

Haig backs London's NATO reorganization

by Lonnie Wolfe

It is perfectly lawful that the British policy circles pressing for a reorganization of NATO chose their loyal servant Robert McNamara as their up-front spokesman.

Though it was McNamara who shipped tactical nuclear weapons to Western Europe, he did so as a quick fix to psychologically bluff and threaten the Soviets, but never thinking that they would be used. According to sources in the defense community, McNamara and his sponsors in the policy establishment do not believe there will ever be a war in Europe or, for that matter, that the Soviets would ever deploy, for any reasons, their strategic nuclear forces. It is this utopian thinking that has governed the systematic dismantling of U.S. strategic capabilities, in favor of conventional forces for population warfare.

When the phony peace rhetoric of McNamara's *Foreign Affairs* article is stripped away, the McNamara proposal breaks down as follows. In the first phase, the United States and its NATO allies join the Soviets in a no-first-use pledge covering Europe. In the next phase, this is extended to the rest of the world. Strategic arsenals would become useless and then be eliminated.

Additional monies could be shifted into conventional arms. By removing the threat of nuclear retaliation, McNamara et al. could launch conventional warfare in the developing sector, either through surrogates or directly, without risk.

Taylor's genocide doctrine

McNamara represents the civilian current of the utopian "no-win" conventional warfare policy pole within the NATO establishment, the networks most associated with the NATO Brussels headquarters and NATO General Secretary Luns. The utopian military current is most vocally represented in the United States by the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the McNamara era, Gen. Maxwell Taylor.

While Taylor will maintain some distance from the no-first-use pledge, in a series of articles in the *Washington Post* and elsewhere, he has repeatedly stated that nuclear weapons are useless for the wars of the future. Taylor, like McNamara, is a member of the Draper Fund for Population Activities, an organization which includes as its director Prince Phillip of Great Britain,

and is dedicated to the systematic reduction of world population levels by any means necessary. Taylor is one of their military strategists. In an interview obtained by *EIR* last year, Taylor reported that a study he prepared for the Draper Fund has caused him to conclude that more than a billion people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America would have to be written off—i.e., they will be eliminated through war, disease, or famine.

This genocidal chaos in the developing sector, Taylor argues, must be policed by the United States and its allies. Using rhetoric about "matching forces with missions," Taylor therefore concludes that U.S. and NATO forces must be redesigned into some modern-day equivalent of the British colonial forces.

This is the policy doctrine behind the Carter administration's *Global 2000 Report*, which recommends the reduction of world population by 2 billion people. This is also the policy, as this journal has documented previously, behind Alexander Haig's efforts to foment regional warfare in Central and South America.

Taylor, like other utopians, firmly believes that the Soviets will buy these "new rules," that they will allow the British-dominated directorate to depopulate the developing sector as long as the Soviet Union or its allies are not threatened militarily. At some point, however, this colonial warfare policy will alter the strategic balance, making nuclear war not only likely, but inevitable.

A litmus test

Anyone who is currently focusing on the need for conventional deterrence or significant conventional force improvement in Europe as a *principal* problem for the NATO alliance is part of the same British-directed conspiracy as McNamara and Taylor. Similarly, anyone who is focusing attention to the problem of out-of-area NATO deployments is a British conspirator.

Carroll Wilson and his European Security Study (ESECS) fit the bill on both counts. In an interview obtained by this journal, Wilson made clear two basic premises of ESECS: 1) nuclear weapons are not useable and upgraded conventional deterrence must be the future direction of NATO policy; and 2) the alliance must concern itself much more with out-of-area deployments. Wilson makes his arguments from a number of standpoints, including those made by fellow ESECS member McGeorge Bundy in his co-authored *Foreign Affairs* piece, that the alliance can no longer politically afford the deployment of nuclear weapons.

The Wilson-ESECS strategy will eventually lead to a shift of focus away from the central front which it professes to study to some support role for out-of-area deployments by the British, the Americans, and the French. Statements that nuclear weapons are useless show a continued desire to maintain the Malthusian



The Uncertain Trumpet

economic and anti-science policies that have wrecked Western military capabilities over the last 20 years.

These utopians believe that, if necessary, they can threaten the Soviets with a nuclear strike with their new “miracle weapon”—the cruise missile. The United States plans to deploy nearly 10,000 of these cheap, million-dollar-a-copy, low-flying drones through 1988, regardless of whether any are deployed in Europe. The utopians think that firing the cruise en masse, large numbers of modern-day Nazi V-1 buzz-bombs, will make it through Soviet defenses.

The British Directorate

The Atlantic Council study group reflects similar thinking. The major arguments in their published document, *Strengthening Deterrence*, can be summarized as follows:

It is no longer likely that the Soviet Union will ever launch a military attack on Western Europe; the penalty is too high. There is also too much of a reliance on nuclear weapons systems within the alliance, especially since the likelihood of deploying such systems in actual war-fighting is slim. Instead, the alliance finds itself weak in much-needed conventional forces and a credible conventional deterrent, says the study.

Military conflict in Europe, the study says, has been replaced by economic and political subversion by the Soviets. The continued reliance on nuclear weapons

exacerbates this problem by causing fear among European populations. A solution lies in increasing Europe’s contribution to a conventional force improvement.

The principal theatre of conflict, the council finds, will not be Europe but the developing sector. Out-of-area NATO deployments must be handled not through formal structures, but through informal arrangements among nations that have the capability. Nations like West Germany which have limited ability for military and political means to deploy out-of-area (i.e., out of Europe), should assist such deployments by picking up additional defense responsibilities within the alliance.

In private interviews obtained by *EIR*, spokesmen for the Atlantic Council were quite explicit about the form they intend for a reorganized NATO. NATO, said a member of the study group, would be divided into effectively two bodies—one more or less inert, dealing with the European front of NATO, and a second, informal directorate, to deal with out-of-area deployments, both dominated by British policy interests.

The first grouping would eventually evolve into some version of the old European Defense Community proposal for a European body within the overall NATO policy-making channels. This proposal, which would have as its major effect the reduction of the power of the United States within the alliance, was originally put forward by the British in the early 1950s and scuttled by the French.

The second grouping, the directorate, would be comprised of the British, the Americans, and the French. Its policies would be dominated by British colonial warfare doctrine for the developing sector. Their deployments, according to the Atlantic council spokesman, would “trample” concepts of national sovereignty, acting in total disregard of accepted practices of international law.

The Atlantic Council spokesman stressed that their main policy objective is refocusing NATO south—into the developing sector. There had been discussion of whether NATO should take on additional crisis-management functions such as control of trade with the East bloc. These problems, the spokesmen said, should be handled by other mechanisms outside of NATO, to avoid complicating the refocusing process.

Dealing with opposition

Atlantic Council and ESECS sources recognize that there is opposition to their reorganization plans. For one thing, American patriots might resent being reduced to a deployable vassal of British policy-interests within the NATO command.

At least one important feature of the current Malvinas crisis, as defense community sources point out, is that it is considered an advertisement for the need to increase conventional force capabilities for so-called out-of-area deployments. But the crisis also contains

unanticipated pitfalls for the Atlantic Council-ESECS crowd by demonstrating general British military incompetence and a building resentment among the American people for continued British colonial doctrine.

It is also recognized that the current political composition of Europe is not right for the scheme. The backers of the British NATO organization plan, therefore, to use the peace movement and terrorist capabilities to destabilize and topple adversary governments, like that of Helmut Schmidt in West Germany. According to an Atlantic Council spokesman, by 1984, the European political map will be populated by right-wing neo-fascist regimes perfectly amenable to their doctrine.

The United States and Reagan administration present the greatest potential challenge to this conspiracy. While the administration is riddled with Angophile traitors like Secretary of State Haig, the President himself remains skeptical of the conventional warfare doctrine. His statements on Soviet strategic superiority, while inadvertently fueling the rigged debate on nuclear

doctrine, is an attack on the McNamara-Taylor concepts from his own muddleheaded terms of reference. More importantly, there are still patriotic, traditionalist circles in the U.S. military establishment, who remember whom we fought in the American revolution, and why.

ESECS, the Atlantic Council, and McNamara and company are counting on the inability of these opposition currents to come together and formulate an alternative policy. Should that happen, the planned chaos and confusion of the coming period will provide the climate for their policy coup, and their reorganization plans will likely go through.

The proposals by Democratic Party figure Lyndon LaRouche and the National Democratic Policy Committee on military doctrine represent just the kind of perspective required to catalyze this anti-British, anti-colonial current in the military and the U.S. population. There are now two competing proposals on the agenda for NATO reorganization.

Who's who on the Atlantic Council

The following are members of the Atlantic Council working group on the credibility of the NATO deterrent. The New York Council on Foreign Relations is abbreviated as CFR.

Kenneth Rush, co-chairman; chairman, Atlantic Council; CFR; former deputy secretary of defense.

Brent Scowcroft, co-chairman; CFR; former assistant to the President for national security affairs.

Francis O. Wilcox, project director; director general, Atlantic Council; CFR.

Joseph J. Wolf, rapporteur; former member, U.S. delegation to NATO.

Theodore C. Achilles, vice-chairman, Atlantic Council; CFR; former counselor to State Department.

Robert R. Bowie, see ESECS box.

Richard Burt, CFR; left working group to direct office of politico-military affairs, State Department.

Arthur Cyr, vice-president and program director, Chicago CFR.

Robert F. Ellsworth, president, Robert Ellsworth and Company; former deputy secretary of defense.

Andrew J. Goodpaster, see ESECS box.

Lincoln Gordon, CFR; former assistant secretary of state; left working group to join senior review panel, CIA.

Joseph W. Harned, deputy director-general, Atlantic Council.

William G. Hyland, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; CFR.

Lane Kirkland, president, AFL-CIO; CFR; Trilateral Commission.

Lyman L. Lemnitzer, CFR; former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Jay Lovestone, consultant on national affairs, AFL-CIO and ILGWU; CFR.

Robert McFarlane, former special assistant to the President for national security affairs; left working group to be special counselor, State Department.

George McGhee, CFR; former undersecretary of state; ambassador to West Germany.

Henry Nau, left working group to join National Security Council.

Paul H. Nitze, CFR; former secretary of the navy; left working group to become special arms control negotiator, Europe.

Jeffrey Record, senior fellow, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

Eugene V. Rostow, former undersecretary of state; CFR; left working group to become director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

George M. Seignious, II, former deputy assistant secretary of defense; and former director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, guest scholar, Brookings Institution; CFR; former counselor, State Department.

Robert Strausz-Hupe, ambassador to Turkey; CFR; former ambassador to NATO.

From the Atlantic Council study

The following are excerpts from the concluding section of the Atlantic Council policy paper The Credibility of the NATO Deterrent, issued early in 1982.

Conclusions

First, the security of the allies can be endangered by events outside the NATO area just as much as by the threat in Europe, and by political warfare, whether at home or abroad, just as much as by the military threat. The defensive measures of the allies, whether within or without the alliance, must be equally ecumenical.

Soviet military strength cannot be permitted to dominate any friendly region, whether in Europe, Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East. The armed forces of the free world should be able to deter and check Soviet attempts to subjugate free peoples by fear or force, whether the threat be direct or indirect.

The allies should equally be able to help cope with the use of militant surrogates of the Soviets to subvert or overthrow governments friendly to the West without getting bogged down in another Vietnam. . . .

Second, the United States must, by its actions and attitudes, reassume the global responsibilities of leadership among the free world nations that cannot otherwise be fulfilled. The response of the European allies thereto is equally indispensable for the continued confidence and strength of the alliance. . . .

There is no reason why the European allies, particularly those which are now as well off as the United States, should not hold themselves to the same high standard of increased defense effort. . . .

The public support necessary for a common defense effort still depends on alliance-wide devotion to the concepts of self-help and mutual aid. If it exists, all other differences can be dealt with satisfactorily. Without it, the alliance will falter.

Third, deficiencies in conventional strength in a time when the West no longer has nuclear superiority must not be allowed to dangerously affect the credibility of the NATO deterrent strategy. . . .

Fourth, the reservoir of military reservists in Europe

should be tapped, first to provide a reserve for Allied Forces Central Europe and thus compensate for U.S. forces presently allocated to NATO, which may be required to protect the interests of allied nations outside the NATO area, and subsequently to further strengthen the conventional capability of the alliance. . . .

Fifth, the allies must be increasingly conscious of the risks of disagreements among themselves and together find ways to keep such differences to manageable proportions, recognizing that without political harmony there can be no common defense. . . .

Sixth, allied cohesion, and the political will to contribute separately and jointly to the common defense, depends upon public understanding of the issues. . . .

Recommendations

The nations of the Atlantic alliance . . . should equally improve their means of defense, and jointly consider the following proposals:

1) Expand military capability so that challenges outside the NATO area can be met without affecting the credibility of the NATO deterrent.

2) Compensate for the contingent need to use perhaps two to three American divisions now earmarked for NATO in other areas by drawing on the reservoir of readily available European reservists and civilian resources to form equivalent replacement units.

3) Provide the means to establish the readiness of NATO's conventional forces by providing the equipment, manpower, and training now in seriously short supply, as noted in this study.

4) Increasingly accord to the role of conventional forces the priority required of them as the result of the passing of the period of Western nuclear superiority.

5) Proceed to deploy modern long-range theater nuclear weapons while continuing to seek satisfactory arms limitation agreements.

6) Be willing to join our allies in pressing for arms-control agreements which will enhance stability, particularly confidence-building measures.

7) In the longer term, increase the conventional-force level by organizing trained European manpower into additional reserve units.

8) Continue support for and the ability to reinforce the countries of the northern and southern flanks: particularly the political, economic, and military assistance needed by Turkey to play its full role in the alliance.

9) Seek to continually adjust the burdens of global defense so that nations which benefit from efforts in the common cause share more equally in the burdens thereof.

10) Make a major effort to break through the resistance to developing a more economic use of the defense production resources of the alliance as a whole.

Taylor: 'NATO thinks demographically'

This interview with former U.S. commander of forces in Vietnam Gen. Maxwell Taylor was made available to EIR last year, and printed in full in our April 14, 1981 issue. In it, General Taylor elaborates the importance of NATO for implementation of population-reduction policies in the Third World.

Q: Is your paper ["World Population Growth and U.S. Security Interests"] intended for circulation within the new administration?

A: It was written as a strategic document. You should note that my report is already quite selective about what can be saved. I have already written off more than a billion people. These people are in places in Africa, Asia, Latin America. We can't save them. The population crisis and the food-supply question dictate that we should not even try. It is a waste of time. The Soviets are not about to save them, either.

There will be horrible consequences for our failure to heed the warnings of General Draper and others. These people will suffer from continuous cycles of natural disaster, famine, hunger, floods, drought. Upwards of 500 million people will try to escape, become refugees, flee across borders. Most of them will never make it. Some old fools and young ones may talk of trying to mount a noble effort to help these people, and I am sure we will try to do the humanitarian thing. But they can't be saved, and we must be selective.

Q: You mean that we should focus relief efforts on the countries you list.

A: We cannot even save all the strategic countries. We don't have the resources. The Soviets will make things very costly by stirring up trouble. What we must do is make some difficult choices. If we can get oil from places like Mexico, then we can write off Nigeria.

The demographics dictate that there will be breakdown crises in these countries. The Soviets may pick up a few, but they won't be able to keep them alive, either. They can't afford too many Cubas; it drains their resources. . . . They really don't look at the demographics

any differently than we do. It is just that they don't have to worry about what their population thinks about difficult political decisions, ones that write off millions of people. There is not enough food or capital to save everybody. To save a few, it will take hundreds of billions of dollars. Each will have to reduce population growth rates, and population where necessary.

Q: Do you have a sense of whether Bill Draper would take the General's views into account in running the Eximbank?

A: It's an excellent thing that the boy is going to take it over. I've known him for years; he's a good boy, just like his father. But he won't be able to do much at the bank. What does he have to work with—a couple of billion dollars? He can do some seed work, not much else. It's going to take all the money in Europe and all the petrodollars to make even a credible effort at saving a few countries; the boy knows that.

"There are only two ways of preventing a world with 10 billion inhabitants. Either the birth rate drops or the death rate will rise. There are, of course, many ways to make the death rate increase. In the thermo-nuclear age, war can take care of this very quickly and in a definitive way. Famine and disease are the two oldest."

—Robert Strange McNamara, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, former President of the World Bank

Q: How is population policy shaping up elsewhere in Washington?

A: There is no real population crisis response mechanism in the U.S. government. Ideally, the National Security Council would become a National Policy Council and expand its function to implement population policy. For now, decisions will be made through the NATO command, which thinks demographically. Their decisions must be imposed with the full weight of the West. The Soviets are aware of this; they will conduct limited surrogate warfare for certain areas. They will not fight a world war over areas of the world they don't need. These are the rules of the modern game.

Q: Were you personally close to General Draper?

A: Yes, I admired him very much. He was wonderful person. I heard my first lecture on the population explosion at the Army War College in 1940. . . . MacArthur never really understood this. He was really wrong.

At this point in human history, a population-induced catastrophe is unavoidable. We must plan for it. We started to deal with the population problem far too late to spend more wasted time. . . .

ESECS: 'We will shape NATO debate'

The following are excerpts from a Feb. 12 interview with Carroll Wilson, director of the European Security Study group, which was made available to EIR:

Q: What are the basic premises of the study?

A: Our major goal is to design a functional military doctrine for NATO in the context of the changed economic and political situation of the 1980s. For the first time, the potential exists for the creation of a conventional NATO deterrent force. I am talking about the idea that conventional forces are the principal deterrent to war, not nuclear forces. I think that we have to accept that there is a continuing depression in the Western economies and that this downturn will last well into the decade. The other factor is the growth of political opposition to the idea that Europe might become a nuclear battlefield. This makes the deployment of any new nuclear weapons systems highly problematic.

Q: You mentioned growing economic problems. . . .

A: Yes, and what that means is that we must make choices. We need a policy that is both affordable and doable. The time has come to reverse our outdated reliance on nuclear forces, and to look at the kind of cheap, affordable conventional weapons systems that can do the job for the alliance. The doctrines of the 1970s will not work in the 1980s and that means that real deterrence must not depend on nuclear forces.

Q: You seem to be talking about restructuring the NATO command as well.

A: Absolutely. We are examining in the study a 1,400-mile-long front that is the joint responsibility of several nations. We are looking at the changing character of that front-line deployment, and that implies that we will change the character of the command structure as well. We are evolving towards the Europeans taking more responsibility for their own defense, and that means that they must be willing to make a greater contribution as well. Our study will be making specific recommendations.

Q: Would you say that your arguments for conventional readiness are similar to those of Gen. Gert Bastien, one of the theoreticians of the peace movement, who argues against the emplacement of Euromissiles and for an improved conventional deterrent?

A: I find it a positive development that the leaders of the peace movement support such an idea. The fact that they are thinking about such things is not at all bad. It is their arguments for unilateral disarmament that are crazy. And here we disagree strongly. The Soviets cannot be allowed to maintain any advantage in Europe, so we must improve our conventional forces. It is not a one-for-one match-up that is required, but we have a long way to go to make a conventional deterrent credible so that nuclear weapons are really a last resort.

Q: What do you think of U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger's program?

A: I do not want to comment on a specific program, because I am the director of the study. When we release our papers and reports, you'll know where we stand. Look, we are a bunch of private citizens from four countries who think that we need a new, fresh examination of defense policies. If there wasn't something really rotten about our defense thinking now, my friends and I wouldn't be working so hard on this study. The present policies are no good.

Q: Do you think that the NATO decision to deploy the so-called Euromissiles will be carried out?

A: I don't know that it is politically feasible anymore. But I am convinced that their deployment, were it to take place, would not be sufficient to make NATO viable. I am saying that we have to look at the idea that nuclear deterrents in Europe may break down. Our goal is not to make nuclear weapons the first line of defense, which they are now, but the last. Therefore, you need a conventional build-up of forces, in a ready condition, that becomes a real deterrence.

Q: What is the study's schedule?

A: Late this fall, we will be issuing a series of papers, which may be published as a book. These will be preliminary to our final report, to be issued in January 1984. In the interim, we will hold private workshops on various issues. These will develop the substance of our proposals. By the time the final report is released in 1984, we'll be right in the center of major election campaigns in the United States, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany, and that is exactly where we want to be. We want our report to become an election issue, and I can guarantee that it will. We feel that we will help shape the debate on NATO, as we discuss our proposals over the next two years, and when we issue our report.

‘NATO will trample on nation-states’

The following are excerpts from a mid-March interview with a former NATO official and current member of the Atlantic Council study group on defense posture, made available to EIR.

Q: What do you think of recent proposals for an increased reliance by NATO on conventional defense, and the creation of some variant of the European Defense Community idea within NATO?

A: It is our thinking that there has been a wrongly placed over-emphasis on nuclear and battlefield nuclear. I think that we have a wonderful opportunity to move on these issues now. The peace movement is a real boon to what we want to accomplish. It has raised people’s consciousness about the nuclear issues. Ironically, many of their leaders are not unwilling to support—albeit tacitly in some cases—the idea that we are pushing that improvement of conventional defenses raises the nuclear threshold.

Q: What about [Carter administration arms control negotiator] Paul Warnke’s recent statement that there really is no nuclear umbrella over Europe?

A: He is right. There really hasn’t been one for some time. No American President would respond to a non-nuclear attack with nuclear weapons launched from the United States. That was Schmidt’s reasoning on the Pershing and cruise deployment, but it is clear that for a nuclear umbrella to really be in place, there must be an unequivocal willingness to use nuclear weapons and that is not the case now.

Q: Do you see this as the lawful evolution of NATO doctrine?

A: Absolutely. Few people understand the significance of the original NATO treaty. It marked an end to the idea that the United States alone could deter wars with its own forces and its own nuclear arsenal. There were many who said “let Europe take care of itself.” But with

the help of our British allies, we reversed isolationist opinion in the United States and committed ourselves to a defense of Europe.

But even in the beginning, we had received notice with Korea the conflict would not be confined to Europe alone. Now we have reached the conclusion, and say so in this study, that we no longer feel that a Soviet attack on West Europe is likely. The risk is too great. The greater threat is political and economic subversion—and that cannot be deterred by military means. Now the NATO allies must look at the map of the world and recognize realistically where the threats are—and they are outside of the NATO theater. In this type of situation, our most realistic defense posture is a credible conventional defense that means that the Soviets would not be able to blackmail Europe, that they would not be able to occupy it easily.

Q: How would NATO be made credible?

A: The most important question to look at is the question of out-of-area deployment and how the developing sector “theater of conflict” will be managed. It is foolhardy to think that NATO as a whole could deploy into an area like the Persian Gulf or East Africa. It is utopian to think that 15 parliaments could agree on a single line of policy in a case where a member of the alliance did not come under direct attack in Europe by a Warsaw Pact member. That being the case, you examine the capacity to respond. There are three NATO members with such capabilities, in varying degrees of readiness—France, Britain, and the United States. What happens is that these three NATO countries agree, informally, to coordinate policy to respond to crises. Then quiet arrangements are made by other NATO allies to pick up a burden of responsibilities that might have to be shifted from the NATO theater to deal with such contingencies.

I can tell you that this is already in process. The State Department is fully agreed on this idea of an informal British-American-French directorate as the center of NATO. This group will deal with primarily developing-sector conflict and will divide responsibilities, again, informally. For example, the French could easily handle parts of Africa, the British will be of help in the Mideast and the Gulf. I’m not talking about multilateral force, but less formal operational arrangements and policy coordination. You have to keep these arrangements quiet. After all, what we are talking about is doing things in some areas of the developing sector that will trample all over certain sovereign nations. You don’t want such things debated out in the open. You just do it, quickly and quietly.

Q: How does this concept relate to the European Defense Community proposals and other ideas?

A: The EDC or some arrangement like it is a natural evolution within the framework of a reoriented NATO. When it was tried out before and rejected, Western Europe was incapable of standing on its own without the U.S. nuclear umbrella. While I am not saying that we would remove the umbrella, Western Europe is now capable of contributing much more to its own defense.

Q: What is your thinking on the talk of Europe becoming a "Third Force"?

A: It won't happen. There is no real sentiment for it in Europe. They don't want to go neutral. The most likely outcome will be a realigned NATO along the lines I have described, a conventional-based EDC component, under NATO command, backed by a U.S. umbrella should it be hit by Soviet nuclear weapons, with U.S. troops still present, though perhaps eventually reduced in numbers.

The NATO allies will tacitly agree that those members who can—France, the U.S.A. and Britain—will deal with crises outside of Europe. . . . We have a good argument and the peace movement is not really opposed to it.

Q: Aren't the Soviets trying to make things more difficult for NATO in Europe?

A: The Soviets think they're smart building up the peace movement. But what is coming is a reaction to the peace movement, and that reaction will place "law and order"—right wing, if you will—pro-NATO governments in power. Europe will also be significantly realigned over the course of the next 20 months, and these new governments are the ones that will carry out our policy. Look at Italy: topple the present government and you get Craxi. In Germany, Schmidt will fall and that is for certain. If he falls, you get a Christian Democratic Union-Free Democratic Party coalition, more pro-NATO and so forth. I am not saying that all these new governments will be "right-wing" in the traditional sense. You'll have things like Craxi, who is the right wing of a left-wing party. But you won't have people like Schmidt who try to straddle the middle. Europe will be polarized and that is always a good time to introduce a new policy.

Q: How do you plan to promote the Atlantic Council's proposal?

A: Some people urged that we call a NATO ministerial meeting and lay everything out quickly. We said no. Communiqués from such meetings don't mean anything. We want implementation. The way to get it is to surround policy makers with these ideas, all ready for implementation. Then you wait for a crisis to develop, for changes in governments and cabinets and you push these ideas out into the open. But first, you get everyone debating strategy and doctrine. That is how we are proceeding, and with a little luck, we'll make it.

Interviews

'Falklands a model for new NATO push'

According to U.S. defense analysts, the Malvinas/Falkland Islands crisis is the first example of the increasing need for NATO readiness to intervene into the Third World. Excerpts from recent interviews made available to EIR follow.

'Crisis strengthens RDF concept'

A prominent defense analyst with close ties to NATO's civilian command, April 6, 1982.

Q: Doesn't the Argentinian-British showdown raise questions for NATO as a whole?

A: This will force Britain to wake up and start getting its military straight. It is not a superpower and never can be, but it can't be bullied around by two-bit Latin dictatorships either. It needs to be able to project force into the developing sector. That's the point. You need something to deal with the new theater—the developing sector—without abandoning Europe completely. This requires Europe to pick up more. To make things work, you need informal arrangements between the British, the French, and the Americans, with the Americans in the center. These are the powers that can project out of area. This crisis is like an exercise, even if it may get out of hand.

Q: This will have some impact on the defense debate here.

A: Or what passes for one right now. In a sense it strengthens both types of Rapid Deployment Force ideas—the sea-based one and the air-lift capacity. You can't have it taking three weeks to get somewhere. But as long as you have an airlift capacity for where it is appropriate, it's not so bad to have some time to set up negotiated deals while you sail onto the scene. But it shouldn't take us as long as it's taking the British.

'Fighting will be in developing sector'

A Heritage Foundation-linked military analyst, April 6, 1982.

Q: How do you estimate the impact of the Falkland Islands crisis?

A: Regardless of how it is settled, the real victor is the

doctrine that says you need to be able to inject conventional forces into the developing sector and actually be able to fight there. Strategic forces are no good at all in these situations, and that is a real shocker to some people who think that strategic forces can solve everything. So if choices are being made, I say get your conventional forces ready and make sure they can be deployed in the right configuration, not anchored in Europe. The idea of sea-based land power, supported by sea-based air power, is what we need to get ready for the battles of the next decades.

'This is the first battle of the new era'

A defense analyst involved with the Atlantic Council study on Western defense in the 1980s, and former adviser to leading Congressmen on military affairs, April 6, 1982.

Q: What effect will the Falklands crisis have on British military doctrine and NATO policy?

A: I'm not saying that Britain is going back to the days of its colonial empire. But they are going to be credible and they are going back to basics, so to speak, on the naval doctrine they developed. That is the key—the sea-based projection of military force into the developing sector, with sea-based troop-marine capabilities, augmented by U.S. airlift capabilities. We are looking at the first battle of the new era—whether it comes to actual fire or not. This is a confrontation in the military theater of the next several decades—the developing sector. It is better than a war in the Gulf, since it demonstrates greater logistical problems. Carrington boasted that you didn't need the British Navy any more, that all you needed was a few Trident submarines to have a credible nuclear deterrent. Garbage. To be real nowadays, you need the ability to project conventional forces into remote regions.

Q: Does the crisis create problems for the British-American relationship?

A: Yes. I know of a meeting that took place recently between senior British and U.S. military officials to discuss the idea of coordinating NATO out-of-area deployments through a new type of directorate. The conclusion was reached that the Carrington-influenced doctrine that consigned the British Navy to oblivion stood in the way of really implementing anything. . . . So these military people said the best thing that could happen was for Carrington to get canned.

Q: What impact will the crisis have on the domestic defense debate?

A: It will make the case for sea-based projection capabilities. It will strengthen—within limits—the arguments of those who say that we need carrier task forces capable of injecting troops into the developing sector.

LaRouche outlines counterplan for NATO restructuring

In response to continuing British blackmail against President Ronald Reagan, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., proposed on April 16 to call the British bluff. LaRouche, a probable candidate for the 1984 presidential nomination of the Democratic Party, today proposed a sweeping reorganization of NATO and of related features of the United States' transatlantic military treaty organizations.

"Despite the noisy tradition of Benedict Arnold currently visible within parts of the executive branch and Congress," LaRouche stated, "the Monroe Doctrine is the current law of the United States. The Senate has ratified the Havana Treaty of 1940, the Chapultepec Treaty of 1945, and the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of 1947. Therefore, by law, Britain is embarked upon an act of war against the United States.

"Against this fact," LaRouche continued, "The British and their agents of influence have circulated two blackmail documents against United States' enforcement of its own law, the Monroe Doctrine. The chief point of blackmail by the Ayatollah Thatcher government's friends is the threat that Britain will pull out of NATO. The second point of blackmail is financial; not only does London threaten to collapse the U.S. dollar, but the argument is made that the United States is so poor, and its Congress so craven that it could not defend itself adequately without the aid of the formerly-industrialized nation known as Britain.

"It is time to call the British bluff on both counts. Therefore, I outline a proposed sweeping reorganization of NATO. I also identify, once again, the means at the disposal of the President and Congress for organizing an economic boom in the United States," the former 1980 Democratic candidate continued.

Two key measures

The kernel of LaRouche's proposal for reorganization of NATO is twofold: strip away the civilian apparatus associated with Joseph Luns and his cronies, and