

## Kissinger, Gromyko, and the Carrington ultimatum

by Criton Zoakos

Lord Peter Carrington, the secretary general of NATO, arrived in Washington on Monday, Sept. 10, to deliver an ultimatum to the Reagan administration which, if accepted, will sound the death knell of the Western Alliance. Carrington's ultimatum, reduced to its bare essentials, and with the diplomatic sugar-coating removed, stands as follows:

The Reagan administration, during the upcoming Reagan-Gromyko meeting scheduled for Sept. 28, must accept the Soviet demand to cancel the American anti-missile defense program, the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or face a breakup of the NATO alliance before the November election.

Carrington has vowed to destroy President Reagan's SDI, the so-called "Star Wars" program. During April of this year, before he formally assumed duties as NATO's secretary general, he vowed publicly that if "Europe" fails to convince Washington to drop Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, then "Europe" will split from the United States. The question, of course, as Bismarck put it during the 1878 Congress of Berlin, is: "Exactly what does your Lordship mean by 'Europe?' What sinister interests are concealed behind that convenient word, 'Europe,' which do not dare claim to be any one nation's interests?"

Are the national interests of France, or of the Federal Republic of Germany, or of Italy, or even of the United Kingdom compromised by Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative or enhanced by a decoupling of the United States from the European nations? None of these nations' governments has dared to so much as insinuate this argument to their own public—except, of course, the KGB-run government of Andreas Papandreou in Greece. Nevertheless, Carrington is threatening President Reagan with a "decoupling" unless

Reagan abandons the last and only remaining available option of defending the United States from the Soviet Union's relentless strategic buildup.

First the question: How dare his Lordship! Well, my dear reader, what do you mean "how dare he?" Peter Carrington is the senior business partner of our own Henry A. Kissinger, you know. He is the senior partner at a corporation called Kissinger Associates, Inc. Henry's son David for over one year now has been doing his apprenticeship at Peter Carrington's offices in London. For years, going back to 1973-74, Henry and Lord Carrington shared great sinister moments together in the back alleys of London.

Now you may recall that three weeks before Carrington's arrival in Washington, Henry Kissinger went on record, both on national television and in the printed media, announcing loudly and clearly that he has been advising President Reagan to meet with Andrei Gromyko, the Russian Foreign Minister. Kissinger also announced at the time that Reagan should meet Gromyko and not Chernenko, the general secretary of the Russian Communist Party, because, Kissinger said then, Chernenko is old, ailing, and he might be going into the hospital soon. Thus Kissinger during the hot days of mid-August.

Then, suddenly, out of the blue, so to speak, the world public was hit by three simultaneous announcements: First, the White House announced that President Reagan will be meeting Mr. Andrei Gromyko on Sept. 28. Second, the West German daily *Die Welt* quoted its Moscow correspondent saying that Russian President Constantine Chernenko was hospitalized with a severe heart ailment. With these two Kissinger prophecies thus fulfilled, we were then told that Dr. Kissinger's partner, Lord Peter Carrington, had arrived

in Washington for "consultations" with the administration.

Nobody from the liberal-controlled media reminded either Congress or the public that Carrington is on record threatening to split the alliance unless Reagan drops his strategic laser-beam defense program. Carrington met with President Reagan, Vice-President Bush, Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, the House and Senate leaderships of the foreign policy committees, National Security Council (NSC) director Robert McFarlane, Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle, and others inside the government.

More interesting were Carrington's meetings with persons in informal capacities. One group of such persons is something in Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), founded by Henry Kissinger three years ago, which calls itself the "Grand Strategy Forum." This group, through its various spokesmen, has made it clear that it stands for the complete dissolution of the military alliance of the West.

In a discussion Sept. 10, CSIS Ibero-America specialist Robert Kupperman, recently returned from Moscow, said: "More than anybody, we at Georgetown have been the only ones to talk frankly about the break-up of NATO. . . . In public, no one has been willing to talk about the demise of NATO in a formal sense except for Henry Kissinger. . . . I spoke to Fred Ikle privately last night, and he tells me is opposed to this idea, [but] he coordinates his work in Europe with Lord Carrington and David Abshire. In the case of both of them, it's impossible for them to say publicly that they accept the idea of NATO breaking up, but they clearly accept the idea intellectually. You have to distinguish between the requirements of the job and what people really think. . . . Ikle will be leaving the administration soon after Reagan's second term."

It was under the informal auspices of this treacherous "conservative" group that a group of Russian-influenced notables met with Lord Carrington at Georgetown. Among them were included Carter's NSC chief Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mondale adviser Bob Hunter, current CSIS director Amos Jordan, former CSIS director and current U.S. Ambassador to NATO David Abshire, poor Adm. Thomas Moorer, Adm. James Woolsey, Robert "Blowtorch Bob" Komer, James McLaughlin, Robert Osgood, and Mrs. Anne Armstrong, the member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board who invited Henry Kissinger back into the government from the back door.

This group of Carrington's guests represents a much larger consensus of the nation's oligarchical establishment which, regardless of "left" and "right" labels of convenience, is now in virtual control of the Reagan administration's foreign and national security policy, and is bent on both destroying the President's Strategic Defense Initiative *and* decoupling the United States from Europe. Contrary to the idiotic ideological euphoria of rank-and-file Republicans after their party's nominating convention, the battle to save this nation from

betrayal appears to have been all but lost. It will most certainly be lost irrevocably if the Kissinger-Carrington scheme for decoupling *and* abandonment of the SDI meets with success between now and the latter part of October. The loyal Reaganites' protestations that "Kissinger is out of the government and has no influence" will not wash.

### The acid test

The only things going on in the government by way of foreign and national security policy are the things which are signaled in advance by Henry Kissinger and nothing else. It is a fact that otherwise well-meaning and patriotic Republicans are such shameless cowards that, with their cowardice, they are causing the same kind of damage to the national interests of the United States as the liberal Democrats do with their outright treachery.

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erally been with respect to their attitude toward the presidential candidacy of Lyndon LaRouche and toward the strategic issues raised by the Schiller Institute. Despite their stated agreement, on specific policies and objectives, with the campaign of Mr. and Mrs. LaRouche, when confronted with the overwhelming blackmail coming from Kissinger and his oligarchical patrons in the Republican Party (such as Anne Armstrong of Texas), they suddenly grasp at straws to find excuses for their cowardice. The most popular such excuse lately is that "LaRouche is exaggerating the Russian danger" and that "the Schiller Institute is unduly alarmist" with respect to ongoing Russian military deployments.

These dear conservative fellows prefer to subscribe to the convenient theory of the "crumbling Soviet empire," concocted for their edification by Messrs. Kissinger, Carrington, Abshire, et al. How sad, these staunch conservatives who are so prematurely celebrating their envisaged electoral victory in November, forgetting that the presidency has already been stolen from them by the Soviet agent-of-influence, Henry Kissinger, remind one of that famous general who proudly marched for 20 years with his head high while his pants were down to his ankles.

## Lord Carrington's speech in Washington

*The following is excerpted from the speech delivered by Lord Peter Carrington before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 13.*

There are those in Western Europe who claim to find it difficult to distinguish the superpowers, in terms either of political morality or potential threat. There are those in the United States who argue that other parts of the world are now more important, and Europe therefore less. On either side of the Atlantic, there are those who question NATO's present policy on nuclear weapons, on grounds of morality or military effectiveness or both. . . .

I have no sympathy with the Mercutian school of strategic analysis—a plague on both your superpowers. Those who belong to it—or who pretend to do so—tend to see salvation in terms of a security system embracing both Eastern and Western Europe, but independent of superpowers. . . . The figures for support for the Alliance, which emerge from public opinion polls throughout NATO Europe, [are] one reason why those who would like to cut the security link between Western Europe and the United States have played the nuclear card as vigorously as they have. . . .

As far as NATO is concerned, the fundamental assumption has always been that the security interests of the United States do not come to a sudden halt at the Eastern seaboard. Europeans, therefore, find it quite easy to understand that you do not regard them as ending at the Western seaboard either—or for that matter, on the Gulf or the Rio Grande. They remember, for example, that you have for many years had important bases in the Philippines; and that Monroe was in the doctrine business long before Truman. In the light of this, and of what they see of Soviet activity around the world, the European allies are not at all surprised that you are determined to look after your security interests in the Pacific region and in Latin America. What would surprise them would be the idea that you intended to do less than that in Europe.

Anxiety about nuclear weapons no doubt accounts for some of the current questioning of America's commitment to Europe. . . . I implied earlier that some have used the nuclear issue to forward political purposes which are not clearly stated; and which would not be very popular if they were. It would be silly to ignore this; and equally silly to dismiss on that account all those who campaign for change, however radical, in nuclear policy. . . .

Those in the West who . . . talk about a non-nuclear defense policy, need to explain what they would then do in response to nuclear blackmail. Conventional defenses alone would be of no use against an enemy who could without risk threaten a nuclear strike. . . .

Those who argue, not for unilateral nuclear disarmament, but for the West to adopt a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons can fairly claim to meet this crucial test. Their policy would leave us with the means to deter the use of nuclear weapons against us, and thus with an effective response to nuclear blackmail. On the other hand, the more honestly it were pursued, the more effectively a policy of no-first-use would remove from the calculations of the Soviet leadership the fear that a major conventional attack on Western Europe might meet with a nuclear response. In my view, this would significantly reduce our ability to deter aggression and, once again, increase the risk of war.

Where I do see force, however, is in the argument that NATO's conventional defense capability should be strengthened to achieve what non-purists will allow me to call a raising of the nuclear threshold. But it would be misleading to suggest that strengthening of our conventional defenses is an easy thing to achieve. Emerging technology will have a useful part to play, but it is not a panacea; there is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union will stand still and do nothing if the West makes major improvements to its conventional defenses. . . .

The idea is a promising one for all that, and I intend to promote it vigorously. As a start, I would very much like to see greater priority attached to the critical areas of infrastructure and sustainability identified by Senators Nunn and Cohen. . . . There is a natural tendency in all allied countries to spend money at the more glamorous end of the military spectrum. Senator Nunn has been right to ask whether essential support is not following at too great a distance. I have, of course, hoisted in the fact that Senator Nunn is not only pointing to areas where more needs to be done. He is also reflecting what seems to be a strong feeling in Congress that it is the European Allies who should be doing the extra, or a substantial part of it.

This feeling isn't going to go away. . . . It would be helpful if it could be so conducted as not to lead the Russians to believe that we are about to come apart at the seams. It is important for this that the debate be conducted with a full knowledge of the relevant facts, and as far as possible without hidden agendas. We cannot, for example, hope to reach agreement if the majority are talking about burden-sharing within the parameters of existing alliance strategy; while others—whether in the United States or in Europe—question the premise of transatlantic partnership, or seek to bring about the increase in conventional capability which they would consider sufficient to allow for a policy of no-first-use. . . .

I shall be pressing for more where more is needed; I should be concentrating in particular on the conventional leg of the triad. . . .