
Interview: Angelo Correia

'I am completely in favor of the SDI'

Angelo Correia, chairman of the Defense Commission of the National Assembly and a member of the Partido Social-Democratica, was interviewed by EIR on March 12. Text excerpted.

EIR: Mr. Correia, could you describe Portugal's strategic situation, and give us your view of it?

Correia: You must realize that I speak on my own behalf, not on behalf of the Defense Commission. I speak on behalf of my party, the PSD.

This world is bipolar. Portugal is located in an *apparently* peripheral part of Europe. In geographic terms, it may be; not in political terms. Portugal is something of a pivot for the Alliance. Our assets and our vulnerabilities stem from our geography. Portugal is a key area for Europe's rapid reinforcement from the United States. If anything happens in the Central Front, a strike in Europe, you need a rapid reinforcement from the United States: You reach Europe through Portugal.

Secondly, NATO is conceived for European conflict, conflicts occurring in the north, and excludes out-of-area conflicts. In fact, it is impossible to decouple what goes on in Europe and the growing circle around Europe: Attempts at controlling raw materials, oil, minerals, the sea lanes—this kind of conflict is becoming increasingly important with the growing importance of indirect strategies, in North Africa, the Middle East, southern Africa, and the South Atlantic. Geography places Portugal in a key location for the United States' Rapid Deployment Force stopovers and refuelings.

Think of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. We had to accept American planes stopping in the Azores. During the Shaba [Zaire] conflict, they stopped in the Madeira Islands. The United States is now projecting an enlarged fleet and facilities there. That is a second strategic value and asset.

The third concept is not directly military, but political: Portugal's relations with Africa, the relationship between Africa and Western civilization. And it is an asset to have capabilities in Africa.

EIR: The Ogarkov Doctrine stresses direct assault in Europe, with a *Blitzkrieg* capability brought to bear. What im-

pact does this have on your own position?

Correia: If there is an assault, it will be in Central Europe. Portugal is not directly involved, but indirectly. It would start with the hunting of Soviet submarines in the Atlantic: You must control the area between Iceland and Norway and the South Atlantic. If you don't, you cannot reinforce Europe, which must essentially be done by sea. The most probable military threat would involve two areas: the mining of our territorial waters—the Azores, Madeiras, our harbors—and diminishing the capacity for operations, restricting the surveillance and patrolling activity. The operational capability of NATO would be restricted. Such are the two main targets.

Next come the political aspects, the efforts of the Soviets to decouple Europe from the United States. Twenty years ago, there was an umbrella, MAD worked. But later, with the coming and then realized strategic parity, Europe was actually threatened with a tactical Soviet strike; their conventional forces became a risk. Strategic balance as such was useless.

The mistake that some political leaders in Europe are now making is to accept the very possibility of decoupling from the United States. Soviet superiority has not been fully realized in Europe, or people have been afraid, or they behave like Finland. Europe may think that reaching a partial relationship or an ambiguous relationship between the United States and itself would be more acceptable to the Soviet Union, and that this was paying due regard to Soviet superiority.

Now to come to the Strategic Defense Initiative: It is a totally logical consequence of all this. The SDI is first of all a *defensive strategy*, which reduces the danger of nuclear annihilation of the Earth, reduces the first-strike and second-strike capacity of the Soviet strategic missiles, be they SLBMs or ICBMs, makes all arsenals obsolete. It is the greatest deterrent and the least polluted defense we could reach for the U.S. and for Europe. The ABM Treaty, the SALT agreements, authorized one ABM system. The U.S. never deployed one; the Soviets did so, around Moscow. Why say no, then, in the name of the ABM Treaty? The SDI—well, by 1990 or so, 85% of Soviet strategic missiles will be useless. It augments our defensive capability. It is *not* a militarization of space; it is avoiding the penetration of missiles on our own soil. It does not hurt people—that's the third element.

So I am completely in favor of the SDI. The SDI is not what the Soviets say, "militarization of space." No! Space is full of military satellites, ICBMs. The SDI is the new way of preventing the destruction of Earth, of territory, of human life—the most deterrent effect on Soviet strategy, by rendering their capacity useless. Why is Moscow attacking it? Because with the SDI, they are deprived of their political tools. They know that all their investment, their financial efforts, are becoming useless: 85% of the missiles useless within six years, or even more than 85%.