

middle of April 1983, I was engaged in continuing private discussions with representatives of the Soviet Union on the subject of the strategic doctrine which the President announced on March 23. . . . The limited purpose of these discussions was to explore conceptions with a view to reporting my findings to appropriate channels of my government, and to ensure at the same time that were my recommendations accepted by my government, the Soviet government would have competent knowledge of the intent and implications of the policy being proposed.

Despite the private and informal nature of these fact-finding discussions, the President's announcement of March 23 caused those discussions to secure the highest strategic importance in Moscow, and to become a significant factor in the unfolding of the global strategic situation after that date. At the same time, these discussions placed me in a situation of special advantage for understanding exactly what the Soviet government was thinking, and its purpose in rejecting the President's offer of negotiations under the new strategic doctrine. . . .

Soviet interest covered two overlapping areas. The first was my proposed strategic doctrine itself. Second, it had come to Soviet attention that my own quarterly forecasts for the U.S. economy, regularly published since November 1979, had proven consistently accurate, whereas their own, as well as those of the U.S. government and private forecasting services generally, had been usually wrong, and overall absurd when compared with my results. As it turned out, it was Soviet belief that my economic analysis of the proposed strategic doctrine was correct which played a leading part in Moscow's summary rejection of the President's proposal of March 23. . . .

My discussions of these matters with Soviet representatives affirmed what I know by other means. The Soviet government has no serious technical disagreement with any part of the strategic package I have outlined. . . .

I interpreted the orders to break off discussions with me as crucial evidence of Soviet intentions to move quickly toward a thermonuclear confrontation with the United States, and so informed my friends in the U.S. government. I forecast that the Soviets would begin to escalate on a countdown toward a thermonuclear confrontation as early as August 1983. Events proved my spring 1983 forecast of such a Soviet posture to be correct; the countdown toward thermonuclear confrontation began during August, and has been escalating in various sections of the globe ever since. . . .

[I]f President Reagan were reelected, beginning November 1984, he would without doubt unleash a massive economic mobilization modeled significantly on the precedent of the 1939-43 period, to the effect that the Soviet strategic advantage of the present moment would rapidly evaporate. This present period of 12 months ahead is a period of the United States' greatest strategic vulnerability to a Soviet thermonuclear confrontation which has ever existed is or likely to exist in the foreseeable future.

The Soviets respond to proposal: seek a U.S.

by Rachel Douglas

When, on March 23, 1983, the President of the United States offered the Soviet leadership the greatest opportunity of the post-war period, to free the world from the tyranny of Mutually Assured Destruction, Moscow replied "No." The Soviet media never printed what Reagan said.

Under Yuri Andropov, the Soviet Union refused to consider even exploratory negotiations on the development of ballistic-missile defense by both superpowers. On Aug. 10 in the weekly *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Andropov's long-time adviser Fyodor Burlatskii spelled out the blood-curdling response the Kremlin gave instead: The U.S.S.R. would sooner go to war than allow the United States to develop a strategic defense capability, of which the Soviets had intended to be sole possessors. Reams of Russian newsprint were sacrificed to appeals, proclamations, and tirades against defensive strategic weapons, saying one day that they are impossible to build and the next that they will cause World War III, and never letting onto what is evident from Soviet military writings and scientific work: The U.S.S.R. has had its own anti-missile beam-weapons program for years and is ahead in the field.

Burlatskii called all "space" weapons a *casus belli*, thereby threatening the United States with a Soviet first strike.

As 1983 drew to a close, the Soviet Union had positioned its enormous military forces and widespread irregular capabilities in a war formation: They would deal the United States a strategic humiliation, or else inflict that nuclear strike. Chief of Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, who became the chief spokesman for the Soviet state as the Soviet military eclipsed the ailing Andropov in the last quarter of the year, confirmed in a Dec. 5 press conference that the threat of putting the U.S. mainland in a less than five-minute range of Soviet nuclear missiles has been carried out with the deployment of submarines off the American coasts. In May, the President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences had warned that the Soviets would also move to the status of launch under attack at the point new American intermediate-range missiles

beam-weapons strategic confrontation

were stationed in Western Europe. "The deployment of missiles . . . that can reach their target in about five to seven minutes of course excludes the possibility of taking any sort of decision, any sort of action that might stop the unleashing of war. The only possibility in this event is an *automatic response, using all available forces against all possible opponents*," declared Academician Anatolii Aleksandrov. Installation of those U.S. rockets began in December, and served as Moscow's pretext for announcing the submarine deployment and an array of other "countermeasures" such as the installation of short-range nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe.

Moscow, playing the wounded party, refused every opportunity to avert the stringing of this hair trigger on nuclear war, the inevitable culmination of the Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine, at which the Soviet Union has connived for three decades but never accepted for itself. The result of this refusal, said *EIR* founder Lyndon LaRouche in a challenge to Andropov (*EIR*, Sept. 13) was a conscious choice "to plunge the world into war."

"The essence of the 1983 missiles crisis," wrote LaRouche in May, "is the simple fact that thermonuclear 'deterrents' have ceased to be deterrents. We have reached the 'point of no return' with this deterrence doctrine. Moscow refuses to negotiate scrapping the doctrine. Therefore, unless Moscow is very stupid, Moscow has chosen either to force a decisive U.S. strategic backdown, or to go directly to risk of total thermonuclear war."

The view of an empire

As we editorialized on June 21, "There ain't no Commies in Russia any more." What the March 23 offer and its rejection by Moscow revealed was a "paradigm shift" among the Soviet leadership. With scant pretense of devotion to Marxism-Leninism, the Kremlin rulers are presiding over an empire with all the barbarian proclivities of the Russian Empire and the Byzantine Empire from which Russia inherited its

world view.

Moscow has friends to match its new stance: from Nazi-trained suicidal terrorists in the Middle East to the Swiss-centered banking oligarchy that is orchestrating global economic collapse at the cost of millions of lives. Accordingly, Soviet foreign policy schemes this year came from the armory of imperial geopolitics. In an April interview with *Der Spiegel*, the West German weekly, Andropov endorsed a spheres-of-influence ordering of world affairs. In answer to a question about the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, he said, "We have a long common border, and it does make a difference to us what kind of Afghanistan it will be. To make this better understood, let us put it this way, for example: Suppose the United States didn't care what kind of government Nicaragua had. Nicaragua is very far away from the United States, whereas we have a common border with Afghanistan, and by helping Afghanistan we defend our national interests." Astute observers concurred with what *EIR* pointed out in our coverage of Andropov's interview: His justification of Soviet policies as those proper to a landpower, while the United States would be a sea power, mimicked the geopolitical theories of Haushofer, the brains behind Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.

This is the Soviet posture that emerged from the Pugwash Conferences, the international conspiratorial sessions begun in the 1950s by senior British intelligence figure Bertrand Lord Russell. Like its predecessor organization, Russell's World Association of Parliamentarians for World Government, Pugwash is a vehicle for establishment of a one-world government, but—in recognition of Soviet superpower status upon acquisition of thermonuclear weapons and ICBMs—one with two imperial divisions, an Anglo-Saxon-dominated Western division and an Eastern division under Russian domination. Under the aegis of Pugwash, Russell's faction of British intelligence (continued today by NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington) and the part of the U.S. foreign policy elite typified by Henry Kissinger and the State Department made arrangements with the Soviet leadership, against a common enemy: the nation state.

The basic arrangement was the retaliation-deterrence doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction itself, the notion that the nuclear age dictates a shift from traditional war-fighting to a defense based only on the ability to obliterate the opponent.

The keynote speech by Dr. Leo Szilard at the Second Pugwash Conference (September 1958), "How to Live with the Bomb and Survive," was a treatise on MAD and a touchstone of the Pugwash movement, it called for a Soviet-American nuclear arms race to reach a level of deterrence sufficient to maintain a "metastable" state of tension. Szilard explicitly identified this as the two-empire idea, saying that "when [the] long-range rocket stage is reached . . . it is conceivable that America and Russia may be able to go one step further, that they may be able to agree on a revision of the map."

But, as the Soviet mode of operation in the Middle East and elsewhere makes clear, Moscow joined the two-empire game with the intent to emerge solely dominant. "Russia is

still 'Holy Russia' and Moscow is still the 'Third Rome,' ” wrote that British master of cultural manipulation, Arnold Toynbee, in the 1940s. In offering the Soviets their own half-world empire, the Pugwashites were encouraging the ancient Russian Orthodox doctrine that Moscow will rule as the “Third and Final Rome.” The force unleashed by such geopoliticking, which is continued today by Kissinger, Carrington, and their like, does not play by the rules.

Margin of superiority

Throughout the 1960s, Soviet participants at Pugwash regularly included top strategists from the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, who were glad to help instill MAD as U.S. and NATO doctrine. They, on the other hand, always assuming that deterrence at a certain point could fail, never abandoned the idea that armed forces have to be able to fight wars. Hence the Soviet quest for marginal strategic superiority, not only by the surreptitious development of defensive technologies, but by circumventing, violating, and flying through loopholes in every arms-limitation agreement ever signed.

If the advanced industrial sector in the West doomed itself to collapse through economic decay, the proliferation of the drug culture, and cultural pessimism, Moscow could rest assured of eventual world hegemony in any case. But if the United States, in a national mobilization for defensive beam weapons with all the gear-up of science and industry that entails, catalyzed a genuine economic recovery and epidemic of cultural optimism, then the Soviet Union would have to find its future in a world dominated by republican nation-states—with no room for empire. To date, Moscow says it would prefer going to war.

After Reagan's March 23 speech posed this choice, the Soviets cashed in every accumulated asset at their disposal—military, political, terrorist, financial. With forays in the Middle East, in the Western Hemisphere, in Asia, and especially in Europe, Moscow aimed to bombard Reagan with multiple crises to the point at which he could not deal with all of them and would back down at one critical moment.

The Soviets embarked on this dubious venture with the confidence that, should Reagan not back down, the U.S.S.R. possesses a margin of superiority in every category of nuclear weapons now deployed by the two sides. By means of “hidden” missile deployments, which have been detected by U.S. surveillance but are not counted at strategic arms talks because the Soviets don't admit they exist, and clever Soviet subterfuges such as stockpiling missiles that are not in their launchers but are available for rapid “reload” or are exempted from strategic arms counts because they are deployed at “test” ranges, the U.S.S.R. has 45 percent more nuclear weapons that can hit U.S. territory than vice versa.

Furthermore, it is not the case that this advantage is meaningless because either side could wipe the other out. All three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad are vulnerable. American strategic bombers would probably be destroyed by Soviet inter-

ceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles before dropping their bombs. As *EIR*'s Editor-in-Chief, Criton Zoakos, documented in the Oct. 25 *EIR* cover story, U.S. nuclear-armed submarines have either already lost or are about to lose their value as a deterrent, due to abruptly upgraded Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technologies. If the Soviets launched a nuclear first strike, at present they could probably annihilate 90 percent of U.S. land-based missiles before the latter left their silos. Lastly, the Soviets have two crucial war-fighting capabilities the United States does not have at all: a civil defense program and a nation-wide anti-missile defense system based on powerful anti-aircraft missiles doubling as anti-missile missiles.


This huge war machine is undergoing reorganization to achieve a higher level of war-readiness. The autumn 1983 series of Warsaw Pact military meetings focused on the ability to launch combat actions with shorter advance notice than ever before.

EIR has ascertained that, since 1979, the Soviet military has been creating war-theater command and force structures, to be the in-place war-fighting organization of the armed forces. Referred to by one British analyst as “preemptive strike commands,” they complete the array of institutions that “shadow” the institutions operating in wartime. The existing Military Districts in the U.S.S.R. and Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe, into which Soviet ground forces are organized, are each slated to transform into a “front” in war-fighting. The theatre commands are an intermediate level of command, between the Military District and the General Staff, and are transformable into autonomous commands for a “sector” or group of fronts—a Theater of Military Action, known in Russian as TVD. Four TVDs have been identified around the perimeter of the U.S.S.R.: the Far East, the Southern (divided into Central Asia and Transcaucasus parts, the second of those oriented to the Middle East and Mediterranean), the Central (Europe) and the Northern.

Shift to terror

In the last quarter of the year, Moscow went into a phase of rapid-fire acts of terror against any and all, employing the Nazi tactic of *Schrecklichkeit*. The cold-blooded murder of 269 passengers aboard Korean Air Lines Flight 7 on Sept. 1 tested world reaction to such behavior. The bombing of U.S. and French force headquarters in Beirut, part of a wave of Soviet-sponsored Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, followed the next month. And in Western Europe, the anti-missile “peace movement,” which Moscow had been backing all along to disrupt NATO, moved through its Hot Autumn of 1983 into an outright terrorist phase.

Especially from September onward, there were coordinated Soviet pre-war deployments in the Northern and Central theaters. According to the London *Daily Telegraph*, the Soviet Navy conducted its “biggest worldwide demonstration of maritime power for many years,” in September. During a week-long exercise, 60 percent of the ships of the Murmansk-



based Northern fleet were at sea, mainly in the North Atlantic, but also in the Mediterranean and Caribbean seas. The North Atlantic is where Soviet nuclear submarines pass en route from Murmansk to the open seas; a "break-out" of a large number of subs into the Atlantic in early 1977 dramatically tested this deployment. In November and December, British naval officials reported a pattern of Soviet deployments of missile-carrying submarines and surface ships off Britain this fall, fitting what another analyst described as a shift of naval forces from the Northern Fleet to the Baltic Fleet. In combination with Soviet naval special forces (*spetsnaz*) operations in which mini-submarines mined or prepared to mine Swedish and Norwegian coastal waters, these were moves to turn the Baltic Sea into a Soviet lake. The Soviets strong-armed Finland into putting its air-defense network at the service of the Warsaw Pact for detection of cruise missiles passing over Scandinavia, and they skyrocketed their own ground force deployment into the Baltic region.

These military moves, together with a propaganda barrage attacking Reagan as a "second" Hitler, point toward early confirmation of intelligence warnings that Moscow is preparing a pre-emptive military strike against West Germany as a test of the nuclear tripwire, facing the United States with the ultimate question of whether to go to all-out nuclear war to defend Europe, or back down in a strategic humiliation.

West Germany began to experience not only terrorism, but sabotage bearing the stamp of Soviet *spetsnaz* pre-war deployments, such as the cementing-up of chambers of bridges in West Germany where NATO forces would place explosives if retreating from a Soviet attack.

On Dec. 15, the Warsaw Pact side broke off the last of three main arms talks. As the Soviets had done at the Soviet-American intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) talks on Nov. 23 and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks on Dec. 8, they refused to set a date to resume the 10-year-old Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna, thus shutting the third major arms control channel in the space of three-and-a-half weeks. Although the MBFR talks, on forces in Central Europe, have been deadlocked for years, cutting them off is a further pre-war attempt to terrorize the West Europeans.

Rise of the marshals

In January, *EIR* reported the estimation of one British expert on the Soviet military, that Andropov was working on a margin of tolerance from the military that could vanish in six months if he did not succeed in splitting the European NATO members away from the United States using his levers of arms control offers and the so-called peace movement in Western Europe. Instead, Andropov himself vanished, seven

and a half months into the year. The Soviet military picked up the baton.

The commander of Ground Forces, the chief of Rear Services and the first deputy Chief of Staff were elevated to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union in March, and the commander of the Strategic Rocket Corps became chief Marshal of Artillery.

If Andropov's *Spiegel* interview revealed the cynical map-drawing of a geopolitician, it was Marshal Ogarkov who laid down the parameters of the Soviet mobilization for total war. On May 9, for the anniversary of the end of the "Great Patriotic War," Ogarkov published a long article in the daily *Izvestia*, which LaRouche characterized in the May 31 *EIR* cover story as "a definite war-plan against another power . . . a war-plan implied to be made ready to go into operation as early as this year."

Ogarkov asserted "the necessity of having, in peacetime, organs of command and control which could immediately go into action at the outbreak of war without a lengthy period of reorganization." With the creation of the war-theater commands, these are being put into place.

Soviet economic policy in 1983 likewise proceeded from a directive by Ogarkov, this one published in the party magazine *Kommunist* in July 1981, which demanded "coordination of the mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces and the national economy as a whole, especially in the utilization of manpower resources, transport, communications and power . . . [and] further improvement of the system of mobilization readiness of the national economy itself, proceeding from the fact that a close interconnection of the mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces, the national economy, and civil defense is a very important condition for maintaining the defense capability of the country as a whole at the necessary level." Ogarkov proposed the World War II-era State Defense Committee as a model of centralization.

The changes made in the Soviet economy this year matched this schema, not the much-ballyhooed "Hungarian-model decentralization" that Andropov was supposed by many to carry in his portfolio of reforms. For KGB chief Andropov and his party and police henchmen launched a campaign against corruption, which enabled them to knock out dozens of members of the vast patronage machines built up under Leonid Brezhnev. It also appears to have been aimed against the middle layer of the economic bureaucracy, so that increased local decision-making can be coupled with tighter control from above, as required by Ogarkov.

Several personnel shifts also pointed to militarization of the economy, starting with decisive sectors such as nuclear power, transport, and the machine tool industry. Sergei Afanasyev, minister of General Machine Building—which builds missiles—since 1965, was named minister of Heavy and Transport Machine Building. Another former official of the Ministry of General Machine Building, Minister of the Machine Tool and Tool Making Industry Boris Bal'mont, was promoted to full membership in the Communist Party

Central Committee in June (as were Ogarkov's First Deputy Chief of Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev and Deputy Defense Minister Gen. V. M. Shabanov). And on Aug. 1, Yevgenii Kulov moved from the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, which makes nuclear warheads, to head a new state committee for atomic power.

By autumn, one other economic policy shift was also apparent: The Soviets abandoned the slowed investment policy of the 11th Five Year Plan (1981-85). Investment was at least doubled, perhaps tripled, in order to crank up capacity for the military mobilization.

Russian culture

The good news is that communism is dead, a long-time observer of Soviet affairs quipped at the end of 1983, but the bad news is that Genghis Kahn has taken over the U.S.S.R.

It is impossible to evaluate the strategic threat of war from the Soviet Union without a tool applied by *EIR*, practically alone among strategic analysts in the West, during the unfolding crisis of 1983: an understanding of the culture of Russia since it was forged under the influence of the Byzantine Empire and Eastern Orthodoxy a thousand years ago. Looking across this sweep of a thousand years, *EIR* could discern, as revealed in the Sept. 27 cover story, "Those features of current Soviet foreign policy and strategic postures which cohere with the Russian Orthodox Church's centuries-old perspective for the 'Third and Final Rome,'"—an empire with Moscow as its capital.

Russia has changed, we reported, but it has changed into something old. With a literary revival of the likes of blood-and-soil ideologue Fyodor Dostoevsky and an officially sponsored outbreak of vile anti-Semitism, the Soviet Union is reverting to the outlook of the Russian Empire. It has modern trappings now, with brigades of Soviet systems analysts and sociological poll-takers to rival the nuttiest psychological profiling centers in Britain or the United States, but Mother Russia is underneath. Her social base was never fundamentally transformed either by 19th-century industrialization or after the Bolshevik Revolution. Thirty-five percent of the Soviet population still lives on the land, and these peasants, organized into collective farms that mimic the traditional Russian peasant commune and grind up tractors and other hardware relentlessly with no return, are a huge constituency against progress.

This is the Russian population that was the base for the Russian Orthodox Church, historically the enemy of the factions of Western civilization that fought for the idea of the perfectability of the individual human being, the idea expressed in the *filioque* doctrine of Augustinian Christianity. It is therefore lawful that 1983 saw the Soviet state restore to the Church the ancient Danilevskii Monastery and the emissaries of Moscow's Patriarch Pimen (the first high-ranking Soviet spokesman to denounce beam weapons, in 1982) fan out around the globe to participate in the false peace movement.