

## Editorial

# A way out of the Pershing bind

When one contemplates the West's "peacenik" opponents of placing Pershing II medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, one might automatically assume that rationality is in favor of the Euromissiles. This is not the case.

Let's look more closely at those critics. They include men like Cyrus Vance and Paul Warnke—the men who made the decision in the first place to install the missiles.

In May 1978, Leonid Brezhnev and Helmut Schmidt had reached an agreement, in the context of broad industrial-cooperation and trade pacts, for rough parity in Europe. That was a perfectly workable agreement. But in 1979, Henry Kissinger went to NATO and, on behalf of the U.S. State Department and Chatham House in London, dictated the imposition of the Euromissiles. The Soviets responded by developing the SS-20s. The Euromissiles have been nothing but a destabilization factor; they don't benefit either side strategically; they are insane.

The Pershing IIs are an extension of "forward defense," the Kissingerian doctrine of limited nuclear war provocation. Cancelling the previous 23-minute warning time after launching against a Soviet target, the Pershings are five to six minutes away from nuclear war. It is understandable that Warsaw Pact nations say, "We have to get rid of these missiles at all costs, because this is the trigger for war."

The problem is not in their attempt to find negotiating formulas to deal with this trigger. The problem is that in the Mutually Assured Destruction framework in which negotiations are currently proceeding, there is no possibility of a political solution; and the strategic devolution will continue to be determined by the British gameplan of splitting Europe from a demented United States.

The current situation within the Atlantic Alliance starts with the fact that France will not negotiate the

French nuclear weapons systems in a NATO framework, as President Mitterrand has stressed, whatever the Fabians in his government may wish. And the British will never consent to give up their sovereign nuclear capability. What they will try to do is trade off something belonging to the United States—to make that so attractive that the Soviets say, "All right, the British are the lesser evil, let them keep their capability so long as we get something we consider equally valuable." It's a typical British trick.

In Germany, all sorts of Social Democrats and titled Bavarians and Allgemeine SS veterans are trying to make deals with the Warsaw Pact to obtain reunification. The Soviets may be led by this grouping's overtures to exaggerate the extent of current strategic negotiating possibilities.

The MAD framework, of dickering over medium-range weapons while pretending that the ICBMs will "deter" all-out thermonuclear war, belies the fact that wars are not caused by weapons, but by people. Weapons negotiations as such are not going to work unless they affect the policy-making structures which determine war. What is needed are direct talks between the Soviets and the United States, without British intermediation; Washington should consult with its allies, particularly in France and Germany, whom it has treated miserably, but the superpowers are the superpowers, and must solve their problems directly.

In the present situation of economic disaster, all the ingredients for war exist. If negotiations are left to the Kissingers, Kenneth Adelmans and Vances of this world, those ingredients will be detonated. *EIR* has long urged the parallel, independent development by each superpower of high-energy, antiballistic-missile beam-weapon defense systems capable of countering ICBM attacks—and of regenerating world technological development through their effects on civilian industry. From that standpoint, much can be accomplished.