

will threaten the very survival of the Polish nation.

These facts, unpleasant as they may seem to some, constitute reality. But even within this framework, steps could be taken by the United States to the benefit not only of the Polish people and Polish-American relations, but also of U.S. foreign policy on a broader scale. Few questions, for example, have so aggravated U.S. relations with Western European allies as the differences over policy towards Poland. Terminating the patently counter-productive economic sanctions against Poland is the obvious first step Washington should take; but that is only the first step. The real issue to be faced, for the United States as well as for Poland, is the international debt crisis.

Interview: Polish energy official Jan Kubit

In 1978, Poland resolved upon a goal of having 20 percent of the country's electrical energy generated by nuclear power by the year 1990. Even this figure was low by the standard of East European nuclear power targets at that time; yet it represented a healthy if belated beginning for the Polish nuclear industry. By January 1979, the 20 percent target had been radically scaled back to 8.6 percent—a 60 percent cutback! This was part of an overall defensive retrenchment of Polish economic plans, as the country came under pressure from international creditors. With the crisis of 1980, all bets were off on the future of Polish industry, and it is still an open question, whether Poland will return to its ambitious plans for nuclear industrial power.

EIR interviewed Jan Kubit, Plenipotentiary of the Ministry of Mining and Energy for Questions of Nuclear Energy, and Member of Parliament, in Warsaw in December.

EIR: What is the general energy situation in Poland?

Kubit: Obviously, the energy crisis touched Poland, too, although the timing differed here from that of the Western countries. In the West, the energy crisis—especially oil—struck in 1973-74, whereas in Poland it appeared in 1976. Of course, the question is, why? The answer is relatively simple. In the West, the share of oil used in producing electricity was rather large, and given the relatively cheap price of oil, a tendency developed in the West to build electricity plants using oil. Consequently, the West restricted the construction of plants fired with black and brown [lignite] coal.

In Poland, the percent of oil-fired stations is very small.

Thus, the crisis was moved forward in time in Poland. Starting in 1976, instead of intensifying the development of energy, including nuclear energy, it was hampered, and electric power stations were built only on coal. Now, we must openly say something that specialists have long known: the transformation of the primary energy in coal into heat energy is the most primitive. On the other hand, uranium ore has been, and can in the future be, used for heat generation.

This is the general background for the Polish energy situation. . . .

The issue is simple. Local authorities and inhabitants must learn to like nuclear energy. That is, they must see certain specific advantages in nuclear power development—apartments, schools, the whole social infrastructure—and they must recognize the building of a nuclear power station as a boon to the whole region. This is what pays, because losses associated with the interruption of building and prolongation of construction times are much bigger than the cost of building social infrastructure.

That is why we are not afraid of the greenies. We will teach them to love nuclear energy. Obviously the problem of radioactivity is a cheap propaganda device and not a technical problem. The threat to the environment from nuclear power is many times smaller than from coal or other energy sources. But people have always been afraid of something new. They were afraid of fire. That's why to be burned was the worst form of punishment. Later, they became afraid of the atom bomb, and thus became afraid of atoms. . . .

EIR: What about more advanced nuclear technologies: breeders, high-temperature reactors, fusion?

Kubit: As yet, there is no country, not even the U.S.A., that foresees the broad use of breeders by the year 2000. Well, in the U.S.S.R., except for the Byeloyarsk plant—which is the biggest in the world, 600 MWe—there has still not been any decision to build more reactors. And until then, breeders will not be subject to trade negotiations.

With the HTR, the process is even slower. We can foresee the use of these reactors for production of heat for processes, such as the gassification of coal. But this is a theme for the future.

For the immediate future, the next 30 to 35 years, the pressurized water reactor will dominate. The size of the reactors will not be increased, merely more of them will be built. Efforts of scientists and technicians must be concentrated on unification, standardization in order to diminish costs of utilization and renovation of stations. There is a lot more to be done here, and a lot of new possibilities.

EIR: We think that development of [anti-ballistic-missile] beam weapons would start a new era in the nuclear field and spur a new technological revolution.

Kubit: I am not a politician. . . . I think it is the basic aim of all scientists to utilize all scientific means for full devel-

opment. I would like to see scientists solve the problem of using a higher degree of the energy of uranium. Right now we are using less than one percent of the energy content of uranium. We can use up to 79 percent. This is the task of the whole civilized world, because the lack of energy is affecting the world. This applies to industry too. In this area, competition is a wonderful platform, and thus it is what we have to aim at.

Interview: Bazyli Samojlik, senior economic adviser

Bazyli Samojlik is an economic adviser to Prime Minister Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski. Dr. Samojlik explains his view of the short-term thinking behind Poland's application to join the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in this interview, conducted in December 1982 in Warsaw.

EIR: Poland is actively seeking to gain membership in the IMF. What is the reason for this?

Samojlik: Because of the level of our debt, our inability to pay, and the strong demand for credit for our most urgent needs, we are looking for every possible source of credit, even if it is on bad terms.

The issue of trade sanctions has made this question even more urgent. Generally, our possibilities of exports to the United States are not all that great. But what is more important is that because of the revocation of Most Favored Nation status by the United States, we cannot get [U.S.] credits for purchases.

We need credit. Our application to the IMF for membership is to be seen in that light. It is a possible source of credit. We are not that concerned about IMF control over the economy. Already, the degree of control by the IMF and the banks is huge. The foreign banks know more about the Polish economy than the average Polish citizen.

Nor are there things we are trying to hide from them. We are ourselves trying to change our economy. We don't think there will be any dramatic change after we gain IMF membership. In general, the approach they recommend for changes is the same as we are applying anyway. . . .


We know the standard IMF conditions, and we do have in our economic policy certain principles which will contravene the measures they demand. This might be a source of collision between our internal policy and IMF expectations. But, as I have said, our sources of credit are very narrow. . . .

I personally am very pessimistic about what we can get from the IMF, and about relations with the IMF in general, but that's mainly because I don't know what political conditions are attached.

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