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The Soviet command displays its scientific and strategic power

by Rachel Douglas

The Moscow daily *Izvestia* attacked Henry Kissinger again the other day, which deserves notice. Not that the article had anything of the quality of *EIR*'s vigorous forecast of Kissinger's demise (*EIR*, Oct. 19, 1982). But embedded in the turgid prose of the Soviet Neanderthal school of rhetoric was one informative sentence.

Izvestia faulted Kissinger on Oct. 29 for holding that "it is only possible to trade with the socialist countries if they begin 'internal political changes'." That little formula recalls not only the posture known in Kissinger's days of managing détente as the "Sonnenfeldt doctrine," but also the current stance of Kissinger's friend, Secretary of State George Shultz. Shultz is currently cast as the man who can patch up relations with Western Europe on the basis of a "global strategy" for trade relations with Eastern Europe. Regarding "internal political changes" in the East, Shultz hosted a conference on "Democratization in Communist Countries" at the State Department Oct. 18-19, which was billed as an implementation session for President Reagan's June 1982 speech to the British Parliament.

Because of these echoes, *Izvestia*'s incidental polemic with Kissinger helps clear the air around interpretations of a benchmark speech delivered by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev on Oct. 27. What it communicates, as do other Moscow sources, is that the security of the Warsaw Treaty Organization defines a limit to Soviet accommodations with Kissinger, Shultz, or their senior associates in London, even in such a time of geopoliticking as the present.

This is also the message of the Soviet military-political leadership, as it showed itself when Brezhnev appeared before commanders of Soviet forces from districts all over the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, flanked by Prime Minister Tikhonov, Defense Minister Ustinov, Foreign Minister Gromyko, and Politburo members Andropov and and Chernenko, who represent the transitional leadership of the succession period.

In Washington, there has been serious suggestion that the Brezhnev speech, which both assured the military of a high level of supplies and demanded from the military their more efficient use, be primarily read as a sign of Soviet weakness—the kind of sign that would justify the Kissingerian method of conducting relations with Moscow. Especially as long as the United States is in a deep economic decline, such an interpretation can only be the basis for strategic miscalculations.

The Soviet leader's speech before such an audience, publicization of which was unusual for the Soviets, revealed contours of an emerging post-Brezhnev leadership coalition such as *EIR* outlined last issue. It is an alliance of the military with political leaders and technical people from the heavy-industry sector, people who will try reforms and crackdowns against the bureaucracy in order to loosen the Soviet economy's worst bottlenecks, but will be in no rush to put the defense sector on short rations.

Some details of Brezhnev's presentation, such as his mention of his personal, day-to-day involvement with military decisions and the briefings he receives from Ustinov, were pointed reminders on his part of the power concentrated in his hands.

Remarks two days later by his long-time aide Konstantin Chernenko, who said in Soviet Georgia that Brezhnev was too busy with preparations for the mid-November Central Committee plenum to leave Moscow "even for a short time," suggested that Brezhnev was asserting his personal authority with an eye toward claiming the decisive say on organization changes that may be pending in the leadership bodies. The overriding message, however, was that every Soviet party leader, now and with the succession, has to act in concert with the military if he is to act effectively.

A British observer of Soviet affairs found such a policy pattern confirmed by Brezhnev's speech, and commented to *EIR* that, "the alliance of the military command and the industrial managers has been sealed. . . . They have put forward prescriptions that cannot be ignored. They have

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mapped out a technological-industrial strategy for the U.S.S.R. for the next 10 years. Their attitude is: 'We will have to do it.' "

The same attitude, with slight modification, applies to Eastern Europe. At present, the Soviets are scarcely discouraging debt-strapped East European countries from applying to the International Monetary Fund for rescue—on the principle that someone else's bailing them out is preferable to Moscow's doing it; but the message is equally clear that those countries must stay inside the Soviet defense perimeter. On Oct. 15, *Pravda* published a long, unsigned article on "deepening socialist economic integration," largely devoted to the need to develop new technologies in electronics and other fields to "ensure a sharp upturn in labor productivity" and "technical and economic independence from the capitalist West." *Pravda* gave an example of East European integration, one with obvious military meaning: freight cross-haul time could be reduced, *Pravda* said, if Russian broad-gauge railroads were extended "deep into the territory of fraternal countries."

Science and the art of war

When we reported on the 26th Party Congress of the Soviet Union and contemplated the cuts in American science funding by the first sweep of Budget Director David Stockman's scythe, *EIR* commented on March 24, 1981: "If the intended policies of both nations are carried out, the United States will be reduced to a third-rate power status by the time President Reagan completes his first term in office." We quoted Brezhnev's words to the Congress about "regroupment of scientific forces of the Soviet Union" for encouraging the use of frontier technologies for economic expansion. The Soviets, we revealed, were talking about "fundamental breakthroughs which lead to new domains in human activity," and we concluded that, "if the present anti-science bias of our defense policy is not reversed. . . important national resources are going to be locked into commitments leading us further and further away from what must be done to meet the Soviet scientific challenge."

The Brezhnev speech centered on that same 26th Party Congress theme, which is timely today, when a national debate on the possibility of using directed beam technologies for strategic defensive weaponry has been joined in the Untied States, but by no means settled.

Brezhnev called for "due account of the latest achievements of science and the art of war." Saying that a foreign policy is only "effective when it relies on the real economic and military strength of a state," Brezhnev added, "Competition in military technology has sharply intensified, often acquiring a fundamentally new character. . . . We expect that our scientists, designers, engineers and technicians will do everything possible to resolve successfully all tasks connected with this."

Brezhnev defined the privileges and responsibilities of the armed forces in national policy: ''Our people loves its Armed Forces and is confident of their constant preparedness to defend their socialist homeland. . . . The people spare nothing for them to be able always to rise to their task. We supply the Armed Forces with the most modern weapons and combat technology. The Central Committee of the party takes measures so that you will not lack anything. And the Armed Forces should always be worthy of this care.''

America and China

Brezhnev's speech and the one given Oct. 29 by Chernenko included statements on Soviet relations with the United States and China.

While Brezhnev criticized the United States for "a political, ideological, and economic offensive against socialism" and "threatening to push the world into the flames of a nuclear war," Chernenko practically gloated over the erosion of United States power and influence. Ticking off areas of the world where Washington experiences "tension" in its relations (Western Europe, Japan, Latin America and the Mideast were named), and pointing to soaring numbers of bankruptcies and unemployed persons in the United States, Chernenko quoted an unspecified American newspaper: "If Moscow could manage to infiltrate its agents into the White House, it could still hardly do more to undermine the authority of America than is being done by the present administration."

Where American policy has floundered, both Brezhnev and Chernenko made clear, the Soviets are looking to bolster their own position. This is eminently true in the case of whose "China Card" may prevail.

Brezhnev exceeded his previous comments on the Moscow diplomatic overture to Peking for "normalization" of ties, in the following passage:

"Our relations with China are of no small significance. We honestly desire normalization of relations with this country and we are doing everything that depends on us for this. In Peking now they also say that normalization is desirable. As yet, changes of a principle nature are not visible in the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. But the things which appear must not be ignored by us."

Chernenko even spoke of relations "with the great Chinese neighbor of the U.S.S.R.," the kind of language of esteem not heard in many years with respect to China.

This upgrading of terminology reflects the results of a first round of normalization talks, held by Deputy Foreign Minister L. Ilyichov in Peking and due to be followed by a second round in Moscow, at an un-announced date. From the Soviet side, these talks were part of a strategy, outlined by Brezhnev at a March 1982 speech in Tashkent, for creating "a big zone of peace and stability" on the Asian continent, i.e., on the U.S.S.R.'s eastern flank.

The zone was already defined, in Brezhnev's summary, by the stable relations between the Soviet Union and India, and could be expanded by improvement of relations with China and with Japan. The Chinese, for their own reasons, have made some response.