

## **EIR**SpecialReport

# The psycho-sexual impotence of Gen. Danny Graham

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It is clear that Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Daniel Graham hates me enviously, not because of anything I have done, but because he is professional military officer enough to be able to recognize that I manifest a specific quality which he lacks, the psycho-sexual capacity to make genuine “command decisions.” I do not use “psycho-sexual” in the sense Dr. Sigmund Freud misanalyzed the problem, but of the capacity for “love” as Apostolic Christian teaching, for example, defines “love.”

Perhaps at some time during the past, General Graham was not impotent; perhaps, like so many professionals, he lost an important part of himself—his soul—in Bundy’s and McNamara’s long war in Vietnam. A certain special quality is required of military commanders who train and lead troops into battle, a quality of love based on risking the highest personal physical sacrifice in fruitful service of a higher purpose. It is a quality of command reflected in Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s conduct of the War in the Pacific, his approach to the post-war development of Japan, and his design of the Inchon landing in Korea. Perhaps Danny Graham had something of this quality once during his military career; the common feature of every observation of Danny Graham’s behavior during the past year is a lack of that specific quality most indispensable in the military commander.

I have no personal malice toward poor Danny Graham on this account, but only the wish that his lost soul might be redeemed. Nonetheless, in his present position as the Heritage Foundation’s leading spokesman for the “High Frontier” concoction, he is doing grave damage to the most vital strategic interests of the United States. His psycho-sexual problem is therefore no longer a private matter.

To quote former President Nixon, “Let’s put this into perspective.” Danny Graham is unfortunately not exceptional on this point. Beginning “Operation Phoenix,” when military professionals were degraded into the roles of Burkes and Hares in Vietnam, the former potency began to evaporate from dedicated military professionals and others involved. The more they did as they were ordered by the evil Robert McNamara et al., the more they mutilated that special moral conviction upon which the republican patriot relies, as his deepest personal resource, for effective command. They were condemned to fight a useless war in the most



U.S. Army photograph

*The Vietnam War, a quagmire in which dedicated American military leaders were morally destroyed.*

abominable manner, to no outcome but Henry A. Kissinger's abortion of the tiresome conflict, and the humiliating spectacle confronting veterans of the war as the balance sheet was struck on 30 years of U.S. post-war Vietnam policy, in Vietnam and Kampuchea, in 1975.

The war in Vietnam itself was fought against the repeated advice of General MacArthur. Worse, it was fought under the auspices of semi-secret agreements with the Soviet government negotiated by U.S. Eastern Establishment accomplices of Bertrand Russell through channels led by the Pugwash Conference series. It was fought under the auspices of the Nuclear Deterrence doctrine of Dr. Leo Szilard's "Dr. Strangelove" address at the second Pugwash Conference, in Quebec, of 1958. The escalation of the war which President Johnson launched following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, was the projected first of a series of local wars to be fought under the United States' adoption of a strategic policy of Nuclear Deterrence. Under McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, James R. Schlesinger, Henry A. Kissinger, and so forth, Johnson's war in Vietnam became a war in abominable violation of every principle of modern strategic doctrine, and degenerated rapidly into a population war against the civilian populations of Vietnam and Kampuchea.

A soldier, of course, does his duty as ordered; this is especially the code of the professional officer. Except under military government, the officer corps has no latitude to resist abominable commands of government, once policies of that command are securely established according to specifications of the military code of honor. No conceivable alternative

exists for military policy as such. Under a constitutional republic, such as our own, the moral responsibility lies with the civilian for every action conducted according to orders by the military.

This republican military system works as long as the civilian command is both intelligent and moral, and as long as the civilians seek and weigh the best counsels of the military professionals. What happens then if the civilian command is both immoral and a pack of bungling cretins from the standpoint of military science? What happens to the officer who must, year after year, practice a war-fighting policy which all of his training and code of honor instruct him to be militarily incompetent in form and immoral in conception?

The effect of the 1964-72 conduct of the war in Vietnam on the U.S. military immediately affected by such abominable circumstances is often mistakenly explained in terms of unpopularity directed against the military from within growing portions of the civilian population. The truth is, that the U.S. military tradition—the tradition shared in exemplary fashion by General MacArthur—provided the military professional no honest basis for defending the way in which that war had been conducted. His impulsion to defend the military arm of our republic as a necessary institution, left him no resort but to defend that institution as an agency of national political will, an agency of force per se, while leaving the citizen within the officer no moral argument of self-defense otherwise. He could not defend the conduct of the war competently, sincerely, from the standpoint of U.S. military tradition nor from the standpoint of vital U.S. interests defined otherwise.

The honest military professional was left implicitly with the proposition that he must defend the importance of the U.S. military institutions despite those institutions' extended journey through the morass of Indochina. Thus, his confidence in his own powers of judgment was eroded, together with his sense of certainty respecting the moral commitment underlying the training and deployment of those institutions.

This intellectual and moral predicament seized upon corresponding flaws within the personality of the officer affected. What quality within the individual corresponds to the state of mind in which that individual loses a sense of efficient connection between the rigorous exercise of his mental-creative powers of judgment and his willful practice as an individual? The common name for such a flaw in the personality is psycho-sexual impotence.

Now, the United States is confronted by a threat to its very existence. This is a time when every resource of the U.S. military tradition must be mobilized and the nation mobilized economically as during the "crash program" efforts of 1939-43. The civilian population and large chunks of the military are gripped by psycho-sexual impotence left over from the experience of the war in Vietnam. Danny Graham's obsessive, foolish formulation of his "High Frontier" dogma is the most concentrated expression of that psycho-sexual impotence.

Let us examine this crisis, and then examine the problem of psycho-sexual impotence in the setting of the kinds of command decisions required of the executive branch and its military institutions in face of that crisis.

### The real Soviet threat

Since 1962, the Soviet military command has been continually planning to win a war against the United States according to the outline set forth by the Zhukov-Sokolovskii-Ograkov current of the Soviet military, Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii's *Soviet Military Doctrine*. From the beginning, in 1962, that doctrine has had two leading features. To overcome the threat of thermonuclear "assured destruction," the Soviet military has combined the lessons of the German Liberation War's (Freiherr vom Stein, General Scharnhorst) conduct of the war on the Russian front against Napoleon Bonaparte (Russian depth), with emphasis on development and deployment of ABM weapons based on "new physical principles"—laser weapons, and so forth.

Now, the combined effects of relative superiority of Soviet military capabilities and the Malthusian destruction of the West from within economically and morally, have created for the Soviet leadership a "window of strategic opportunity," at the same point the Soviet command is emplacing new kinds of ABM radar facilities preparatory to saturating Soviet defenses with beam weapons.

The present Soviet command is convinced that the combinations of relative weakening of U.S. military strength, Soviet success in promoting European disengagement from



A soldier on guard during "Operation Masher," January 1966.

U.S. Army photograph

the United States, the Nuclear Freeze movement steered from Moscow, the worsening economic depression of the West, and imminent international financial collapse, will enable the Soviet Union to force a humiliating and historically decisive strategic backdown of the United States before the November 1984 U.S. elections, thus assuring Soviet world-hegemony thereafter.

This Soviet posture, reflected in the shooting down of KAL Flight 7, in the deployment of Qaddafi in North Africa, the deployment of forces of Iran and Syria in the Middle East, the unleashing of terrorism against the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, and the "Sputnik" effect of Soviet deployment of beam-weapon capabilities soon, is based partly on sly and thorough long-range calculations, but is also based on a fanatical, messianic quality of irrational commitment not distant in quality from the outlook of Ayatollah Khomeini.

However, the root of the strategic problem facing the United States is not the Soviet leadership or Soviet military capabilities as such. The heart of the problem lies within the West, in the policies of the circles represented by McGeorge Bundy and Henry A. Kissinger. The root of the strategic problem is the semi-secret agreements which the friends of the late Bertrand Russell and David Rockefeller—as well as Kissinger's current business partner, Britain's Lord Peter Carrington—have negotiated with the Soviet leadership through channels including the Pugwash Conference and the Dartmouth Conference.

It is these Pugwash Conference-centered forces, including Kissinger, who imposed upon the United States and NATO not only the Nuclear Deterrence, SALT I, and 1972 ABM Treaty doctrines, but who have also created and steered the upsurge of a Sodom and Gomorrah counterculture and the degeneration of Western economies into Malthusians' "post-industrial society" wreckage during the past period of more than 15 years.

The essence of the strategic problem of the United States is twofold. Immediately, we must mobilize to persuade the Soviet leadership that thermonuclear confrontation is inadvisable. At the same time, we must uproot and demolish every vestige of the evil doctrines of Bertrand Russell and the Pugwash Conference.

Danny Graham may oppose the 1972 ABM treaty, which he proposes we explicitly violate. Otherwise, he opposes every strategic policy upon which the very existence of the United States depends. He has not only demonstrated his stubborn military incompetence by proposing space-based anti-missile nuclear rockets, a 20-year-old design which has been hopelessly obsolete for nearly a decade. He proposes to pit this obsolete, and ultimately useless, High Frontier design against a qualitatively superior Soviet development of beam-weapon defenses. Worse, he loudly—and incompetently—opposes the technologies able to match Soviet ABM capabilities, technologies advanced by our nation's most qualified scientist specialists in these matters, including Dr. Edward Teller.

The Soviet command laughs at, and richly enjoys Danny Graham's silly antics. If Graham succeeds, Soviet victory over the United States is assured. Naturally, the Soviets accuse President Reagan of intending to adopt Graham's obsolete designs. It makes very good Soviet anti-U.S. propaganda. They would hope that the United States would be foolish enough to listen to Graham. Danny Graham may not be personally a traitor by disposition, but no Soviet agent assigned to his position in U.S. life would act any differently than Graham has done. We think the root of the problem is by no means treasonous impulses, but rather is simply a product of psycho-sexual impotence. We have compassion for poor Danny Graham; he may be in fact a spiritual victim of McGeorge Bundy's and Robert McNamara's conduct of the war in Vietnam.

### What is 'Entschlossenheit'

In his *On War*, Karl von Clausewitz employed and popularized the use of an ordinary German word, "*Entschlossenheit*," in his efforts to focus upon the distinguishing innermost quality indispensable to the military commander. In English, we would prefer "quality of command decision."

The importance of this term in military science was established by the new doctrine of military practice erupting out of Lazare Carnot's revolution in warfare, beginning 1793-94. Starting from the pivot-point of production and deployment of massed fire of new generations of mobile field artillery, Carnot redesigned the arms of warfare and their battlefield deployment, and raised the principles of firepower and mobility to new heights of importance, making technological attrition and logistical depth the leading qualities of concern to the central military command.

This revolution in warfare incorporated lessons tested in the American Revolution. The American, who represented a

90 percent literacy rate, more than twice that of Britain then, was culturally a superior fighter over the British soldier, a fighter whose individual cultural superiority and reliability under fire (potentially) were realized in such forms as aimed fire of riflemen in skirmish-line tactics, an effective increase in both firepower and mobility of the individual soldier. This general conception was rooted in the earlier work of George Gemisthos and Leonardo da Vinci during the 15th century, and Niccolo Machiavelli's doctrine of republican war-fighting at the beginning of the 16th century, as well as Gottfried Leibniz's work on weapons design and warfare, and mastery of the geometry of fields of fire by the French command of Vauban, Monge, et al. The individual citizen of any republic which is committed to technological progress, is potentially superior per man to any opposing sort of military force, both in durability of political will, individual resourcefulness, and in ability to discover and exploit new, usable dimensions of warfighting deployments.

The opposing, prevailing doctrine, prior to Carnot's reform, was called "cabinet-warfare doctrine." This was a doctrine based largely on relatively fixed positions and associated rules of battle conduct. It was a doctrine designed for desertion-prone, illiterate, "hayfoot-strawfoot" soldiers of the solid line of musket-fire and relatively fixed artillery position, and so forth.

Massed fire of mobile field artillery, faster-moving columns of infantry trained to deploy for combat from these columns, and reforms in the use of cavalry, enabled outnumbered French forces to demolish the 18th century armies of Europe, culminating in the destruction of Prussia in a single day's battle at Jena, in 1806. This cleared the way for the Prussian reformers around vom Stein, Humboldt, and Scharnhorst, to introduce to Prussia republican military reforms based on the model of reference developed by Carnot. This French tradition was injected massively into the U.S. military beginning 1815, and was affirmed by the experience of the 1861-65 war under Generals Grant and Sherman, crushing the highly able cabinet-warfare armies commanded by Lee et al. It was also massively confirmed at Sedan during the same general period, by a Prussian military which had not neglected the American lessons of 1861-65.

This is the historical basis for the modern military tradition prior to Nuclear Deterrence. It is the tradition to which we must instantly return.

This military tradition introduced two elements of fluidity into the conduct of warfare. First, it made *mobile development* the essence of tactics and strategy. This in itself already required military commanders to expand the scope of their mental life, to comprehend the battlefield in the enlarged terms of reference—the added dimensionality—mobile development implies. The genius of MacArthur's Pacific war and the famous work of General Patton in Europe are illustrative of the lessons of Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan. Second, even more important, the commander in the field and in

the general staff is obliged to devise on the spot virtual revolutions in war-fighting—doing what was previously considered to be “unthinkable.”

In both aspects, the proper metaphor is the term “flank.” One must find in either mobile development as such, a flank of one sort or another with which the adversary has not prepared himself to defend effectively, and to accomplish this by aid of maneuvering him into a position in which such a flank appears. or, one must recognize in one’s capabilities the possibility of doing something effective which simply has not been prescribed in any of the manuals of training programs.

This sort of behavior in the mental life of commanders is closely related to creative scientific work, to the work of genuine discovery. If a commander has the developed psychological aptitudes to make such tactical and strategic discoveries, the question of command then bears down upon two interrelated features of his psycho-sexual makeup. Does he have the temperament to push through his processes of thinking to the point of discovering a possibility, and working that through to its conclusion quickly? Second, does he have the will to deploy his forces ruthlessly, effectively to execute that discovery in battle?

This, in bare bones, is what Clausewitz signifies by *Entschlossenheit*—the quality of command decision. This is the quality Danny Graham presently demonstrates himself not only to lack; he is bitterly hostile toward anyone who lacks his own psycho-sexual impotence on this point.

### The secret of ‘creativity’

The secret of creativity is most efficiently and quickly described by reference to a conception introduced by Plato, the notion of *the hypothesis of the higher hypothesis*. This approach enables us to quickly, thereafter, locate the psycho-sexual element of impotence in thinking such as Danny Graham’s. The distinctions to be understood are as follows:

**Simple Hypothesis.** In this kind of attempted problem-solving, the individual seeks to explain the phenomena under consideration in a way which does not conflict the established principles of knowledge and practice of his peer group of reference. In the design of physical experiments in routine scientific work, this means that the hypothesis formulated for design of the experiment does not violate any principle which the experimenter believes to be the prevailing assumptions and formulations of science in general or the localized area of specialized interest.

Simple hypothesis typifies non-creative modes of scientific or other thinking in which apparent logical consistency with established opinion prevails.

**Higher Hypothesis.** In all creative thinking, as typified by thinking leading to greater or lesser scientific revolutions, an experiment is selected which conclusively challenges one or more of the most fundamental of the prevailing assumptions of either science as a whole or some branch of scientific inquiry. A successful such experimental demonstration

therefore overthrows the elaborated superstructure of algebraic or analogous formulations of either scientific work generally, or some branch of scientific inquiry.

“Higher Hypothesis” is by its nature intrinsically in opposition to the outlook of “Simple Hypothesis.” That distinction is key to the issues of psycho-sexual impotence, for reasons we shall indicate.

The fact that man’s progress since the “agricultural revolution” involves successive scientific revolutions—at least, implicitly so—and that technological progress causes increase of the potential relative population-density of society, prompts us to examine a deeper principle underlying successful higher hypotheses. Successive technological revolutions represent an increase in the per-capita power of mankind over nature, and therefore a line of progress in man’s attempt to master the underlying laws of the universe. This implies that there must be some underlying ordering principle governing the connection of one successful scientific revolution to its successors: a common principle of discovery, common to all properly defined higher hypotheses.

**The Hypothesis of the Higher Hypothesis.** This is a form of experimental hypothesis which selects its experimental subject to test the existence of an underlying common principle of scientific discovery.

The *isoperimetric theorem of topology* is an example of such experimental work. The work of Plato, Pacioli, Leonardo da Vinci, Kepler, Euler, on the study of the universal implications of the Platonic solids is another example. Karl Gauss’s discovery of the commonly underlying principle of self-similar conic and elliptic functions is another example: the “arithmetic-geometric mean.” The “Zeta function” of Riemann is an example of an incomplete effort of the same quality.

This does not represent the discovery of final, perfect universal laws of discovery. It represents the ongoing work of science in uncovering common principles of discovery which are valid as far as man has gone, and which are yet to be improved upon without repudiating the conditional adequacy of what has been discovered earlier to this purpose. This activity, of well-defined hypothesis of the higher hypothesis, is the essence of all scientific-creative work, and the exemplar of the proper meaning of the word “reason.” For emphasis, let us call it the principle of “creative reason,” a principle which Immanuel Kant failed to comprehend.

“Creative reason” is the inborn, divine potentiality of each human individual. However, to bring this forth in the individual, that individual must reach a certain level of moral development, a level corresponding to the line of upward development described by Dante Alighieri in the “Paradiso” canticle of his *Commedia*. True, a certain formal development of the knowledge of science (for example) is required to make such moral potentiality efficient for scientific work, but no amount of education and related qualifications can produce a creative thinker unless this moral development is

also present.

The moral development required is briefly identified in the following terms of reference.

At the moment of our birth, we are each predominantly irrationalist hedonists, infantile existentialists or anarchists. We possess the divine spark of potential development of reason, but at that moment we are dominated by our sensual desires for immediate satisfaction of our appetites in the here and now. If we mature—as many adults have not developed much beyond infantilism today—the certainty of our death persuades us that a life dedicated to momentary pleasures enjoyed in the flesh contributes nothing but memories which die with us in our graves. To live an existentialist's hedonistic, irrationalist life is therefore to live like a beast. If our lives are to be something more worthy than that of the cattle we slaughter rightly according to our needs, there must be something of our having existed which endures beyond our death, of durable benefit to mankind more generally. Therefore, to every person who is not an infantile beastlike, immoral existentialist, the true self-interest of each individual life is that of developing both the powers to contribute durable benefits, and to employ those potentials to the utmost for this purpose.

A wicked society might probably crush the good contributed by its individual members, and prefer the pleasures of Sodom and Gomorrah. Thus, we cannot limit our concerns to our own good works—unless we are fools. We must ensure that society as a whole is disposed to foster the development of potentialities for good in each individual, and to nurture the good contributed by each individual. That becomes the center of self-interest for the moral, sane individual.

For every moral and sane person, the center of his or her self-interest is knowledge of principles empirically displayed in the course of human history as a whole—in *universal history*. We must discover what principles govern the course of successive generations either toward advancement of the human condition, or toward deterioration. We must discover the principles of judgment which must guide us individually, and as a nation, if our life's work is to be of durable benefit for generations to come.

In Christianity, and in the Judaism of Philo—the Judaism of 2,000 years of Jewish survival—universal history is the empirical evidence of the lawful will of the Creator. It is man's duty to discern that lawful will with increasing perfection, and to govern the individual will and will of nations accordingly. In Christianity, this centers around the figure of Jesus Christ, and the principle of trinitarian consubstantiality as set forth in the Gospel of St. John and the "*Filioque*" principle of the Latin version of the Nicene Creed. We must share God's expressed love toward mankind, and seek to perfect our knowledge and practice of the lawful ordering of the universe according to the motive supplied by our own participation in that love. This is the highest condition mankind may achieve in Dante's "Paradiso" canticle.

It is that standpoint—that moral standpoint—which exemplifies the potential for creative reason. The ability to think rationally, and also to act rationally, according to universal values so defined, requires such a notion of individual self-interest, and the motive supplied as passion by that kind of love.

Without those moral qualities, an individual may be very clever—diabolically clever in a bestial way, but not a person gifted with the power of creative reason.

### **Rage and psycho-sexual impotence**

The principal correlative of Danny Graham's recent public behavior is an intense but petty rage, directed against me (most strenuously), against Dr. Teller, and against everyone who challenges the perfection of his ill-conceived High Frontier concoction. It is a quality of rage like that of Friedrich Nietzsche, M. Bakunin, or Fyodor Dostoevsky. It is morally bestiality.

An honest man in Graham's shoes would delight in learning something new and important, to become as quickly as possible a leading spokesman for something far better than he advocated yesterday. That is the pleasure of the creative mind, the pleasure of which no individual ought to deprive himself or herself. Does not a bright child in school delight in learning new things which overthrow earlier, wrong beliefs? Graham lacks—has lost—that capacity for beautiful, child-like delight in new discoveries.

Like a miserable Caliban, he roars and rages against everyone who threatens his present obsession with the technologically obsolete. The issues of the welfare of the United States—even in face of a menacing strategic crisis—can not penetrate his perception. Danny's obsession comes first; if it is no good for the United States, so much the worse for the United States.

There have been such generals aplenty in military history. There was the case of Field Marshal Haig, whose family announces that Gen. Alexander Haig is its cousin. Haig butchered the youth of Britain in France, in one insane infantry charge after another into artillery, machine-gun fire, and trenches, and left the cream of the youth of Britain hanging dead meat on the barbed wire of France. There have been such generals in history aplenty, men whose rage-governed petty obsessions with obsolete military ideas produced such slaughter.

This rage is the most prominent phenomenon of acute psycho-sexual impotence. It is the rage of the rapist, of the habituator of prostitutes, the rage of the homosexual, for example. A few simple obsessions, linked to a perverted sense of existentialist's self-interest, define the extent of the domain within which the person afflicted with such psycho-sexual impotence defines his simple hypothesis. Danny Graham's petty ego is the span of his present patriotic fervors. Perhaps it is the walking corpse of something which died in Vietnam. If so, it is not the only case of such a casualty.