

U.S. and Soviets begin disarmament negotiations: the questions at stake

by Criton Zoakos, Editor-in-Chief

The Geneva arms-control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union which began at the end of November are taking place in very fragile circumstances, and represent perhaps the world's proverbial last chance before an uncontrollable plunge into a period of military conflicts, strategic showdowns and unbridled arms competition.

That these talks are taking place at all is a tribute to the sense of responsibility and peaceful commitments of primarily three individuals: Chancellor Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany, President Reagan of the United States, and President Brezhnev of the Soviet Union. To a large extent, these heads of government have worked over many months toward the purpose of getting the Geneva talks off the ground, over the objections of powerful opposition raised by both political factions and bureaucratic cliques within their respective nations.

Contrary to widespread lies published in the major American newspapers, the Geneva negotiations which started Nov. 29 were made possible by many months of secret personal diplomacy conducted between Presidents Reagan and Brezhnev with the mediation of Chancellor Schmidt. This "secret diplomacy" apparently started very early in the Reagan administration, perhaps after the President's first meeting with the Chancellor during the transition period. During the months which followed that initial meeting, Secretary of State Alexander Haig maintained an obsessive effort to impose exclusive personal control over all U.S.-U.S.S.R. contacts, official and unofficial, diplomatic and otherwise.

The President's own personal channel of communication with Mr. Brezhnev, mediated through Chancellor Schmidt, apparently was the most important U.S.-Soviet liaison which eluded the watchful secretary's vigil.

Although Secretary Haig himself was also formally committed to starting the Geneva negotiations, he jealously insisted on controlling the negotiating process, because he desires to obtain from them a different set of policy results than the President does. The secretary's objectives have been in jeopardy ever since the Senate voted in favor of selling AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia.

Within days after that historic vote, President Reagan, in a remarkable press conference, announced his proposal to cancel the scheduled deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe if the Soviet Union agrees to withdraw its own, already-deployed SS-20s.

A few days later, on Nov. 22, President Brezhnev paid a three-day visit to Bonn, West Germany, and subsequently, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. talks in Geneva started promptly at the pre-scheduled date. They are expected to be exceptionally protracted, and their ultimate outcome is viewed generally as doubtful.

That outcome will depend on the political fortunes of the three protagonists who made the talks possible. Reagan, Schmidt, and Brezhnev are all facing enormous political problems at home. If the political fortunes of any one of the three suffers a serious reversal, the fragile peace process will disintegrate.

This delicate situation was best portrayed by a speech Chancellor Schmidt gave before the German Federal Parliament on Dec. 2. There are three distinct "philosophies of military security," Schmidt emphasized in referring to the various factions involved in the strategic debate, both East and West: first there is the tendency which argues that peace can be secured only if one's own side attains military superiority; second, there are those who argue that only unilateral disarmament of one's own side will secure peace; third, there is the view that the maintenance of military equilibrium between the two sides is a necessary precondition for establishing the political trust required for the maintenance of world peace.

Schmidt, who identifies his efforts with this third "philosophy of military security," proposed the establishment of a "*politische Sicherheitspartnerschaft*," a political security partnership, between East and West for the purpose of maintaining world peace. He thus came very close to proposing a political *factional* alliance across the East-West boundary.

Chancellor Schmidt is continuously confronted with the threat of being toppled by fanatics from the so-called peace-movement within his own party and within his coalition government. The controllers of that peace

movement are primarily interested not in "peace" per se, but rather in toppling Schmidt in order to destroy the tenuous Reagan-Schmidt-Brezhnev connection. Once this connection is broken, then the disarmament negotiations will fall in the hands of the one-worldist systems-analysis crowd associated with the British Secret Intelligence Service and Lord Carrington's diplomatic deployments. Under the control of this faction, the disarmament negotiations would either collapse and open the way for an unbridled arms competition involving a protracted massive waste of economic resources, or in the SALT III type of technology-control agreement designed to foster a "post-industrial society" political faction in the Soviet Union.

Soviet President Brezhnev is facing a domestic political situation equally as uncertain as that threatening Helmut Schmidt. Brezhnev's most formidable opponents are in the Suslov-Ponomarev configuration of the Politburo, i.e., the "one-worldist" Marxist-Leninist ideological priesthood whose historical pedigree goes back to an era in Soviet history dominated by such British-Venetian intelligence assets as Karl Radek, Trotsky, and Bukharin. This faction, through its "systems analysis" cult institutions, is in close contact with both British intelligence and certain NATO intelligence centers through which the old European "black" nobility is working out its "one-worldist" scenarios (e.g., the Club of Rome, International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis, and the "Libyan" connection).

A second faction within the Soviet Politburo challenging President Brezhnev's efforts is that which is associated with the military establishment. Their attitude basically is: we are willing to give a pro forma chance to the peace negotiations but a) the United States government is too unstable and too war-provocative to be trusted and b) we shall be watching the world map to see what happens in the hot spots, the Middle East, Caribbean, Angola, Southwest Africa, and so forth, more than we watch the speeches at Geneva.

Both these Soviet factions tend to collaborate in pouring all sorts of resources into the West European and especially the West German "peace movement," along with Lord Carrington's and Willy Brandt's Socialist International and, ironically, along with Israeli intelligence. If that "peace movement" succeeds in toppling Helmut Schmidt the "fears" and "preconditions" of both the Suslov-Ponomarev and the military factions will have turned into self-fulfilling prophecies. If so, the Brezhnev faction's chances of dominating the leadership succession process in Moscow will be reduced to virtually nil. This leaves the leaders of the Soviet military "hawks" with a serious problem on their hands: if the leadership succession issues are reduced to a simple confrontation between the military and the Suslovian/systems analysis

crowd, the military are going to be at a severe disadvantage. Without an alliance between themselves and the political forces represented in the "Brezhnev-Grishin" configuration, it will be difficult to prevent the Soviet allies of the Club of Rome from imposing a SALT III-like limitation on technological growth.

A similar problematic factional lineup existed in the Soviet Union when Nikolai Bukharin tried to impose his anti-industrial "agrarian socialism" model. The Bukharin case is linked with issues very much alive today in Soviet politics. Bukharin anti-technology wrecking-operations were defeated by means of Stalin's purges. The issue of those purges was critical in Khrushchev's rise to power and it thus touches on the arrangements which brought into existence the post-Cuban Missile Crisis arrangement among factions which has ruled the U.S.S.R. from 1963-64 to date. That arrangement is apparently about to be replaced in a way that will be closely associated with the Geneva disarmament negotiations.

From the official Bonn communiqué

... Helmut Schmidt and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev stressed the great importance of political dialogue between states, influencing relations between them, especially in the present international situation. They believe such a dialogue must fulfill the task incumbent on all states of overcoming the pressing problems of the present day. They consider it important that both states contribute, in accordance with their responsibility, to a positive and stable development of the international situation and to securing a lasting peace.

Mindful that such a policy plays an important role in the concrete shaping of bilateral relations in various fields, both sides will continue efforts to develop economic relations of mutual interest consistently on the basis of existing treaties, especially the long-term treaty of May 6, 1978, and the long-term program of July 1, 1980.

They thereby assume that a good development of economic relations, in accordance with mutual interests, has positive effects on their overall relations and can make a contribution to international stability and the reinforcement of peace.

They welcome the agreements reached by companies, banks and organizations on both sides about the delivery of Soviet natural gas to the Federal Republic of Germany and other West European countries and of pipe and pipeline equipment to the Soviet Union. . . .

In the course of the talks, Helmut Schmidt and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev paid particular attention to the questions of security, arms control and disarmament. They believe it necessary to contribute through concrete negotiations to a stable parity of power at the lowest possible level.

They expressed their satisfaction that the negotiations agreed on Sept. 23, 1981 between the United States of America and the Soviet Union are to start in Geneva on Nov. 30. Both sides set out their respective views of the related problems, on which differences of opinion between them exist. They take the view that the creation of balance at the lowest possible level, in the field of weapons which will be the subject of the talks, is of great importance for consolidating stability and international security, and that all efforts must be made to reach a corresponding agreement. . . .

Helmut Schmidt and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev stressed that crisis and conflict in various parts of the world not

only concern the affected states, but can also have negative effects on the whole international situation.

They consider it particularly important in the present situation that all states, taking into account their responsibility for the maintenance of peace and for proper restraint in their mutual relations, concentrate their efforts on the removal of existing sources of tension and the prevention of new situations of conflict. The only reliable and sensible means for this is the achievement of necessary political solutions.

They set out frankly their respective views of the situation in Asia, Africa and Latin America, where development has considerable significance from the view point of international security. They came out in support of a solution of the existing problems by peaceful means that would enable the people of these regions to concentrate their efforts on realizing the task of their economic and social development.

They are convinced that in the present world situation contacts between the leading statesmen in West and East are particularly important. They called for a continuation of the dialogue and of the contacts between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union at the highest and other levels. . . .

What Schmidt and Brezhnev said

The official West German press spokesman, Kurt Becker, told the press on Nov. 23 that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in his meetings with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, had stressed that because Germany has had to live with the threat of Soviet missiles for years, it also has understanding for the Soviet concern over the new missiles scheduled to be deployed in Western Europe. "If you really want to prevent the stationing of new weapons on our side," Schmidt reportedly told Brezhnev, "you should reduce armaments on your side in order to make stationing of new weapons in the West unnecessary." Schmidt, according to Becker, stressed too that the issue of medium range missiles should have been discussed "long ago at the SALT level," and that at the upcoming Geneva negotiations the French and British missiles should be included in the negotiations. Becker also reported that Schmidt told the Soviet President that: "I never believed you, Mr. Brezhnev, would ever try to push the nuclear button, but the existence of your missiles is a means of exerting possible pressure. . . . You must withdraw all those missiles which are targeted against Europe."

Schmidt continued: "I want to stress that our two nations should consider themselves to be in a kind of peace partnership. . . . Our two nations were hit most by the last war. . . . Therefore our commitment is never to let it happen again. . . . We know from three personal meetings with you, Mr. Brezhnev, since 1978 that you are as much committed to peace as I am, or as Mr. Reagan, the President of the United States, is. You know me and know, therefore, that I have always told you the truth. I know that Mr. Reagan wants talks, and wants substantial disarmament on the missiles problem. I have personally never had any doubt that you are no war-monger. But Mr. Reagan is not a war-monger either. . . ."

Leonid Brezhnev was reported by spokesman Zamyatin to have responded in the following way: ". . . We know the American position quite well. The new weapons are a significant shift in strategic terms, they can reach Soviet territory from Western Europe while our SS-20s cannot reach U.S. territory. . . . Be aware that only some minutes might decide, if the new weapons are stationed, on the fate of the European continent. . . . We do not want war, we want peace. We approve the U.S. commitment to enter negotiations with us because this has been a longstanding proposal of the U.S.S.R."