

State Department drives for final phase of 'New Yalta'

by Kathleen Klenetsky

As we go to press, developments in Washington strongly suggest that State Department traitor Richard Burt will be confirmed as the new American ambassador to West Germany, perhaps as early as July 15. According to Senate sources, the "hold" which had been placed on Burt's nomination by a coalition of Senate conservatives, led by Sens. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Steve Symms (R-Idaho), has effectively been dropped, paving the way for the Senate to vote on Burt and several other controversial foreign-service nominees, including Rozanne Ridgeway, Burt's projected replacement as Assistant Secretary of European Affairs.

Should Burt be confirmed, as now seems likely, it will represent a crucial victory for the State Department over the national security interests of the United States. The State Department is now functioning as the coordinating agency for the Western oligarchy's conspiracy to sell out the West to Russia's "Third Rome" imperialists.

The New Yalta

The Burt confirmation is actually just the latest in a string of victories which State has managed over past weeks, the most important of which includes the TWA hijacking, through which State was able to reduce United States influence in the Mideast to near zero, and the announcement that President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachov will hold a summit in Geneva Nov. 19-21.

Taken together, these developments signal that the so-

called New Yalta plan advocated by key factions of the Western oligarchy, including the State Department bureaucracy—beginning with George Shultz—has entered a final phase.

The New Yalta scheme championed by these Neville Chamberlains, calls for the United States to further disarm itself, and specifically to abandon the Strategic Defense Initiative for beam-weapon defense against nuclear attack. It also calls for the United States to divest itself of its interests in Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, allowing these areas to fall into the Soviet sphere of influence. In exchange, the United States would be permitted to enmire itself in wars with its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.

Kissinger first publicly articulated that proposal in a now-notorious speech to the 1982 summer get-together at the exclusive Bohemian Grove in California, where he stated that the United States should unilaterally reduce its influence worldwide to "25% of its postwar extent."

Richard Burt's presence in Bonn is a crucial element in this planning. With his close ties to the Social Democratic Party, which has been scrupulously following Moscow's policy directives, and to the Green Party, Burt has been slated to play a principal role in the destabilization of the present, pro-American Kohl government.

Kohl's replacement by an SPD-dominated government will then have two major desired effects: First, it will hasten the process of NATO "decoupling," with West Germany either de facto or de jure breaking with NATO. Second, it

will mean that the most important source of support within Europe for the SDI, both politically and technologically, will be gone.

It is in this context that recent reports of a "softening" in Moscow's negotiating position at Geneva must be analyzed. On July 9, Leslie Gelb, the national defense correspondent for the *New York Times*, published a front-page article claiming he had been told by high-level administration sources, that Soviet negotiators at Geneva had informally made a new proposal on the SDI. The offer, according to Gelb, would allow the United States to continue to pursue the SDI—but on a research basis only. All development and testing would be banned.

That condition would make it absolutely impossible for the United States to develop a strategic defense.

Gelb followed that up with a July 11 story, based on an interview with Rep. Steven Solarz (D-N. Y.), suggesting that the Soviets are also ready to make concessions in the field of offensive nuclear weapons.

Solarz, who had just been in Moscow for a series of high-level meetings, reported that Soviet General Staff member Col. Gen. Nikolai Chervov had informed him that the Soviets are now prepared to make a 25% reduction in warheads, as well as missiles. The Soviets, who enjoy a massive superiority in warheads, had previously insisted that only missiles be counted as part of any arms control accord.

Although the Soviets issued an official denial of the July 9 Gelb piece, these two developments were immediately seized upon by the New Yalta crowd as proof that the Soviets were modifying their hard line. The State Department, while denying any knowledge of the Soviet offer, issued a statement that it would certainly be a "welcome" development.

In a related statement July 11, responding to a recent letter which Mikhail Gorbachov sent to the Union of Concerned Scientists, the State Department adopted the Soviet version of what the Geneva talks are supposed to be about, using the very words of the Kremlin propagandists. According to this remarkable statement, the United States is committed to "preventing an arms race in space" and "welcome[s] Mr. Gorbachov's reaffirmation that the Soviet Union has the desire and political will to realize the objectives of the Jan. 8 agreement" between Shultz and Gromyko on the Geneva talks. "If this is indeed the Soviet intention, the Soviet Union will find the U.S. a ready partner."

On the same day, Rep. Solarz teamed up with Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.), who had just returned from observing the Geneva talks, and Rep. Jim Leach (R-Iowa), to introduce a joint resolution in Congress calling on the administration to agree to a ban on SDI testing, development and deployment, in exchange for cuts in Soviet strategic weaponry. Solarz said the Soviets are showing "flexibility" in their negotiating position at Geneva, citing the new Soviet "offer" to allow SDI research as proof.

Also on the same day, Sens. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), who had also been in Geneva, gave a lengthy briefing to U.S. reporters with the same basic message. Said Stevens: "SDI is on the table, we've reassured ourselves of that. SDI and what it means in terms of these negotiations, where research begins and where it ends, where any kind of preliminary application of any breakthroughs . . . there is going to have to be a negotiation on that. I think even the definition of what research is would be negotiable."

Burt, decoupling, and the SDI

The Gelb leaks, particularly on the Soviet's SDI "offer," represent the end phase of the State Department's long-term strategy for subverting President Reagan's beam defense plan.

EIR has confirmed that State actually invented the Soviet proposal, and then passed it along, utilizing a series of private and governmental backchannels here and in Europe, to the Kremlin. It was then leaked by State to Gelb as a "Soviet offer." Gelb, a former State Department official, is also an intimate friend of Burt, and currently occupies the same post at the *Times* which Burt used to hold—facts which strongly suggest that Burt was the source for Gelb's scoop.

The purpose of this rather Byzantine maneuvering is actually quite straightforward: State, as part of proving to Moscow that it can keep up its end of the New Yalta bargain, wants to create a situation in which President Reagan will be forced to make the SDI "negotiable"—a euphemism for killing it.

By fostering the illusion that the Soviets have adopted a more flexible position at Geneva—i.e., they will now allow SDI research, instead of demanding that the entire program be chucked, and are willing to make deep cuts in their offensive arsenal—State intends to provide the pretext for SDI opponents in the United States and in Western Europe to mount a major lobbying effort to force Reagan to agree that the Soviet offer should become the basis for negotiation at Geneva.

EIR has learned that once in Bonn, Burt will officially launch this treacherous State Department operation, functioning as the key on-the-ground coordinator for its implementation. Burt will work closely with Western European governments, and the U.S. embassy network in this process will go into high gear by Aug. 10, when the European foreign ministers meet in Stockholm. That meeting is expected to forge a unified European position: Since the United States has consistently maintained that the SDI is only a research program, and, since the Soviets have agreed to accept an SDI research program, what reason could Reagan possibly have for not accepting the Soviet offer?

Once this operation has succeeded in establishing the "Soviet" offer as "what Europe wants," Moscow will then allow the State Department proposal to be officially put forward in its own name. At that point, Reagan will be boxed

into a corner from which it will impossible to escape—unless he tosses the entire State Department and its rotten policies out the window.

The Kampelman angle

This carefully orchestrated plot against the U.S. strategic defense program will have the backing of at least one top member of the U.S. negotiating team: Max Kampelman. Indeed, the “Soviet” offer corresponds to a proposal which Kampelman put forward in a widely publicized *New York Times Sunday Magazine* article on Jan. 27.

In that piece, co-authored by Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Kampelman suggested that President Reagan’s plan for an advanced technology, multi-layered defensive system capable of defending populations as well as missiles, be junked in favor of a more “practical” terminal defense.

This was more than a simple statement of opinion by a private citizen. Appearing right after George Shultz succeeded in getting Kampelman appointed chief U.S. negotiator on space-defense issues at Geneva, the *Times* article sent a signal to Moscow that State’s operation to wreck the SDI was proceeding according to plan.

Not surprisingly, Kampelman hailed the news of the Reagan-Gorbachov summit as the one development which might break the current Geneva deadlock, pointedly stressing that the SDI is the major stumbling block to progress in arms control.

Kampelman’s comment indicates that, if the State Department continues to get its way, Reagan’s meeting with Gorbachov will be used to put a U.S. stamp of approval, at least implicitly, on the New Yalta deal, including its SDI component.

From the standpoint of the New Yalta gang’s strategy for the summit, it is significant that, according to high-level sources, final arrangements for the meeting were made through Armand Hammer, a longtime Soviet asset and close ally of Richard Burt. Hammer met with Gorbachov several weeks before meeting with Reagan.

Hammer is reinforcing the State Department’s message of Soviet “flexibility.” In an op-ed for the *Houston Chronicle* after the Reagan-Gorbachov meeting was made official, Hammer wrote that the replacement of Andrei Gromyko as Foreign Minister by Gorbachov ally Eduard Shevardnadze, meant a significant relaxation of Soviet policy. Reporting that Gorbachov had “implored” him to tell Reagan, “We don’t want an arms race in space,” Hammer suggested that that it should now be possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to cooperate on SDI research.

According to State Department sources, Richard Burt’s European Affairs Department has frequently used Hammer as a backchannel to the Soviets. “We’re very impressed with Dr. Armand Hammer and all of his various contacts with the

Soviets,” one Burt aide said.

It was hardly accidental that the announcement of the summit came just as a resolution of the hostage crisis began to emerge. The coincidence strongly implies that some kind of quid pro quo between the United States and the Soviets was involved.

It is known that the State Department, through Richard Burt, carried on negotiations with the Soviets, as well as with Syria, to enlist their “good offices” in the effort to release the hostages. Burt met with the head of East German intelligence operations the evening before the hijacking took place. But this was just a ludicrous cover story, since, as the State Department knows full well, Syria and the Soviet Union set up the hostage-taking in the first place.

The immediate result of the hostage crisis has been to further diminish U.S. influence in the Mideast. The State Department has now managed to elevate Syria—which is still officially on the U.S. government’s list of terrorist states—to a position of near-saintliness for its “help” in securing the hostages’ freedom. Underneath all the public relations, what this boils down to, is that the United States has basically surrendered the Mideast to the Soviets, by implicitly agreeing to Soviet-surrogate Syria’s “Greater Syria” ambitions.

Drive U.S. out everywhere

The results of the Beirut incident represent just one aspect of the Soviets’ overall strategy for using terrorism, among other means, to destroy U.S. influence worldwide, leaving Moscow the only global superpower.

According to a threat assessment report recently prepared for the CIA, the TWA hijacking was part of a new, coordinated radical strategy which has been devised to drive the United States out of key regions of the world. The principal architects of the strategy include radical Third World states and terrorist groups, with clear support from the Soviet Union.

Entitled “Expelling America: A New Coordinated Radical Strategy,” the report names Libya, Iran, Cuba, North Korea, and Syria as key participants in the operation, whose strategy is to expel U.S. military, economic, and political influence from five areas: East Asia, South Asia, the Mideast, West Africa, and Central America.

The report says that the implications of Soviet involvement are “far-reaching. . . . The Soviets may seize the opportunity, or pre-plan with radicals to launch a major strategic move in conjunction with radical diversionary activity.” It also notes that the “gradual radicalization of Soviet policies” regarding the United States is “a major developing concern.”

Despite the report’s glaring omission of Western Europe as one of the principal areas from where the Soviets plan to drive out the United States—a goal which Burt’s confirmation will further mightily—it is otherwise right on target. Unfortunately, U.S. policy, judging by recent events, is operating on a totally different track.