

NATO 'decoupling' means genocide for Third World

by Gretchen Small and Susan Welsh

Some of *EIR*'s readers may have been startled to read in these pages that Henry Kissinger and other advocates of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Western Europe intend to deploy those soldiers for neocolonial wars against the developing sector. But precisely this policy has now been published in black and white, in a massive seven-volume study by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), commissioned by the U.S. Department of the Army. Under the guise of combatting Soviet subversion, the report in fact recommends that the United States be the instrument for a policy of genocide, that it uphold the austerity conditionalities of the International Monetary Fund, and that it force the Third World to accept Malthusian population reduction.

Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000 was released to the public in June, and constitutes just a portion of the original background papers prepared during 1981-1982, recommending how the Army must be restructured to confront the world the project's authors envision for the coming decade and a half.

The *Strategic Requirements* project was carried out under the direction of those "brains" of the Carter-Mondale administration, James Schlesinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. But no Reagan loyalists should dismiss this study as just another scenario by Mondale supporters; it is CSIS fellow Henry Kissinger, after all, who in a March 5 *Time* magazine essay called for the withdrawal of "perhaps up to half" of the U.S. ground forces in Europe, insisting that American troops should be deployed, not to prevent "a hypothetical esoteric war in an area where we have major allies" (Europe), but rather in the Middle East, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere.

And so *Strategic Requirements* argues: "The NATO commitment has diverted the U.S. Army's energy from less se-

rious but more likely conflicts outside Europe."

The recommended military strategy for a United States "decoupled" from Western Europe is not new. It is simply the extension to the end of the century of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), developed by the evil Lord Bertrand Russell in the 1950s: a Malthusian post-industrial world order policed by two imperial powers, fighting over control of what the CSIS authors call "choice pieces of real estate" in the developing sector, but never coming to full-scale war themselves.

The report, the authors emphasize, has launched a series of initiatives to radically change U.S. strategic thinking, among them the Nunn-Cheney Congressional Study Group on Grand Strategy (Sen. Sam Nunn of Georgia is the Senate's leading advocate of decoupling from Western Europe and bringing U.S. troops home).

The pullout from Europe

The call for a U.S. withdrawal from Europe is developed throughout the study, beginning with the foreword:

The purpose of this book is to reexamine our assumptions on the nature of war. . . . The authors conclude that it is highly unlikely that the U.S. will wage another massive European land war in the coming decades. Rather, the United States will face low-intensity, unconventional and proxy conflict in non-European areas. . . . Will the U.S. Army adapt its doctrine, force structure, and manpower policies to the new realities? Or will the army continue to devote its resources and energies to preparing for the kind of war that is least likely to be fought?

Strategic Requirements was based on the following general assumptions, the authors explain:

- General nuclear war will not occur;
- a catastrophic breakdown of the world economic order will not occur;
- the Soviet Union will continue to pursue its goal of world domination and will remain the major adversary;
- no unilateral technological breakthrough will occur that would provide any single nation total military dominance.

Each of these assumptions except the third is highly questionable and indeed *improbable*. A competent U.S. military/political strategy, rather than proceeding from these foolish premises, would seek to *prevent* such catastrophes from occurring. But such is not the concern of the Kissinger crowd at CSIS.

Instead, in a passage which reads like an invitation for the Warsaw Pact to move across the Elbe into West Germany, authors John Blodgett and David B. Rivkin write in their chapter on "World Environment":

The main thrust of this book is that the existing military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the U.S. will obviate a Soviet attack in central Europe—that is, World War III—during this century. Thus, any conflict that erupts will emerge in the Third World. The NATO alliance is largely irrelevant in that world.

These dangerous fools could not be further removed from strategic reality. The real contest between the superpowers today is to develop antiballistic-missile defense, and the Soviets have deployed the "peace movement" in Europe and the United States chiefly to prevent the United States from realizing President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. The month that the CSIS book was published, the Soviet Union conducted the largest land maneuvers in East Germany ever, maneuvers aimed to cow Western Europe into breaking with the United States, maneuvers which West German military intelligence officials feared could become the cover for a "live" military incursion into the Federal Republic.

Colonialism on the British model

Under the regime of the MAD doctrine, *Strategic Requirements* foresees a Hobbesian world order of peoples battling over scarce resources, and the transformation of the U.S. Army into an expeditionary colonial instrument on the British model, for the conduct of what Britain's psychological warfare experts—and CSIS—call "low-intensity operations." The core of this new Army will be the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), a brainchild of the Carter administration.

"Perhaps the citizens of the U.S. will have to accept a new definition of 'winning' in military events which would countenance vague and ambiguous results short of a clear-cut victory," warns CSIS. ". . . In order to deal effectively with the low-intensity conflicts that will characterize Soviet

proxy operations, the U.S. must increase the proportion of its armed forces available for low-intensity conflict."

Make no mistake, these overt and covert "low-intensity" operations are not aimed against the Soviet Union, but *against the governments and peoples of "friendly" countries of the Third World themselves*:

In a friendly country that the U.S. wishes to protect, preemption [of Soviet designs] can be carried out at several levels with the use of: psychological operations to induce direct action by the government or the population; military or paramilitary assistance, special-operations forces for training or operations in unconventional warfare; deployment of U.S. surrogate forces, allies or proxies; deployment of U.S. military forces; or any combination of these.

The new Malthusian order

The superpower rivalry, then, is subsumed by the requirement to perpetrate a Malthusian genocide program against the Third World. As the volume's "Conclusion" reports:

The pressure of skyrocketing population growth, especially in urban areas, ethnic and religious tensions, food and water scarcities, and competition by the industrialized nations for increasingly scarce energy and mineral resources, all will create conditions of intra- and interstate violence which the Soviet Union will seek to exploit.

Blodgett and Rivkin elaborate:

The objects of all this geostrategic attention, the Third World countries themselves, will resist clienthood. Most will seek rather to flirt episodically with both suitors, gaining needed economic aid in the process. . . . Nevertheless, it seems likely that with superpower attention focused so squarely on the Third World, there will be an erosion of neutrality before the year 2000. . . . Thus, the superpowers will seek to nail down their more important clients with whatever combination of economic and military support appears necessary to that end. . . . both will seek to assure themselves access to *those choice pieces of real estate* vital to their global strategic designs [emphasis added].

Whole sections of the developing sector are slated to disappear altogether:

There are substantial areas of the world that would cause little concern for the central powers if they simply disappeared—for example, Bangladesh, Mali and Yemen. Others have a single commodity that can be ignored or acquired elsewhere—for example, tea from Ceylon, or coffee from Uganda. Elsewhere it is convenient to maintain a certain level of local order—for

example, to get Jamaican bauxite, or Angolan oil, or Bolivian tin.

No nation will thrive under this new order, not even the United States, for all will disintegrate under the pressures of resource scarcity. Protracted wars will result, and terrorism will dominate the globe:

The mid-1950s image of bipolar confrontation has been transformed into an ambiguous multiactor game in which the U.S. plays a decreasingly important role. We can no longer dictate the apparent course of political and military events.

"There are many reasons why a high level of violence will exist," writes editor William J. Taylor in a section on "Future Trends and Phenomena." "At the interstate level, violence probably will be generated by demands for resources. Some of these will be demands for access to or possession of resources essential for economic development, including food. The latter will be *exacerbated by the general (though possibly erroneous) view that the world has sufficient natural resources to go around* [emphasis added]."

This is a "post-industrial world," explains J. Bowyer Bell, writing on "Unconventional War":

First, there will surely be a continuing series of postcolonial wars, insurrections, rebellions, coups, and assassinations creating opportunities and dilemmas for the centers of power. Second, simply because the post-industrial world is so stable, those denied by the present will seek recourse in violence.

Sounds horrible? Not for Bell! He concludes:

In a sense, *the good news about terrorism, the weapon of the weak, is that this politics of atrocities is a sign of general stability.*

The case of Ibero-America shows what the CSIS planners have in store for the entire Third World: population reduction, economic collapse, and terrorism. "Taking the Caribbean Basin as a whole, urban riots, terrorism, and coups will occur along with various levels of insurgency, particularly in Central America," write Georges Fauriol and William Perry. "Rapid population growth throughout the region" and the failures of modernization "will complicate the problems of political rule."

The most likely conflict scenarios that will impel a U.S. force deployment are described as:

1) an outward spread of communist subversion and main-force military violence from Nicaragua threatening Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Belize, and southern Mexico (and the oil fields of the latter three);

2) civil war in Colombia threatening the Venezuelan oil fields, and possibly also the Panama Canal; and

3) an insurgency in Puerto Rico. . . .

The possibility of stability in major sectors of the area is summarily dismissed. "The internal situation in a number of Andean states will resemble the current turmoil in Central American countries." Escalating terrorism and "incipient guerrilla insurgencies" will affect all of them, and "modernization and population growth will bring sharp social polarization in the short run. . . . Rising expectations and premature urbanization will aggravate the impact of these developments." In Colombia, "the volatile situation will erupt into a medium-intensity civil war toward the end of this decade." The Southern Cone countries—Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile—with Venezuela, are expected to serve as policemen of the other nations in the region.

As for Mexico, the authors predict:

Mexico's major problems of today will endure: its population, its poverty, and its economic growth. . . . Coupled with a strengthening of left-wing forces in El Salvador and increasing domestic friction in Mexico, a period of extensive violence will engulf Guatemala, along with Belize, and the southern border regions of Mexico. The major strategic significance of this upheaval will be the damage done to those three countries' oil fields, the ensuing danger to the security of the U.S. energy supplies, and the implied threat to U.S. territorial security.

"Domestic political fissures" are projected for the late 1980s in Mexico, with the "conservative pragmatic tendency" (associated with the administration of President Miguel de la Madrid) confronting the "more populist-nationalist perspective" that could win the 1988-1994 presidency, which will be worsened by Central American violence.

From the standpoint of this study, the current wars in Central America—which were triggered under Brzezinski and Schlesinger during the Carter administration—can be understood as the cutting edge of the campaign to force a shift in U.S. military strategy in the direction specified here. Every aspect of the CSIS's "new military" is already being employed: special forces, acceptance of a "no-win" perspective of protracted fighting, the use of "proxies" (as in the case of the Nicaraguan contras).

The collapse scenarios for the region are certainly possible, but so are alternatives that could spare the continent the horror of such a Hundred Years' War. Ibero-American nations could unify their capabilities, form a Common Market, and become one of the world's economic superpowers by the year 2000. If a U.S. administration would cooperate with its southern neighbors in relieving their debt burden, and set about exporting capital goods for their industrialization, the rapid development of Ibero-America could preclude any room for the proxy warfare launched by the Soviet Union. Stability and cooperation could then be taken as "the given"—and U.S. military doctrine shaped accordingly.