

The *present danger* posed by negotiator Kampelman

by Criton Zoakos

Chief arms control negotiator Max Kampelman is pursuing a negotiating strategy on arms control which, if allowed to be implemented at the scheduled March 12, 1985 Geneva meeting, will pose a major threat to world peace and a catastrophic danger to United States national interests. To borrow a phrase from Mr. Kampelman himself, historical circumstances (and he himself) worked to promote him to the unenviable status of being the greatest “present danger” facing this nation and world peace. He has ended up becoming a one-man Committee of Present Danger.

His policy is to sell out President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative in the upcoming Geneva talks.

The evidence is his own words, laid out in a Jan. 27, 1985 article published in the *New York Times Magazine*, over the signature of himself, the notorious Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Goddard Institute scientist Robert Jastrow. The article’s title is *Defense In Space Is not “Star Wars,”* and the uninformed reader might mistake it as an argument in support of President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.

Before the specific proposals and policies outlined in the article are examined, a few words about the article’s surrounding circumstances. Some bureaucrats in Washington have argued that the article does not represent the policies which Mr. Kampelman intends to pursue, as it was written before he had been appointed chief negotiator for the Geneva talks. Nonsense. Not only the article’s contents are exactly what Kampelman intends to do in Geneva—if he is allowed to get there unscathed—but also, that insufferable slickster, Secretary of State George Shultz, proposed Kampelman for the job because Kampelman had outlined to Shultz this strategy of destroying the SDI.

It is a plain fact of life that George Shultz is an enemy of

the Strategic Defense Initiative. Shultz was the man who, before Jan. 7, 1985, had designated the SDI a “negotiating chip at the bargaining table.” It was Shultz who had then to be called on the carpet by President Reagan to be told that the SDI is not a “bargaining chip to be negotiated.” And after this dressing down, it was Shultz who pushed, shoved, insisted, and cajoled to have Kampelman appointed chief U.S. negotiator at the new arms-control talks in Geneva.

For those with short memory: Max Kampelman was Walter Mondale’s chief “arms-control” advisor during the presidential campaign, was he not? The Mondale campaign’s chief slogan was to stop Reagan’s “Star Wars,” was it not? One would be fair to argue that Max Kampelman, together with McGeorge Bundy, was the chief architect of Mondale’s anti-SDI campaign strategy, would one not?

The Chief Arms Control Negotiator and the Secretary of State are in collusion with the Russians to stop the SDI. We shall present this fact after we have dealt with what Kampelman has to say in his *New York Times* article.

Max Kampelman’s signal to Moscow

This review has enough evidence in hand to show that the single most important formulation in Kampelman’s article is a seemingly obscure little phrase, buried in a sea of speculative platitudes toward the end of the text. It reads: “. . . It is no longer possible to limit space-based systems without imposing a simultaneous limit, along the above lines, on terrestrially deployed systems. . . .” The affirmative formulation of the same argument reads, “. . . *It is possible to limit space based systems while imposing a simultaneous limit, along the above lines, on terrestrially deployed systems. . . .*” and was written and published for the purpose of signalling to

Moscow how Shultz's negotiating team under Kampelman intends to torpedo President Reagan's SDI.

The scheme is pivoted on Kampelman's argument "*along the above lines*." These stipulations, almost pure speculations of what he wishes to believe the SDI will degenerate into, are as follows, in his own words:

- ". . . We can now construct and deploy a two-layer or double screen defense, which can be in place by the early 1990s at a cost we estimate to be somewhere in the neighborhood of \$60 billion. . . ."

- ". . . It would prevent the Russians from concentrating their warheads on such high-priority targets as the national command authority, key intercontinental ballistic missile silos or the Trident submarine pens. . . ."

- "Simply a so-called "point defense" of our missile silos, it has been suggested, would be sufficient to restore much of the credibility of our land based deterrent. . . ."

- "The Russians can overwhelm any point defense we place around those silos, if they wish to do so, by allocating large numbers of warheads to these critical targets. But if we include a boost-phase defense to destroy their warheads at the time of firing, their objective becomes enormously more difficult to accomplish."

- "The likely technology for an early use of the boost-phase defense would use 'smart' nonnuclear projectiles that home in on the target, using radar or heat waves, and destroy it on impact. The technology is close at hand and need not wait for the more devastating but less mature technologies of the laser, the neutral particle beam or electromagnetic rail gun. The interceptor rocket for this early boost-phase defense could be derived from air defense interceptors that will soon be available, or the technology of antisatellite missiles (ASAT) launched from F-15 aircraft. These rockets could weigh about 500 pounds, the nonnuclear supersonic projectiles about 10 pounds."

". . . The technology used for the terminal defense could be a small, nonnuclear homing interceptor with a heat-seeking sensor, which would be launched by a rocket weighing one to two tons and costing a few million dollars each. . . ."

The cost for the *boost-phase* defense "would be roughly \$45 billion. That price tag includes 100 satellites each holding 150 interceptors—sufficient to counter a mass Soviet attack from all their 1,400 silos."

The cost for *terminal point* defense "would be about \$15 billion and include \$10 billion for 5,000 interceptors, plus \$5 billion for 10 aircraft carrying instruments for tracking of Soviet warheads."

What is wrong and what is impracticable

It is Danny Graham's High Frontier scheme, and all the criticisms applied to that apply to the Kampelman proposal. Specifically, it relies on technologies of the 1950s which had been ordered stashed away by Robert McNamara by way of Project STRAT-X. Especially the boost phase, space-based component of Kampelman's scheme will not work. The sat-

ellite-launched "nonnuclear projectiles" supersonic though they may be, would be travelling, under the most charitable assumptions, at twice the speed of the Russian ICBMs. Their size, weight, and fuel limitations (to fit 150 of them in one satellite), makes them difficult to maneuver in the final kill phase of their trip, and thus not exactly reliable in a combat environment. Given that fewer than half of Kampelman's satellites would be in a position to shoot in the event of a massed Russian attack, one could generously concede that his boost-phase screen might, under most fortunate circumstances, intercept 15% to 20% of Russia's warheads.

Anyone who has thought this matter through knows that such performance of a boost-phase defense is catastrophic for the defending force. The terminal point defense line, armed with 5,000 of Kampelman's interceptors, would have to contend with 7,000 to 8,000 Russian warheads. If the Russians time their land-based ICBM launch with a "pin down" attack from submarines stationed near the American coast, at a distance of 2-3 minutes flight time, most of Kampelman's 5,000 "terminal defense interceptors" either would be destroyed or could not be launched on time to stop the incoming warheads.

Even though numerous scenarios could be spun out along similar lines, the basic point to be made is that Kampelman's scheme is fake because no effective strategic defense can work if the terminal point defense has to deal with 80%, 70%, or even 50% of the nuclear warheads the Russians are known to possess at this time. The problem is that Kampelman's boost-phase defense component has no credibility as a *defensive* strategy.

Could it therefore be an *offensive* strategy that Kampelman is concealing behind his proposal? Theoretically, the only defensive usefulness of Kampelman's scheme might be *after* the Russian ICBM force had been significantly reduced by a U.S. first-strike.

Also, theoretically, the Russians should be howling to high heavens as soon as they read in the *New York Times* Max Kampelman's and Zbigniew Brzezinski's ravings. But the Russians have not howled at the Kampelman version of "Star Wars." They have merely continued to scream and rave against President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, and they have vowed from the pages of *Pravda* to "stop" the "technological revolution" which President Reagan promised in his remarkable Inaugural Address.

The Moscow-Kampelman deal

In the matter of the Kampelman version of "Star Wars," Moscow had difficulty concealing its ecstasy.

According to our exclusive information, the Russian government's negotiating strategy for the Geneva talks which begin March 12 will be centered around a "generous" offer to reduce Russian nuclear missiles by around 10% if the United States agrees to limit its Strategic Defense Initiative to some version of Kampelman's "defense of silos and national command authority" and firmly and unequivocally

abandon forever the pursuit of those laser and particle-beam technologies, those "new physical principles" which alone can guarantee an effective defense against nuclear weapons.

There is no mystery why the Russian military would gladly go along with Mr. Kampelman's scheme of a High Frontier-type of strategic defense. One might argue that the Russian leadership would be interested in encouraging follies such as Kampelman's as a last resort effort to derail Reagan's SDI. Kampelman's scheme, a partial and dubious defense of missile silos and command centers inside the U.S.A., is advantageous to the Russians both militarily and diplomatically.

Militarily, the Kampelman type of strategic defense can easily be overwhelmed. If the United States were to be persuaded by guile to adopt Kampelman's approach, at the end of that effort, some time in the 1990s, the strategic assets of this country would enjoy the kind of defense which the Soviet Union's strategic assets are already enjoying in the mid-1980s, as a result of the combined civil-defense, silo- and bunker-hardening procedures and the massed deployment of interceptor missiles which, even though masquerading as anti-aircraft missiles, can fulfill significant anti-missile missions because of their 100,000-foot-plus combat ceiling. Of such anti-missile missiles, the Russians have already manufactured, deployed, and stored scores of thousands. For every one American warhead, the Russians already have 10 such interceptor missiles.

What would oblige the Russians to make their anticipated "generous offer" to Kampelman in Geneva?

Simply, the hope that in this way they may force the United States to either stop or slow the effort to construct a four- or five-layer-deep space-based defense employing a diverse variety of laser and particle-beam technologies. A growing body of evidence accumulating since 1977 keeps pointing to the conclusion

to deploy their first, however primitive anti-missile laser weapon some time in 1987 or 1988. If they can delay or slow down the American laser and particle-beam program until then, they will have won the race and, with it, the world for a long time to come.

As Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov emphasized to Russian troops in mid-January in East Germany, the current purpose of Russian strategy is to "buy time." Ogarkov drew an analogy between this year's arms negotiations and the 1939 Hitler-Stalin Pact. In both instances, he argued, Russia entered into agreements with "the devil" for the purpose of "buying time." One might add a few further analogies: Now as in 1939, the Russian imperial leadership is in bed with the Gnostic oligarchy of the West. The interests which today, in the West, are promoting the Kampelman accommodation with Moscow are the same families which put Hitler in power.

What is involved, however, is not exactly "buying time," in order to accelerate further a Russian military buildup. As that buildup has been going on at breakneck speed for some time now, and as it cannot best its 1987-88 deadline, the only

form of "buying time" available to Ogarkov et al. is to either derail or slow down the American attempt to catch up with Moscow.

For this, Moscow is prepared to generously accept the Kampelman scheme, and throw into the bargain a rhetorical promise to reduce its offensive arsenal by 10%. If the United States accepts, the result will be that by the year 1995 or so, American strategic defenses will be where Russia's were in 1983-84. Russian strategic defense, however, will be well into the 21st century, and in a position to dictate terms to this country.

Also to bear in mind are two unspoken assumptions.

One is the unspoken assumption in the Russian diplomat's mind, which in part will guide the form in which the offer to Kampelman will be presented next March in Geneva, is that America's European allies will bolt from the Alliance, because either a) Kampelman accepts the Russian offer and the U.S.A. reneges on its commitment to defend Europe by becoming preoccupied with defense of its own silos and command centers, or b) Kampelman rejects the offer and thus "misses the opportunity" of reducing Russian strategic forces by, say, 10%.

The second unspoken assumption, in Kampelman's mind, derives from the currently circulating euphoric reports regarding the presumed backwardness of the Russians' own laser- and particle-beam defense program. It is said that the haste with which Moscow returned to the negotiating table proves how frightened it is by the President's SDI. This fear itself, the argument goes, shows how hopelessly behind the Russian program is.

All this is nonsense. For all we know, the Russians are ahead in the technologies which manage long distance laser-beam transmission of high energies, and relatively behind in the microtechnologies of target acquisition and tracking. They are confident that a combination of research and stealing will help solve their problem. They have no fears in this area. If they have been able, through their political penetration, to secure the appointment of Max Kampelman as chief American arms negotiator, they just might have enough similar resources to secure for them the timely stealing of a few technical secrets in optical mirror and microcomputer technologies.

The source of the Russians fear is only one: that American society might undergo a revolutionary transformation in scientific and technological practice as a result of the imminent technologies of the President's SDI. All their endeavors are concentrated on preventing this scientific and technological revolution, which the President promised in his inaugural speech and which *Pravda*, the following day, vowed to prevent.

Max Kampelman's self-designation as a "conservative" derives from his pathological opposition to the prospect of this technological and scientific revolution. He is a conservative in the same sense as a cow who would rather die than improve her habits.