for the Gipper, but it can muddle through."

To a degree, President Reagan foiled the "Palace Guard" with his apparently swift recovery from surgery. The day before he went in for the operation, he devoted his weekly radio broadcast to a restatement of his uncompromising commitment to the SDI. The prospect remains for the man at the helm to order his upstart "Palace Guard" back into the servants' quarters where they belong, in order to guide the ship of state into safe harbor.