NATO science and environmental official lauds the 'greening' of the alliance

In the June 15 issue of *EIR*, European Economics Editor Laurent Murawiec demonstrated how NATO created environmentalism and the peace movement. Speeches and policy documents by NATO's "movers and shakers"—including former U.S. ambassador to NATO and Aspen Institute executive Harlan Cleveland, NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns, and Club of Rome founder Aurelio Peccei—revealed that NATO's major objective is to control and contain the development of technology. NATO is only secondarily concerned with military matters.

The redirecting of NATO into an instrument for steering members into a common post-industrial future took a giant step forward in 1969 with the creation, by Henry Kissinger and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, among others, of the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS). They sold President Nixon on adding "a new social dimension" to NATO, concerned with "the degradation of national environments under the impact of technologically based industrialization."

The role of NATO's non-military adjuncts, such as CCMS and the Science Committee, are a theme of the interview Murawiec conducted on June 15 with the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Scientific and Environmental Affairs, Dr. Philip W. Hemily, who explains the symbiotic relationship between NATO "technology assessment" projects run by those committees, and peace-protest/terrorist movements such as the Green Party in West Germany. The interview took place at NATO headquarters in Brussels. Excerpts follow.

Murawiec: At the end of the April 1978 NATO conference commemorating the 20th anniversary of the NATO Science Committee, Harlan Cleveland demanded that the committee provide "more policy input" to NATO activities in general. What has happened since then?

Hemily: The focus of Harlan's remarks was only implicitly the NATO Science Committee; in fact he addressed himself very much to the NATO governments. But a good deal has happened. We have seen the end of a cycle of 20 years during which we built a good base of support for basic sciences, especially with our [NATO] exchange programs. After the Sputnik, there had to be a lot of science and technology; our programs provided a unique basis for transatlantic interaction.

In the latter part of the 1970s, with the economic downturn, the slowdown of the growth period had its consequences. Questions were asked about new needs and new priorities. . . .

The conference demonstrated the third dimension of NATO. We're picking up that thrust: in fact, the foundations of the Atlantic alliance are much, much broader than usually portrayed; they're economic, they're political. They must be taken one step further: We are peoples that share a common heritage, a common patrimony. We want to stress this ingredient of the alliance.

We propose—and it will be accepted in the next few months by the North Atlantic Council, the highest body of the alliance—to create a Foundation for Science, the Environment, and Culture, as an umbrella, a general mechanism for all the non-military aspects of the alliance, an umbrella under which the Science Committee will continue, the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS), etc. In fact we already have inside NATO a small cultural committee, working under the information department, which deals with . . . people who research the political-economic aspects of defense and security policies. It is a nucleus from which we can build.

The Foundation will group the existing institutions. Its board will be the North Atlantic Council. It will provide the basis for establishing an endowment, much

like the U.S. national foundation for the arts and humanities. . . . It will permit us to bring in private funds, new funds from the outside.

Murawiec: Back in 1978, what did the ad hoc group you referred to work on?

Hemily: We did two things to promote interaction, with a new option of addressing social problems, and successfully so. We became concerned with the welfare of the developing countries who belong to the alliance, and their scientific institutions. In spite of some resistance, by 1980 the North Atlantic Council endorsed the program.

The distinguished member of the Club of Rome who is also on the board of the [NATO] Science Committee, former minister Eduard Pestel, pushed a lot for this.

We changed the Science Committee, made it more operational. It now sends an annual message, for example to the political, economic, and scientific communities of the alliance. The first message was on the management of research systems in a period of zero growth.

We need to maintain a healthy system of industrial research, without isolationism. We're a forum for that, and we work with the European Science Foundation, which is based in Strasbourg. It's sponsored by the European Community, so with them and the U.S. National Academy of Science, the Academy of Engineering, we—the NATO Science Committee—did a lot of work on this quarter. We concluded that interaction must be promoted, especially for industrial researchers.

We decided to choose those areas which were not a priority elsewhere. Nuclear physics, for example, was a preferred area: well covered, well funded by governments, by other institutions, so there was no point in our supporting nuclear physics; medical research is a low priority for us too.

Until quite recently, we still devoted some effort to basic science, but there has been a shift. We looked into what one could call "science, technology, and zero growth." We looked at new areas of science and engineering, especially what we call "oriented research," a targeted area of interest for an industry, a product. So you'll have NATO Advanced Studies Institutes [ASIs] on the designing and manufacturing of microcircuits, chips. . . .

Murawiec: What about social sciences?

Hemily: Ah! These sciences are commonly looked at as "soft," but Pestel and others have always insisted that without much more input from the social and behavioral sciences, many of the problems posed by technology cannot be understood, like unemployment. . . . One should not take the social sciences as "instant social sciences" like you make instant coffee, as Dr. Henry David said at the 1978 conference. David is a very good man. He was at Cambridge, at the LBJ school [The Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs of the University of Texas at Austin], at Columbia University and the National Science Foundation, and the president of the New School for Social Research. He will be coming here early July to critique our wisdom. . . .

So, we're reinventing parts of Futures Research here, in the social-behavioral field—like our human factors panel working on ergonometrics, the man-machine relationship, how to civilize the machines. . . . We've done studies on the adjustment process for Turkish workers returning from Germany to Turkey, to their village.

Murawiec: What about demographic studies?

Hemily: It's come up very much recently. We look more at the population problems within the alliance, since the Club of Rome is looking at the worldwide trends. We're looking at the current resource assessment. The [NATO] economics directorate has examined East bloc demographics, but the panel on eco-social sciences will be examining the demographic analysis. The *Global 2000 Report* of the Carter administration has been discussed here a great deal under CCMS especially.

But there's a problem with CCMS. At the beginning, in 1969, when Nixon gave his speech in Washington which called for establishing this "third dimension of NATO"—the speech had been written by Moynihan and his staff—CCMS had a broad-based perspective.

[Now] it's really looking for a role. Of course, CCMS did great work on energy conservation, and solar energy—they were real pioneers, but the International Energy Agency has picked up the work of CCMS where CCMS had left it. We celebrated the tenth anniversary of CCMS in Washington in 1979, and some countries were very reluctant to get into politically sensitive areas.

In the past, the French had been very reluctant but recently French interest has increased enormously. Think how significant it is that the Deputy Secretary General of NATO for Scientific and Environmental Affairs is a Frenchman now!

Murawiec: What issues should be tackled by CCMS?

Hemily: Issues such as terrorism. It's sensitive, sure, but questions should be raised: What are the experiences of various countries? Another subject that ought to be discussed is drugs. That's a worldwide problem.

CCMS meetings are now at a very senior level, at a political level, if you wish. Our annual "roundtables," like the 1980 roundtable on technology assessment, have turned out to be quite controversial. At first, European governments are very reluctant to go into this—and then the [West German] Green Party, the environmentalist party, put pressure on the governments and forced them to establish units that will assess technological developments. So we outlined the manner of doing it.

To come back to the *Global 2000 Report;* it was good,

comprehensive; it invited stimulating criticism. As Peccei had said for *Limits to Growth,* it was a good commando raid. The time had come for the ideas that are in it. What was needed was to make outrageous statements, to get people concerned. Not that *Global 2000* was outrageously wrong, but it got people arguing the right way.

Global 2000 was a result of the process initiated by *Limits to Growth,* and it stimulated the debate afresh throughout the world. There has been a difficult problem with the new [U.S.] administration, which either had a different approach or rejected initially that of *Global 2000.* Now they reassessed *Global 2000.* . . .

Then, last fall, we decided to start working on an assessment of the assessment. In November, CCMS will hold a roundtable discussion on the real challenges facing the Western societies that can be coped with in a short time-frame. We don't want to look at problems of the oceans in a hundred years, but at problems posed right now. . . . [Club of Rome collaborator] Jacques Lesourne has helped us a lot.

Murawiec: What questions will you address?
Hemily: Questions like the atmosphere at work, technological unemployment, demographic trends in an aging population, the bankruptcy of social security systems, the work ethic, the peace movement—certainly the peace movement! Apart from the efforts by the Soviets and the extreme left to manipulate it—the rest, many people in that movement, are very sincere. We must deal—that's one theme—with the youth movement, the alienation of the young. . . .

Murawiec: So now NATO's priority goes to "out-of-area" deployments in the social-cultural field?
Hemily: That's exactly right, I could not agree more. Those are the really serious problems facing mankind in the longer term, barring the risk of nuclear war, and they represent a worldwide bomb with a slow fuse; it's already burning. The lesson of the May 7 [NATO defense ministers'] resolution and the June 10 [NATO summit] resolution [at which NATO out-of-area deployment was approved—ed.] is that it is issues outside our little family of nations that have an increasingly serious impact on us. It is now understood by everyone. France and Germany did not want to discuss these problems before, now they do. The Middle East, Africa. . . .

Murawiec: With which institutions did CCMS originally work?
Hemily: Well, it's very informal. Russell Train, with Moynihan, was the first U.S. representative at CCMS. Now he leads the World Wildlife Fund. So. WWF, NATO, the OECD, the Club of Rome, IIASA [the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Vienna, a joint NATO-KGB think tank—ed.], IFIAS [International Federation of Institutes for Advanced Studies], all work together, without any of the constraints and formalisms. There is a network of like-minded people that are interacting together—there is a symbiotic relationship among these organizations.

Murawiec: Is there work with the Soviets on these issues?
Hemily: Yes, through UNEP [the U.N. Environmental Program] in particular, and through ECE [the U.N.'s Economic Commission on Europe]. The Russians had a hard time admitting it at the beginning; they said there is no pollution here, only capitalism produces pollution. Then they were hit by this Lake Baikal affair [the pollution of the world's largest fresh-water lake by paper mills—ed.] and then they saw good reasons for collaborating. A lot of bilateral agreements of cooperation on ecology were signed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the détente years until 1978. There was extensive interaction with the Soviet Union, through the U.N., ECE especially. Now it's at a standstill. Sadly enough, IIASA is in trouble. What stupidity to have put a KGB man [Djermen Gvishiani] at the helm there! Such an amateur spy! It's sad. It has given a pretext for the U.S. to cut off its participation, the British are withdrawing too. . . . This network of communications, my God, we've got to keep it alive! And the Soviets, they have problems, they must deal with these: they have alienation, youth alcoholism. . . .

[In a 1981 interview with *EIR,* Club of Rome cofounder Alexander King revealed that he had collaborated with IIASA head Gvishani since the founding of the Club in 1969. Gvishiani officially joined the Club of Rome in 1981—ed.]

This relationship between King and Gvishiani, how close! CCMS has links with the East bloc countries. In our [NATO] advanced science institutes—there are 80 a year, with 10-15 percent of the attendees not coming from NATO countries, and a good deal of these from the Eastern countries—we talk with them. This creates networks, a network of people who know each other. What counts is not just the two weeks they spend together, but the years after. Symbiotic relationships are established, long-lasting ties. We should have more of these—that's also what Basket Two of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Helsinki Summit] called for, science, education, and the environment. In fact, we should have NATO and the Warsaw Pact sponsor jointly 8 or 10 such interacting projects every year.

Murawiec: How did you operate the transition from the era of the "Sputnik Gap" to that of "Limits to Growth"?
Hemily: Well, there was the period of the "technological gap"—King can tell you a lot about that, after all, Servan-Schreiber's book [Le Defi Américain—ed.] was

essentially OECD texts he appropriated. There was this meeting in Deauville on the management of technology on both sides of the Atlantic. I was involved. Out of this was decided to establish an International Institute for the Management of Technology. It was established in Milan in 1971, with Olivier Giscard d'Estaing, the brother [an executive of IBM-France—ed.], Aurelio Peccei, Umberto Colombo, top Germans, Britons, and Dutch. But it never worked. It failed and it disappeared. We could not get the European industries to be integrated. Perhaps the concept was wrong—why separate "technology" from management in general? There was already the INSEAD [Institut Supérieur Européen d'Administration des Affaires, located in Fontainebleau, France, near the former NATO headquarters—ed.]; then, King also helped a lot to establish the EIRMA, the European Industrial Research Management Association, which I always call Irma La Douce. There was Peccei and [Trilateral Commission member Humberto] Colombo and King and Casimir the Dutchman—the 100 top high-technology firms in the world linked together through that institute, which trains managers.

For the last 20 years we've had these fantastic people, King, Peccei—what can we do when they disappear? Before the Club of Rome, in NATO, there had been the report of the three wise men, Lester Pearson, Gaetano Martino, and Halvard Lange [the foreign ministers of Canada, Italy, and Norway, respectively, who were commissioned by the North Atlantic Council in 1956 to write a report on "non-military cooperation in NATO." They wrote that the nation-state "is inadequate for progress or even survival in the nuclear age."—ed.] on non-military cooperation within NATO. Then later, a study sponsored by the (NATO) Science Committee, funded by the Ford Foundation, the Armand report, and then the Kilian report. It called for the establishment of a European MIT. . . . It almost came up! Pierre Aigrain [a physicist who served in various high research administrative posts under French President Charles de Gaulle—ed.] was instrumental in that—he was carrying very strict instructions from le general—[De Gaulle]—to kill it.

Murawiec: What other institutions do you work with?
Hemily: There is the European Science Foundation, [Lord] Brian Flowers was its first president. We work closely with them, on this informal basis of a network. We could have more useful links with OECD, officially, if it were not for this "neutrality" thing.

But at staff level, the interaction is total. One of our staffers here with NATO is the man who originally set up the FAST program [Forecasting and Assessing Science and Technology] at the European Community. He was a graduate of SPRU [Science Political Research Unit, Sussex University, Tavistock Institute—ed.], and stayed some while with IIASA. . . . It's all the same network.

Book Review

The crimes of Lord Mountbatten

by Uma Zykofsky

Mountbatten and the Partition of India
by Dominique Lapierre and Larry Collins
Vikas Publishing House Pvt.
New Delhi, 1982, rupees 401

The British Crown has always cosmeticized its imperialist design as an effort to uplift impoverished and backward peoples. This myth has been cultivated most energetically by the British East India Company and its kept historians in regard to India, the jewel of the far-flung British Empire from the 18th century until 1947.

The idea that British imperialism is a cheerful acceptance of "the white man's burden" was forcibly imported to the colonies, by means of the re-education of the indigenous elites. While India's poor "natives" were victimized by British Malthusian looting and taxation policies, the subcontinent's leadership was taken to Great Britain and anglicized. At Oxford and Cambridge Universities, they were taught to believe that before the British set foot in India, their native land was steeped in bestiality and irrationalism.

Of course, the British were lying. The true history of the Indian subcontinent includes a great contribution to world civilization, stretching with unbroken continuity over 5,000 years. Sanskrit, the world's oldest language, was a product of this rich history and culture. Throughout their rule of India, the British conspired to destroy this culture as a living tradition, going so far as to hide crucial historical and archaeological data from the Indians, to better press their case that the country was savage, uncultured, and in need of colonial rule.

India's leaders in the fight for independence—notably Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Maulana Kalam Azad—considered the rediscovery of India's history central to their freedom struggle. Only upon the base of India's millennia-old traditions and philosophical wealth could a new nation-building effort be carried out in the post-World War II period, they believed. A foremost figure in his effort was Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the anti-British philologist, historian, and lawyer who began the project to revive and re-energize India through a writing of its actual history.