

## 'Mutually Assured Survival' dominates 1983 policy battles

by Richard Cohen in Washington, D.C.

On March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan made an address on national television to announce a new revolutionary strategic doctrine based on the research, development, and deployment of advanced ballistic-missile defense systems.

While the overwhelming majority of senior Reagan administration officials have been too blind to realize it, the March 23 pronouncement and the shock waves it sent through Moscow's elite, as well as their channels in the New York Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and allied outlets in the United States and Europe, determined the foreign-policy questions that gripped the nation's capital in 1983.

The questions brought to the fore by the President's March 23 announcement of a "Mutually Assured Survival" doctrine had been increasingly begged during the past 30 years. Since the apostles of the Council on Foreign Relations first gave birth to Dr. Henry Kissinger as a "strategic nuclear expert" in 1956, and then invested their energies in hauling the Soviet Union into Bertrand Russell's Pugwash "peace" process, Washington's strategic doctrine operated within the parameters of joint nuclear blackmail, codified as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

President John F. Kennedy, terrified by the nuclear brinksmanship of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, bought the advice of Pugwash and turned loose the accounting abilities of his Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to entrench MAD. McNamara put forward the doctrine of "flexible response," throwing into question this nation's nuclear commitment to Europe while the Soviet Union initiated one of world history's most dramatic peacetime arms buildups.

Authority was cracking within the Western Alliance system. Economic upheavals culminated in the Aug. 15, 1971 decoupling of the dollar from gold. Henry Kissinger answered the growing Soviet pressure to end U.S. superiority in certain strategic weapons areas by seeking to institutionalize limited Soviet superiority through the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) in 1972.

Despite SALT I, the Soviet Union continued its broad rearmament program, while Kissinger oversaw the broad retreat of U.S. conventional superiority in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, and facilitated potential security disasters for the West in the Third World by strengthening the policing arm of the teetering monetary system, the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

By the early 1980s, Moscow could witness a slight but growing strategic military advantage and a United States, which had just suffered four years under the regime of Jimmy Carter in which total restraint was placed on any attempts to respond to the Soviet challenge. The West under U.S. leadership showed no sign of the will to revive basic industry, and no plan to reverse the technological slide in the military field.

For Moscow, the advent of Ronald Reagan was a sour note, especially the new President's plan for "strategic modernization." But Moscow reasoned that modernization would take time, would have to pass through a Congress unprepared to hike military expenditures under conditions of high federal budget deficits and high interest rates, and could be compromised by the powerful Pugwash "peace and disarmament"

crowd. Finally, Reagan's modernization program, while challenging marginal Soviet superiority, would not introduce new technologies—especially not the ones toward which the Soviets had already channeled significant resources.

### **Soviets face loss of advantage**

Considered from the point of view of the Kremlin, then, the President's new March 23 antiballistic defense program, if it were implemented, would rapidly reverse the strategic impact of their 25-year arms build-up. Further, Soviet estimates of strategic dominance by the 1990s, largely based on their own ballistic missile defense (BMD) effort, would be decimated. Indeed, Soviet planners would also recognize in the President's plan the seeds for the technological and economic revival of the West, a potential revival of a magnitude with which Moscow knew she could not compete.

And considered from Pugwash's anti-growth and anti-technology perspective, implementation of the bold new doctrine would be fatal to the "post-industrial society" blueprint.

The post-March 23 confrontation between the White House and Moscow, and the treasonous role of the Pugwash group, dominated 1983. As 1984 opens, this process threatens to intensify. But the President and his national security advisers most intimately involved in pressing the March 23 doctrine have underestimated Moscow's reaction to the policy, unlike the leading representatives of the Pugwash policy, typified by Henry Kissinger, his business partner and now Secretary-General-designate of NATO, former British Foreign Minister Lord Peter Carrington, and Democratic Party foreign-policy guru Averell Harriman.

Moscow is prepared to escalate to thermonuclear blackmail to force a capitulation in Washington while the Pugwash crowd—terrified by Moscow's escalations—is scandal-mongering against the U.S. military establishment, targeting the fiscal year 1985 defense budget for major reductions, and harassing the President's strongest beam defense supporters, including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey.

### **Blackmail on the MX**

As 1983 approached, Moscow and the Pugwash elite had reason to believe that even Reagan's strategic modernization program could be defused.

By the summer of 1982, Ronald Reagan had lost the dominant bipartisan coalition of forces on Capitol Hill that secured his early budget and tax programs. Then, by the fall of 1982, the centerpiece of the President's strategic modernization program, the MX missile, could no longer be sustained by his crumbling congressional coalition. If that vital project were to be saved, Reagan was told he would have to make a deal.

In the late fall, the President was urged to launch a "bipartisan" commission outside the administration to sell the MX to Congress. Deputy National Security Adviser, Robert "Bud" McFarlane, who had served under Kissinger on the

Nixon National Security Council, and Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger's handpicked successor and current business partner, along with Secretary of State and Kissinger-intimate George Shultz, succeeded in this move, and Reagan began the year with a Jan. 3 announcement of the formation of a "Bipartisan President's Commission on Strategic Forces" to be headed by Scowcroft.

Under Scowcroft's script, the President would have to accept all recommendations of the commission's report in order to secure legislative backing for the MX. The price for the MX was first made public on March 21 in a *Time* magazine article by Kissinger, outlining a detailed program that would forbid the development of an effective U.S. pre-emptive strike capability through the unilateral scrapping of all ICBM MIRVed warheads (multiple-warhead missiles), substituting a single-warhead mobile missile dubbed the Midgetman.

Kissinger and Scowcroft were attempting to reinforce the MAD doctrine by hypothetically undermining the Soviets' first-strike capability. But the Soviet Union need only increase the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers to offset what would be a U.S. increase in single-warhead launchers. Not only was the Kissinger-Scowcroft program antagonistic to the MX, limiting the total number deployed to 100 (that is, well below the level necessary for a credible first-strike capability); Scowcroft based his testimony on the dangerous falsehood that the U.S. had "at least another decade of secure deterrence," and needed only a few MX missiles deployed during the later 1980s as a "hedge" against "unlikely" Soviet SLBM developments. He baldly stated, more than a month after Reagan's March 23 speech, that his commission considered no ABM concepts to be viable or necessary until well after the turn of the century.

The so-called "MX basing controversy" was of no real importance here: key Congressional liberals led by Rep. Les Aspin "made a deal" with Scowcroft and Kissinger against Reagan on the basis of Scowcroft and Kissinger's reaffirmation of MAD. They assumed they could knock off Scowcroft's miserably truncated, slow-motion "MX" strategy at their leisure.

Thus by March, Kissinger and his cohorts had blackmailed their way to the President's desk with a plan that was directly opposed to the MX missile and ballistic-missile defense. On other fronts as well, including China relations, the Middle East, and international economic policy, the Kissinger team had finagled their way onto center-stage—largely with the help of Shultz and the White House political crowd headed by White House Chief of Staff James Baker III and Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver. By the beginning of 1983, the Reagan foreign policy was starting to resemble the disasters orchestrated under Kissinger's "détente."

### **The March 23 shock**

Then, on March 23, Reagan delivered a shock to those in Moscow carefully calculating Kissinger's progress. Kissin-

ger and his closest associate Helmut Sonnenfeldt told an April Trilateral Commission meeting in Rome that the new program was a disaster. Within a month, Scowcroft would take the stand in Capitol Hill hearings to echo the Soviets' charge that the President's commitment for ballistic missile defense is "destabilizing."

From April through the first weeks of August, the Pugwash crowd, bolstered by Soviet actions aimed at facilitating Pugwash credibility, mounted a furious counterrevolution against the President's new defensive strategic doctrine.

On May 23, Scowcroft told a Washington press conference that under presidential prodding he was prepared to extend the life of the Commission on Strategic Forces. On June 8, a blackmailed President, eager to maintain the MX program, endorsed the Scowcroft Commission proposals that the MX be produced and deployed in limited numbers, under condition that the President press for an arms-control agreement with Moscow and that Kissinger's Midgetman missile be promoted. Scowcroft, aided by Shultz, McFarlane, and James Baker, had by early May welded together a winning congressional coalition in support of his formula. The President was reminded after the early-May congressional passage of monies for the MX that the funding could collapse, along with the Hill coalition supporting it, if the President reneged on his part of the bargain.

Scowcroft also stated on May 23 that Andropov's U.S. specialist, Georgii Arbatov, had shown positive reactions to key aspects of the Scowcroft Commission Report, particularly the appeal for the Midgetman. Between April 22 and May 2, Arbatov had met privately in Washington with Kissinger lieutenants Scowcroft, Sonnenfeldt, and William Hyland.

On May 26, Kissinger lunched privately at the White House with Reagan. It was at this midday meeting that Kissinger pushed hard for the appointment of his business partner and ideological mentor Lord Peter Carrington to replace NATO Secretary General Luns; by November, Carrington was appointed.

At about the time of this Kissinger-Reagan meeting, Shultz began a process of intensive and regular "back-channel" meetings with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Then on May 30, Shultz dispatched Moscow's favorite American statesman, the aging Averell Harriman, and his wife Pamela, also an intimate of leading figures in the Democratic Party apparatus, for four days of private meetings with Andropov and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Harriman conferred with Shultz before and after the trip.

In addition, during the week of May 23, no fewer than 25 Soviet KGB and GRU (intelligence and secret police) officials, featuring Gen. Mikhail Milshtein and Andropov associate Fyodor Burlatskii, were granted entry to the United States to attend a convention of "nuclear freezeniks" in Minneapolis. This began a round of 33 such forums where KGB officials could promote disinformation and profile American reactions. FBI Director William Webster refused to intervene.

As Pugwash opened up the nation to direct Soviet propaganda and consolidated their control over the NATO structure, Moscow facilitated their cause. After Harriman's early June trip to Moscow, Andropov issued a series of signals starting with a sudden change in the Soviet position at the Vienna Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. This was followed by a cosmetic change in the Soviet position at the START talks. Kissingerite Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger claimed that Moscow was playing a positive role in facilitating the Pope's trip to Poland. Andropov also released a number of Soviet Pentacostals, and surprisingly agreed to a "no-holds barred" 1986 conference on the reunification of families and free travel in Europe, an item of particular importance to Israel and West Germany.

The hard-pressed White House on June 10 announced the indefinite extension of the Scowcroft Commission. Two days earlier, the President had approved a new SALT negotiating position heavily weighted to the primacy of the new "Midgetman" missile. Reagan proposed that negotiations should concentrate on the number of warheads rather than launchers.

In July President Reagan unexpectedly reappointed Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker, a sharp critic of the President's defense budget, and in August—to the shock of most—appointed Kissinger himself to head a "Bipartisan Commission on Central America."

### Kissinger's maneuvers

From early May on, the Harriman wing of the Democratic Party and Kissinger-allied elements within the Reagan administration pressed the White House for a secret compromise on ballistic-missile defense. The "compromise" reportedly would include a commitment not to deploy BMD, but merely use the threat of deployment as a bargaining chip in arms-control negotiations, while restraining expenditures on the program to no more than the amount the Soviets are said to be spending—an approach that would lock the United States into permanent inferiority, since the Soviets are already ahead in this area. The effort to kill the program through compromise was launched on May 6 by Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd in an appeal on the Senate floor. By midsummer, James Baker, the State Department and the Pentagon's Richard Perle (assistant secretary of Defense for International Security) were chipping away on the inside against the implementation of the March 23 policy.

Thus by August Kissinger and his coterie were privately hailing the imminence of a "major negotiation" with the Soviet Union. The broad surrender to Moscow was fully outlined on April 24 in a Kissinger interview in *Parade* magazine. Baker, Deaver, and Nancy Reagan were reported to be euphoric about the prospects of a spring 1984 Reagan-Andropov summit that would supposedly help to sell Reagan as the "candidate of peace." And Shultz was preparing to take a major step in this direction as he obsessively readied himself for a meeting with Gromyko, anticipated for the

conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in September. That meeting, Shultz thought, would take him to Moscow where he would plan the summit with Andropov.

However, on Sept. 1, the Soviet Union decided to shoot down the unarmed civilian aircraft KAL 007—the mark of the beginning of Soviet and Soviet-surrogate-directed shocks and provocations culminating in the early-October slaughter of U.S. Marines in Beirut at the hands of terrorists. The failure of Kissinger and company to secure a promised six-month delay in NATO's stationing of Euromissiles suggested to Moscow the political weaknesses of their allies in the West. How could forces exhibiting such weakness be counted on to fully derail Reagan's March 23 program, Moscow asked.

### **The Chamberlain response**

The Kissinger crowd tried to cover their footprints, but Democratic Pugwashers typified by the party's national chairman, Charles T. Manatt, showed no shame. On Sept. 20, Manatt, with Harriman at his side, told a Georgetown University audience that all the announced candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination favor Pugwash's policy for a nuclear "freeze," stating, "Contrary to the Republican Party's continued opposition to halting the arms race now, the Democratic Party calls for a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons."

Kissinger and his coterie publicly reported that the KAL atrocity undercut hopes for a summit—but claimed the shoot-down was committed by lower-level Soviet military forces, not Andropov (making excuses Andropov scorned to claim for himself).

On Sept. 21, Scowcroft called together his Capitol Hill collaborators to join him in pressuring National Security Adviser William Clark to authorize further arms-control concessions. Clark was told that the crucial Hill group would not support the MX program when it came up in October for approval of production funds if the White House did not accept eight principles to be included in the U.S. START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) position; most points centered on the so-called "build-down" concept, another gimmick aimed at paving the way for the Midgetman missile. On Sept. 27, Clark reportedly agreed.

On Sept. 26, the White House had announced another concessionary adjustment, this time in its position at the intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) talks. On Sept. 24, Shultz had held a meeting of top Kissingerites, including Scowcroft, Sonnenfeldt, Hyland, Eagleburger, and Richard Burt (assistant secretary of State for European Affairs) for the purpose of assessing ways out of the KAL-promulgated impasse in relations with Moscow.

In short, Pugwash agents in the Democratic and Republican parties moved with speed and terror to mount Chamberlain-like appeasement in the wake of Moscow's thunder.

Moscow in turn escalated, instigating and openly endorsing North Korea's attempt on the life of South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan, the violent overthrow of the Maurice Bishop regime in Grenada, and finally, the Oct. 23 massacre of Marines in Beirut.

But during the week of Oct. 17, Reagan and his national security advisers decided to respond to Moscow's challenge. For the first time, the President went on national television to attack Syria, who with Soviet backing had temporarily torpedoed Lebanese reconciliation talks scheduled to begin that week. At virtually the same time, the Soviets facilitated the overthrow of the Grenada government, resulting in Bishop's assassination. Bishop had met with senior Reagan administration officials, including Clark, not long before and was reportedly considering loosening his ties to Moscow and Havana.

Then on Oct. 25, nineteen hundred U.S. Marines and Rangers landed in Grenada and within days had ousted the Soviet-backed Hudson Austin regime.

For the first time in 10 years, U.S. force had been used aggressively, breaking the taboos of the "Vietnam syndrome." The best advice of Baker and Deaver had been ignored (resulting in one of the most popular actions of the Reagan administration). The intended message to Moscow: The United States is prepared to fight.

But in background briefings surrounding the U.S. action, it became clear that Reagan and his advisers had correctly ascertained a conscious Soviet challenge, yet were dangerously underestimating the intention that lay behind it. Senior White House officials identified the building Soviet provocations as "low-order probes" when in fact they were neither probes nor low order.

### **Miscalculations**

By early December the blustering administration consensus told itself, "Moscow will get the message." Administration officials eagerly pointed to intelligence reports indicating unusual signs of caution and fear among Moscow's elite in response to a show of force in Grenada. Signals from Surinam and Nicaragua in response to the Grenada operation further inflated the administration's confidence, as did Khomeini's failure to live up to his threats to block the Straits of Hormuz in the wake of Iraqi air attacks on Iranian oil shipping due to a massive U.S. naval presence off the Persian Gulf.

Then on Nov. 29, after two days of meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, the White House announced a new Israeli-U.S. strategic agreement, an agreement that would at minimum create the perception that the Israeli Army would be affixed to the massive U.S. naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Long-awaited U.S. air and naval retaliation against Syrian and Soviet provocations could begin with the promise that if the situation in Lebanon were to be escalated by Syria on the ground, U.S. troops would not be needed to answer—the Israelis could take their place.

What Moscow sees is a U.S. response based upon an

underestimation of Soviet intentions. Beyond the rhetoric and overconfidence, the Soviet leadership sees a White House which perpetuates the Kissinger/Pugwash presence, which will be under increasing pressure as the 1984 elections draw near, which has not entered into a war mobilization as has the Soviet Union, and which, through the new arrangement with Israel aimed at demonstrating regional strength, has only signaled strategic weakness. For while U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and Reagan were citing U.S. willingness to fight—a willingness which indeed exists within the population and the institutions of government if confronted with a strategic threat—the U.S.-Israel strategic alliance was apparently forced through the administration by Kissinger, via his protégé Eagleburger, sold to Reagan as a way of avoiding using American troops, thus sending the message that the United States will back away from direct confrontation.

The Kissinger-concocted deal was also read elsewhere as a sign of weakness. Several days after the arrangement, Syria and Iran responded through surrogates with the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kuwait. Israel challenged the central asset of U.S. Arab allies in the area, Palestinian Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat, threatening to violently blockade his exit from Tripoli against the wishes of their U.S. ally.

Now the Middle East trap that further engulfed the White House with the Nov. 29 accord is a vulnerability that the Pugwash crowd has seized for its own use. Having generated steam among most Democrats and a growing number of Republicans for the demand to recall U.S. forces from Lebanon, and blaming the Pentagon for inadequate U.S. security precautions in Beirut before to the October massacre, the Pugwash crowd intends to discredit the U.S. military in general, including Defense Secretary Weinberger, an ally critical to the President's pursuit of strategic modernization. Weinberger, echoing sentiments often repeated by Reagan, is committed to the view that spending on defense must be governed by what is necessary to meet the perceived strategic threat, not by any budgetary consideration. But Pugwash believes that the sizable U.S. budget deficit, along with the evolving Middle East fiasco, can be parlayed into a major attack on U.S. defense spending in election year 1984, with the primary target for budget-slashing being the President's ballistic-missile defense program.

Unless the White House moves quickly to break the web of miscalculation by announcing immediate steps to enhance the U.S. strategic deterrent and mobilize for the crash development of BMD in early 1984, further galvanizing the American people's will to fight, Moscow will move to global confrontation aimed at thoroughly humiliating the Reagan administration. The Pugwash crowd with their attempts to appease Moscow and weaken Reagan, are encouraging the Soviets to move toward that confrontation. Moscow knows that the stakes are high, the advantage is theirs, and time is short.

## Citizen candidate movement challenges the KGB Democrats

by Warren Hamerman

In the first months of 1984, well before either the Democrats or Republicans hold their summer presidential nominating conventions, the Soviet military command most probably will have instigated a global military showdown with the United States. The entire Democratic Party's officially approved presidential nomination puppet show is now on tour to boos and apathy in the United States but to rave reviews in Moscow. Only the "unorthodox" challenge of Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. for the Democratic nomination is being denounced in Moscow, for only his policies represent a potential threat to the "Third Roman Empire" aspirations of the Russian Orthodox Church/military complex.

As Lyndon LaRouche emphasized in a Nov. 26 statement on the Soviet war threat, only a bipartisan outpouring of popular support in the United States for the LaRouche crash beam-weapons development program and his design for a world monetary reorganization can convince the current President to take the command decisions necessary to protect the national security of the United States. In 1984, the stakes are not merely the U.S. presidency, but the future existence of the nation and mankind. There is no margin of error left in the American political system. The outcome will be decided by the confrontation between the LaRouche citizen-candidates' mass movement and the "Benedict Arnold Alliance," the politburo of Lane Kirkland, Charles "Banker" Manatt, and "frontrunner" Walter Mondale.

### Democratic Party a battleground in 1983

During 1983 the Democratic Party, its vast traditional constituencies still shattered by the debacle of the Carter-Mondale administration, was the battleground for full-scale combat between the "peace-with-Moscow-at-any-price" officialdom and the feisty, self-conscious American patriots of the party's LaRouche wing. The challenge of the LaRouche Democrats to the Democratic Party "politburo" of Harriman, Kirkland, Mondale et al. broke into an increasingly open slugfest.

The day-to-day ring manager for the Moscow Democrats was the inept and corrupt Manatt, chairman of the Democratic National Committee and a member of the notorious West Coast law firm which had an overt business relationship during the 1980 Olympics with top Russian operative Dzh-