

ciation helped them do the job.

H. A. R. "Kim" Philby, son of top British Arabist St. John Philby, is currently a KGB General. After his first contact with Soviet intelligence at Cambridge University in the 1930s, Philby dropped his left profile and joined the circles of the pro-Hitler Cliveden Set around Edward VIII and Lord and Lady Astor. This coincided with the period of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, and was part of the same process.

After a period at the British Embassy in Washington in the 1940s, during which he was giving U.S. atomic secrets to the Soviets, Philby returned to the Middle East under journalist's cover. Ostensibly "retired" from the British Secret Intelligence Services (SIS) because of his increasingly notorious KGB role, Philby was in fact assigned to the Shemlan British intelligence center outside Beirut. In the 1950s, he traveled throughout the Arab world, meeting and taking over his aging father's networks. In 1963, "Kim" Philby moved from Beirut to Moscow, but continued his lifelong work for the joint Anglo-Soviet attempt to destroy the United States.

The Soviet adoption of British and Nazi assets in the Middle East was patently clear at the September United Nations-sponsored International Conference on Palestine in Geneva. Top Soviet Islamic experts Vladimir Vinogradov of the Foreign Ministry and Orientology Institute head Yevgenii Primakov rubbed shoulders with Salem Azzam of the London-based SIS front, the Islamic Council of Europe; representatives of the Swiss Nazi front; the Geneva-based "Islam and the West"; and the Nazi-financed Palestinian radicals of the PFLP. While the conference ostensibly had a radical "left" tinge, more than one speech lavished praise on Hitler's

collaborator, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, as "the first freedom fighter of Palestine."

As the Soviets push for strategic confrontation, their assets are becoming increasingly violent. On Aug. 20 in Teheran, the Khomeini regime set up the "Assembly of United Islamic Movements" for worldwide radical terrorist activities against the American "Great Satan" and his allies. A chief figure in this new "Islamintern" is East German intelligence-trained Ayatollah Khoini, notorious as the leader of the "students" who took over the U.S. Embassy in Iran. These Shi'ite fanatics have been identified as responsible in both the April bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and the Oct. 23 attack on the Marine compound.

One of these fanatics, Ahmed Huber, is a close friend of Genoud since the latter's Cairo days. A self-proclaimed National Socialist convert to Islam, Huber is a member of the Swiss Socialist Party, of the "Party of the Islamic Liberation" established as a British intelligence front in Teheran in the 1950s, and a frequent visitor to the Islamic Department of the University of Leipzig, an East German intelligence center for Mideast operations. Speaking from his home in Berne, Switzerland, barely 24 hours after the Beirut bombing, Huber told a journalist, "That's marvelous what happened. I am really proud of my Iranian friends and of the Shi'ites in Lebanon. They did their job! The Americans and the French are finished. . . . All the real Muslims are opposed to that regime. . . . There will be new coups, new explosions like in Beirut, but this time it won't be in Beirut, it will be in New York and in Washington! There also, there are groups of young Muslims who are ready to be killed, to sacrifice themselves!"

THE U.S.S.R. AND ISLAM by Allen and Rachel Douglas

The Soviet Union's Muslim Hierarchy

Before Zbigniew Brzezinski ever heard about Soviet Muslims, **Alexandre Bennigsen** was the authority on them. He shaped the field of Soviet Central Asia studies in the post-war period, training dozens of specialists at the Sorbonne and the University of Chicago. Bennigsen spread his gospel on the potential for Soviet Muslim revolt far beyond academia; a person who has followed his career for many years observes, "Bennigsen has had an absolutely horrendous effect on American strategic estimates [in that area of the world]. I can't tell you how many times he has traveled to Washington to testify before Senate committees and meet with people."

There is no question that the subject matter is important. The U.S.S.R.'s Muslim population of 44 million, living in

Azerbaijan on the Western shore of the Caspian Sea and in **Kazakhstan** and the four **Central Asian republics** to its East, makes it the fifth largest Islamic country in the world, ahead of, for instance, Egypt. By the year 2000, it is estimated that one of every two births in the Soviet Union will be in the Muslim regions; this population is already reproducing itself at a much faster rate than that in the Slavic republics.

Contrary to Bennigsen's myths, the interesting question is not whether at some point in 40 or 50 years those Muslims will threaten Russian rule. Empires have disintegrated on ethnic lines before. But an overriding strategic question will be answered, in this decade, long before Muslim demography transforms the Soviet Union: Will Moscow destroy U.S. power worldwide and preside over a last Russian empire, while the entire Western heritage of the Renaissance self-destructs or is incinerated in nuclear war? As for Soviet Muslims, will they or won't they serve Soviet imperial aims

during this crisis?

EIR's examination of Bennigsen's writings against the activities of the Muslims he writes about, shows that the Sorbonne professor fails the simplest test of good faith—accuracy of his information. Bennigsen's daughter **Marie Broxup** of the **Royal Central Asian Society** in London is his collaborator and frequent co-author. Their 1983 book *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet Empire* acknowledges that Soviet Muslims have served as a foreign policy asset, but argues that they are drastically less usable now since Russians killed Muslims in the invasion of Afghanistan. In the Spring 1983 issue of *Religion in Communist Lands*, Broxup stated:

... after the evident failure of the Soviets to represent their invasion of Afghanistan as an inter-Islamic affair and the collapse of the Tashkent Islamic Conference [September 1980] which had been announced in the Soviet press as the most important post-war political meeting of the Muslim world, relations between the Soviet government and the official Muslim establishment have deteriorated. This decline is evidenced by the fact that since September 1980 not a single foreign Muslim delegation—other than those from Afghanistan—has visited Central Asia and, with the exception of the visit to North Yemen of Mahmud Gekkiev, Mufti of northern Caucasus and Daghestan, no Soviet Muslim delegation has been sent abroad.

At the end of this section is a partial list of the dense Soviet Muslim diplomacy since that Tashkent conference, plenty of it in time for Broxup's article. For a specialist in the field, this information is easily accessible, as it was to *EIR*.

The Soviet Islamic establishment

Just as Stalin made his deal with the Russian Orthodox Church during World War II, because the Russians would go to battle for Mother Russia not for communism, in 1943 a concordat was signed for Soviet Muslims after discussions between Stalin and the **Mufti of Ufa, Abdurrahman Rasulayev**. It revived a hierarchy set up in 1783 by Catherine the Great as the **Central Muslim Spiritual Board**. While no battles were fought in Soviet Central Asia, it provided a vital reservoir of manpower. War production in Tashkent and other cities was critical for the Soviet armed forces. The mosques sprang back the moment official persecution was lifted.

Today Soviet Islam is organized under four Spiritual Administrations, each headed by a Mufti or Sheikh.

1) **Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan**, Tashkent, Uzbek SSR, covers Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. **Mufti Shamsut dinkhan ibn Ziyautdinkhan ibn Ishn Babakhan**, 45. Babakhan, whose grandfather and great-grandfather were mullahs, assumed the post when his father died

in 1982. **Babakhan, Sr.** had been the top Soviet mullah for 30 years, an international traveller and a member of the **Supreme Islamic Council for Mosques** at Mecca. The Tashkent board is the largest of the four and has the most deployments into the Islamic world abroad, including near neighbor countries that share ethnic groups with Soviet Central Asia. The Tashkent board's very active **Deputy Chairman for International Relations** is **Yusupkhan Shakirov**.

2) **Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Transcaucasus**, Baku, Azerbaijan SSR. **Sheikh-al-Islam Allakhshukur Pasha-Zade** (aka Pashayev), 34. Appointed at age 31, the young mufti speaks Arabic and fluent Persian. He is reported to have studied orientology in Baku and had further schooling in Egypt. Before taking office, he visited Afghanistan and Iran.

3) **Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the European Parts of the U.S.S.R. and Siberia**, Ufa, Bashkir ASSR (in the Ural Mountains). **Mufti Talgat Tadjuddin** (or Taziyevev), 34. Educated at Al-Azhar University in Egypt, he has made the pilgrimage to Muslim holy places in the Middle East.


4) **Spiritual Administration of Muslims of North Caucasus**, Makhachkla, Daghestan ASSR. **Mufti Mahmud Gekkiev**, 48.

The Muslim boards were encouraged to expand especially after the **23rd Soviet Communist Party Congress** (1966), which upgraded the "social sciences"—of which religion is the oldest, all talk about "scientific atheism" notwithstanding. If anything, Soviet "scientific atheists" today study religion's effectiveness as a motivating force.

In 1968, the Tashkent board began to publish the quarterly *Muslims of the Soviet East* in English, French, Persian, Arabic, and Uzbek to propagandize to Mideast readers what a great life their Muslim brothers in the Soviet Union enjoy. The same year, Soviet Muslims first went abroad, and a Soviet mullah presence on the annual Hajj to Mecca became an established custom. These travels are good not only for propaganda but for meeting Muslim leaders from all over the world, including at the highest levels. King Khalid of Saudi Arabia received Babakhan, Sr. during the 1975 Hajj.

Soviet mullahs are trained at one of two schools (usually both—a total curriculum of 11 years) in Central Asia. The primary one is the **Bukhara madrasah**, to which Soviet Muslims come from all over the U.S.S.R. Bukhara has a "work-study" program so that the budding mullahs can teach at nearby mosques while getting their degrees. The best students go on to the **Imam al-Bukhari Islamic Institute of Tashkent** and then some take further training in Damascus or Cairo. These two schools together were handling 100 students at a time in the late 1970s, with rapid expansion slated. The graduates staff the official Muslim infrastructure of the four boards, write for the magazine, and fan out to mosques throughout the U.S.S.R.

They also turn up with **Russian Orthodox Church/Moscow Patriarchate** personnel at various international func-



Afghanistan: Case study of Soviet ethnic deployments. Before the April 1978 coup in Kabul, thousands of Soviet Uzbek and Tajik cadre were infiltrated across the border. The Baluchi area of Pakistan is now targeted.

tions. At the August 1983 Vancouver Assembly of the World Council of Churches, an EIR special investigator asked Shakirov of the Tashkent board if he ever briefed Alexandre Bennigsen; the previously jovial mullah blanched and fled.

Soviet Muslim diplomacy since 1980

This partial listing begins after the Tashkent Conference for the 15th century of the Hejira, September 1980, which was attended by Muslims from Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, Benin, Bulgaria, Ghana, Jordan, North Yemen, South Yemen, Cyprus, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritius, Mali, Palestine, Senegal, Syria, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and Japan.

From the U.S.S.R.:

- *September 1980*: Rector of the Bukhara madrasah attends Patterns of Islamic Thought conference in Algeria.
- *November 1980*: Editor of *Muslims of the Soviet East* tours Islamic sites and meets Catholic leaders in Spain.
- *November 1980*: Tashkent board delegation visits Mali.
- *Autumn 1980*, after the Tashkent conference: Mufti Babakhan, Sr. goes on Hajj to Mecca.
- *January 1981*: Mufti Mahmud Gekkiev of the North Caucasus board visits N. Yemen, invited by the High Mufti.
- *February 1981*: Mufti Babakhan, Sr. leads delegation to Bulgaria on invitation from Bulgaria's Chief Mufti.
- *Winter 1981*: Mufti of Ufa Talgat Tadjuddin lectures in Denmark.

- *April 1981*: Tadjuddin attends Tokyo disarmament conference.
- *Late 1981*: Tadjuddin leads delegation to "holy places" in Saudi Arabia, where he meets World Islamic League representatives and is received by King Khalid. On the way home, he visits Supreme Mufti of Syria in Damascus.
- *1981*: Tashkent board foreign affairs chief Shakirov visits Afghanistan and South Yemen.
- *1981*: Tashkent board delegations under Shaikh Abdulgani Abdullah tour Algeria and the United States.
- *1981*: Gekkiev tours Ghana, Benin, Upper Volta, Mali.
- *Spring 1982*: Sheikh Pasha-Zade of Transcaucasus board visits Afghanistan and Iran.
- *1982*: Shakirov leads Soviet Muslim delegation to New Delhi conference on "Indian Ocean Zone of Peace."
- *January 1983*: Pasha-Zade travels to Jordan and Syria.
- *September 1983*: Babakhan, Jr. visits Syria.
- *October 1983*: Soviet Muslim delegation in Kuwait received by Prime Minister, Crown Prince Sheikh as-Sabah.

To the U.S.S.R.:

- *May 1981*: Chief Mufti of Syria visits Moscow and Ufa.
- *August 1981*: Shariat justice from Nigerian state of Qadun visits Ufa board.
- *October 1981*: President of National Council of Muslim Representatives of Ghana visits Ufa board.
- *December 1981*: Chief Muftis of Syria and of North Yemen, among others, join leaders of all four Soviet boards at Moscow preparatory meeting for the Russian Orthodox Church's upcoming peace conference.
- *April 1982*: Supreme Mufti of Syria Ahmad Kuftaru visits Uzbekistan at invitation of Tashkent board.
- *May 1982*: Russian Orthodox Church/Moscow Patriarchate "peace" extravaganza attended by Soviet Muslim officials and Muslim leaders from Syria, Togo, Senegal, Jordan, and Mauritius, among others.
- *1982*: Jordan's Minister for Holy Places visits Tashkent.
- *August 1983*: Delegation of Algeria's Supreme Islamic Council visits Tashkent Board and Baku.

Geidar Aliyev and the 'Peoples of the East'

Geidar Ali-Reza ogly Aliyev, First Deputy Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R. and full member of the Soviet communist party Politburo, is not a token Muslim.

He is one of the most powerful men in the U.S.S.R., a career KGB officer with field experience in Iran and Turkey who rose to the top of the party leadership. Born in an Azerbaijani Shi'ite Muslim family, Aliyev's career merges that religious tradition with that of the Communist International's

Baku Congress of Peoples of the East.

That July 1920 conference in the Azerbaijani capital was a huge, chaotic affair attended by 3,280 delegates speaking dozens of languages. Called by Comintern executives **Georgii Zinoviev** and **Karl Radek**, it brought together activists of different nationalities, who had hitherto been working for British, Venetian, German, Swiss, or Russian intelligence in the cauldron of Eurasian geopolitics. One of Radek's guests (though barred from speaking at Baku) was **Enver Pasha**, leader of the Venetian-controlled Young Turk movement, whose career speaks volumes: He went from being Chief of Staff of the Ottoman Imperial Army in the Second Balkan War (1913), to organizer for the Comintern's **Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies** in Moscow (1920), to a sorry end, killed by the Red Army in his British Army uniform while leading a revolt in Bukhara, Soviet Central Asia (1921).

While Zinoviev gave the keynote, **Islam-Marxists** dominated Baku. Sessions were chaired by the communist **Nariman Narimanov**, an Azerbaijani noble from the **Hummet** (Endeavor) movement, a nationalist socialist party allowed within the Bolshevik party since 1904. Thanks to the interventions of Narimanov and figures like the non-communist **Narbutabekov** from Tashkent, the main point stressed at Baku was the uniqueness of East, its superior revolutionary fervor that defined a vanguard role for the impoverished colonial masses.

The Baku conference formed a **Council of Propaganda and Action**, which functioned until 1922. Meanwhile, the Comintern's **Central Asiatic Bureau** was set up in Tashkent by the Indian **M. N. Roy**, a freelance agitator who had only recently hooked up with the Comintern in Mexico, where he co-founded the Mexican Communist Party while on a German intelligence payroll. Roy, who contemptuously called the Baku Conference "Zinoviev's Circus," worked in Tashkent until the bureau was abolished in July 1921 and succeeded by a Moscow-based **Eastern Section of the Comintern** under Roy's deputy, **Georgii Safarov**.

The next project in Turkestan, as Soviet Central Asia was called in those days, was the **Communist University for Toilers of the East**. Its sessions in Tashkent drew Roy, Iranian Islamo-Marxist **Sultan-Zade**, and the Volga Tatar **Mirza Sultan-Galiev**, whose name became synonymous with the Islamo-Marxist heresy—"sultangalievizm."

The Baku operation was continued by Radek's attending the founding conference of a **League of Oppressed Peoples** in Berlin, with the German **Graf von Reventlow**, a "mon-archo-marxist" whose wife **Fanny von Reventlow** ran a group called **Children of the Sun**, in Ascona, Switzerland. Fanny's Ascona center is a footnote to Baku that brings the story of Islamo-Marxism full circle, for it was attended not only by the Anthroposoph leader **Rudolf Steiner** and the future Nazi **Rudolf Hess**, but by prominent French Sufi mystic, **Louis Massignon**. Massignon would later teach **Alexandre Bennigsen**, today's foremost peddler of the line that Islamic

nationalism is a live threat to the U.S.S.R.

The Azerbaijani party

The Tashkent toilers' school was repeatedly purged and leading Islamo-Marxists, including Narimanov and Sultan-Galiev, were shot in the 1930s as "nationalist deviationists." By the late 1920s, the Comintern's Third World operations were reshaped to emphasize the building of individual communist parties, but the role of the **Azerbaijani Communist Party**, with its heritage from Narimanov, stayed as strong as ever. The party's approach, later perfected by Geidar Aliyev, was to exploit indigenous belief structures à la Islamo-Marxism, but taming them away from the disruptive excesses of Sultan-Galiev et al. and shaping them as a means for the outward expansion of influence. Azerbaijan supplied organizers and administrators to Soviet Central Asia proper, establishing Baku as the hub of Soviet activity in the Islamic world. The Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi communist parties were organized from Baku.

What this meant for adjacent countries became evident at the end of World War II, when Soviet troops occupied the northern half of Iran. Azerbaijanis on both sides of the border were organized into a single Azerbaijani administration. Even after the Soviet pullout, the Azerbaijani party leadership kept its agents in the Azeri part of Iran, running them in close collaboration with the KGB. The wartime and postwar head of the Azerbaijani party, **Mir Diaffir Bagirov**, reportedly fond of the slogan "Long live the united people of Azerbaijan!", was a close friend of the KGB chief **Lavrentii Beria**, whose experience in Baku went back to pre-1917 days when he reported both to the Tsarist Okhrana and to the Baku party chief **Anastas Mikoyan**. With Beria, until Beria's execution in 1953, and alone, until he himself was eliminated in 1956, Bagirov personally ran agents in merchant circles in Iranian Azerbaijan.

Another influential Azerbaijani party figure under Bagirov was **Gassan Aliyev**, elder half-brother of Geidar. After the war, Gassan Aliyev voluntarily relinquished his party post and established himself at the **Azerbaijani Academy of Sciences'** earth sciences section, a chair powerful enough that sources familiar with Baku politics term Gassan Aliyev's clout crucial to his younger brother's meteoric career.

With this high party connection to help him as well as roots in the religious establishment (another relative was **Ali-Zade**, long-time head of the **Muslim Spiritual Administration of the Transcaucasus**), Geidar Aliyev launched his career through the KGB. According to the 1976 book *Partiya ili mafiya (Party or Mafia)* by Ilya Zemtsov, who worked under Aliyev in Baku before emigrating, the former covert communications officer behind German lines was assigned to a newly expanded **Eastern Department of the KGB** in 1953. In the following years, says Zemtsov, Aliyev was deployed in "Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey again."

In 1957 he got his degree from the History Faculty, State University of Azerbaijan and by 1964 he was Deputy Chairman of the **Azerbaijani KGB** with the rank of Colonel. In 1967, the year Yuri Andropov became national KGB chairman, Aliyev was made head of the KGB in Azerbaijan. When **Ayatollah Khomeini** was living in Iraq in the 1960s, agents from Aliyev's Azerbaijani KGB maintained a Soviet liaison with him.

In 1969, Aliyev took over as **First Secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party**. He tore the party and state apparatus apart from top to bottom, replacing nearly two thousand officials with KGB men, in order to carry out a project that became known as "the Azerbaijan experiment." Aliyev's special formula was a sweeping anti-corruption purge, extensive profiling of public opinion by sociologists, and attention to the "spiritual needs" of the population. His own appearances at religious funerals and carefully calculated "leaks" about his disciplining of officials who dealt crudely with the mosques built Aliyev the reputation of a man who remained a Shi'ite Azerbaijani while at the top of KGB and party. All the while, Aliyev played frequent host to communist and non-communist visitors from the Islamic world.

Just months before his November 1982 elevation to full Politburo membership, according to *The Times* of London, Aliyev told visitors in Baku of his "personal hope that the Azerbaijanis will be united in the future." In speeches at various cultural events, Aliyev harped on the theme that Azerbaijanis in Iran are deprived of schooling and theater in their native tongue and that Soviet Azerbaijanis are therefore obliged to assist them in their cultural development.

Elite Muslim ethnics

Since Aliyev became first deputy prime minister, the quaint story has been put about that his primary portfolio is "transport." From the public record of his activities in 1983, this responsibility has Aliyev not only rushing to the scene of a Volga River boat crash and addressing locomotive workers, but receiving the Vietnamese, Bulgarian and East German ambassadors, Cuba's transport minister, the Greek merchant marine minister, and the speaker of the Syrian Peoples Assembly.

Aliyev is not only no token, but he is not alone among members of the Soviet elite of Muslim background. The second most prominent is **Uzbek Communist Party First Secretary Sharaf Rashidov**, a non-voting Politburo member, who already in 1956 joined Mikoyan on a tour of Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Burma, Vietnam, China, and Mongolia.

Soviet Muslims people Soviet embassies and desks of the Foreign Ministry, putting their language skills and cultural background to use in coordination with the KGB. Just one outstanding case is the Uzbek writer **Sarvar Azimov**, who was posted in Lebanon from 1969 to 1974 and Pakistan during the late 1970s; fluent in Arabic, Farsi and Turkish, Azimov reportedly had his hand in KGB covert operations among Baluchi separatists at that time.

Soviet orientology and ethnography

Two of the most frequent Soviet emissaries to the Middle East are **Yevgenii Primakov** and **Igor Belyayev**. Primakov has been a force in Soviet Middle East policy since his days as advisor to Nikita Khrushchev in the early 1960s. Belyayev was entrusted with delicate diplomatic missions to Egypt and Israel this year, probing for the restoration of Soviet ties in each country. Neither holds any Soviet government post.

They are top figures in the foreign policy think tanks of the Soviet Academy of Sciences: Primakov heads the **Institute of Orientology** and Belyayev is deputy director of the **Africa Institute** under **Anatolii A. Gromyko**, son of the veteran Soviet foreign minister.

The Soviet think tanks' personnel not only process and synthesize huge quantities of intelligence data, but serve as cadre for operations in the regions they study and as ideamen for the party Central Committee and the Foreign Ministry. In 1982, intelligence leaks in the Italian press reported the existence of a *plan vostok* (eastern plan) for building Soviet influence in conservative as well as radical states, jointly cooked up by Primakov's Institute of Orientology and the **International Department of the Central Committee** of the Soviet Communist Party. The plan as described was more simplistic than Soviet policy in fact, but the nexus producing it was correctly identified.

Both the think tanks and the party International Department stem from the machine of the **Communist International** described in the previous section.

The mother of Soviet think tanks, the **Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)**, was mandated in a speech at the 20th Congress of the Soviet communist party in 1956 by Politburo member **Anastas Mikoyan**, the Armenian graduate of an orthodox theological seminary and survivor of the Bolshevik party in the Azerbaijan. Mikoyan called for developing a political science analysis capability equal to that of Western agencies studying the Soviet Union. The apparatus left over from the prewar institute run by Hungarian Cominternist **Eugen Varga** was reactivated for the task, and expanded to include protégés of Mikoyan's co-thinker **Otto Kuusinen**. A Finnish Comintern Executive member at one time slated by Moscow to be president of Finland, Kuusinen by now was sitting on the Soviet Politburo. Careers he helped included those of **Georgii Arbatov**, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, (IUS-AC) **Fyodor Burlatskii**, Central Committee adviser and journalist, and **Yuri Andropov**. All of them were involved in the Central Committee advisory group on international affairs set up by Kuusinen simultaneously with the think tanks; there was a fluid circulation of personnel between the party and the Academy organs.

In its first years, IMEMO enjoyed substantial input—articles, consultations, etc.—from the **British and Italian communist parties**, which were of particular importance for

building up IMEMO's Middle East section both because of those parties' experience in colonial affairs in the region and because they had always been a hybrid of Western and Soviet intelligence influences. **Donald Maclean**, one of the British intelligence defectors in multiple-agent Kim Philby's group, worked in IMEMO for decades after his flight to Moscow. The IUSAC and the Africa Institute were spun off from IMEMO in the 1960s.

The orientology wizards

Yevgenii Primakov was deputy director of IMEMO from 1971 to 1978, but the organization he now heads, the Institute of Orientology, is much older. More than any other Soviet think tank outside of the Russian Orthodox Church's Department of Foreign Church Relations, it embodies knowledge accumulated over centuries.

The **Asian Museum** of the Russian Academy of Sciences was set up in 1818, the time of the Holy Alliance, around a manuscript and art collection dating from the early 18th century. In 1855, during the Crimean War, the **Oriental Department at St. Petersburg University** was transformed into a separate **Eastern Languages Faculty**, which soon, in the words of a 1923 chronicler, "gave Russia a cadre of brilliant specialists and practical functionaries and helped the expansion of knowledge about the East." This knowledge was put to use by the Russian masters of geopolitics in the late 19th century, who in the main were Pan-Slavists bent on expanding the Russian Empire to protect the Orthodox faithful everywhere—in the Balkans and in the Holy Land. The Pan-Slavist Foreign Ministry official **Count N. P. Ignatyev**, co-manipulator of the Balkan wars of the 1870s (and later Minister of the Interior overseeing the Okhrana in its first years), rose by virtue of his diplomatic exploits in gaining territories from China in the Far East. When the forerunner of 20th-century Islamic fundamentalism, **Al-Afghani**, visited Russia in 1888, he was the guest of the Slavophile publicist **Katkov**, who otherwise collaborated with a co-founder of the **British Round Table**, **W. T. Stead**, on various geopolitical schemes. Al-Afghani was received by **Procurator of the Holy Synod, Konstantin Pobedonostsev** and visited the Oriental Department in St. Petersburg.

The **Russian Orthodox Church** was developing its own Eastern operations, exemplified by the work of **Nikolai Il'minskii**, a professor at the Kazan Ecclesiastical Academy who had lived in Cairo and Constantinople, mastered several languages of Central Asia and arranged with **Pobedonostsev** to hold Russian Orthodox services in those languages in the Central Asian parts of the empire.

In 1917, these Oriental studies institutions and more were in existence. Far from being shut down, they underwent rapid expansion geared to the Comintern perspective of the Baku conference. The 1923 pamphlet *Orientalism in Petrograd, 1918-1922* was prepared by the Asian Museum's **Committee of Orientologists** (formed 1921) under guidance of **S. F. Oldenberg** and **N. Ya. Marr**, Eastern specialists who worked on into the Soviet period. It describes the expansion of orien-

tology with the **Russian Academy of the History of Material Culture** (formed August 1919), the **Scientific Research Institute for Comparative History of Languages and Literatures of West and East** (August 1921), transformation of the Church's **Orthodox Palestine Society** into the **Russian Palestine Society** under the Academy (1918), the **Petrograd Institute of Living Eastern Languages** (autumn 1920, for training people "preparing for practical activity in the East"), and the **Petrograd Theological Institute** (1919, providing the training "necessary for fundamental study of

Soviets boost Baluchi 'autonomy' movement

In the July-August issue of Asia and Africa Today, joint publication of the Soviet Institute of Orientology, the Institute of Africa, and the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, Vladilen Baikov openly promoted the struggle of Baluchi separatists for independence from Pakistan. The following is excerpted from Baikov's "In the Mountains of Baluchistan":

The social mainstay of the Baluchis is the tribe headed by the *sardar*. For centuries these hereditary rulers exercised supreme military, administrative and judicial power over their tribesmen. . . . The traditional form of government, that is the powers of the *sardars*, survives despite all attempts of the central government to break the hold of the *sardars* and to introduce central rule from Islamabad. *The Pakistan Times* admitted that the central administration's influence in Baluchistan does not extend outside its local office buildings. Tribal traditions have firm roots: the people cherish their loyalty to their clans and their *sardars*.

I was lucky to meet Muhammed Akbar Khan, *sardar* of the Bugtis. . . . "My status puts me in the class which is usually referred to as the exploiters," Akbar Khan told me, "but I view myself as a progressive, because I favour the establishment of a progressive social order. . . ."

For centuries the Baluchis have been waging a desperate struggle for independence. Their old folk songs and ballads speak of the numerous wars they have had to wage against the Persians, Arabs, Mongols, Hindus, and other invaders. . . .

The Baluchis' search for their national identity ran into the wall of official Pakistani ideology. . . . The central government succeeded in stopping the bloodshed only in 1977 when it declared an amnesty and released about 6,000 movement supporters, its leaders, from prisons. A temporary lull set in. But how long was it going to last?

Orthodox theology and successful serving of the Church under contemporary conditions”).

As Primakov boasted in a recent history of Soviet oriental studies, “The overwhelming majority of Orientalists from the **Asian Museum**, the **Oriental Department of Petrograd University**, and the Moscow **Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages** accepted Soviet power without any reservations and did all they could to give their knowledge and energy to the people.”

In 1930, most of these institutions were merged into the **Institute of Orientology**, which has been expanding its work ever since. The main institute, located in Moscow since 1950, helped set up oriental studies centers also in the Soviet republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, which constitute an active political intelligence network. In October 1981 for example, in Baku to inaugurate the Azerbaijan branch of the **All-Union Orientalists Association**, Primakov was warmly greeted by Geidar Aliyev.

About Soviet orientology today, Primakov says in the same article that “the traditional complex [of studies] cannot develop without discharging functional tasks connected with the study of the present. Moreover, the second function of the traditional cycle, which is of applied nature, is becoming increasingly complicated, and its importance is growing.” What that means can be seen in Soviet orientology publications’ ultra-refined examinations of specific Third World situations (see box, for the example of Baluchistan). “Concrete situations,” Primakov calls them, explaining how the same Shi’ite current can be “progressive” in Iran and “reactionary” in Afghanistan.

All this practical activity “in no way presupposes an arrogant attitude to the traditional cycle of Oriental sciences, i.e., the so-called classic Oriental studies,” writes Primakov. Indeed not, and the Institute of Orientology’s recent efforts in this domain are a dead giveaway of their worldview. The institute’s scholarly journal *Narody Azii i Afriki (Peoples of Asia and Africa)* devoted many pages last year to a translation of the *Resurrection of the Sciences of the Faith*, by **al-Ghazali**, the medieval irrationalist philosopher who is the father of Islamic fundamentalism. This project was surpassed as a self-indictment for bestiality perhaps only by the journal’s appreciation of Arnold J. Toynbee, the British adept of cultural decay who described Moscow as the Third Rome, for his work on “history and culture in an ecological perspective.”

The Soviet ethnographers

Targeted profiling of the potential for ethnic separatism is also done under the auspices of the **Institute of Ethnography**, run since 1966 by Academician **Yulian Bromley**, a descendant of Scottish immigrants who made their money in Moscow industry. The work of Bromley, who has defined “ethnic unit” as superior even to “class” in the determination of history, is crucial for revealing the higher-level cultural control of Soviet political operations in the Third World.

Even more suggestive is Bromley’s collaboration with Western ethnographers under investigation by *EIR* for pos-

sible ties to the **Society for Endangered Peoples** and other control-points for separatist terrorism in Europe. It is already known that a 1976 conference of Soviet and Western anthropologists attended by Bromley and top British ethnographer **Ernest Gellner**, whose 1979 book *Words and Things* had an enthusiastic foreword by Bertrand Russell, was sponsored by the **Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research** and held at its **Burg Wartenstein** castle in Austria; originally known as **The Viking Fund**, this foundation had been endowed in 1941 by Swedish industrialist **Axel Wenner-Gren**, who was so notorious a supporter of the Nazis that hardly a single American anthropologist would take its money after the war.

Bromley’s own work speaks for itself: There is hardly an ethnic sub-group anywhere inside or outside the U.S.S.R. that has escaped scrutiny by the brigades of Soviet ethnographers deployed from his institute. Like the orientologists, they are drawing on the material amassed since the **Ethnology Section of the Russian Geographical Society** was formed in 1845. In 1917, a **Commission for Studying the Tribal Composition of Russia and Adjacent Countries** launched new studies; after several permutations, this group acquired the name of **Institute of Ethnography** in 1937.

In a recent issue of *Social Sciences* (No. 3, 1983), Bromley listed new monographs issued by his institute which typify its work on Soviet “nationalities”—every Soviet person is endowed with a “nationality” different from his U.S.S.R. “citizenship” and carries an internal passport identifying him as Great Russian, Uzbek, Ukrainian, Jew, etc.—as well as foreign countries of interest to the Soviets. On the home front, there are studies like “Modern Everyday Life of the Buryat Countryside,” “Sufism in Turkmenia (Evolution and Survivals),” and “Khorezm Legends as a Source Material for the Study of the History of Religious Cults of Soviet Central Asia.”

Bromley adds, “Much attention is given to the ethnographic study of modern ethnic and ethnocultural processes in foreign countries,” as shown in the works: “Indians and Pakistanis Abroad,” “Ethnic Processes in the Countries of South America,” “Small Peoples of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines,” etc. Special attention is devoted to “the role of religions in the life of peoples in foreign countries,” which is examined in “A History of the Inquisition,” “Folk Religious Beliefs of the Population of Indochina,” “Catholicism and Free-Thinking in Latin America in the 16th-20th Centuries,” “Symbolism of Cults and Rituals of the Peoples of Asia (the U.S.S.R. excluded),” “Peoples of Malaysia and Indonesia (Some Aspects of Non-Material Culture),” and “The Maronites.”

This kind of work has been turned to account by the KGB, as is shown in the 1979 scenario book *The Coming Decline of the Chinese Empire*, by KGB journalist Victor Louis. In his design of China splintering into Manchu, Uighur, and other ethnic entities, Louis merges the profiles of modern ethnography, with geopolitical projects dating back to the Tsarist empire.